A remarkable tripartite collaboration. . . . A new and highly revealing account of how the Korean War began, based on a careful comparison of Chinese, Soviet, and even North Korean sources. The authors' achievement, from a historian's perspective, is roughly the equivalent of making a first flight around the hidden side of the moon. . . . An exemplary standard for the "new" Cold War history. -Atlantic Monthly

A fascinating and exciting book. Every expert on Soviet and Chinese foreign policy and every student of international relations and the Cold War will have to read it. I am awed by the materials that have been put together in this book; it is international collaboration at its very best. 

-Melvyn P. Leffler, University of Virginia

This title, the first using newly available resources from China and Russia, represents the opening of a new era in the study of Sino-Soviet relations and their effect on international politics. The credentials of the authors are the highest.
-Library Journal

This magisterial work provides the missing dimension of the Korean war - how policy was made on the communist side. Making use of previously unavailable Chinese and Soviet sources . . . this is likely to become the standard work on the subject.
-John Merrill, George Washington University.

Many critics have discussed French military doctrine in terms of its broad social and political contexts. They assess, for example, the endemic political crisis and the pathological civil-military relations characteristic of the Third Republic, the general acceptance of social Darwinistic attitudes to international relations, and the influence of Bergson's élan vital. I shall not survey this wider debate but will concentrate on a careful reading of military doctrine as such. What are its strength? its weaknesses? What are its hidden assumptions?

My reading of French military doctrine will focus on the writings of Ardant du Picq, Ferdinand Foch, and Loyzeau de Grandmaison for two reasons. First, they are most often quoted by critics of the French military.  Second, each of them is interesting in his own right and demonstrates some of the deeper dilemmas of military doctrine. Taken together they span the period from before the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871 up to the First World War.  I shall not criticize these military writers for failing to predict the future but will concentrate on their implicit assumptions and logical errors, which in principle could have been identified by an independent and critical observer contemporary with the writers.

Stanford University's Center for International Security and Arms Control (CISAC) started a project on defense conversion in the Soviet Union in early 1990. Following the breakup of the Soviet Union, the project has concentrated on defense conversion in Russia. The objectives of the project are to study and assist the process of demilitarization through the diversion of military production assets, broadly interpreted (facilities, personnel, technology, etc.), and building a civilian industry and infrastructure.

As a part of this project, CISAC sponsored an international conference on defense conversion on December 1-2, 1992. This report summarizes the authors' impressions, following the conference, of the status of privatization and conversion in Russia, and of U.S. government and business involvement in those processes. The conclusions drawn and the recommendations made are our own, based on both conference presentations and our own research.

The purpose of this document is to explore a plan for the application of cooperative naval measures in the Pacific to meet political, economic, and military changes and to serve the interests of all countries in the region.

What guidance does international law provide in determining who succeeds to the treaty obligations of a large nation-state when it splits up? This Article will consider, first, the general rules of inheritance in such a case and, second, what has happened so far in four concrete areas.

This book is essentially a series of case histories of U.S.-Soviet nuclear arms control negotiations, as seen from the American side. It describes the processes of governmental decisionmaking for arms control in Washington, D.C., and the techniques for joint U.S.-Soviet decisionmaking at the negotiating table.

As general counsel of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and member of U.S. delegations to disarmament conferences for eight years, the author was in a unique position to assess the difficulties of fashioning an arms control treaty that could pass muster within the executive branch of the U.S. government, be approved by U.S. allies, be successfully negotiated with the Soviets, and then win the approval of the U.S. Senate. This process will be even more complex now that the United States will face at least four nuclear powers from the former U.S.S.R.

The book has three purposes. The first is to add to the recorded history of the following negotiations: the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963, the Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968, the ABM Treaty of 1972 and its companion SALT Interim Agreements, and the 1987 INF Treaty. The author asks in each case, What did the president and his assistants do (or fail to do) to negotiate a successfulu agreement?

The second purpose is to use the case book approach, common in law schools and business schools, as a teaching device for those who wish to learn how the American government made decisions about arms control negotiations, how U.S.-Soviet negotiators reached decisions, and what the results of the decisions have been.

The book's third purpose is to generalize about what works and what does not work in the complex world of arms control negotiations, including information on the impact of negotiating committees and comparisons of the process for negotiating arms control treaties with that for achieving arms limits through action and reaction, without written agreement. The concluding chapter looks to the future: What changes will occur in the arms control process given the end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the Soviet Union?

Stanford University's Center for International Security and Arms Control (CISAC) has undertaken a project to work with elements of the Soviet defense industry to help them convert production from military to civilian uses. In this project we refer to conversion as the use of defense industry facilities, personnel, and/or technology for the production of nondefense products and services. One aspect of this work is to facilitate cooperation between U.S. and Soviet companies. Representative Les Aspin, chairman of the House Armed Services Committee (HASC), asked the Center to initiate this project. The Institute of U.S.A. and Canada Studies (ISKAN) of the Soviet Academy of Sciences is coordinating the Soviet Union's participation.

In recent years issues in international security have been increasingly influenced by economic factors. This is evident in the defense budgets of the major powers as well as in arms transfers to regions such as the Middle East. Furthermore, arms control has taken on a broader meaning, involving unilateral cuts and confidence-building measures to supplement negotiated structural arms-control agreements.

The principal objective of this project is to assist the Soviet defense industry in their defense conversion activities by:

• Analyzing the conversion problem in the Soviet Union and, if appropriate, extracting lessons from the U.S. experience.
• Assisting the Soviets in contacting and exploring cooperative ventures with appropriate U.S. companies.
• Stimulating discussions among Soviet defense experts and U.S. government officials and academics on appropriate changes to trade policy.

The dissolution of the Soviet Union has brought new nuclear non-proliferation dangers and opportunities. Both revolve around the approximately thirty thousand nuclear weapons and the fissile materials for perhaps ninety thousand nuclear bombs in the former Soviet Union. The weapons are now deployed in only four of the newly independents states - most in Russia, but some still in Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine. "Loose Nukes" is the colloquial description of one aspect of the new threats.

New positive and negative assurances from all five permanent members of the UN Security Council are now vitally important, not only to provide support to Ukraine and every other non-nuclear-weapons state's legitimate concerns, but to advance the vital goals of nuclear non-proliferation prior to the critical 1995 NPT review and extension conference.