* Please note all CISAC events are scheduled using the Pacific Time Zone.

This event is co-sponsored by the Project on Russian Power and Purpose in the 21st Century and the Center for International Security and Cooperation.

Seminar Recording:  https://youtu.be/gDD68gqClt8

About the Event: Media and public discussions tend to understand Russian politics as a direct reflection of Vladimir Putin’s seeming omnipotence or Russia’s unique history and culture. Yet Russia is similar to other autocracies—and recognizing this illuminates the inherent limits to Putin’s power. Weak Strongman challenges the conventional wisdom about Putin’s Russia, highlighting the difficult trade-offs that confront the Kremlin on issues ranging from election fraud and repression to propaganda and foreign policy.

Drawing on three decades of his own on-the-ground experience and research as well as insights from a new generation of social scientists that have received little attention outside academia, Timothy Frye reveals how much we overlook about today’s Russia when we focus solely on Putin or Russian exceptionalism. Frye brings a new understanding to a host of crucial questions: How popular is Putin? Is Russian propaganda effective? Why are relations with the West so fraught? Can Russian cyber warriors really swing foreign elections? In answering these and other questions, Frye offers a highly accessible reassessment of Russian politics that highlights the challenges of governing Russia and the nature of modern autocracy.

Rich in personal anecdotes and cutting-edge social science, Weak Strongman offers the best evidence available about how Russia actually works.

Book Purchase: https://press.princeton.edu/books/hardcover/9780691212463/weak-strongman

Discount Code: FRYE 30%

About the Speaker: Timothy Frye is the Marshall D. Shulman Professor of Post-Soviet Foreign Policy at Columbia University and Co-Director of the International Center for the Study of Institutions and Development at the Higher School of Economics, Moscow. He is also the Editor of Post-Soviet Affairs.

Professor Frye received a B.A. in Russian language and literature from Middlebury College in 1986, an M.I.A. from Columbia's School of International and Public Affairs in 1992, and a Ph.D. from Columbia in 1997. He served as the Director of the Harriman Institute from 2009-2015 and as Chair of the Political Science Department from 2016-18.

* Please note all CISAC events are scheduled using the Pacific Time Zone.

This event is co-sponsored by the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies and the Center for International Security and Cooperation.

Seminar Recording: https://youtu.be/s3MMxYH6bfU

About the Event: Rose Gottemoeller served as the US chief negotiator of the New START treaty. The first woman to lead a major nuclear arms negotiation, she played a critical role in creating US policy on arms control and ensuring that a deeply divided Congress came together to ratify the treaty to safeguard the future of all Americans.  

In her new book, Negotiating the New START Treaty, Gottemoeller gives an insider’s account of the negotiations between the US and Russian delegations in Geneva in 2009 and 2010.  

On May 21, at 1p Pacific, Gottemoeller will discuss her book, her years of high-level experience and her analysis of the complicated relationship between the US and Russia with Michael McFaul, director of the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies and the former US Ambassador to Russia.  

Gottemoeller and McFaul were in the trenches together during the negotiations--he in the White House, she in Geneva. In this online event, they will discuss the New START treaty and the key role it played in President Obama's nuclear policies. 

McFaul will interview Gottemoeller and moderate a Q&A with the audience. This event is co-sponsored by the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies and the Center for International Security and Cooperation. 

About the Speaker: Rose Gottemoeller is the Frank E. and Arthur W. Payne Distinguished Lecturer at Stanford University's Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies and its Center for International Security and Cooperation.

Before joining Stanford Gottemoeller was the Deputy Secretary General of NATO from 2016 to 2019, where she helped to drive forward NATO’s adaptation to new security challenges in Europe and in the fight against terrorism.  Prior to NATO, she served for nearly five years as the Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security at the U.S. Department of State, advising the Secretary of State on arms control, nonproliferation and political-military affairs. While Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control, Verification and Compliance in 2009 and 2010, she was the chief U.S. negotiator of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) with the Russian Federation.

Prior to her government service, she was a senior associate with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, with joint appointments to the Nonproliferation and Russia programs. She served as the Director of the Carnegie Moscow Center from 2006 to 2008, and is currently a nonresident fellow in Carnegie's Nuclear Policy Program. She is also a research fellow at the Hoover Institution. 

At Stanford, Gottemoeller teaches and mentors students in the Ford Dorsey Master’s in International Policy program and the CISAC Honors program; contribute to policy research and outreach activities; and convene workshops, seminars and other events relating to her areas of expertise, including nuclear security, Russian relations, the NATO alliance, EU cooperation and non-proliferation.

* Please note all CISAC events are scheduled using the Pacific Time Zone.

Seminar Recording: https://youtu.be/zXMKvurtEw0

About the Event: Dan Baer, Senior Fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, will join Rose Gottemoeller in a fireside chat to speak about the OSCE’s important role as an inclusive platform for security dialogue between the West and Russia and as a valuable instrument for practical cooperation on the ground to address common security challenges on the basis of shared commitments. The OSCE seeks to promote security in the larger context of relations among the states of North America, Europe and Eurasia, including Russia and all the states of the former Soviet Union and those European states that are not members of NATO or the EU.In an era of increasing challenges to multilateralism, this unique element of the Euroatlantic/Eurasian security architecture should be better recognized and utilized. While the OSCE emerged from the Cold War, today's challenges invite a reinvigoration its role as a diplomatic and operational platform. The US has long seen the OSCE as an important vehicle within the European security scene, and with the new administration’s commitment to multilateralism, it will be interesting to observe what role the US will take within the Organization on topics ranging from conventional arms control and confidence- and security-building measures to the security challenges of climate change and human rights. At the same time, while what were once Russian hopes that the OSCE would become a kind of alternative to NATO have dissipated, it is an open question whether Russia will choose to leverage the OSCE as one of the few remaining forums where Russia's engagement and cooperation with European and North American partners can deliver positive impacts on shared challenges.

About the Speaker: Dan Baer is a Senior Fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. He served in Governor John Hickenlooper’s cabinet as executive director of the Colorado Department of Higher Education from 2018-2019. He was U.S. ambassador to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) from 2013 to 2017.  Previously, he was a Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor from 2009-2013.

Before his government service, Baer was an assistant professor at Georgetown’s McDonough School of Business, a Faculty Fellow at Harvard’s Safra Center for Ethics, and a project leader at The Boston Consulting Group. He has appeared on CNN, Fox, MSNBC, BBC, PBS Frontline, Al Jazeera, Sky, and The Colbert Report and his writing has appeared in The Washington Post, The Wall Street Journal, USA Today, Foreign Affairs, Politico, The Christian Science Monitor, Foreign Policy, The Chronicle of Higher Education, Westword, The Denver Post, and other publications. He holds a doctorate in International Relations from Oxford and a degree in Social Studies and African American Studies from Harvard. He lives in Denver and is married to Brian Walsh, an economist at The World Bank.

* Please note all CISAC events are scheduled using the Pacific Time Zone.

Seminar Recording:  https://youtu.be/zTgJxOfgvNY

About the Event: In Bullets Not Ballots, Jacqueline L. Hazelton challenges the claim that winning "hearts and minds" is critical to successful counterinsurgency campaigns. Good governance, this conventional wisdom holds, gains the besieged government popular support, denies support to the insurgency, and enables military and political victory. Hazelton argues that major counterinsurgent successes since World War II have resulted not through democratic reforms but rather through the use of military force against civilians and the co-optation of rival elites.

Hazelton offers new analyses of five historical cases frequently held up as examples of the effectiveness of good governance in ending rebellions—the Malayan Emergency, the Greek Civil War, the Huk Rebellion in the Philippines, the Dhofar rebellion in Oman, and the Salvadoran Civil War—to show that, although unpalatable, it was really brutal repression and bribery that brought each conflict to an end. By showing how compellence works in intrastate conflicts, Bullets Not Ballots makes clear that whether or not the international community decides these human, moral, and material costs are acceptable, responsible policymaking requires recognizing the actual components of counterinsurgent success—and the limited influence that external powers have over the tactics of counterinsurgent elites.

Link to purchase: https://www.cornellpress.cornell.edu/book/9781501754784/bullets-not-bal…

Discount code: SAVE 30% WITH CODE 09FLYER United States Order online at cornellpress.cornell.edu or call 800 848 6224 Canada Email utpbooks@utpress.utoronto.ca or call 1-800-565-9523 UK, Europe, Asia, Middle East, Africa, Australia, New Zealand, Fiji, & Papua New Guinea Use code CS09FLYER at combinedacademic.co.uk
 

About the Speaker: Jacqueline L. Hazelton is is an assistant professor in the department of strategy and policy at the U.S. Naval War College. Hazelton specializes in international relations, specifically international security. Her research interests include compellence, the uses of force, military intervention, counterinsurgency, terrorism, and U.S. foreign and military policy. She received her Ph.D. from the Brandeis University Politics Department. Her BA and first MA are in English Literature from the University of Chicago. Her second MA, also from Chicago, is in international relations. Her book, Bullets Not Ballots: Success in Counterinsurgency Warfare, is published by the Cornell University Press Studies in Security Affairs series. Hazelton is at Stanford’s CISAC and the International Security Program at the Belfer Center, Harvard Kennedy School, this year writing her second book, explaining why Western great powers sometimes try to use ambitious liberalizing methods in military intervention.

* Please note all CISAC events are scheduled using the Pacific Time Zone.

Seminar Recording:  https://youtu.be/mz-f4jzKrRI

About the Event: In 1903, the United Kingdom’s War Office announced that up to 60 percent of men who presented for military enlistment were physically unfit for service. Amid growing fears about national decline, the government convened an Inter-departmental Committee on Physical Deterioration to investigate the issue. After consulting anthropologists from the British Association for the Advancement of Science (BAAS), the Committee’s 1904 Report recommended a National Anthropometric Survey – a large-scale collection and investigation of biometric measurements of British citizens’ bodies – to determine the occurrence of physical deterioration in the population.

Relying on extensive archival research, the presentation shows how the Survey emerged as a solution for these goals and why it was never implemented. It examines how its design was shaped by (1) the Inter- departmental Committee, who hoped to measure the population’s health and develop social reforms, and (2) BAAS anthropologists who wished to advance their eugenic research on racial classification in the UK and promote anti-immigration policies. In the process, these groups imbued the Survey’s methods with varying politics of national inclusion and exclusion.

Drawing on concepts and methods from Science and Technology Studies, the paper presents the Survey as a precursor of contemporary state biometric infrastructures that demonstrates how these systems link measurements of citizens’ bodies with notions of national belonging. The Survey was not simply a tool to collect citizen data. It was also a locus of tensions over industrialization, class, urbanization, immigration, race, and empire – dynamics that resonate in biometric systems today.

About the Speaker: Michelle is a CISAC/HAI Pre-Doctoral Researcher at Stanford University, and a PhD Candidate at MIT in History, Anthropology, and Science, Technology, and Society (HASTS). Her research broadly focuses on the ways national biometric identification systems shape state-citizen relationships, and how past biometric infrastructures influence contemporary ones.

THIS EVENT STARTS AT 2:40PM. Introductions will start at 2:40pm. Each presentation will be 20 minutes with a 10 minute discussion.

* Please note all CISAC events are scheduled using the Pacific Time Zone.

Register in advance for this webinar: https://stanford.zoom.us/webinar/register/WN_u9n9HEq0QqmgMpVr2py4Aw

About the Event: Many policymakers believe that the consolidation of the U.S. defense industry is suboptimal, pointing to cost overruns, program delays, and technological problems with products. Meanwhile, economists believe that there may actually be efficiencies to be gained through consolidation in the defense industry and that therefore, its effects are not always negative. Utilizing a novel approach that combines economic and social science analyses, this thesis asks whether the consolidation of the U.S. defense industry has, in fact, increased costs and schedule delays of major defense acquisition programs and decreased private sector innovation and investment in innovation. Analysis of original datasets of Selected Acquisition Report summary table data from 2000-2020, schedule delay data compiled from GAO Annual Weapon’s Assessment reports since 2003, and company research and development spending of the prime contractors from 2000-2020 suggests that defense industry consolidation leads to negative effects on the cost and schedule of major defense acquisition programs as well as varied effects on private sector innovation/investment in innovation. Case studies of the F-35 and Ground Based Strategic Deterrent illustrate the dangers of the current state of the industry and also raise questions about the efficacy of current economic methodologies for analyzing cost growth of major defense acquisition programs. Policymakers should consider further examination of defense industry competition and M&A activity as well as the benefits of knowledge-based acquisition practices as the Department of Defense moves towards key decision points regarding legacy systems and the future of U.S. defense capabilities.

About the Speaker: Corinne is a senior studying Political Science with concentrations in International Relations and Political Economy. She became interested in public-private partnerships through her work at a tech startup and her thesis expands upon this interest by examining the effects of U.S. defense industry consolidation on procurement outcomes. She has also served as a research assistant on projects about the U.S. intelligence community, offensive cyber operations, and information warfare. In addition to her academic interests, Corinne plays field hockey for Stanford and the USA Women’s National Team.

THIS EVENT STARTS AT 2:40PM. Introductions will start at 2:40pm. Each presentation will be 20 minutes with a 10 minute discussion.

* Please note all CISAC events are scheduled using the Pacific Time Zone.

Register in advance for this webinar: https://stanford.zoom.us/webinar/register/WN_u9n9HEq0QqmgMpVr2py4Aw

About the Event: At the September 2012 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum, Russian President Vladimir Putin launched his “Pivot to Asia”, ostensibly launching a reorientation of Russia’s foreign policy. Yet, has Russia truly pivoted to Asia? If so, why? Data on Russia’s economic and security ties with major Asian countries illustrate that Russia’s shift to Asia is real, especially towards China. Such a shift has been motivated by the Kremlin’s desire to reduce Russia’s economic reliance on Europe in light of Western sanctions as well as shared regional security interests and elite diplomacy between Putin and other heads of state. While Putin and the Kremlin have taken deliberate actions to support a pivot east, broader geopolitical and economic trends have been at least as consequential in pushing Russia east, such as Asia’s growing economic power. Far from starting in 2012 with Putin’s pronouncement, Moscow continually looking east is part of a historical pattern dating back several hundred years. As the global balance of power shifts towards Asia, U.S. policymakers must be cognizant of the second and third order effects U.S. foreign policy can have on the Kremlin’s ties with major powers in Asia.

About the Speaker: Kyle is a senior studying economics from Santa Rosa, California. Inspired by his experiences leading the Stanford U.S.-Russia Forum, his thesis examines Russia’s so-called pivot to Asia. Next year, he will be returning to Stanford to complete a Master's in Management Science & Engineering.

Introductions will start at 2:40pm. Each presentation will be 20 minutes with a 10 minute discussion.

* Please note all CISAC events are scheduled using the Pacific Time Zone.

Register in advance for this webinar: https://stanford.zoom.us/webinar/register/WN_C-7gXRifSDWhhfZ2yBCkTg

About the Event: What motivates Middle Eastern nations to develop the cybersecurity governance agencies that protect from malicious cyber activity? As the world has watched major cyber powers such as China, Russia and the United States emerge, a region often at the forefront of conversations on conventional military conflict, the Middle East, has broadly been left undiscussed in the realm of cyber policy. While this may be indicative of a lack of malicious cyber activity within the region, cyber conflict, however, is on the rise between Middle Eastern States. An original data set of over 50 significant cyber incidents since 2007 shows that the biggest perpetrators of malicious cyber activity against Middle Eastern states are state actors within the region, as opposed to extra-regional states, third-party hacking groups, terrorist organizations or political organizations. Moreover, this malicious cyber activity has had two major waves of increase that align with both the Arab Spring and the Persian Gulf Crisis. The growing threat of regional cyber conflict in tandem with political unrest and conventional military conflict suggest that Middle Eastern nations have been motivated to develop cyber defense structures in response to a growing regional threat of malicious cyber activity.

About the Speaker: Kate is currently studying History with a minor in Middle Eastern Languages. She has pursued her interests in both cyber policy and Middle Eastern politics through an internship at the National Security Commission on A.I. and as deputy head of Lt. Gen. H.R. McMaster's research team. She has received a Fulbright award to purse a Master's in Conflict Research, Management and Resolution at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem next year.

THIS EVENT STARTS AT 2:40PM. Introductions will start at 2:40pm. Each presentation will be 20 minutes with a 10 minute discussion.

* Please note all CISAC events are scheduled using the Pacific Time Zone.

Register in advance for this webinar: https://stanford.zoom.us/webinar/register/WN_C-7gXRifSDWhhfZ2yBCkTg

About the Event: Why do certain Latin American countries receive substantially more Chinese investment than others? Various reports, books, and statements from officials argue that Chinese investments, notably ones from its Belt and Road Initiative, seek to augment Chinese global influence through corruption, political influence, and debt diplomacy. Since 2005, the People’s Republic of China has increased its interest in Latin America, as evidenced by its upward trend of investment with the region now receiving nearly 10% of total Chinese investment, or $200bn. Using the American Enterprise Institute’s China Global Investment Tracker, this thesis aims to identify some potential factors for the distribution of Chinese investment across different Latin American nations and test the veracity of such claims, and explain why Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela receive such high levels of investment compared to regional peers like Colombia and Mexico. The data suggests that Latin American corruption is not an influential factor in Chinese investment destinations, but rather the primary motive is more likely the potential for commodity exports like soybeans, petroleum, and copper. As China raises its economic influence in Latin America, Beijing will likely obtain greater political and diplomatic influence. The United States government must understand Beijing’s intentions in the region and compete accordingly rather than maligning the PRC’s actions in Latin America without providing a competitive alternative.

About the Speaker: Carter is a senior studying International Relations with specializations in international security and East and South Asia, as well as German studies. Growing up in Phoenix, Arizona, he extended his affinity for Latin America into his thesis by writing about Chinese investments across various Latin American states. After graduation, he will be moving to Bologna, Italy and Washington, DC for a Masters in International Relations at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies.

Introductions will start at 1:50pm. Each presentation will be 20 minutes with a 10 minute discussion.

* Please note all CISAC events are scheduled using the Pacific Time Zone.

Register in advance for this webinar: https://stanford.zoom.us/webinar/register/WN_Uoa_Nef3RAu1JAfPRDTg2A

About the Event: When and under what circumstances does the US government publicly attribute state-backed cyber intrusions? Over the past decade, the US government has become increasingly willing to publicly attribute the state adversaries behind cyber incidents. Yet the timing of public attribution appears to vary significantly. Much of the existing work on public attribution of cyber incidents is theoretical – examining when states should publicly attribute – without providing a systematic study of the circumstances in which it actually takes place. This thesis seeks to fill this gap by compiling a data set of every public attribution by the U.S. government to another state from 2010-2021, in addition to data on timing. My analysis suggests that the U.S. government is not a unitary actor; instead, public attribution operates through four distinct channels – technical alerts, criminal charges, and official and unofficial policy statements. Bilateral relations between the U.S. and adversary state, U.S. domestic politics, and attribution by private sector entities have no systematic effect on the timing of public attribution. Moreover, case studies of public attribution for Iran’s Operation Ababil and Russia’s Dragonfly 2.0 campaign demonstrate that organizational factors matter more than the public discourse would suggest. As the government pursues whole-of-government strategies of “persistent engagement” and “defend forward,” this thesis suggests that policymakers must think systematically across government about when and under what circumstances to publicly attribute cyber incidents to other states.

About the Speaker: June is a senior studying International Relations and minoring in Computer Science. Her course of study has focused on cyber policy and international law, inspired by her experiences at the Atlantic Council’s Cyber Statecraft Initiative and State Department. Her thesis extends these interests, by examining the US government's approach to public attribution in cyberspace.