This book is essentially a series of case histories of U.S.-Soviet nuclear arms control negotiations, as seen from the American side. It describes the processes of governmental decisionmaking for arms control in Washington, D.C., and the techniques for joint U.S.-Soviet decisionmaking at the negotiating table.

As general counsel of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and member of U.S. delegations to disarmament conferences for eight years, the author was in a unique position to assess the difficulties of fashioning an arms control treaty that could pass muster within the executive branch of the U.S. government, be approved by U.S. allies, be successfully negotiated with the Soviets, and then win the approval of the U.S. Senate. This process will be even more complex now that the United States will face at least four nuclear powers from the former U.S.S.R.

The book has three purposes. The first is to add to the recorded history of the following negotiations: the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963, the Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968, the ABM Treaty of 1972 and its companion SALT Interim Agreements, and the 1987 INF Treaty. The author asks in each case, What did the president and his assistants do (or fail to do) to negotiate a successfulu agreement?

The second purpose is to use the case book approach, common in law schools and business schools, as a teaching device for those who wish to learn how the American government made decisions about arms control negotiations, how U.S.-Soviet negotiators reached decisions, and what the results of the decisions have been.

The book's third purpose is to generalize about what works and what does not work in the complex world of arms control negotiations, including information on the impact of negotiating committees and comparisons of the process for negotiating arms control treaties with that for achieving arms limits through action and reaction, without written agreement. The concluding chapter looks to the future: What changes will occur in the arms control process given the end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the Soviet Union?

Stanford University's Center for International Security and Arms Control (CISAC) has undertaken a project to work with elements of the Soviet defense industry to help them convert production from military to civilian uses. In this project we refer to conversion as the use of defense industry facilities, personnel, and/or technology for the production of nondefense products and services. One aspect of this work is to facilitate cooperation between U.S. and Soviet companies. Representative Les Aspin, chairman of the House Armed Services Committee (HASC), asked the Center to initiate this project. The Institute of U.S.A. and Canada Studies (ISKAN) of the Soviet Academy of Sciences is coordinating the Soviet Union's participation.

In recent years issues in international security have been increasingly influenced by economic factors. This is evident in the defense budgets of the major powers as well as in arms transfers to regions such as the Middle East. Furthermore, arms control has taken on a broader meaning, involving unilateral cuts and confidence-building measures to supplement negotiated structural arms-control agreements.

The principal objective of this project is to assist the Soviet defense industry in their defense conversion activities by:

• Analyzing the conversion problem in the Soviet Union and, if appropriate, extracting lessons from the U.S. experience.
• Assisting the Soviets in contacting and exploring cooperative ventures with appropriate U.S. companies.
• Stimulating discussions among Soviet defense experts and U.S. government officials and academics on appropriate changes to trade policy.

The dissolution of the Soviet Union has brought new nuclear non-proliferation dangers and opportunities. Both revolve around the approximately thirty thousand nuclear weapons and the fissile materials for perhaps ninety thousand nuclear bombs in the former Soviet Union. The weapons are now deployed in only four of the newly independents states - most in Russia, but some still in Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine. "Loose Nukes" is the colloquial description of one aspect of the new threats.

New positive and negative assurances from all five permanent members of the UN Security Council are now vitally important, not only to provide support to Ukraine and every other non-nuclear-weapons state's legitimate concerns, but to advance the vital goals of nuclear non-proliferation prior to the critical 1995 NPT review and extension conference.

Stanford University's Center for International Security and Arms Control (CISAC) started a project in early 1990 following a proposal from Marshal Akhromeyev,specialadvisor to President Gorbachev and Les Aspin, chairman of the House Armed Services Committee.  The intent was to bring a delegation of Soviet defense executives, government officials and academicians to the United States. The objectives of the project were to study and assi§t the process of demilitarization through the diversion of military production assets, broadly interpreted (facilities, personnl., technology, etc.), and to building a civilian industry and infrastructure. In spite of changes in the project agenda, the objectives remain the same. These objectives are being addressed by informing the debate in the Russian and American
governments as well as in the international financial institutions, recommending innovative conversion efforts, interacting directly with Russian defense enterprises and American companies interested in cooperative business activities, and participating in scholarly analyses through publications and topical conferences.

This analysis argues that the basic purpose of NPT safeguards—to verify compliance with an obligation not to "manufacture" nuclear weapons—could be easily thwarted if a non-nuclear-weapon party is able to produce nuclear-explosive material and build bombs in facilities that are not declared to the IAEA and inspected by IAEA inspectors.  The language of the NPT, its negotiating history, and the subsequent agreement applying its safeguards provisions all support the conclusion that non-nuclear-weapon NPT parties agreed to permit inspection of activities.

Challenging the literatures on war termination, civil war, and revolution--which typically dismiss the possibility of negotiated settlement--Stephen Stedman examines the problem of negotiations during civil wars and demonstrates that third party mediation can help resolve such conflicts.

Stedman analyzes four international attempts to mediate a settlement to the Zimbabwean civil war of the 1970s and compares the three failed negotiations--the 1974-1975 Kenneth Kaunda/John Vorster "detente" exercise, the Henry Kissinger mediation that led to the Geneva conference of 1976, and the Anglo-American initiatives of David Owen and Cyrus Vance in 1977-1978--with the successful 1979 Lancaster House Conference on Rhodesia, chaired by Lord Carrington. Drawing on primary sources not available previously, his discussion of the factors that distinguish the failures from the successful attempt is a major contribution to conflict resolution theory, particularly with reference to the work of William Zartman. A final chapter considers the lessons of the Zimbabwe experience for South Africa today.

In August 1991, the people of Moscow and Leningrad demonstrated to the world that democracy is an idea whose time had come for the Soviet Union. As a result, the Soviet
government received a mandate for political reform. This reform, if successful, will result in a political system that will be very different from any that the people in the Soviet Union have ever known-a government of the people, by the people, and for the people.

Hand in hand with political reform, the Union and its republics will be attempting sweeping economic reforms. While recognizing how difficult it will be for the Soviet Union to achieve economic reform, it is also important to observe that it is at least conceivable now. A critically important component of economic reform in the Soviet Union is the conversion of their defense industry from a centrally managed monolith to a collection of independent, privately owned enterprises, producing civil products.

The world is facing truly breathtaking changes, in particular from the socialist countries. The traditional rigidity of communist regimes and the preeminence of the communist parties in these countries are breaking down. Strong voices of nationalism within the Soviet Union are challenging the very integrity of the union itself. Thus, a bipolar world--where the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), led by the United States, and the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO), led by the Soviet Union, represent both .an ideological schism and a superpower confrontation--is no longer the basis or even a dominant force for threatened conflict.

The recognition is growing that such factors as economic strength, abundance of basic resources, productivity, and the health and morale of the population are in many respects stronger bases of national security than are military forces. This recognition conflicts sharply with the concept of national security as defined in the Dictionary of Military Terms (issued by the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff) as "a military or defense advantage over any foreign nation or group of nations."

In view of all these developments, the realization that military power and national security are not synonymous is becoming more prevalent in the United States.  More attention is focusing on internal threats from deficiencies such as those in education, from erosion of the country's infrastructure, drugs, and problems of the environment. This attention, in turn, has deflected public concern and attention from military issues. The decreased concern not only has diminished the priority given to military preparedness but also, unfortunately, has lessened the concern with arms control.

This paper addresses the steps that the United States should take to insure the continuation of its position of influence and involvement in world commerce and geopolitics in light of the developments in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.  The developments are both positive--prodemocracy movements, lessened tensions--and negative, the latter suggesting that there may well be a period in which pent-up ethnic, ideological, and nationalistic pressures could give rise to local conflicts and regional disputes throughout the world, not just in Eastern Europe.