In the wake of the Iraq debacle, the United States will occupy a position of greatly diminished stature and leverage among the many allies that stepped forward to offer unqualified support immediately after September 11, 2001. No relationship has been more badly damaged in this relatively short period of time, or is in greater need of repair, than the alliance between the United States and Turkey. Although America's standing has declined precipitously across Europe, Turkey is the one NATO country at risk of becoming strategically unmoored.

The U.S. plan to deploy elements of its Ballistic Missile Defense System in Eastern Europe was bound to be controversial. Russia has long been wary of U.S. missile defense plans and skeptical of U.S. claims about the ballistic missile threat from the third countries that missile defense is supposed to counter. The choice of Eastern Europe as the site of the upcoming deployment has made the plan particularly contentious, linking it to the already controversial process of eastward expansion of NATO. As a result, many Russians believe that in reality the missile defense system is directed against Russia.

Talk delivered at dinner during CISAC's conference, "The Security Implications of Increased Global Reliance on Nuclear Power," Wednesday, 19 September 2007, Stanford University.

Introduction: "Since you're dealing with the transition ongoing in the world to nuclear energy, I thought it might be comforting to hear a little about the problems of earlier energy transitions--from wood to coal and from coal to oil as well as natural gas and nuclear power. Energy transitions take time, writes Arnulf Grübler. 'Hardly any innovation diffuses into a vacuum,' he says. 'Along its growth trajectory, an innovation interacts with existing techniques...and changes its technological, economic, and social characteristics....Decades are required for the diffusion of significant innovations, and even longer time spans are needed to develop infrastructures....' The diffusion process is a process of learning, and humans learn slowly."

The Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) draft National Response Framework proposes much-needed improvements for disaster preparedness and response. As currently written, however, the framework also ignores--and is likely to subvert--key changes that Congress enacted in Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006. Congress had compelling reasons to adopt those changes. The draft framework overlooks the concerns that helped shape the legislation Congress enacted, and would put the nation at risk to some of the same systemic failures that hobbled the Federal response to Katrina.

I will open my testimony by examining the framework's most glaring departure from the reforms Congress enacted in 2006: the proposal that disaster preparedness and response efforts be led by the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, rather than by the Administrator of the Federal Emergency Management System (FEMA). I will then briefly explain why I believe Congress made the correct decision in assigning that leadership responsibility and authority to the FEMA Administrator, and why the shift proposed by the draft framework would put the emergency management system at such risk. I will conclude by raising some additional issues that the Subcommittee may wish to consider as it reviews the draft framework, especially those involving the uncertainties that continue to surround response to catastrophic events.

Nations, States, and Violence presents a revisionist view of the sources of nationalism, the relationship of the nation to culture, and the implications of nationalism and cultural heterogeneity for the future of the nation-state. It accepts the now-standard view that national identities are not inherited traits but constructed communities in order to serve political ends. But the resulting national identities do not emerge from some metaphorical plebiscite as had been suggested by some; rather they result from efforts by people to coordinate their identities with people who share at least some cultural traits with them. Coordination leads to powerful social and cultural ties that are hard to unravel, and this explains the persistence of national identities.

Understood as the result of coordination dynamics, the implications of national homogeneity and heterogeneity are explored. The book shows that national heterogeneity is not, as it is sometimes accused of being, a source of hatred and violence. Nonetheless, there are advantages to homogeneity for the production of public goods and economic growth. Whatever the positive implications of homogeneity, the book shows that in the current world, classic nation-states are defunct. Heterogeneity is proliferating not only due to migration but also because small groups in many states once thought to be homogeneous are coordinating to demand national recognition. With the prohibitive costs of eliminating cultural heterogeneity, citizens and leaders need to learn how best to manage, or even take advantage of, national diversity within their countries. Management of diversity demands that we understand the coordination aspects of national heterogeneity, a perspective that this book provides.

In addition to providing a powerful theory of coordination and cultural diversity, the book provides a host of engaging vignettes of Somalia, Spain, Estonia, and Nigeria, where the author has conducted original field research. The result is a book where theory is combined with interpretations of current issues on nationalism, economic growth, and ethnic violence.

Reviews

"In this provocative little book, a Stanford political scientist presents an intriguing account of nationalism and its implications for conflict and cooperation."--Foreign Affairs

The threat of the use of weapons of mass destruction by terrorist groups is perhaps the gravest threat confronting the international security system. In 2004, the United Nations Security Council, acting under Chapter VII, adopted Security Council Resolution 1540 (UNSCR 1540). UNSCR 1540 calls on UN member states to enact legislation and to take effective measures to prevent non-state actors, and terrorist groups in particular, from obtaining weapons of mass destruction. UNSCR 1540 also obligated states to report on measures they have taken to fulfill the substantive requirements of the resolution. In addition, UNSCR 1540 established an ad hoc committee ("the 1540 Committee") to receive states' reports and in turn to report to the Security Council on implementation of the resolution. In 2006, the 1540 Committee's initial two-year mandate was renewed for another two years.

UNSCR 1540, as administered by the 1540 Committee, has largely been effective in encouraging states to provide detailed descriptions of the domestic legal authorities and administrative structures they have in place to address the threat of WMD proliferation. Additional progress can and should be made by the Security Council and the 1540 Committee, however, to ensure that the maximum nonproliferation and security benefits that might be produced by UNSCR 1540 are achieved. Our recommendations address implementation, adaptation, international cooperation and assistance, information sharing and assessment, and organizational implications.