FSI scholars produce research aimed at creating a safer world and examing the consequences of security policies on institutions and society. They look at longstanding issues including nuclear nonproliferation and the conflicts between countries like North and South Korea. But their research also examines new and emerging areas that transcend traditional borders – the drug war in Mexico and expanding terrorism networks. FSI researchers look at the changing methods of warfare with a focus on biosecurity and nuclear risk. They tackle cybersecurity with an eye toward privacy concerns and explore the implications of new actors like hackers.
Along with the changing face of conflict, terrorism and crime, FSI researchers study food security. They tackle the global problems of hunger, poverty and environmental degradation by generating knowledge and policy-relevant solutions.
Through research and track-two diplomacy, CISAC scholars seek to identify policy oriented, cooperative measures aimed at fostering effective dialogue between Pakistan and India in an effort to enhance nuclear safety and security in the region.
Until recently, analysts of civil war focused their attention on the negotiation of peace agreements and paid scant attention to the implementation process. Rather legalistically, they assumed that a contract between state and insurgent leaders would remain binding in the post-agreement phase. In the 1980s and 1990s, however, negotiated agreements in such countries as Angola, Cambodia, Liberia, and Rwanda collapsed and resulted in new deadly violence. In some cases more blood was shed after the failure to implement a peace accord than before the peace negotiations began.
Under the leadership of CISAC Consulting Professor George Bunn and Fritz Steinhausler (University of Salzburg), a visiting professor at CISAC and IIS, the European Forum and CISAC co-sponsored workshops on the legal and illegal transport and diversion of hazardous materials, and US and EU policy responses to security threats. Bunn and Steinhausler also conducted a CISAC project to strengthen global practices for protecting nuclear material against theft and sabotage.
The United States has a global security strategy, in deeds if seldom clearly in words. The U.S. security strategy is to enlarge the areas of the world that it can control militarily and to weaken all states outside those areas. The strategy does not rely solely on military means, but enlarged military control is the end and military means--armed interventions, alliance extensions, arms sales--usually lead the way. Aside from a 1992 Pentagon trial balloon, which was poorly received though accurate enough as far as it went, and a few other statements, the strategy has been manifested via a series of consistent actions rather than formal statements.
Along with this overall strategy, the United States also has policies regarding nuclear weapons. Some of these policies are stated, some are tacit. The stated policies include de-emphasizing nuclear weapons, discouraging nuclear proliferation, and pursuing nuclear arms reductions, a comprehensive test ban, and other nuclear-arms-control measures. The tacit policy is reliance on deterrent nuclear forces to limit escalation of conventional conflicts and to offset the nuclear forces of other powers.
These two policies, military enlargement and reliance on nuclear stability and arms control, are not compatible. Continued enlargement backed or led by military force will not support de-emphasis of nuclear weapons, let alone nuclear disarmament. It may not support nuclear nonproliferation even among allies, depending on whether the United States is seen to become overextended or overcommitted at home or abroad. Military enlargement weakens support for several of the arms-control measures on the U.S. agenda. Enlargement is also likely to lead to crises that will test the stability of nuclear deterrence more seriously than it has been tested since the early years of the Cold War.
In this paper I first remind the reader of the main components of the U.S. military enlargement strategy. Next I describe why other states, given the U.S. enlargement strategy, find and will continue to find nuclear weapons useful. These states are not all potential opponents. Third, I explain how the U.S. enlargement strategy undermines nuclear arms control. What is more important, I show why it will inevitably lead to nuclear crises. Last, I discuss the alternative strategy of military restraint and show how it would ensure U.S. influence for a longer time and with greater safety than the present strategy of unilateral U.S. military enlargement.
Ethnic conflicts in the former Soviet Union, and their potential for triggering serious interstate conflicts, pose a major threat to regional and international security in the years ahead. Even as the dissolution of the Soviet Union diminished the threat of nuclear and conventional warfare on which the postwar alliance system rested, the disruptive consequences of the major political, economic and social transformations sweeping the region have created a variety of new threats to regional security.
The Project on Peace and Cooperation in the Asian-Pacific Region has been a cornerstone of research at the Center for International Security and Cooperation for three decades. It supports initiatives on security cooperation and tension reduction in the Asia-Pacific region with special emphasis on China and Korea. Currently, it focuses on Asian nuclear issues and Northeast Asia regional peace issues.
As part of a response to growing government concern over the threat of cyber attacks directed against critical national infrastructures, the National Security Agency (NSA) contracted with Stanford University in 1998 to undertake a multi-track program to provide a forum, develop information, and to analyze options for addressing this threat.
Scholars analyze the capacity of international organizations to address transnational issues such as security, pandemics and environmental change. Researchers also are involved in work aimed at revitalizing international organizations to make them more effective and responsive to evolving challenges in a globalized world.
The nuclear cities have been isolated for security reasons for many decades, and this has also resulted in economic isolation. Their sole output has been research, materials, and hardware for nuclear weapons. As Russian government funding for these activities decreases, it is strongly in the interest of the United States to find productive civilian activities for the weapon scientists and technicians to discourage proliferation to aspiring nuclear weapon states. The best chance of doing this in a sustainable fashion is to help build the civilian economies of these isolated cities.
The program explores the applicability of international policy instruments, such as the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) sanctioned at Kyoto in 1997, to decisions regarding and prospects for energy sector modernization in provinces of China. Much of the cheapest ways to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions is to take advantage of low-cost opportunities for reductions wherever they arise in the world. Nevertheless, there is much uncertainty as to whether the CDM is the most practical and reliable way to ensure GHG reductions in developing countries.
