Security

FSI scholars produce research aimed at creating a safer world and examing the consequences of security policies on institutions and society. They look at longstanding issues including nuclear nonproliferation and the conflicts between countries like North and South Korea. But their research also examines new and emerging areas that transcend traditional borders – the drug war in Mexico and expanding terrorism networks. FSI researchers look at the changing methods of warfare with a focus on biosecurity and nuclear risk. They tackle cybersecurity with an eye toward privacy concerns and explore the implications of new actors like hackers.

Along with the changing face of conflict, terrorism and crime, FSI researchers study food security. They tackle the global problems of hunger, poverty and environmental degradation by generating knowledge and policy-relevant solutions. 

Paragraphs

A distinguished panel including psychological scientists, political scientists, and psychiatrists – Arie W. Kruglanski, Martha Crenshaw, Jerrold M. Post, and Jeff Victoroff – assesses the impact of different metaphorical framings (warfare, law enforcement, epidemiology, and prejudice reduction) on the worldwide effort to combat and prevent terrorism. The authors show that the metaphorical “war on terrorism” that has dominated post-9/11 thinking about national security and foreign policy is highly limited, blinding political leaders and other key decision makers to different possibilities both for containing the worldwide spread of terrorist ideologies and also for preventing terrorism by alleviating the social problems giving rise to it. The report includes an editorial by Louise Richardson, Harvard University, who underscores the importance of not reducing counterterrorism to simplistic metaphors that hamper our ability to face inherently complex political and security issues.

All Publications button
1
Publication Type
Journal Articles
Publication Date
Journal Publisher
Psychological Science in the Public Interest
Authors
Martha Crenshaw
-

Topics:

"Ballistic Missile Defense"

Dean Wilkening will cover work in progress concerning regional assessments of the strategic impact of ballistic missile defenses. The nature of the problem and analytic tools to assess the impact will be discussed, along with preliminary results for the impact of American and Japanese missile defense deployments in North East Asia.

"Research Reactors and Non-Proliferation"

Bekhzod Yuldashev will present a short review of the utilization of research reactors and present status of research reactor programs. The related non-proliferation aspects of existing and future research will also be discussed.

Reuben W. Hills Conference Room

Dean Wilkening Speaker
Bekhzod Yuldashev Speaker
Seminars
-

Ron E. Hassner (speaker) is an assistant professor of political science at University of California, Berkeley. He returns to CISAC as a visiting professor, having served as predoctoral fellow from 2000 to 2003. His research revolves around symbolic and emotive aspects of international security with particular attention to religious violence, Middle Eastern politics and territorial disputes. His publications have focused on the role of perceptions in entrenching international disputes, the causes and characteristics of conflicts over sacred places, the characteristics of political-religious leadership and political-religious mobilization and the role of national symbols in conflict.

Hassner was a fellow of the MacArthur Consortium on Peace and Security in 2000-2003. In 2003-2004 he was a postdoctoral scholar at the Olin Institute for International Security, Harvard University. He is a graduate of Stanford University with degrees in political science and religious studies.

Jacob Shapiro (discussant) is a CISAC postdoctoral fellow. His primary research interest is the organization of terrorism and insurgency. His other research interests include international relations, organization theory, and security policy. Shapiro's ongoing projects study the balance between secrecy and openness in counterterrorism, the impact of international human rights law on democracies' foreign policy, the causes of militant recruitment in Islamic countries, and the relationship between public goods provision and insurgent violence in Iraq and Afghanistan. His research has been published in International Security, International Studies Quarterly, Foreign Policy, and a number of edited volumes. Shapiro is a Harmony Fellow at the Combating Terrorism Center at the United States Military Academy. As a Naval Reserve officer he was assigned to the Office of Naval Intelligence and the Naval Warfare Development Command. He served on active duty at Special Boat Team 20 and onboard the USS Arthur W. Radford (DD-968). He holds a PhD in political science and an MA in economics from Stanford University and a BA in political science from the University of Michigan.

Reuben W. Hills Conference Room

Ron Hassner Speaker
Jacob Shapiro Speaker
Seminars
Paragraphs

At first glance, the U.S. military's response to the incident at Minot Air Base involving the transportation of six nuclear warheads across the United States was reasonably thorough and harsh--three colonel-rank commanders were relieved of their positions, the bomber wing at Minot was decertified from its wartime missions, and a number of air force personnel lost their certifications. More action will probably come in the next few months. Defense Secretary Robert Gates asked the Defense Science Board to review the incident, and the 2008 Defense Appropriations Bill will require the Defense and Energy departments to submit a report detailing what procedures and policies they use when handling nuclear weapons.

But a closer look at the investigation doesn't give much hope that Washington will learn the proper lessons from the incident. The U.S. military is clearly at the "scapegoat" stage of its understanding of what happened. It claims that the accident was caused by human error; according to a Defense representative, it was "a failure to follow procedures, procedures which have proven to be sound." The irony of this statement seemed to elude the official (and much of the press, for that matter).

All Publications button
1
Publication Type
Journal Articles
Publication Date
Journal Publisher
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists Online
Authors
Pavel Podvig
0
Affiliate
agvaanluvsan.jpeg

Dr. Undraa Agvaanluvsan is a Member of Parliament in Mongolia and has previously served as an Ambassador-at-Large for nuclear security at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In this role, her portfolio included nuclear security issues,  the nuclear fuel cycle, and the policy on developing uranium and rare-earth mineral resources.

Beyond her government work, Dr. Undraa served as the president of the Mitchell Foundation for Arts and Sciences. She is also an Asia21 Fellow with the Asia Society and co-chairs the Mongolia chapter of the Women Corporate Directors, a global organization supporting women on corporate boards. Currently, she is serving on the International Advisory Board of Duke Kunshan University.

A nuclear physicist by training, Dr. Undraa earned her PhD from North Carolina State University and holds a diploma in High Energy Physics from the International Center for Theoretical Physics in Trieste, Italy. She has conducted research at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and taught energy policy at Stanford University’s International Policy Studies Program, where she was also a Science Fellow and Visiting Professor at CISAC. As a scientist, Dr. Undraa has published extensively on neutron and proton-induced nuclear reactions, nuclear level density, radiative strength function, quantum chaos, and the Random Matrix Theory, including its applications in electric grid networks.

Date Label
Paragraphs

On July 5, 2005, President George W. Bush and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh signed an agreement pledging their governments to actions designed to culminate in a formal nuclear cooperation agreement that would end a three-decade U.S. nuclear embargo against India. Although the formal agreement has not yet received final approval from Congress, concerns about the consequences of the agreement, particularly its possible adverse effect on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the worldwide nonproliferation regime, have made the agreement controversial. This article traces the events that led to the Bush-Singh meeting, explicates the current situation, examines the arguments for and against the proposed agreement, and makes some preliminary judgments regarding the agreement's effects on the nonproliferation regime. The failure to prevent India's 1998 nuclear tests with the threat of sanctions (because the Indians calculated that long-term U.S. resolve was not sustainable) set in motion a chain of events that would ultimately end the nuclear embargo. However, the conditions for a better U.S.-India nuclear agreement--from a nonproliferation perspective--will inevitably arise if the current proposed agreement is not adopted.

All Publications button
1
Publication Type
Journal Articles
Publication Date
Journal Publisher
Nonproliferation Review
Authors
Leonard Weiss
Authors
News Type
News
Date
Paragraphs

David L. Heymann, assistant director-general for communicable diseases and the director general's representative for polio eradication at the World Health Organization (WHO), has joined CISAC as a consulting professor.

Heymann has dedicated much of his career as a medical doctor to investigating and fighting the spread of infectious diseases and mobilizing global efforts to prevent pandemics.

"Dr. Heymann's expertise on threats to health security is a welcome addition to CISAC," Siegfried Hecker, CISAC co-director, said. "He is deeply knowledgeable about the most severe disease-related threats as well as how best to build cooperative international efforts to reduce these threats."

Prior to assuming his current position at WHO, Heymann served as executive director of WHO's Communicable Diseases Cluster, which includes programs on infectious and tropical diseases. In that position, he oversaw the response to Severe Accute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) in 2003.

Before joining WHO, Heymann worked for 13 years as a medical epidemiologist in sub-Saharan Africa, on assignment with the U.S. Centers for Disease Control. While there, he participated in investigating both the first outbreak of Ebola, in Yambuku (then Zaire) in 1976, and the second outbreak, in Tandala, in 1977. He directed the international response to the Ebola outbreak in Kikwit in 1995. Heymann also spent two years as a medical officer in the WHO smallpox eradication program in India prior to 1976.

Heymann spent two weeks in residence at Stanford last spring, co-hosted by CISAC and FSI, during which he delivered a a talk in FSI's Payne Lecture series. In the lecture, titled "Infectious Diseases across Borders: Public Health Security in the 21st Century," he discussed the collective responsibility to defend public health. He surveyed WHO's efforts to fight emerging and re-emerging infectious disease on every continent.

Among those efforts is a global network of scientists who monitor and collect viruses, sending samples to four WHO collaborating centers for analysis and tracking. This network detected the novel virus H5N1, known as avian flu, in 1997, a disease WHO continues to track closely.

Currently, Heymann said, the H5N1 virus is in the third of six phases in WHO's pandemic alert system, meaning that there have been cases of human infection but "no, or very infrequent, human-to-human spread."

Heymann emphasized, "It is important to prevent the disease at the source." At the same time, WHO is working to "provide universal access to vaccines," which, while not eliminating the disease, "will prevent sickness," he said.

All News button
1
News Type
News
Date
Paragraphs

Martha Crenshaw is a pioneer in terrorism studies, one of a handful of scholars worldwide who started investigating the subject long before Sept. 11, 2001.

Crenshaw, who joined CISAC this year as a senior fellow at FSI and a political science professor by courtesy, brings three decades of study to her current agenda of examining distinctions between so-called old and new terrorism, how terrorism ends, and why the United States is the target of terrorism.

"We are very fortunate to have Martha Crenshaw join CISAC as a senior fellow," said Scott Sagan, CISAC co-director. "Her detailed knowledge of the inside workings of terrorist organizations and her deep understanding of earlier counter-terrorist campaigns have brought much-needed historical perspective to contemporary policy debates after 9/11."

Associate professor of law Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, who led the search that resulted in Crenshaw's hiring, said her "combination of attention to historical detail, interdisciplinary methods, and knowledge of institutional context has made her one of the nation's foremost scholars of terrorism. Her appointment is great news for CISAC and Stanford, where she will strengthen an already significant scholarly community working on homeland security and terrorism."

Coming to Stanford from Wesleyan University, where she was the Colin and Nancy Campbell Professor of Global Issues and Democratic Thought and a government professor, Crenshaw said she found the opportunity to join an interdisciplinary research center a welcome change.

"CISAC's and my interests merged perfectly," she said, as the center was looking to build its research expertise in terrorism. She said she looks forward to teaching graduate students in the Ford Dorsey Program in International Policy Studies as well as working with research colleagues at CISAC and across campus.

Crenshaw's terrorism studies began with a graduate seminar paper she wrote on actions by the FLN, or National Liberation Front, during Algeria's war for independence from France in the 1950s and 60s. She arrived at the topic the way many professors advise students to do--she noted in a study of Vietnam-era guerrilla warfare the comment that "no one has studied terrorism."

That seminar paper inspired her dissertation, which formed the basis of her 1978 book, Revolutionary Terrorism: The FLN in Algeria, 1954-1962, a case study in the strategic use of terrorism by a revolutionary nationalist movement.

Having written numerous articles and edited four books on terrorism, Crenshaw is now editing a book tentatively titled The Consequences of Counterterrorist Policies in Democracies. The Russell Sage Foundation supported the research, which Crenshaw said illuminates issues such as "the strength of executive power, effects of counterterrorism legislation on minorities, and unintended consequences of counterterrorism policies."

As a lead investigator with the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism at the University of Maryland, a Department of Homeland Security Center of Excellence, Crenshaw is also researching why the United States is the target of terrorism, a study that could be especially useful in informing counterterrorism policy.

Crenshaw "trace[s] the evolution of anti-American terrorism over time--since the mid-1960s," she said, comparing groups that used terrorism to others with similar ideas that have not resorted to terrorism. Comparing case studies, she explained, allows her to "analyze incentives for the use of terrorism."

In "The Debate over 'New' versus 'Old' Terrorism," a paper Crenshaw presented at the American Political Science Association annual meeting in September--and which will be published as a chapter in an edited volume, she questions oft-heard claims that terrorism in recent years has taken on a new character to become more religious and lethal. She found the distinctions too hastily drawn and possibly dangerous.

"There is no fundamental difference between 'old' and 'new' terrorism," she said.

"Rejecting our accumulated knowledge of terrorism by dismissing it as 'obsolete'" would be a mistake that could lead to bad policy choices, she added. Before 9/ll, assumptions that "new" terrorism would forsake the "old" technique of hijacking and turn to weapons of mass destruction turned out to be wrong, she pointed out.

Crenshaw said researchers and policymakers should "ask why some groups cause large numbers of civilian casualties and others do not, rather than assuming that religious beliefs are the explanation for lethality."

All News button
1
-

Philip G. Roeder (Ph. D. Harvard University, 1978) is professor of political science at the University of California, San Diego. A specialist on the politics of the Soviet successor states, Roeder has focused his recent research on the design of political institutions for countries torn apart by secessionist movements. He is the author of Where Nation-States Come From: Institutional Change in the Age of Nationalism (Princeton) and Red Sunset: The Failure of Soviet Politics (Princeton). He is the co-author of Postcommunism and the Theory of Democracy (Princeton) and co-editor of Sustainable Peace: Power and Democracy After Civil Wars (Cornell). His articles have appeared in such journals as the American Political Science Review, World Politics, and International Studies Quarterly. He is currently working on two longer-term projects:

  1. Alternatives to Independence (What are the consequences of various institutional arrangements designed to avoid granting independence to secessionists?) and
  2. The Tenacity of the Nation-State (Why do states almost never relinquish sovereignty willingly?)

CISAC Conference Room

Philip Roeder Professor of Political Science Speaker University of California, San Diego
Seminars
News Type
News
Date
Paragraphs
In a fall 2007 International Security article, CISAC fellow Jacob N. Shapiro and former fellow Dara K. Cohen offer ideas for reforming the Homeland Security Alert System (HSAS). The color-coded system does not encourage local officials to take precautions in times of increased terrorism risk, in part because people don't trust the system, the authors write. The Department of Homeland Security should work with state and local governments to develop a "playbook of possible actions for each alert level," Shapiro and Cohen suggest, to build confidence in the system and to encourage people to act on risk levels.
All News button
1
Subscribe to Security