The Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies would like to extend the warmest best wishes to Senior Fellow and Raymond A. Spruance Professor of International History, David Holloway. After over 30 years as an expert in political science and history at Stanford University, Holloway will retire on September 1, 2018.

David Holloway was co-director of the Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC) from 1991 to 1997, and director of FSI from 1998 to 2003. His research focuses on the international history of nuclear weapons, science and technology in the Soviet Union, and the relationship between international history and international relations theory. He is best known for his book Stalin and the Bomb: The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy, 1939-1956 (Yale University Press, 1994) which was chosen by the New York Times Book Review as one of the best books of 1994. Holloway has also actively contributed to the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Foreign Affairs, and other scholarly journals over the course of his career.

As a member of our institute, Holloway’s quiet warmth and kindness have always been infectious, both inside and outside of the classroom. The depth and insight of his work over the years, not to mention his dedication to FSI and the Stanford Community at large, has been an inspiration. He will be sorely missed. We all wish him the very best with this new chapter in his life and with the completion of his latest book, a complete global history of nuclear weapons, non-proliferation, and international politics, due to be published in 2019.

We caught him to hear his views on recent developments in U.S.-Russia relations one last time and to talk about his time at Stanford.

At the NATO summit, Trump claimed that Germany “is a captive of Russia.” Is there any foundation to this claim?

I don't think so. Trump made the statement in connection with the Nord Stream Oil Pipeline. A lot of people have criticized Germany for building this because it will increase German reliance on Russia. Critics believe that by sending oil through Germany, Russia will potentially have more freedom to interfere in Ukrainian territories. However, the German government has reassured the international community that they would help Ukraine if Russia does use the pipeline to push for recognition of the annexation of Crimea. In Germany’s defense, I think they feel that they have to have economic relations with Russia unless they are in a state of war or close to one – it is the only logical arrangement.

How do you think we can reconcile the disjunction between the U.S. president’s pro-Putin statements and position at the Helsinki press conference with the fact that his administration is implementing sanctions against Russia? 

The policies certainly look contradictory. Trump has not said anything critical about Putin (which is remarkable when he is quite willing to say critical things about everybody else), yet, as you say, his administration has imposed tough sanctions. Why is Trump so reluctant to support his own administration? And why is it that he wanted to meet Putin in the first place? We just don’t know.

On a related note, the Chinese claim that Trump is a very good tactician/strategist and that his behavior at the Helsinki summit was “Kissinger-in-reverse.” That is, it was intended to weaken Russia's ties to China by offering better ties with the U.S. and potentially with Western Europe. Thus, the Chinese see Trump’s performance not as a sign of incompetence and incoherence (as many do in the West), but as further evidence of his coherent strategy.

We often ascribe a malicious masterplan or intentional nefariousness to adversaries. For my part, while possible that the president has a master-plan, I think it is most likely that he does not. Trump has created a backlash against Russia in the U.S. which will make it even more difficult for U.S.-Russian relations to improve in years to come.

There have been a number of articles written about Trump’s push for increased allied investment in NATO; he started by pushing for all members to meet the 2 percent GDP investment quota, but then demanded that they invest 4 percent. Is demanding 4 percent feasible?

The truth is that every American president has pushed the European members of NATO to spend more on defense. Even Obama did it. However, Trump has done it much more openly and offensively. I think the push for 4 percent was more a case of showmanship; the stance he was taking was, “You're not even at 2 percent but you should really be at 4 percent!”

What is the impact of all of this?  I have certainly seen many Europeans turn around say that the E.U. cannot rely on the U.S. anymore. If we have a Trump administration for another six years and/or a U.S. administration in 2020 that takes a similar line, I think we could well see the end of NATO. 

The President’s remarks referred to the fact that only 9 of NATO’s 29 members have reached the 2 percent quota. Yet many NATO advocates are counter-arguing that many of the remaining 21 nations have significantly increased their defense spending. How would you weigh in?

I would agree with NATO advocates and add that the reason why expenditure got so low in the first place is that, after the end of the Cold War, Europe seemed peaceful. I think the 2014 annexation of Crimea by Russia somewhat changed this perception, and the parts of the continent most under threat are the Baltic States and Georgia. As a side note, we should also remember that NATO troops have fought and died in Iraq and Afghanistan alongside the U.S. It is not that they have been doing nothing.

The President claims he vastly improved U.S.-Russian relations at the Helsinki summit. Others, like FSI Director Michael McFaul, claim that the summit was further evidence that we are in an era of “Hot Peace” with Russia. What do you think?

Before I answer your question, I want to say that I think it is good to have Russian and American leaders talking to each other. These are the two largest nuclear powers; I think that there should be open communication on military issues and nuclear issues most particularly.

The world isn't at stake in the same way it was during the Cold War. Yet, there are still fears of military conflict, and we have a new phenomenon: election hacking. The question of Russian meddling in the last U.S. election is complicated by Trump's relationship with Russia. The press conference at Helsinki was so extraordinary, not least because, if Trump really wanted to open a dialogue with Russia, he greatly damaged his chances by virtue of his own behavior. If, instead, he had insisted that Putin did interfere—openly declared his trust in his own intelligence services—I do not believe that the Russians would have walked away. I believe they have an interest in having a dialogue with the United States.

Some political scientists argue that we are now in a new Cold War in Asia, namely with North Korea and/or a possible North Korean-Chinese alliance. Do you agree?

I think of the Cold War as having three elements. First, after World War II there was a geopolitical element: the USSR wanted to control Eastern Europe both for security reasons and for ideological reasons. Second: the U.S. and its West European allies were motivated to help spread principles of liberal democracy and market capitalism, the Soviet Union’s Communist Party wanted to rule via centralized government control and a centrally-planned economy. Third, we had a military element: the arms race and the build-up of huge military confrontations.

Based on these three elements, I'm inclined to see what's going on now more as a breakdown of the international system created after World War II and that the U.S. had dominated. America is not as powerful as it once was. First, Russia turned out not to be a great fit for the established international system, for a variety of reasons. Second, China has risen to become an economic powerhouse that seeks to extend its influence – not (primarily) by military means but through the “belt and road” initiative investment, by building infrastructure in surrounding states. There was always a difficult relationship between the U.S. and China, but nothing like what the U.S.-Soviet relation was at the height of the Cold War.

With everything that has happened in the last few years, which event is going to prove a truly pivotal point for contemporary history when we look back in 20 or 30 years' time?

I think that the ten-day trip that Trump took to Europe was pivotal. The attacks on NATO, not to mention the way he treated Britain (Theresa May in particular), and what we know about his conduct during his meeting with Putin… I think we may look back on that week as a pivotal moment in the breakup of the transatlantic relationship. I don't know what it portends for U.S.-Russian relations, but I think it has made those relations much worse.

Let’s talk about your career here at Stanford. What brought you to FSI originally?

I had an invitation to come for a visit of three years. I was teaching in Edinburgh at the time, and I got a letter from Condi Rice, who was the assistant director of CISAC back then. After the three years, I decided I wasn’t going back. What was so attractive about FSI was the people. I know it may sound rather cliché, but there was such a great sense of possibility about the place. If you had an idea, instead of hearing people say, “Oh, we've never done it that way,” people would say, “Oh, yeah, let's see if we can help you do that!”

What is your fondest memory from your time at Stanford?

That's very difficult. I think one of my best memories is when Gorbachev came to speak at Stanford back in 1990. He gave a speech in the Stanford Memorial Auditorium, and the place was packed; it was at the height of Gorbo-mania. In the course of the speech he thanked some of us at FSI for helping to bring about the improvement in US-Soviet relations…Bill Perry, Pief Panofsky, Sid Drell, and myself. And that was – that's a pleasant moment to remember.

What advice would you give an undergrad starting at Stanford?  And what advice would you give a graduate student hoping to have a career in political science, history, or policy?

To the undergrad, my advice is rather obvious: at Stanford, you have this chance to look around and to try different things, new subjects and programs. Take full advantage of that!

To graduate students: I think most assume that when you choose to be a graduate student, you're choosing to be a specialist in a discipline. That’s true! Yet, at the same time, it is also very important to look around and see what there is outside your discipline, to learn how to communicate with people, particularly ones with other interests and in other fields.

We talk a lot about interdisciplinary work. But truly interdisciplinary work is very difficult. When I came to Stanford, I thought it fantastic that FSI had specialists in such diverse fields all in one place. At the time we had John Lewis who was a China specialist. Sid Drell was a physicist with a lot of experience working on national security issues. Phil Farley spent a long time in the State Department working on arms control issues. I learned a lot from Sid Drell; I wasn't doing physics, but we wrote something together. That kind of possibility and opportunity was incredible. I continued to love this about Stanford over the past 30 years, and I've been very grateful for all of these opportunities. 

As a last thought, I remember a conversation I had with John Hennessy when he was Dean of Engineering, and I was director of FSI. I remember telling him that, much to my surprise, a lot of our best supporters were (and continue to be) engineers. He said, “That’s obvious! No engineer thinks that his discipline alone can solve a problem. You have to work with other people when you're doing something!”

Then he said, “Engineers are also not averse to trying to raise money!” [laughter]

With so much circulating about the Helsinki summit on social media and in the press, we asked one of our resident Russian experts and historians at CISAC, Prof DAVID HOLLOWAY, for his 60 second quick take-aways on the Trump-Putin meeting of July 16th.

Quick-Take: Helsinki 2018 with David Holloway 

Q:What specific results/agreements have come out of the meeting?

A: That’s not clear.  We have only the press conference to go on.  Putin mentioned a number of areas in which working groups might be reestablished.  Trump mentioned that the NSC would follow up with the Russians on issues addressed in the meeting.  Those included arms control, the humanitarian in Syria, and counterterrorism.  Cooperation in those areas could be beneficial. 

Q: Trump mentioned that the meeting marked a “fundamental change” in US-Russian relations.  Is that true?

A: First, we don’t know what specific agreements – if any – have been concluded.  A broader dialogue between the two governments appears to be likely, and there are some areas in which agreement could be reached quickly – extension of New START, for example.  But reconstituting working groups is no guarantee that agreements can be reached.

Second, the tone of the press conference was extraordinary.  Trump’s earlier tweet that the US was to blame for the worsening of US-Russian relations set the tone.  Putin showed much greater command of the issues than Trump, which was to be expected.  Trump seemed obsessed by US domestic politics and his own political position, which was not a surprise.  Trump’s unwillingness to back his own intelligence agencies on the issue of Russian interference in the 2016 election was perhaps predictable, but nonetheless remarkable in the context of a meeting with Putin.

Third, taken together with the NATO summit last week, the meeting with Putin may come to look like a turning-point in US foreign policy, overturning – or at least greatly weakening – a long-standing alliance and creating dangerous uncertainty in European security relations.

About David Holloway:

DAVID HOLLOWAY is the Raymond A. Spruance Professor of International History, a professor of political science, and an FSI senior fellow. 

His research focuses on the international history of nuclear weapons, on science and technology in the Soviet Union, and on the relationship between international history and international relations theory.

Want to hear more from our experts?

FSI Director, MICHAEL MCFAUL, has been reporting live on the Trump-Putin summit from Helsinki. For access to his interviews with NBC News and MSNBC in the lead up to and the aftermath of the July 16th meeting, click here. To hear his post-Summit interview with NPR News, click here. 

In her latest article for The Atlantic , 'The Self-Inflicted Demise of American Power', CISAC co-Director AMY ZEGART argues that Trump’s foreign-policy doctrine can be summed up as “Make America Weak Again.” For the full article click here.

FSI's Deputy Director, KATHRYN STONER weighs in on the Helsinki summit and how disheartening it is to our own president reject the findings of our own Justice Department and Intelligence Agencies to defend Putin and blame everything on Hillary Clinton and her email servers. Listen to the episode of Background Briefing with Ian Masters click here. 

Discover More:

Check out the Russia Research page on our website for all articles and interviews about US-Russian relations with FSI faculty and visiting scholars.

The Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University is very pleased to announce that Lieutenant General H.R. McMaster, US Army (Ret.), has been appointed the Bernard and Susan Liautaud Visiting Fellow at FSI effective September 1, 2018. 

McMaster will also hold the Fouad and Michelle Ajami Senior Fellowship at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University, and serve as a lecturer at the Stanford Graduate School of Business in management.

“H.R. McMaster is a soldier-scholar who has seen war from every angle -- on the hot battlefield and through the cold judgment of history. Few officers ever serve their country in the highest levels of government. Fewer still have done so while getting a Ph.D. and writing an influential book about civil-military relations,” says Amy Zegart, a senior fellow and co-director of the Center for International Security and Cooperation at FSI. “He will bring a deep well of expertise and experience to the Hoover and Stanford communities. We are thrilled to be welcoming him back to the Farm.”

H.R. McMaster served in the United States Army for 34 years before his recent retirement in June 2018. Until recently, he also was the 26th Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.

Alongside his military career, he earned a Ph.D. in American history at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill in 1996. He has published essays, articles, and book reviews on history, the future of warfare, and leadership in numerous publications including, but not limited to, Foreign Affairs, the Wall Street Journal, and the New York Times. 

His seminal work is his book Dereliction of Duty: Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Lies that Led to Vietnam, published in 1997 and subsequently a New York Times bestseller.

In recent years he has been voted one of TIME magazine’s “100 Most Influential People in the World” and Fortune’s “50 World’s Greatest Leaders”.

“I am delighted to welcome H.R. McMaster back to the Stanford community,” says FSI director Michael McFaul. “In addition to his insights regarding national security strategy for the academic and policy worlds, we look forward to his contributions to the education and training of future foreign policy leaders from Stanford University.”

In a world complicated by terrorism, cyber threats and political instability, the private sector has to prepare for the unexpected. Amy Zegart, CISAC co-director, the Hoover Institution’s Davies Family Senior Fellow, and co-author (along with Condoleezza Rice) of Political Risk: How Businesses And Organizations Can Anticipate Global Insecurity, explains lessons learned in keeping cargo planes moving, hotel guests protected – and possibly coffee customers better served.  

Immediate denuclearization of North Korea is dangerous to both North Korean and American interests, say Stanford scholars in a new research report. Instead, they advocate for phased denuclearization to take place over 10 years or more, allowing the United States to reduce the greatest risks first and address the manageable risks over time.