The web of measures that comprise the nuclear non-proliferation regime continues to hold at bay the "nuclear-armed crowd" that was part of President John F. Kennedy's alarming vision in 1963. The number of nuclear weapons states in 2004 stands at only eight or nine, and assertive steps may yet keep this number from growing. The proliferation of biological weapons, however, is quite another matter. Biotechnological capacity is increasing and spreading rapidly. This trend seems unstoppable, since the economic, medical, and food-security benefits of genetic manipulation appear so great. As a consequence, thresholds for the artificial enhancement or creation of dangerous pathogens--disease-causing organisms--will steadily drop. Neither Cold War bilateral arms control nor multilateral non-proliferation provide good models for how we are to manage this new challenge. Much more than in the nuclear case, civilization will have to cope with, rather than shape, its biological future.

The dominant (though contested) wisdom among international relations scholars is that military officers tend to be more cautious than their civilian counterparts about initiating the use of force. Sobered by the experience of combat, the theory holds, soldiers are hesitant to recommend military action except under the most favorable of circumstances. It might be the case, however, that military conservatism is simply a product of strong civilian oversight. Indeed, scholars have suggested that military officers actually have powerful incentives to promote the use of force, but these predilections may be muted when civilian leaders can punish officers for botched military adventures. In this article, the author details a quantitative, competitive test of these propositions, showing that states with strong civilian control are on average less prone to initiate military action than states without it. The results suggest that civilian control should play a central role in future models of conflict initiation.

Herbert L. Abrams is one of 16 committee members who collaborated on this National Academy of Sciences report, known as Biological Effects of Ionizing Radiation VII. BEIR VII develops the most up-to-date and comprehensive risk estimates for cancer and other health effects from exposure to low-level ionizing radiation. It is among the first reports of its kind to include detailed estimates for cancer incidence in addition to cancer mortality. In general, BEIR VII supports previously reported risk estimates for cancer and leukemia, but the availability of new and more extensive data have strengthened confidence in these estimates. A comprehensive review of available biological and biophysical data supports a "linear-no-threshold" (LNT) risk model that the risk of cancer proceeds in a linear fashion at lower doses without a threshold and that the smallest dose has the potential to cause a small increase in risk to humans. The report is from the Board on Radiation Research Effects that is now part of the newly formed Nuclear and Radiation Studies Board.

This volume offers a unique perspective on the discussion of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) by broadening the terms of the debate to include both secular and religious investigations not normally considered. The volume contains a structured dialogue between representatives of the following ethical traditions: Buddhism, Christianity, Confucianism, feminism, Hinduism, Islam, Judaism, liberalism, natural law, pacifism, and realism. There are two introductory chapters on the technical aspects of WMD and international agreements for controlling WMD. A concluding essay compares the different ethical traditions. All the authors address the same set of moral issues and this creates a dialogue both within and across traditions. The debate structure is particularly useful and appealing for pedagogical purposes. The introductory essays on the technical and legal aspects of WMD could easily be used to introduce the subject to students.

This article uses the case of the Cuban Missile Crisis to illustrate the criteria by which victory and defeat are assessed in international crises. The evidence suggests that few objective criteria are actually used in such evaluations. Indeed, examination of the specific terms of crisis settlements can prove to be less important than a range of factors that do not conform to traditional rational actor assumptions. These include: i) prior biases in perception, ii) the experience of the crisis itself and the subsequent way in which it becomes framed, and iii) public opinion management during and after the crisis. This analysis has significant implications for policymakers who have to deal with the aftermath of a crisis, and also for the wider public and media, if governments are to be held accountable for their foreign policy.

Boost-phase ballistic missile defense is alluring because rocket boosters are easy to detect and track, they are relatively vulnerable due to the large axial loads on a missile under powered flight, the entire payload (single or multiple warheads and midcourse penetration aids) may be destroyed in a single shot, and countermeasures to defeat boostphase defense are more difficult to devise than for midcourse ballistic missile defenses. Moreover, if intercepted several seconds before booster burnout, the debris will land well short of the target area, although collateral damage to other territory is a serious concern.

On the other hand, boost-phase ballistic missile defense is technically challenging because the intercept timelines are very short (1-3 minutes for theater-range ballistic missiles and 3-5 minutes for intercontinental range missiles) and missile boosters are accelerating targets, thus complicating the design of homing kinetic-kill vehicles (KKVs). This article examines the technical feasibility and nominal capability of one type of boost-phase defense, namely, airborne boost-phase intercept (ABI). Airborne laser systems are not examined here. This article concludes that ABI should be technically achievable within the next decade and that airborne platforms offer some unique advantages, especially for theater ballistic missile defense, that warrant their serious consideration in future U.S. missile defense architectures.

Whole World on Fire focuses on a technical riddle wrapped in an organizational mystery: How and why, for more than half a century, did the U.S. government fail to predict nuclear fire damage as it drew up plans to fight strategic nuclear war?

US bombing in World War II caused massive fire damage to Hiroshima and Nagasaki, but later war plans took account only of damage from the blast; they completely ignored damage from atomic firestorms. Recently a small group of researchers has shown that for modern nuclear weapons the destructiveness and lethality of mass fire often--and predictably--greatly exceeds that of blast effects. This has major implications for defense policy: the US government has underestimated the damage caused by nuclear weapons, Lynn Eden finds, and built far more warheads, and far more destructive warheads, than it needed for the Pentagon's war-planning purposes.

How could this have happened? The answer lies in how organizations frame the problems they try to solve. In a narrative grounded in organization theory, science and technology studies, and primary historical sources (including declassified documents and interviews), Eden explains how the US Air Force's doctrine of precision bombing led to the development of very good predictions of nuclear blast--a significant achievement--but did not advance organizational knowledge about nuclear fire. Expert communities outside the military reinforced this disparity in organizational capability to predict blast damage but not fire damage. Yet some innovation occurred, and predictions of fire damage were nearly incorporated into nuclear war planning in the early 1990's. The author explains how such a dramatic change almost happened, and why it did not.

Whole World on Fire shows how well-funded and highly professional organizations, by focusing on what they do well and systematically excluding what they don't do well, may build a poor representation of the world--a self-reinforcing fallacy that can have serious consequences. In a sweeping conclusion, Eden shows the implications of this analysis for understanding such things as the sinking of the Titanic, the collapse of the Tacoma Narrows Bridge, and the poor fireproofing in the World Trade Center.

This book won the American Sociological Association's 2004 Robert K. Merton Award for best book in science, knowledge, and technology. It was published in 2005 by Manas Publications in New Delhi, India.

After the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, many scholars, journalists, and public officials expressed fear about the security of nuclear facilities in the United States.

The reaction to this new terrorist threat has been strong and predictable. Emergency efforts began immediately to deploy more security forces to protect U.S. nuclear facilities after the September 11 attacks. Experts testifying to Congress have strongly advocated adding more security guards and patrols at nuclear facilities to prevent nuclear terrorism. The increased threat of nuclear terrorism, it is argued, must be met with a countervailing increase in nuclear security personnel.

There are understandable incentives for organizational leaders to want to devote more resources and more personnel to address dangerous problems when they are seen to develop. From a political perspective, action must be taken after a major disaster, at a minimum, to let insiders and outsiders see that top officials are doing something to prevent a reoccurrence. If the causes of the problem are uncertain, however, the appropriate reaction is unclear. This article analyzes how we should think about nuclear security and the emerging terrorist threats. It presents a warning about the most simple, and most tempting, solution to our new nuclear terrorism problem: to add more security forces to protect power plants, weapons facilities, and nuclear storage sites. The article uncovers the dark side of redundancy by focusing on how efforts to improve nuclear security can inadvertently backfire, increasing the risks they are designed to reduce.

This report describes the results of some calculations on the effectiveness of penetrating nuclear weapons of yield 1 and 10 kilotons against targets containing biological agents. The effectiveness depends in detail on the construction of the bunkers, on how the bio-agents are stored, on the location of the explosions with respect to the bunkers, the bio-agent containers and the surface of the ground, and on the yield of the explosion and the geology of the explosion site. Completeness of sterilization of the bio-agents is crucial in determining effectiveness. For most likely cases, however, complete sterilization cannot be guaranteed. Better calculations and experiments on specific target types would improve the accuracy of such predictions for those targets, but significant uncertainties regarding actual geology, actual target layouts, and knowledge of the position of the explosion with respect to the target would remain. Aboveground effects of the nuclear explosions, all of which would vent to the surface, are estimated. They include intense local radioactivity and significant fallout, air blast, and seismic effects to kilometers distances. It is likely, however, that casualties from those effects would be less than the casualties that would result from the dispersal of large quantities of bio-agents.