Despite tensions in the summit lead-up, the two leaders were overly cordial in their remarks after the meeting. Rose Gottemoeller, lead US negotiator for the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), joined The World's host Marco Werman to offer insight.

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U.S. President Joe Biden and Russian President Vladimir Putin held a short summit yesterday in Switzerland that both sides described as substantive, efficient, and without rancor. Did the meeting advance Biden’s objective of building a stable and predictable U.S.-Russia relationship? The short answer: too early to tell.

The meeting took place at a time when U.S.-Russia relations are at their lowest point in 30 years. Unlike his four predecessors, Biden did not enter office with the goal of building a positive relationship with Russia. Stable and predictable are his administration’s watchwords. The White House accordingly sought to keep summit expectations modest.

In the event, the atmospherics at the Geneva lakeside villa appeared encouraging. When meeting with foreign leaders, Putin has a bad habit of arriving late — sometimes hours late — but he showed up on time for this U.S. president. That provided a good start. In his post-summit press conference, the Russian president seemed to go out of his way to express respect for Biden.

That said, whether the meeting qualifies as a success will depend on what happens in the coming months. Biden administration officials have since January talked about their readiness to push back and hold Russia to account for unacceptable actions in tandem with their readiness to cooperate where U.S. and Russian interests converge. In his separate post-meeting press conference, Biden said he had made no threats but did tell Putin that interference in American politics and certain cyber actions were out of bounds and would provoke an American response. With regard to the latter, he alluded to significant U.S. government cyber capabilities.

In his press conference, President Putin took no responsibility for interference in U.S. politics or cyberattacks, but no one expected he would. The big question now: Does the Kremlin continue those activities? That will offer one metric by which to judge the success of yesterday’s summit.

President Biden said the United States would continue to speak out on democracy and human rights, calling that part of America’s DNA. He specifically raised the case of regime opponent Alexei Navalny, whose name Putin avoids, referring instead to “the gentleman in question.” We will see what happens, but the Kremlin takes the view that what happens inside Russia is Russia’s business alone. Putin deflected questions about domestic repression, resorting to his trademark “whataboutisms.” (Biden rejected the Russian leader’s attempt to equate demonstrations for democratic rights in Russia with the January 6 assault on the Capitol.)

The two presidents issued a single joint statement, worked out in advance, in which they reiterated Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev’s formula that “a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.” The statement noted their agreement to launch an “integrated bilateral Strategic Stability Dialogue… to lay the groundwork for future arms control and risk reduction measures.” Biden told the press that he and Putin had discussed next steps in arms control.

Washington and Moscow should get the Strategic Stability Dialogue underway soon. These are discussions that can cover a broad range of questions, including those on which one side or the other may not be prepared to negotiate. The bigger issue will be how long it will take U.S. and Russian officials to work out the mandate (or mandates) for specific negotiations. Secretary of State Antony Blinken has talked about the U.S. interest in a negotiation that would cover and limit all U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons, strategic and non-strategic — a logical follow-on to the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START). While not necessarily rejecting that, Russian officials focus on other issues, including missile defense and long-range, precision-guided conventional strike weapons. Reconciling the different priorities may not prove simple.

The presidents discussed cyber activities, on which the sides agreed to conduct bilateral consultations. However, Washington and Moscow may come to that dialogue with different perspectives as to what constitutes a cyber “problem” and on how to fix it. Adding a layer of complexity is that fact that both sides use, and presumably intend to continue using, cyber means for intelligence-gathering purposes.

Biden and Putin identified other questions — including Afghanistan, keeping Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, the Arctic, and climate change — where the two countries arguably share interests. How discussions on those questions develop remain to be seen.

The two presidents touched on tough issues, foremost Russia’s conflict against Ukraine. Biden said he communicated U.S. support for Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. They agreed that the Minsk process offers the way forward for settling the simmering conflict in Donbas, though they clearly differ as to how the Minsk agreements should be implemented.

The presidents decided that their ambassadors should return to their respective embassies, a sensible step since following up on Geneva will require a fair amount of bilateral diplomacy.

All in all, White House officials and the president should be pleased with the mini-summit in Switzerland and Biden’s press conference. The meeting accomplished what they said they wanted to do: lay out what egregious Russian behavior would cross red lines, triggering a punitive response, and identify areas, particularly related to strategic stability, on which the United States and Russia might cooperate. The hard work of building on the presidents’ discussions will shortly begin. That will determine, likely months down the road, whether Geneva qualifies as a success for U.S. interests.

Originally for Brookings

Presidents Joe Biden and Vladimir Putin will meet in Geneva on June 16, at a time when US-Russian relations have hit a post-Cold War nadir. Biden can use the meeting to make clear the kinds of Russian actions that he considers unacceptable and for which there will be consequences while opening cooperative channels on the few issues where US and Russian interests converge. The White House seeks to keep expectations modest, correctly so.

Biden’s offer in April of a summer summit caught many by surprise, likely including Putin himself. Although the Kremlin played coy about agreeing to meet, the Russian president would not pass up the opportunity, if for no other reason than a meeting with the American president plays to his sense of his and Russia’s importance on the world stage.

While the previous four American presidents came to office expressing hopes of building a positive relationship with Russia, Biden administration officials have set a more limited objective: a stable and predictable relationship. They have made clear their intention to hold the Kremlin to account for egregious misbehavior but also expressed readiness to work with Moscow where interests overlap. In its first four months, the administration applied sanctions against Russia for interfering in the 2020 US presidential election and the SolarWinds hack while agreeing to extend the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty to 2026.

When they meet in Switzerland, Biden should address three sets of issues. First, he should candidly describe to Putin the kinds of Russian actions that he will regard as unacceptable and to which the administration will respond, either with sanctions or in other ways. Interference in American domestic politics should top the list. State-sponsored cyberattacks that sabotage US government systems or private-sector controls for critical infrastructure should also rank high on the list, as should the actions of cyber criminals if allowed to continue to operate freely in Russia against US targets. Although it will be anathema to the Russian president, Biden should note the sorts of human rights violations that will draw US sanctions.

Putin will deny interfering in US politics or conducting cyberattacks, asserting that Washington has no proof, while rejecting the legitimacy of US concerns about what happens within Russia. Biden should not waste time arguing. He should aim instead to ensure that Putin has a clear understanding of what conduct is out of bounds. If American reactions are predictable in Moscow, that could affect cost-benefit calculations when the Kremlin weighs potential actions—perhaps even swaying the decision in some cases.

The second set of issues includes those areas where bilateral cooperation appears possible. One such area is arms control, in which both countries have expressed an interest. The presidents might agree to an early round of bilateral strategic stability talks, which could usefully bring together senior officials to discuss the range of nuclear arms and related issues, including missile defense, third-country nuclear forces, precision-guided conventional strike systems, and the space and cyber domains. The talks could also address nuclear doctrines and steps the two militaries might take to reduce the risk of conflict by accident or miscalculation.

Launching formal negotiations will require more time. The Biden arms control team is not yet fully in place, and the administration will want to conduct at least the first part of a nuclear posture review to underpin its negotiating approach. The more difficult problem, however, stems from the two sides’ different priorities. Washington wants negotiations that will produce limits on all US and Russian nuclear arms, including non-strategic nuclear weapons. Russian officials, on the other hand, seem to attach priority to limiting missile defense and long-range conventional strike systems. Reconciling these different priorities may not prove easy. If Moscow chooses to link questions, an early tough decision could confront the Biden administration: Is the US interest in limiting and reducing all nuclear arms so intense that it would be prepared to countenance some constraints on missile defense?

There may be other specific areas where cooperative discussions make sense. US and NATO military forces will depart Afghanistan by September. Neither the United States nor Russia has an interest in that country plunging into chaos or the Taliban returning to power—and troubles in Afghanistan would be 5,000 miles closer to Moscow than Washington. Climate change could offer an area, though the seriousness of the Kremlin’s intent to tackle that challenge remains unclear.

The third set of questions are those where US and Russian interests clash and no early resolution appears possible. The biggest is Russia’s conflict with Ukraine. Washington wants to see Ukraine develop as a stable, independent, democratic state free to choose its own foreign policy course. Moscow wants to pull Ukraine back into Russia’s sphere of influence or, failing that, it seeks to pressure and destabilize Kyiv so as to frustrate efforts at reform and building a modern European state.

Biden should underscore US support for Ukraine; note that the Russia-Ukraine conflict poses the biggest obstacle to moving the US-Russia relationship back to something approaching “normal;” and make clear that, for starters, the Kremlin needs to make a major change in its course on Donbas, a region in eastern Ukraine where an ongoing conflict has claimed the lives of more than 13,000 people. He might offer to engage more directly—with Kyiv, not over the heads of the Ukrainians—if that would promote a settlement in Donbas. Putin will claim Russia is not a party to the conflict. Biden should reply—perhaps not the only time in this meeting—that a working relationship between the two requires that neither treat the other like an idiot.

The meeting is worthwhile and can modestly advance US interests. It will be useful for Putin to hear clearly and directly what Russian actions cross the line and will merit a response. Push-back and sanctions against Moscow’s misbehavior should be complemented by a degree of engagement, and the summit could set in motion a process to reopen serious US-Russian arms negotiations after a decade’s absence. But genuine gains will come only well down the road. The meeting in Geneva is not about achieving a reset or breakthrough; it is about better management of a difficult relationship that will remain troubled for the foreseeable future.

Originally for Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists

This interview by Melissa De Witte originally appeared in Stanford News.

The upcoming summit between President Joe Biden and President Vladimir Putin is not rewarding the Russian leader for his bad behavior: It’s opening negotiations and delivering a warning to him instead, says Stanford scholar Kathryn Stoner.

Here, Stoner is joined by Stanford political scientist and former U.S. Ambassador to Russia Michael McFaul, Payne Distinguished Lecturer at CISAC and former Deputy Secretary General of NATO Rose Gottemoeller and Russia historian Norman Naimark to discuss what to expect at the summit in Geneva on Wednesday.

The meeting, the scholars say, could reset U.S.-Russia relations, signal deterrence on certain issues – including cybersecurity in light of attacks like the SolarWinds breach that the U.S. has blamed on the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service – and launch strategic stability talks related to nuclear weapons.

Interviews have been edited for length and clarity. For more information on what to expect about the Biden-Putin summit from FSI scholars, visit the FSI website.

Where does diplomacy now stand between the U.S. and Russia?

Naimark: Russian-American relations are at their lowest point since the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, perhaps even since the last years of Gorbachev’s rule. When relations are fraying between the world’s two most powerful nuclear powers, the coming of the summit on June 16 between President Biden and President Putin should be welcomed. It’s worth recalling the heightened military tensions just three months ago between Moscow and Washington, when Moscow moved tens of thousands of troops to the Ukrainian border and mobilized its air and sea power in the region. Both leaders have emphasized that they seek stability, reliability and predictability in their bilateral relations; at the same time, their respective administrations have warned that expectations should be kept at the minimum for any kind of serious breakthrough at the summit.

Stoner: We’ve lost a lot of leverage because of the withdrawal from global politics that started under the latter part of the Obama administration and continued with Trump with his America First platform, which meant America alone. There is some leverage, it’s just how much. We don’t necessarily want to destabilize Russia because it’s a big, complicated country with nuclear weapons, but all signs point to Putin staying in office until 2036. He’s not going away. I think we have to try to signal deterrence on certain issues, like trying to move into another former Soviet republic as he is doing with Ukraine, Georgia and potentially Belarus, but then cooperate in other areas where it is productive to do so.

What do you think about some of the criticisms toward Biden meeting with Putin? For example, that Biden meeting with Putin is only rewarding him for his bad behavior.

Stoner: There is a reasonable question about why Biden and Putin are meeting and if it is somehow rewarding Putin for bad behavior by having a summit with the President of the United States. Rather than rewarding Putin, however, I think this meeting could be Biden’s warning to him that if hacking and other cyberattacks continue, we have a menu of things we could do as well.

Naimark: There is no reason that the American president cannot talk about difficult subjects like cybersecurity, ransomware attacks, human rights, the release of Alexei Navalny, the protection of Ukrainian sovereignty and other important items on the American agenda while focusing on issues of mutual interest: the future of arms control, global warming and the regulation of the Arctic, and outer space. One can always hope that, like the last summit on Lake Geneva between Russian and American leaders [Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan] in November 1985, this one can lay the groundwork for serious improvements in relations in the near future.

Is this meeting a reset of diplomatic relations between the two nations?

Stoner: I know in Washington it is popular to say that Biden is not having a reset of relations with Russia when past presidents all have tried that. I think that’s wrong. I do think it is a reset in the relationship in that there should be more clarity and stability, but that doesn’t mean it’s going to be friendly and universally cooperative, given that we still see many differences in perspectives and some antagonism too. Still, Russia and the U.S. need to talk because there are a lot of issues in common where it would be helpful to coordinate with Russia. After all, even in the depths of the Cold War, the leaders of both countries still talked. Russia has reestablished itself as the most formidable power in Europe and it looks like Biden is acknowledging that and the fact that the U.S. can no longer afford to ignore Russia.

Is there anything the two leaders will be able to agree upon?

McFaul: I used to organize these kinds of meetings when I worked in the government and back when President Medvedev was there. We would have these meetings as a way to force our governments to produce what is called in State Department-speak “deliverables.” We didn’t have meetings to have them, we wanted to get things done. In the first Obama-Medvedev meeting we had a long list of deliverables when they met in July of 2009.

But there is no way that will happen with Putin today because he doesn’t really want to cooperate, he doesn’t really want deliverables. That’s challenging for President Biden, I think, because he has said that he wants a stable, predictable relationship with Putin. I think that’s fine to aspire to, but I don’t think Putin is that interested in that kind of relationship, so that creates a challenge of substance for summits like this.

Gottemoeller: With such different threat perceptions, the two presidents are not going to agree in Geneva about what should go into the next nuclear treaty. They can agree, though, to put their experts together to hammer it out. They can also agree to put the two sides together to tackle the different threat perceptions and the question of what stability means. Finally, they can agree to a deadline, so the talks don’t stall. It won’t be a headline-grabbing outcome, but at least Moscow and Washington will get moving again on the nuclear agenda.

Where can Biden make progress?

McFaul: I think the most likely place to make progress is to launch strategic stability talks, which is an abstract phrase for beginning the process of negotiations about nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles that would be a follow-on to the New START treaty. Biden and Putin rightfully extended the New START treaty early in his term for five years, and I think that was very smart. I personally worked on that treaty, so I think it’s a good treaty and deserves to be extended. But it’s going to run out really fast because the next set of negotiations are going to be much more complicated. I hope they would start some process to begin those negotiations now.

Gottemoeller: Maybe the only place where President Biden can make progress with Vladimir Putin in Geneva is the nuclear agenda with Russia. Since the two men agreed, in February, to extend the New START treaty by five years, they have put out a clear public message that they intend to pursue a deal to replace New START and to launch strategic stability talks. They are not going to have identical ideas, however, about what those two goals mean.

Biden wants a new arms control deal that will control all nuclear warheads, whether launched on intercontinental strategic-range missiles or on shorter-range systems. He also wants to get a handle on some of the new types of nuclear weapons that the Russians have been developing. One new system, for example, uses nuclear propulsion to ensure that it can fly for many hours at great speed over long distances, earning it the moniker “weapon of vengeance.” These exotic weapons did not exist when New START was negotiated; now, they need to be controlled.

Putin, by contrast, focuses on U.S. long-range conventional missiles that he worries are capable of the accuracy and destructive power of nuclear weapons. The United States, in his view, could use these conventional weapons to destroy hard targets such as the Moscow nuclear command center. He also worries that the United States is producing ever more capable ways to intercept his nuclear missiles and destroy them before they reach their targets. In his worst nightmare, the United States undermines his nuclear deterrent forces without ever resorting to nuclear weapons.

What advice do you have for Biden?

McFaul: One, do not have a one-on-one meeting – just have a normal meeting. Two, I would recommend not having a joint press conference that just gives Putin a podium for the world to say his “whataboutism” stuff; it’s better to have separate press conferences because most of the world will be more interested in what Biden says compared to what Putin says.

Third, I think it’s important to cooperate when you can but also be clear about your differences and don’t pull punches on that. In particular, I want Biden to talk about Alexei Navalny, the Americans who are wrongly detained in Russia today, Crimea still being occupied, Russian proxies in eastern Ukraine, and parts of Georgia that are under occupation. They have been attacking us relentlessly with these cyberattacks, these Russian criminals who in my view have to have some association with the Russian government.

That’s a tough list, but I think it’s really important for President Biden to say those things directly to Putin. I have confidence that he can. I was at their last meeting. I traveled with the vice president in 2011 when he met with then Prime Minister Putin. Biden is capable of delivering tough messages and I hope he uses this occasion to do so again.

What would be a sign that their meeting was productive?

Stoner: One sign the meeting was productive would be if Biden and Putin could agree to establish a joint committee or council on some rules surrounding cybersecurity. Another would be if they make plans to talk again about either replacing or reviving the Minsk-2 agreement [that sought to bring an end to Russia’s war on Ukraine]. And three, a positive sign would be if they plan to do some negotiation on further reducing tactical nuclear weapons or strategic nuclear weapons. An agreement to disagree on some issues, but to continue talking on others would be indicative of at least some small progress.

The New START Treaty

The New START Treaty, which was formalized in 2010, and builds on prior agreements put in place through the 1970s and 80s to actively reduce and limit the number of strategic nuclear weapons. The first START treaty in 1994 reduced the number of deployed nuclear warheads in the United States and Russia from 12,000 to 6,000 each. In 2002, that number was reduced further to around 2,200 weapons each through agreements in the Moscow Treaty. The New START Treaty Gottemoeller negotiated dropped that number again to 1,550 deployed strategic nuclear warheads.

This 30 percent overall reduction in nuclear armaments has brought deployed Russian and U.S. warheads to their smallest numbers since the nuclear age began.

“It’s really a challenge to actually do things in government,” emphasizes McFaul. “It’s easy to be something or someone, but to do anything, you have to be able to engage with another partner somewhere in the world. In Rose’s case, she had to engage with one of the toughest partners in the world: the Russian Federation.”

Doing vs. Being

How was Gottemoeller able to accomplish what she and her team did? Coming as an outsider to the Obama campaign and government, the initial months of contacting relevant people in the Department of State and working through the confirmation process were grueling, particularly with the added pressure of the looming deadline for the end of the first START treaty.

“That early pressure was absolutely vital for the ultimate success of the New START treaty,” says Gottemoeller. “These kinds of treaties usually take years to negotiate, but we only had from April to December of that year.”

With such a tight schedule, focus and drive were vital for moving the negotiations forward on time. Based on a clear directive from Presidents Obama and Medvedev, Gottemoeller knew the negotiations were to focus only on reducing strategic offensive armaments. The drive came from the perseverance and professionalism between her team and their Russian counterparts.

“When any negotiation starts, there’s a dance that goes on as the chief negotiators and the heads of the working groups establish their rhythm and get to know each others’ style. There were definitely rough patches, but overall we were able to establish good working relationships with everyone we needed to.”

In establishing this rapport, Gottemoeller’s prior affiliations with the Russian head negotiator, Anatoly Antonov, and her ability to speak directly with him in the Russian language were invaluable, particularly given Gottemoeller’s unique position as the first woman ever to negotiate a nuclear arms deal with the Russian Federation.    

“By the time [Antonov] and I got to the endgame negotiations, we’d developed this motto of ‘мы исправим это,’ or, ‘We’ll fix it.’ By having that mindset, we were able to figure it out, even with our personal differences,” Gottemoeller explains.

Ultimately, she and her team delivered a crucial piece of diplomacy in record time despite the setbacks. “I handed over the final papers on my birthday,” she remembers. “So, it was a personal day of celebration as well as a professional one.”

Advice for Future Negotiators

For upcoming graduates and young people looking to Gottemoeller and her incredible diplomatic career as an inspiration, she gives this encouragement:

“Negotiating about nuclear weapons is not rocket science. You become a good negotiator through your everyday living. It’s part of our natural life and natural living. Don’t let it overwhelm you just because you happen to be dealing with nuclear weapons. It’s still just about meeting interests and crafting compromises in order to achieve your goals.”

It’s a sentiment Director Michael McFaul quickly echoed as he reaffirmed the invaluable work Rose Gottemoeller has contributed both diplomatically and to the future of foreign policy.

“In academia, the literature is thin on the actual practice of diplomacy,” admits McFaul. “But Rose has done a great service to educating future diplomats and future negotiators. We need to be able to learn from case studies like this from the past so we can continue to achieve these kinds of things in the future.”

U.S. officials have long sought to negotiate limits on non-strategic nuclear weapons (NSNW), a sensible next step for U.S.-Russian nuclear arms control. Such a negotiation, however, would raise difficult issues, beginning with the imbalance in U.S. and Russian numbers. A likely Russian position that all NSNW be based on national territory would force the U.S. government to face the different perspectives within NATO on the role of U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe. As Washington prepares for a possible negotiation with Moscow, U.S. officials should consider ways to manage this issue from the outset.  

An Elusive Goal 

Since concluding the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), the United States has sought to limit non-strategic nuclear weapons, also referred to as tactical or sub-strategic nuclear weapons. On signing New START, President Obama said “we hope to pursue discussions with Russia on reducing both our strategic and tactical weapons.” Republicans criticized New START’s lack of limits on NSNW, and the Senate resolution of advice and consent to ratification for New START called for a negotiation with Russia “to secure and reduce tactical nuclear weapons in a verifiable manner.” The Obama administration proposed such a negotiation, but Moscow declined. 

When the Trump administration belatedly engaged Russia on nuclear arms issues in 2020, it also sought to include NSNW. Russian negotiators accepted a one-year freeze on the total size of the stockpiles between the two countries (including NSNW), but the agreement did not include verification measures and quickly fell apart. In a statement noting the Biden administration’s agreement to extend New START, Secretary of State Antony Blinken said Washington would pursue with Russia “arms control that addresses all of its nuclear weapons.”  U.S. allies have generally supported negotiating limits on and reductions in NSNW.

New START limits the United States and Russia each to no more than 1,550 deployed strategic warheads. The treaty only constrains deployed weapons and associated launchers. It does not limit NSNW or non-deployed strategic weapons. The U.S. nuclear stockpile numbers 3,800 warheads, of which 230 are B61 nuclear bombs designated as non-strategic (the U.S. military has eliminated all other NSNW). Russia’s nuclear stockpile numbers just under 4,500 warheads, with some 1,900 categorized as non-strategic or defensive. Russia’s diverse NSNW arsenal includes weapons for delivery by land-, air-, and sea-based systems.

Russia has resisted an agreement on NSNW because it has a much larger NSNW force and regards those weapons as a means to compensate for conventional inferiority compared to NATO or China. Moreover, such an agreement would entail difficult verification challenges. If Moscow agreed to a negotiation that covered NSNW, then it would almost certainly seek to leverage its numerical advantage in NSNW to gain a U.S. concession, perhaps conditioning its readiness to negotiate limits on all nuclear weapons on U.S. readiness to negotiate limits on missile defense, which would be politically controversial in Washington. 

Limiting and Reducing NSNW 

Given the disparity in numbers, a narrow stand-alone negotiation on NSNW has little prospect of success. What incentive would Moscow have to cut to the U.S. level? A more viable approach would seek an aggregate limit covering all U.S. and Russian nuclear warheads. In such an arrangement, the U.S. numerical advantage in non-deployed strategic warheads would partially offset the Russian advantage in NSNW. Within such an overall aggregate limit, the sides could negotiate a sub-limit to constrain the number of deployed strategic warheads on intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), warheads that could be launched in minutes and that pose the greater threat to strategic stability. 

If the sides agreed on such a framework, then a lower aggregate limit would force the Russians to reduce their NSNW number. However, that aggregate likely would not be low enough to drive the Russian military’s NSNW level down to anything close to the U.S. number. 

Despite the challenges, the United States should seek limits on Russian NSNW. First, non-strategic nuclear warheads deliverable by systems such as Iskandr missiles directly threaten U.S. allies. Second, many of these weapons are not “small.” The modernized B61 bomb will have a maximum yield of fifty kilotons, three times the size of the weapon that destroyed Hiroshima, and Russian NSNW reportedly have larger yields. Third, the most likely path to a U.S.-Russian nuclear conflict is a conventional war that escalates when one side employs NSNW.

The Looming Dilemma 

Russian acceptance of such a negotiating framework—an aggregate limit on all U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons with a sublimit on deployed strategic warheads—would be welcomed in the United States and by allies, and rightly so. But it could end up posing a dilemma within NATO. 

The U.S. Air Force deploys 100-150 B61 bombs at a handful of air bases in Europe. Some of these B61 bombs are designated for use by U.S. aircraft. Others are maintained under U.S. custody but, in a conflict and with proper authorization, would be turned over to allies for delivery—sometimes referred to as “nuclear sharing.” The Belgians, Dutch, Germans, and Italians have aircraft and train for that purpose. 

In military terms, this small number of B61 bombs makes a marginal contribution in an overall stockpile of 3,800 weapons. U.S.-based aircraft (the B-2 and, in the future, B-21) could strike targets in Europe with B61 bombs, as could B-52s equipped with nuclear air-launched cruise missiles. The value of the Europe-based bombs is far more in political terms and assurance of allies. In peacetime, they are seen as symbols of the U.S. commitment to NATO’s defense and as coupling U.S. strategic nuclear forces to that commitment. If NATO were to use NSNW, or even signal the possibility of their use, then the alliance would aim to convey a political message that things were about to spin out of control and perhaps escalate to strategic nuclear exchanges.  Moreover, the process of planning, investing in, and exercising these systems is seen by alliance members as a unifying process helpful in assuring allies and deterring aggression. 

The dilemma? Suppose U.S. and Russian negotiators close in on an agreement limiting each side to 3,000 or 3,500 total nuclear warheads, with a sub-limit of 1,000 deployed strategic warheads and appropriate verification measures (an ambitious outcome, to be sure). The problem: the Russians almost certainly would insist on a provision requiring that all nuclear weapons be based on national territory. That would mean the removal of the B61 bombs to the United States. 

Many in the United States and Europe would regard such an agreement as a significant and very positive achievement. Belgian, Dutch, German, and Italian public would welcome an end to the unpopular presence of U.S. nuclear weapons in their countries.

The withdrawal of U.S. nuclear weapons could, however, end the involvement of a broad group of allies in NATO’s nuclear role. More importantly, such an outcome could be seen as calling into question U.S. readiness to use nuclear weapons in the alliance’s defense and signifying a diminution of the broader U.S. commitment to NATO. One could argue that allies should have confidence in the American president to use nuclear weapons if needed, regardless of where they are deployed, but the location of U.S. nuclear arms—in this case, their absence from Europe—could matter. To some, it could matter a great deal; they might even see it as decoupling the United States from European security.

If this issue were not managed carefully, then a split could develop within NATO. Those allies who see U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe as essential to their security, particularly in the Baltic and eastern European regions, might well oppose U.S. acceptance of the “base on national territory” provision—even at the expense of a new treaty. If U.S. negotiators went ahead and nevertheless accepted the provision, then opposition within NATO would complicate ratification prospects. If, on the other hand, U.S. negotiators rejected that provision out of deference to those concerns, and that blew up the chance for a new nuclear arms reduction treaty, one could expect a backlash and round of intra-alliance recriminations. (Knowing that this could be the case would only make it more likely that Russian negotiators would seek this outcome.) 

Thinking Ahead 

This is not to suggest that the Biden administration should not pursue limits on all U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons, including NSNW. Such an approach is the logical next step after New START. The administration does, however, need to factor this issue into consultations with allies and into its negotiating approach toward the Russians from the very beginning. A number of ideas might alleviate the basing on national territory problem, including: 

Seek to require that NSNW be stored at declared storage sites—with monitoring and significant transparency—at some distance from facilities basing NSNW delivery systems. This would slow the process of mating non-strategic warheads to delivery systems in a crisis or conventional conflict. (If the treaty did not require basing on national territory, then this would mean relocation of U.S. B61 bombs to new storage sites instead of the air bases where they are now.) 

Seek to require that Russian NSNW be stored at sites more than some distance, say, seven hundred kilometers, from a NATO member’s territory. This would provide distance between NATO allies such as the Baltic states and stored Russian NSNW. (It would have to apply reciprocally if the agreement did not require that nuclear weapons be based on national territory.) 

Seek to ban nuclear warheads for short-range land-based missiles. This would eliminate NSNW that pose a particular threat to countries such as the Baltic states and Poland, though it could prove hard to negotiate, as the U.S. military has no equivalent.   

Propose that NSNW stored outside of national territory be counted as “deployed strategic warheads.” Each U.S. B61 in Europe would mean one less deployed strategic warhead on deployed ICBMs and SLBMs. In order not to have to cut U.S. deployed strategic warheads too much, the number of Europe-based B61 bombs could be reduced. (Could thirty or fifty not provide allies the same level of political assurance?)

Continue nuclear sharing. NATO allies’ aircraft could train with U.S. strategic bombers in exercises for the use of (U.S.-based) nuclear weapons in support of the alliance. NATO allies could also maintain and exercise dual-capable aircraft for the contingency in which a crisis developed and/or the treaty broke down, even if there were no B61 bombs in Europe. 

Put more boots on the ground. NATO members could bolster conventional deterrence and defense in countries such as the Baltic states and Poland by increasing the size of the multinational formations in those countries to 2,000-2,500 troops each. The United States, which leads the multinational battalion in Poland, could deploy a company to each of the units in the Baltic states.

As Washington develops its negotiating approach, it should consult closely with allies, bearing in mind that the approach could have a major impact on their security perceptions. In a crisis or conventional war, a U.S. president would either be prepared to order the use of nuclear weapons in support of allies or not; the location of the weapons would be a secondary consideration. But location matters for purposes of assurance in NATO, and consultations should weigh whether and how to assure allies other than through the physical presence of U.S. nuclear arms.

Washington has for some time sought to get all U.S. and Russian nuclear arms on the negotiating table. That is a worthwhile goal for U.S. and allied security. Persuading Moscow will be hard enough. It would be a shame if differences within NATO emerged to frustrate that objective. 

Originally for The National Interest

The administration of US President Joe Biden has indicated that it intends to seek “credible, serious, clear-eyed negotiations with [Russia] on hard strategic stability issues.” That envisages a broad set of issues, as strategic stability today is a far more complex concept than it was during the Cold War. It involves countries other than just the United States and Russia. And it is a matter not just of strategic offensive nuclear forces but of missile defense, long-range precision-guided conventional strike systems, and cyber capabilities, among others.

How US-Russian strategic stability talks develop and what happens in ensuing negotiations could well impact German and European security. US Secretary of State Antony Blinken has said Washington seeks to engage Russia in “arms control that addresses all of its nuclear weapons.” That would include Russian non-strategic nuclear weapons, which would mean that similar US nuclear arms, including weapons based in Germany and Europe, would be on the table. Missile defense and conventional strike also have implications for European security. These issues raise a number of questions for Berlin’s consideration, including:

Consultations. The Biden administration will be open to consultations with NATO allies on its approach to these varied questions. As to the structure, German officials might consider suggesting something along the lines of the Special Consultative Group (SCG), the mechanism used by NATO in the 1980s to consult on the negotiation that produced the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. Regular meetings at NATO headquarters, reinforced by senior arms control experts traveling from capitals, ensured that allies understood US positions and the state of play in the negotiations, and allowed them an opportunity to voice concerns and ideas to US policymakers. Among other things, the SCG consultations helped allies to stay in sync, particularly in 1983 when the Soviets engaged in wedge-driving attempts.

Missile Defense. Russian officials say that missile defense must be reflected in the strategic equation looking forward, and they could well insist that Washington negotiates limits on missile defense, perhaps as the price for Russian agreement to negotiate on all nuclear arms. Moscow could seek limits on both the ground-based interceptors that defend the US homeland and the Aegis Ashore interceptors deployed in Romania (and soon in Poland) for Europe’s defense. US officials appear uninterested in constraining missile defense, a subject that would prove controversial in Washington, where Republicans appear to oppose any limits.

That said, if the Russians insist, one of the first big questions confronting the Biden administration will be whether the US and allied interest in a negotiation that covers all Russian nuclear weapons is so strong that the United States should accept a negotiation that could limit missile defense. Germany presumably would answer in the affirmative, but would other allies—particularly Bucharest and Warsaw—agree? Should the Biden administration decide that the trade makes sense, it would be helpful if it could point to a united NATO stance in support, and Berlin might help shape such a stance.

US Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons in Europe. If Moscow agrees to a negotiation that would limit all US and Russian nuclear weapons, forward-based US nuclear bombs in Europe will certainly get attention. In the past, Russian officials have said the bombs should be returned to the United States, and there is no reason to think Russian negotiators would not press for a provision requiring that all nuclear arms be based on national territory. Article IV of the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty provides an antecedent: “Strategic offensive arms subject to this Treaty shall not be based outside the national territory of each Party.” (It does permit notified temporary deployments outside of national territory by heavy bombers.)

Many in the countries that host US nuclear arms—whose presence is not popular—would undoubtedly welcome a “base on national territory” provision in a US-Russian treaty covering all nuclear arms. However, other allies, for whom forward-based US nuclear weapons play an important assurance role as symbols of the US commitment to the defense of NATO, US acceptance of such a provision could be seen as weakening that commitment. As a country that is sensitive to the security anxieties of the allies to its east but where public support for removing US nuclear weapons is high, Germany could play an important role in formulating a consensus view within NATO on such a provision. In doing so, Berlin might consider ways, in an arms control treaty and through other steps to bolster conventional deterrence and defense, to assuage nuclear assurance concerns.

Precision-guided Conventional Strike Systems. Russian officials have expressed concern for more than a decade about long-range precision-guided conventional strike systems that could hit and destroy targets, including strategic targets, that previously required a nuclear weapon. They may well raise this with American negotiators. While NATO has ruled out a nuclear-armed response to Russia’s deployment of the dual-capable 9M729 missile in violation of the INF Treaty, it has not excluded a conventional missile. The US military is developing two missile systems—a 1,000-kilometer range ground-launched cruise missile and the Precision Strike Missile, both conventionally-armed—that lack the range to make sense for use against land targets in Asia but could be useful in Europe.

At some point, the question of deploying such missiles may arise, particularly as the US Army looks to enhance its long-range fires. Even if conventionally-armed, would deployment of these missiles be welcome in Europe? Germany and other European allies would have a better feel for the local politics and public views. If deploying such missiles were to appear too controversial, that might merit a second look at the Russian proposal for a moratorium on intermediate-range missiles in Europe—provided that it included the 9M729 (and forced its elimination or relocation from Europe) and applied appropriate verification measures.

There is a fair chance that serious US-Russian nuclear arms talks will resume later this year. They will touch on issues that affect Germany and NATO. Berlin should begin considering what it might do with Washington and other NATO allies to facilitate a successful outcome to those negotiations and bolster European security.

Originally for Internationale Politik Quarterly

President Joe Biden is the first president since the Cold War to begin his term not seeking closer relations with Russia; there will be no “reset.” He has indicated instead that he will push back against Russian misbehavior while seeking to cooperate where doing so advances U.S. interests. In his first 100 days Mr. Biden has sought to distinguish his policy from that of Donald Trump, who seemed incapable of criticizing Vladimir Putin or Russian transgressions.

The first full day of his administration illustrated Mr. Biden’s approach. The White House said he would extend the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) for five years, essentially accepting an offer Mr. Putin had made more than a year earlier—but something that was very much in the interest of U.S. national security. White House officials also announced that Mr. Biden had asked for assessments of Russian actions such as interference in the 2020 presidential election and the Solar Winds cyber hack, promising that the administration would “hold Russia to account for its reckless and adversarial actions.”

Mr. Biden described his policy directly to Mr. Putin in a January 26 phone call. He discussed New START and strategic stability but also raised issues of concern, including Ukraine, election interference and Kremlin-opponent Alexey Navalny’s poisoning. The White House read-out of the call (there were several important Trump-Putin calls with no read-outs) noted that the president had also said that the United States would “act firmly in defense of its national interests in response to actions by Russia” that caused harm to America or its allies.

Anticipating relations with the Kremlin that will have major adversarial elements, the Biden administration has moved to shore up the trans-Atlantic relationship and repair the damage done during his predecessor’s four years. In a February 19 virtual appearance at the Munich Security Conference, the president reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to NATO and Article 5 (an attack against one shall be considered an attack against all), stressed the importance of collective efforts to meet the “threat from Russia,” and reached out to German Chancellor Angela Merkel, who often found herself the target of Mr. Trump’s ire. (The Biden administration also halted, and then reversed, Mr. Trump’s order to withdraw some 10,000 troops from Germany.)

As the intelligence community completed its assessment of election interference and other Russian actions, and with tensions rising due to the Russian military build-up around Ukraine, the Biden administration calibrated its response. It sanctioned a number of Russian entities and individuals on April 15. As a warning of what could come, the president issued an executive order authorizing sanctions for a broad range of potential Russian misdeeds, and the Treasury Department placed limits on purchasing Russian sovereign debt, though in a restrained manner that could later be ratcheted up and made considerably more painful.

The president foreshadowed the coming sanctions to Mr. Putin in an April 13 call in which he also reiterated the U.S. commitment to support Ukraine, a commitment that the administration has stressed publicly (if Mr. Putin was bothered by Mr. Biden’s “killer” comment in a mid-March press interview, he apparently said nothing during the call). In remarks to the press two days later, Mr. Biden noted that Washington could have imposed harsher penalties, but he had chosen proportionate measures. He added that he did not want an escalatory cycle with Moscow but sought “a stable, predictable relationship.”

Stable and predictable may be as good as it can get in the near term. In both of his calls with his Russian counterpart, Mr. Biden has raised areas—such as arms control and strategic stability—where U.S. and Russian interests should coincide. Secretary of State Tony Blinken and National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan have echoed these points. While virtually all Trump political appointees were let go when Mr. Biden took office, one notable exception was John Sullivan, the ambassador in Moscow. And the president proposed that he and Putin meet this summer.

The Biden administration believes that, even with U.S.-Russian relations at a post-Cold War nadir, the two countries can do business on certain questions where they have mutual interests. In addition to using arms control to manage their nuclear competition, the sides presumably share an interest in blunting the nuclear ambitions of Iran and North Korea. As U.S. and NATO military forces prepare to leave Afghanistan, neither Washington nor Moscow has anything to gain from chaos or a return of the Taliban to power.

The president thus has correctly laid out the possibility of some positive engagement along with measures holding Russia to account for misbehavior. His ability to pursue both of those tracks, however, will depend in part on Kremlin actions.

Arrested immediately on his return to Moscow in January, Mr. Navalny now is in dire health in a Russian prison. His death would spark an uproar in the West. More critically, while the menacing Russian military movements around Ukraine likely aim just to unnerve Kyiv and, at the same time, test Mr. Biden’s reaction (as well as that of the West more broadly), a Russian military incursion remains a distinct possibility.

Such an attack would provoke a deep crisis in relations between the West and Russia. Washington and its European partners almost certainly would respond with new and more punishing sanctions. And should that happen, a summer summit, as well as real effort to work together on selected issues where the countries’ interests converge, could get booted a long way down the road.

Originally for Brookings