International Relations

FSI researchers strive to understand how countries relate to one another, and what policies are needed to achieve global stability and prosperity. International relations experts focus on the challenging U.S.-Russian relationship, the alliance between the U.S. and Japan and the limitations of America’s counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan.

Foreign aid is also examined by scholars trying to understand whether money earmarked for health improvements reaches those who need it most. And FSI’s Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center has published on the need for strong South Korean leadership in dealing with its northern neighbor.

FSI researchers also look at the citizens who drive international relations, studying the effects of migration and how borders shape people’s lives. Meanwhile FSI students are very much involved in this area, working with the United Nations in Ethiopia to rethink refugee communities.

Trade is also a key component of international relations, with FSI approaching the topic from a slew of angles and states. The economy of trade is rife for study, with an APARC event on the implications of more open trade policies in Japan, and FSI researchers making sense of who would benefit from a free trade zone between the European Union and the United States.

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Stanford political scientists Condoleezza Rice and Amy Zegart offer insights about how businesses can most effectively confront “political risks” in an uncertain world where information for customers and clients is now at their fingertips.

 

While political risks have grown more complex, wisely managing them remains fairly straightforward, two Stanford scholars say.

Political scientists Condoleezza Rice and Amy Zegart explain how a company’s fairy tale can become a nightmare if it fails to take effective measures against “political risk,” the probability that an action or event will significantly affect business, positively or negatively.

 

For companies, political risk is defined as the probability that a political action will significantly affect their business – whether positively or negatively.

Whether those threats come from government, Twitter, terrorists or activists and hackers, the reality is that political risks can blindside even the best managers if preparatory measures are not taken, say Condoleezza Rice and Amy Zegart, two Stanford political scientists. They co-taught the Stanford MBA course, Managing Global Political Risk, to more than 200 students over the past six years, collecting case studies and research for their course.

Zegart, the Davies Family Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution and co-director of Stanford’s Center for International Security and Cooperation, and Rice, the Thomas and Barbara Stephenson Senior Fellow at Hoover and a former U.S. secretary of state, feature their findings in the book, Political Risk: How Businesses and Organizations Can Anticipate Global Insecurity. Rice is also the Denning Professor in Global Business and the Economy at the Stanford Graduate School of Business.

Drawing on social science research, interviews with industry leaders and their own experiences, Rice and Zegart explain why political risk is so hard for all organizations to see. They provide detailed examples of best practices and cautionary tales in risk management from leading businesses as well as insights from aircraft carrier operations, NASA’s space shuttle program and professional sports teams.

Political Risk offers a new approach for anticipating, analyzing, mitigating and responding to possible threats that can be applied in any organization.

In an interview, Zegart said that such risk is no longer just about a foreign country’s tax system, regulatory environment or threat of expropriation.

“Instead, security challenges – wars, civil unrest, cyberthreats, terrorism and insurgencies – pose risks and opportunities for global organizations and businesses, which could have catastrophic or – if well handled – beneficial consequences,” Zegart said.

At the same time, globalization and social media have given local people everywhere an ability to spread messages and join in common causes around the world. As a result, politics in one location can have cascading effects elsewhere – whether it’s the spread of Tunisian protests in the Arab uprisings or a campaign to ban the sale of “conflict diamonds” from war-torn African countries.

From fairy tale to nightmare

Consider SeaWorld, the theme park company that in 2013 had just completed an initial public offering that exceeded expectations, raising more than $700 million in capital and valuing the company at $2.5 billion, according to Rice and Zegart.

Eighteen months later, SeaWorld’s fairy tale had become a nightmare. The stock price had plunged 60 percent and top management resigned. Why? A low-budget documentary film examined the treatment of the company’s famed killer whales. Soon, news headlines were excoriating the company, with pressure growing on public officials to regulate the handling of killer whales. Amid the backlash, SeaWorld’s stock fell from $38.92 a share to $15.77 in 2014 – and it has not recovered.

So, how can companies and organizations best manage political risk in our current environment of rapid information? Rice and Zegart suggest a new “framework.”

Understand risks: Companies need to evaluate what their appetite is for political risk. For example, while oil and gas companies undertake long-term investments in distant countries, they might be willing to tolerate more risk than more retail-oriented industries, such as hotel chains and theme parks, that face customers on a daily basis.

Also, they should ask: What is their company-wide understanding about the tolerance of risk? Rice and Zegart suggest companies encourage creative thinking to guard against “blind spots” or groupthink” when it comes to judging risk factors.

Analyze risks: Getting good information about political risks and conducting objective reviews and analyses of those challenges is important, Rice and Zegart wrote. That research can be used to make wiser business decisions grounded in reality. “Getting managers to use rigorous political risk analyses – of any variety – to defend investments can significantly improve decision-making.”

Reduce risk exposure: Organizations need to ask themselves how they can decrease their susceptibility to identified political risks. Also, do good systems and teams exist that can react and handle situations on a timely basis? Also, Rice and Zegart noted, managers can take steps to minimize potential damage long before a crisis unfolds if they plan properly and foresee the likely risks.

Respond to risks: Organizations can learn from incidents where something may have gone wrong. They can use such knowledge to respond more effectively to future crises. “Leaders must react and correct for the human tendency to ascribe close calls to a system’s resiliency when it’s just as likely the near miss occurred because of a system’s vulnerability,” according to Rice and Zegart.

They provide as an example of a wise approach a toy company that in 2006 created a strategic risk management system that helped align views on risk across the company. Leadership set up systematic processes for training all new managers about risk; engaging every important business leader, including the board members, in setting the risk appetite; identifying risks; and integrating risk assessment and reduction into business planning.

They also pointed to a hotel chain that now has a sophisticated security alert system. While the company acknowledges it doesn’t know when or where terrorists may strike next, it has increased preparedness and safety measures in every hotel. The company achieves this by notifying hotel managers about changing conditions that might pose a threat and informing employees what to do in potential cases of risk.

“In the end,” Rice and Zegart write, “the most effective organizations have three big things in common: They take political risk seriously, they approach it systematically and with humility, and they lead from the top.”

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Abstract: International cooperation has long been founded on the idea that securing a common factual understanding of things in the world is a prerequisite for deciding how to act in concert. However, in recent decades the very possibility of such agreement on the facts has come under attack both empirically, through persistent technical controversies around issues such as climate change and crop biotechnology, and theoretically, from demonstrations that facts and norms are co-produced to build alternate, coexisting worlds. The divergent self-understandings of these worlds, in which epistemic and normative order are interdependent, cannot be bridged by simply insisting on a singular “reality” that must be accepted by all.

In this talk, I use the longue durée case of international biotech regulation to suggest a different basis for long-term cooperation. Using epistemic subsidiarity rather than harmonization as the basis for making progress, I suggest how biotechnology risks might be handled in three regimes of subsidiarity: coexistence, cosmopolitanism, and constitutionalism. The advantages and limits of each regime will be exemplified and reflected upon.

Speaker bio: Sheila Jasanoff is Pforzheimer Professor of Science and Technology Studies at the Harvard Kennedy School. A pioneer in her field, she has authored more than 120 articles and chapters and is author or editor of more than 15 books, including The Fifth Branch, Science at the Bar, Designs on Nature, and The Ethics of Invention. Her work explores the role of science and technology in the law, politics, and policy of modern democracies. She founded and directs the STS Program at Harvard; previously, she was founding chair of the STS Department at Cornell. She has held distinguished visiting appointments at leading universities in Europe, Asia, Australia, and the US. Jasanoff served on the AAAS Board of Directors and as President of the Society for Social Studies of Science. She is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations. Her honors include a Guggenheim Fellowship, an Ehrenkreuz from the Government of Austria, membership in the Royal Danish Academy, and the Humboldt Foundation’s Reimar-Lüst award. She holds AB, JD, and PhD degrees from Harvard, and honorary doctorates from the Universities of Twente and Liège.

Sheila Jasanoff Professor of Science and Technology Studies Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government
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This interview originally appeared in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists March 9, 2018.

It was an extraordinary week in North Korean nuclear affairs. First, high-level South Korean envoys met with the North’s leader Kim Jong-un, returning to Seoul with promises of an inter-Korean summit and other seemingly conciliatory statements. That news was quickly eclipsed, though, when later in the week, one of the South Korean envoys turned up in Washington with a personal invitation from Kim Jong-un to US President Donald Trump to meet him in Pyongyang. Trump agreed to meet “at a place and time to be determined.” It would be the first-ever meeting between a sitting US president and a North Korean head of state. But just as everyone was getting their heads around the idea that these two leaders—who just last year were threatening each other with nuclear destruction—would soon meet face to face, the White House added a caveat. On Friday, Press Secretary Sarah Huckabee Sanders said Trump would only attend if North Korea first took unspecified “concrete and verifiable steps.” In case your head isn’t spinning yet, a Wall Street Journal reporter later tweeted that a White House official told him “the invitation has been extended and accepted, and that stands.”

As the Trump White House broadcast its internal confusion, the Bulletin turned to someone who could give the longer view. Siegfried S. Hecker is the former director of the Los Alamos National Laboratory and has visited North Korean nuclear facilities multiple times. We published several interviews with him as North Korea developed its nuclear program last year. (For his in-depth takes on Pyongyang’s recent weapon testing, see herehere, and here.) We asked him what he made of this week’s events, and what they bode for the future.

BAS: Not so long ago, Trump and Kim were trading mockery and threats of nuclear annihilation. In our September 2017 interview, you recommended that Washington dispatch a team to talk to Kim to establish lines of communications and avoid a nuclear catastrophe. It was envoys from South Korean President Moon Jae-in, though, who seem to have broken the stalemate by acting as Pyongyang-Washington intermediaries. Are you surprised that Seoul was able to take on this role? And what do you think of Trump accepting the invitation to talk directly to Kim?

SH: Nothing short of amazing. I did not expect Kim Jong-un to be willing to talk to Seoul first. It was a very clever move on his part to take advantage of Moon’s desire to engage diplomatically and help ensure a peaceful Olympic games. Kim’s invitation to Trump is not so surprising, since he had given hints of being ready to talk, and Moon teed this up nicely. The most surprising part is Trump’s acceptance.

BAS: Let’s get to Trump in a minute. First, how had Kim signaled that he was prepared to talk?

SH: Kim Jong-un gave hints of a diplomatic initiative in his New Year’s message. He announced in early January, “we achieved the goal of completing our state nuclear force in 2017,” and added, “the entire area of the US mainland is within our nuclear strike range, and the US can never start a war against me and our country. These weapons will be used only if our security is threatened.” So, he opened the door for dialogue, and followed up by sending a team to the Olympics along with a high-level delegation that included his sister.

BAS: What did Kim Jong-un tell the South Korean envoys to Pyongyang on Monday?

SH: Kim said that the North would have no reason to possess nuclear weapons if the security of its regime could be guaranteed and military threats against North Korea removed. Moreover, he expressed willingness to talk to Washington on denuclearizing the peninsula and normalizing bilateral ties, and to do so without pre-conditions. He also agreed to a moratorium on missile and nuclear testing while Pyongyang and Washington talk. Kim even said he is willing to accept the joint South Korean-US military drills as a reality. The North has objected vehemently to these in the past.

BAS: Why would Trump accept an invitation to a summit now, when last fall he threatened Kim with fire and fury and the total destruction of North Korea?

SH: We may have an unusual confluence of events. As well as issuing those threats, Trump widely broadcast that he was considering preventive military strikes, and also urged what he calls maximum pressure, both economic and political, on North Korea. He can claim, perhaps even with some justification, that his policies and actions brought Kim Jong-un to the diplomatic table to discuss denuclearization. Kim, on the other hand, can tell his people that he is coming to negotiations from a position of strength now that he has intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and can threaten the United States. In other words, both can declare victory.

BAS: Kim claims that all of the United States is within nuclear strike range, but you said in September that it would take another couple of years before North Korea could hit the US mainland. What has changed?

SH: North Korea successfully launched its largest missile to date, the Hwasong-15 ICBM, on November 29th. It was an impressive feat. Yet it was launched on a highly lofted trajectory to fly high rather than far. One rocket test does not constitute an operational ICBM fleet. Besides, they have yet to demonstrate that the nuclear warheads that would be mounted on this—or its sister Hwasong-14—can be made sufficiently small, light, and robust to survive a fiery reentry into the atmosphere. It still needs to do more missile and nuclear tests. But if Kim tells his people that they can threaten the United States, let’s not argue too much.

From my perspective, there is no imminent threat that a North Korean nuclear-tipped missile will detonate on American soil. However, Kim does deter the United States because he likely has shorter-range nuclear-tipped missiles that can reach all of South Korea and Japan. That alone should deter Washington from military action against North Korea, because they can inflict unacceptable damage to US assets and allies.

BAS: Is the inter-Korean summit that the North and South agreed to earlier this week a good idea? What about the Kim-Trump summit that now seems likely?

SH: The inter-Korean summit is a good idea. It is what South Korean President Moon wants in order to pursue peace on the Korean peninsula, and he has an experienced team in place. The initial visit to Pyongyang by the South Korean envoys has already told us more about Kim than we have learned over the past six years. It moved us at least one step away from the nuclear brink.

The Kim-Trump summit is also welcome, because it has the potential to move us much farther away from the brink and toward an eventual peaceful resolution to the nuclear crisis on the Korean peninsula. But while it offers many opportunities, it also presents serious challenges.

BAS: On Friday, the White House press secretary seemed to waffle on whether Trump was really accepting the invitation to Pyongyang, saying the United States would require North Korea to take “concrete and verifiable steps” before a sit-down with Kim. Any idea what those might be? Is this a White House effort to keep its options open?

SH: I really don't know. If she was referring to the points that Kim agreed on with the South Korean envoys, the only one that would require action is refraining from missile and nuclear tests. This is verifiable, and of course, should the North conduct such tests, there should be no meeting.

BAS: If talks go forward, does the Trump administration have an experienced team in place? If the meeting is to take place by the end of May, as has been proposed, does the United States have sufficient time to make the best of the opportunity?

SH: The administration’s diplomatic team is understaffed and lacks people who have experience negotiating with North Korea. Time is very tight, especially since these efforts were not preceded by lower-level diplomatic engagement. The administration would be well advised to call on experts outside of government who have diplomatic and technical/military experience in Korea.

BAS: What do you see as the biggest challenges?

SH: In spite of the willingness to talk by both sides, Washington and Pyongyang have dramatically different views on what brought us to this nuclear crisis. It will take a long time and tedious negotiations to resolve. The best we can hope for at this time is for the leaders to reach an understanding that they must avoid war. To do so, they must lower tensions and establish mechanisms to avoid misunderstandings. The Trump administration must enter the summit with the understanding that it represents the beginning of a long journey, not the end destination. Even if an agreement is eventually reached, it will be the follow-through and implementation that determine its success. Washington has done very poorly on both over the years.

BAS: There’s a lot of speculation about why Kim Jong-un chose now to talk. Some think the US and UN sanctions were biting hard, but others say his move was taken right out of his father’s playbook. That is, that he is offering a dialogue on arms control to wrest concessions and aid from Washington. Or, he may be buying time to enhance his nuclear arsenal. Or, he is very cleverly trying to drive a wedge between South Korea and the United States. What do you think?

SH: To sort this out requires a comprehensive understanding of both political developments in North Korea over the last 25 years and the growth of its nuclear and missile programs. We are working on that. For now, let me offer one other possibility. Kim may simply be following through on what he laid out in March 2013. He said that North Korea plans to follow a dual-track policy, featuring both military and economic development. His nuclear and missile developments in 2017 may have provided him with sufficient security to allow him to turn to economic development. And economic development will require a link to the international community and at least for now that link goes through Washington.

BAS: In the United States, many responses to the potential summit have been cautious, skeptical, or downright negative. Are you surprised?

SH: Many in the US government and much of the US news media have demonized North Korea’s leaders, and in fact the entire country. So the general public mood is conditioned to be negative or at least skeptical about anything proposed by the North. Moreover, some of the public is concerned that Washington doesn’t have the wisdom and staying power to pull this off.

Although I don’t think we are on the verge of solving the North Korean crisis, Kim’s initiative and Trump’s willingness to meet must be viewed as serious moves to lower tensions on the Korean peninsula. They are welcome steps away from the brink of nuclear war. Now, the hard part begins.

 

 

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Abstract: What are the consequences of the emergence of robotics, big data, and artificial intelligence for international politics? Are these new technologies going to promote instability and conflict, as many warn, or are they going to reinforce U.S. military primacy? In particular, will China be able to gain and eventually exploit the unfolding technological revolution - the so-called Second Machine age - or are such concerns exaggerated? The literature in political science and international relations theory has either largely neglected technology and technological innovation, or simply assumed that technology is a substitute for labor that reduces countries' constraints to go to war. Drawing from the scholarship in economics and management, in this article we look at technology in terms of a set complements and nodes-in-the-network. Thus, while technological innovation reduces the prices of some goods or tasks, it simultaneously makes their complementary assets more difficult to procure (through an increase in the demand). The resulting distributional effects, we argue, explain why actors will benefit unevenly from technological change. We test our theoretical insights by looking at seapower in the first and in the emerging second machine age: respectively, the time of the steam engine, steel hulls, quick-firing long-range guns and the telegraph; as well as the unfolding era of neural networks, fast processors and real-time communications. Our preliminary empirical results corroborate our framework, namely that the effects of technological change are much more complex than the literature acknowledges and highlights the challenges countries will have to face in the military realm during the second machine age.

Speaker biosAndrea Gilli is a Postdoctoral Fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School of Harvard University and a former Postdoctoral Fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation of Stanford University. Andrea has conducted research for several organizations, including the European Union Institute for Security Studies, RUSI in London and the Office of Net Assessment of the U.S. Department of Defense. He holds a Ph.D. in social and political science from the European University Institute, an MSc from the London School of Economics and Political Science and a B.A. from the University of Turin.


Mauro Gilli is a Senior Researcher at the Center for Security Studies of ETH-Zurich (Switzerland). During the academic year 2015-16, he was a Postdoctoral Fellow at the Dickey Center for International Understanding of Dartmouth College. He holds a Ph.D. in political science from Northwestern University, an MA from SAIS-Johns Hopkins and a B.A. from the University of Turin.

Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Mauro Gilli Center for Security Studies of ETH-Zurich
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Kristen Eichensehr is a professor at Harvard Law School. She writes and teaches about foreign relations, national security, cybersecurity, and international law. Her recent work addresses national security screening of investments, separation of powers in the national security state, the attribution of state-sponsored cyberattacks, and the interaction of the Supreme Court’s major questions doctrine with U.S. international agreements.

Eichensehr is a member of the U.S. State Department’s Advisory Committee on International Law, and she serves as an adviser on the Restatement (Fourth) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States. She also serves on the editorial boards of Just Security and the Journal of National Security Law & Policy. Eichensehr received the 2018 Mike Lewis Prize for National Security Law Scholarship for her article “Courts, Congress, and the Conduct of Foreign Relations,” and her article on “National Security Creep in Corporate Transactions” (with Cathy Hwang) was selected as one of the best corporate and securities articles of 2023 by Corporate Practice Commentator.

Prior to entering academia, Eichensehr clerked for Justices Sandra Day O’Connor and Sonia Sotomayor of the Supreme Court of the United States and for then-Judge Merrick B. Garland of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit. She also served as special assistant to the legal adviser of the U.S. Department of State and practiced at Covington & Burling in Washington, D.C.

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About the event: Harvard University Distinguished Service Professor Joseph S. Nye, Jr. will speak to an audience of Stanford faculty, students, affiliates and staff during a talk titled, Will the liberal international order survive? The event will be chaired by Amy Zegart, co-director, Center for International Security & Cooperation, and Davies Family Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution. A Q&A will follow.

Speaker bio: Joseph S. Nye, Jr. is University Distinguished Service Professor and former Dean of the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. He received his bachelor's degree summa cum laude from Princeton University, studied at Oxford University on a Rhodes Scholarship, and earned a Ph.D. in political science from Harvard where he joined the faculty in 1964. In 2008, a poll of  2700 international relations scholars listed him as the most influential scholar on American foreign policy, and in 2011 Foreign Policy listed him among the 100 leading global thinkers. 

From 1977-79, Nye was a deputy Undersecretary of State and chaired the National Security Council Group on Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons. In 1993-94 he chaired the National Intelligence Council which prepares intelligence estimates for the president, and in 1994-95 served as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. He won Distinguished Service medals from all three agencies.

Nye has published fourteen academic books, a novel, and more than 150 articles in professional and policy journals.  Recent books include Soft PowerThe Powers to LeadThe Future of Power, and Is the American Century Over?

He is a fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, the British Academy, the American Academy of Diplomacy, and an honorary fellow of Exeter College, Oxford. He is the recipient of Princeton University’s Woodrow Wilson Award, the Charles Merriam Award from the American Political Science Association, France’s Palmes Académiques, Japan’s Order of the Rising Sun, and numerous honorary degrees. 

Joseph S. Nye, Jr. University Distinguished Service Professor Harvard University
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Director, Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies
Steven C. Házy Senior Fellow, Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies
Professor, by courtesy, of Political Science
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Colin Kahl is director of the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies and the Steven C. Házy Senior Fellow. He is also the faculty director of CISAC’s Program on Geopolitics, Technology, and Governance, and a professor of political science (by courtesy).

From April 2021-July 2023, Dr. Kahl served as the under secretary of defense for policy at the U.S. Department of Defense. In that role, he was the principal adviser to the secretary of defense for all matters related to national security and defense policy and represented the department as a standing member of the National Security Council Deputies’ Committee. He oversaw the writing of the 2022 National Defense Strategy, which focused the Pentagon’s efforts on the “pacing challenge” posed by the PRC, and he led the department’s response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and numerous other international crises. He also led several other major defense diplomacy initiatives, including an unprecedented strengthening of the NATO alliance; the negotiation of the AUKUS agreement with Australia and the United Kingdom; historic defense force posture enhancements in Australia, Japan, and the Philippines; and deepening defense and strategic ties with India. In June 2023, Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin III awarded Dr. Kahl the Department of Defense Distinguished Public Service Medal, the highest civilian award presented by the secretary of defense.

During the Obama Administration, Dr. Kahl served as deputy assistant to President Obama and national security advisor to Vice President Biden from October 2014 to January 2017. He also served as deputy assistant secretary of defense for the Middle East from February 2009 to December 2011, for which he received the Outstanding Public Service Medal in July 2011.

Dr. Kahl is the co-author (along with Thomas Wright) of Aftershocks: Pandemic Politics and the End of the Old International Order (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2021) and the author of States, Scarcity, and Civil Strife in the Developing World (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006). He has also published numerous article on U.S. national security and defense policy in Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, International Security, the Los Angeles Times, Middle East Policy, the National Interest, the New Republic, the New York Times, Politico, the Washington Post, and the Washington Quarterly, as well as several reports for the Center for a New American Security (CNAS), a non-partisan think tank in Washington, DC.

Dr. Kahl previously taught at Georgetown University and the University of Minnesota, and he has held fellowship positions at Harvard University, the Council on Foreign Relations, CNAS, and the Penn Biden Center for Diplomacy and International Engagement.

He received his B.A. in political science from the University of Michigan (1993) and his Ph.D. in political science from Columbia University (2000).

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Abstract: Rising powers often seek to reshape the world order, triggering confrontations with those who seek to defend the status quo. In recent years, as international institutions have grown in prevalence and influence, they have increasingly become central arenas for international contestation. In this seminar, Phillip Lipscy will describe the main findings from his book, which examines how international institutions evolve as countries seek to renegotiate the international order. He offers a new theory of institutional change and explains why some institutions change flexibly while others successfully resist or fall to the wayside. The book uses a wealth of empirical evidence - quantitative and qualitative - to evaluate the theory from international organizations such as the International Monetary Fund, World Bank, European Union, League of Nations, United Nations, the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization, and Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers. The book will be of particular interest to scholars interested in the historical and contemporary diplomacy of the United States, Japan, and China.

Speaker bio: Phillip Y. Lipscy is the Thomas Rohlen Center Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies and Assistant Professor of Political Science at Stanford University. His fields of research include international and comparative political economy, international security, and the politics of East Asia, particularly Japan.

Lipscy’s book from Cambridge University Press, Renegotiating the World Order: Institutional Change in International Relations, examines how countries seek greater international influence by reforming or creating international organizations. His research addresses a wide range of substantive topics such as international cooperation, the politics of energy, the politics of financial crises, the use of secrecy in international policy making, and the effect of domestic politics on trade. He has also published extensively on Japanese politics and foreign policy.

Lipscy obtained his PhD in political science at Harvard University. He received his MA in international policy studies and BA in economics and political science at Stanford University. Lipscy has been affiliated with the Reischauer Institute of Japanese Studies and Weatherhead Center for International Affairs at Harvard University, the Institute of Social Science at the University of Tokyo, the Institute for Global and International Studies at George Washington University, the RAND Corporation, and the Institute for International Policy Studies.

For additional information such as C.V., publications, and working papers, please visit Phillip Lipscy's homepage.

Phillip Lipscy Thomas Rohlen Fellow Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center
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Abstract: This paper explores Iraqi signaling after the 1991 Gulf War. The conventional wisdom argues that Iraq sent mixed signals to the outside world due to Saddam’s desire to balance deterrence and compliance with Security Council resolutions. Drawing on Iraqi primary sources, I explore how Iraqi officials debated their options, crafted signals, and how they interpreted the reception of these signals in the outside world. I argue that Iraqi regime was more rational, but also more dysfunctional, than previous work suggests.
  
Speaker bio: Målfrid Braut-Hegghammer is Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Oslo. She has previously been a Junior Faculty Fellow at CISAC, Stanford University, and a pre- and post-doctoral fellow at the Belfer Center, Harvard University. She received her doctoral degree from London School of Economics in 2009, which received the Michael Nicholson Thesis Prize from BISA in 2010. She recently published Unclear Physics: Why Iraq and Libya failed to build nuclear weapons (Cornell University Press, 2016), which was reviewed in The New York Review of Books, Foreign Affairs, Survival, International Affairs, HDiplo, Babylon, and Internasjonal Politikk. Her work has been published in International Security, The Middle East Journal, the New York Times (online), International Herald Tribune, Monkey Cage and War on the Rocks.

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Målfrid Braut-Hegghammer is an Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Oslo. She first joined CISAC as a visiting associate professor and Stanton nuclear security junior faculty fellow in September 2012, and was a Stanford MacArthur Visiting Scholar between 2013-15. Between 2008 and 2010 she was a predoctoral and postdoctoral fellow at Harvard University's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. Braut-Hegghammer received her PhD, entitled “Nuclear Entrepreneurs: Drivers of Nuclear Proliferation” from the London School of Economics in 2010. She received the British International Studies Association’s Michael Nicholson Thesis Prize that same year for her work.

 

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Associate Professor of Political Science University of Oslo
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Abstract: In the fifty years following World War II, Argentina and Brazil constructed advanced nuclear energy programs that far outpaced those of other countries in Latin America. However, their more memorable and lasting contribution to nuclear energy history may well be diplomatic, rather than technical. Beginning in 1974 with an Argentine delegation’s tour of carefully selected Brazilian nuclear facilities, and vice versa, the two countries – under military rule and in a centuries-long competition for regional influence and dominance – began a rapprochement around nuclear energy as gradual as it was unlikely. A watershed presidential summit in 1980 pledged the neighbors to cooperation in specific areas of nuclear energy. It took until 1991, however, for a growing system of informal inspections to coalesce into the world’s only bilateral nuclear safeguards organization, known as ABACC. This talk will focus primarily on the contributions of the scientific and technical communities, and their close work with the two foreign ministries, within this delicate seventeen-year process.

Speaker bio: Chris Dunlap is a Nuclear Security Postdoctoral Fellow at CISAC. His research is funded by the MacArthur Foundation. His book project, developed from his dissertation, focuses on the fundamental role of nuclear energy technology and diplomacy in shaping modern Brazil and Argentina and their bilateral relationship. The paths taken to develop nuclear energy in the South American neighbor countries also illustrate the impact that these nations and their key actors, often left out of global energy history, made upon the physical, legal, and diplomatic structures of the Atomic Age. By 1995, both nations had ceased early-stage efforts toward a nuclear explosion, accepted full safeguards and international verification of all fuel cycle activities, and transformed the "imported magic" of nuclear technology into their own. How this happened, and why, is the history at the heart of the parallel power play that defined Brazil and Argentina's engagement with Atomic Age diplomacy and technology.  

Chris received his Ph.D. in history from the University of Chicago in 2017, and also holds a B.A. in history with high distinction, B.S. in biochemistry, and M.A. in history from the University of Virginia.
Christopher Dunlap CISAC Nuclear Security Postdoctoral Fellow
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