International Relations

FSI researchers strive to understand how countries relate to one another, and what policies are needed to achieve global stability and prosperity. International relations experts focus on the challenging U.S.-Russian relationship, the alliance between the U.S. and Japan and the limitations of America’s counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan.

Foreign aid is also examined by scholars trying to understand whether money earmarked for health improvements reaches those who need it most. And FSI’s Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center has published on the need for strong South Korean leadership in dealing with its northern neighbor.

FSI researchers also look at the citizens who drive international relations, studying the effects of migration and how borders shape people’s lives. Meanwhile FSI students are very much involved in this area, working with the United Nations in Ethiopia to rethink refugee communities.

Trade is also a key component of international relations, with FSI approaching the topic from a slew of angles and states. The economy of trade is rife for study, with an APARC event on the implications of more open trade policies in Japan, and FSI researchers making sense of who would benefit from a free trade zone between the European Union and the United States.

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Post-9/11, the U.S. government instituted the U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT) Program, which compares two index fingerprints from every foreign visitor entering the U.S. against a watchlist of fingerprints from several million criminals and suspected terrorists. In the first part of this talk, we develop a new probabilistic model for fingerprint matching that allows for population heterogeneity in fingerprint image quality, calibrate this model using data from the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), and embed the model into a Stackelberg game, in which the U.S. government chooses an optimal biometric strategy to maximize the detection probability subject to a constraint on the mean biometric processing time per legal visitor, and then the terrorist chooses his fingerprint image quality to minimize his detection probability. We predict that switching from a two-finger system to a ten-finger system would increase the detection probability in this game from 0.526 to 0.949. This work was the basis of Congressional testimony last fall, and the Department of Homeland Security recently announced that they are switching from a two-finger system to a ten-finger system. In the second part of this talk, we use new data from Cogent (the biometrics vendor for the U.S. Visit Program) to derive a two-stage, two-finger biometric strategy that works as well as a one-stage, ten-finger strategy. The second stage of this two-stage strategy employs texture matching rather than the traditional minutiae matching.

Manas Baveja is a doctoral candidate in the Institute for Computational and Mathematical Engineering at Stanford University and a CISAC science fellow. His doctoral research is focused on quantitative modeling of homeland security projects.

Lawrence Wein is the Paul E. Holden Professor of Management Science at the Graduate School of Business, Stanford University, and an affiliated faculty member at CISAC.

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Graduate School of Business
Stanford University
Stanford, CA 94305-5015

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Lawrence Wein is the Jeffrey S. Skoll Professor of Management Science at the Graduate School of Business, Stanford University, and an affiliated faculty member at CISAC. After getting a PhD in Operations Research from Stanford University in 1988, he spent 14 years at the Sloan School of Management at MIT, where he was the DEC Leaders for Manufacturing Professor of Management Science. His research interests include mathematical models in operations management, medicine and biology.

Since 2001, he has analyzed a variety of homeland security problems. His homeland security work includes four papers in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, on an emergency response to a smallpox attack, an emergency response to an anthrax attack, a biometric analysis of the US-VISIT Program, and an analysis of a bioterror attack on the milk supply. He has also published the Washington Post op-ed "Unready for Anthrax" (2003) and the New York Times op-ed "Got Toxic Milk?", and has written papers on port security, indoor remediation after an anthrax attack, and the detention and removal of illegal aliens.

For his homeland security research, Wein has received several awards from the International Federation of Operations Research and Management Science (INFORMS), including the Koopman Prize for the best paper in military operations research, the INFORMS Expository Writing Award, the INFORMS President’s Award for contributions to society, the Philip McCord Morse Lectureship, the Frederick W. Lanchester Prize for best research publication, and the George E. Kimball Medal. He was Editor-in-Chief of Operations Research from 2000 to 2005, and was elected to the National Academy of Engineering in 2009.   

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Lawrence M. Wein Speaker
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During the Cold War the United States and the Soviet Union made launch-on-warning an important part of their nuclear strategies. To achieve the launch-on-warning capability both countries deployed networks of early-warning satellites and radars as well as command and control systems that allowed them to launch a retaliatory strike in response to a ballistic missile attack. These systems, which remain operational to this day, are believed to support the "hair-trigger alert" posture of strategic nuclear forces.

This presentation will consider the current status of the U.S. and Russian early-warning systems and the extent to which characteristics of these systems can contribute to the danger of an accidental ballistic missile launch. It will also analyze various proposals that aim at reducing the danger of accidental launch--de-alerting, reduction of strategic forces, repairing the Russian early-warning system, etc. It will be shown that most of these measures are inadequate and some may in fact increase the danger of an accident.

Pavel Podvig joined CISAC as a research associate in 2004. Before that he was a researcher at the Center for Arms Control, Energy and Environmental Studies at the Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology (MIPT). He worked as a visiting researcher with the Security Studies Program at MIT and with the Program on Science and Global Security at Princeton University, and he taught physics in MIPT's General Physics Department for more than ten years. Podvig graduated with honors from the Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology in 1988, with a degree in physics. In 2004 he received a PhD in political science from the Moscow Institute of World Economy and International Relations.

His research has focused on technical and political issues of missile defense, space security, U.S.-Russian relations, structure and capabilities of the Russian strategic forces, nuclear nonproliferation. He was the head of the Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces research project and the editor of a book of the same title, which is considered a definitive source of information on Russian strategic forces.

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Pavel Podvig is an independent analyst based in Geneva, where he runs his research project, "Russian Nuclear Forces." He is also a Senior Research Fellow at the UN Institute for Disarmament Research and a researcher with the Program on Science and Global Security at Princeton University. Pavel Podvig started his work on arms control at the Center for Arms Control Studies at the Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology (MIPT), which was the first independent research organization in Russia dedicated to analysis of technical issues of disarmament and nonproliferation. Pavel Podvig led the Center for Arms Control Studies project that produced the book, Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces (MIT Press, 2001). In recognition of his work in Russia, the American Physical Society awarded Podvig the Leo Szilard Lectureship Award of 2008 (with Anatoli Diakov). Podvig worked with the Program on Science and Global Security at Princeton University, the Security Studies Program at MIT, and the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University. His current research focuses on the Russian strategic forces and nuclear weapons complex, as well as technical and political aspects of nuclear nonproliferation, disarmament, missile defense, and U.S.-Russian arms control process. Pavel Podvig is a member of the International Panel on Fissile Materials. He has a  physics degree from MIPT and PhD in political science from the Moscow Institute of World Economy and International Relations.

For a list of publications, please visit http://russianforces.org/podvig/.

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Allen S. Weiner examines to what degree the global "war on terror" that has erupted since September 11, 2001 fits the "just war" doctrine of international relations or even whether it can properly be considered a war at all in terms of positive international law. Whether or not these labels apply is not merely a matter of academic debate, Weiner notes, but has broader implications for the international legal responsibilities of the United States in Afghanistan, Iraq and other theaters of the "war on terror

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Stanford Law School
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Senior Lecturer in Law
Director, Stanford Program in International Law
Director, Stanford Humanitarian Program
Director, Stanford Center on International Conflict and Negotiation
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Allen S. Weiner, JD ’89, is an international legal scholar whose research and teaching focus primarily on the fields of international security and international conflict resolution. He also studies the challenges of online misinformation and disinformation. In the international security realm, his work spans such issues as international law and the response to contemporary security threats; the relationship between international and domestic law in the context of armed conflict; the law of war (international humanitarian law); just war theory, and international criminal law (including transitional justice).  In the realm of international conflict resolution, his highly multidisciplinary work analyzes the barriers to resolving intractable political conflicts, with a particular focus on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. His work on misinformation and disinformation includes a focus on the potential harmful uses of social media in conflict settings, including war zones.  Weiner’s scholarship is deeply informed by experience; he practiced international law in the U.S. Department of State for more than a decade advising government policymakers, negotiating international agreements, and representing the United States in litigation before the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, the International Court of Justice, and the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal.

Senior Lecturer Weiner is director of the Stanford Program in International and Comparative Law, director of the Stanford Humanitarian Program, and director of the Stanford Center on International Conflict and Negotiation. Before joining the Stanford Law School faculty in 2003, Weiner served as legal counselor at the U.S. Embassy in The Hague and attorney adviser in the Office of the Legal Adviser of the U.S. Department of State in Washington, DC. He clerked for Judge John Steadman of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals.

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Concepts and techniques from mathematics--specifically, from lattice theory and reflexive theory--have already been applied to counterterrorism and computer security problems. The following is a partial list of such problems:

  1. Strategies for disrupting terrorist cells
  2. Data analysis of terrorist activity
  3. Border penetration and security
  4. Terrorist cell formation
  5. Information security

This article proposes the creation of a European Institute for Mathematical Methods in Counterterrorism (IMMC), to be based in Austria. Such an institute would require minimal investment but could serve as a catalyst to draw several million euros in research grants and contracts to Austria. This influx of funding would benefit not merely scientists and firms working in homeland security, but other aspects of Austrian science as well.

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A new united nations report recommending the most sweeping reform in the institution's history offers a global vision of collective security for the 21st century that is as committed to development in poor nations as it is to prevention of nuclear terrorism in rich ones.

A new united nations report recommending the most sweeping reform in the institution's history offers a global vision of collective security for the 21st century that is as committed to development in poor nations as it is to prevention of nuclear terrorism in rich ones.

The point is, according to the report's research director, Stephen Stedman, a threat to one is a threat to all in today's world. "Globalization means that a major terrorist attack anywhere in the industrial world would have devastating consequences for the well-being of millions around the developing world," the document states. The report's value lies in putting forward a comparative framework of collective security that addresses all the compelling threats of the day, Stedman explained. "The recommendations really are the most important possible makeover of the institution in 60 years," he said. "I think something is going to come out of it." Stedman, a senior fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC) at the Stanford Institute for International Studies (SIIS), was recruited a year ago by U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan to direct research for the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change. Stedman is an expert on civil wars, mediation, conflict prevention, and peacekeeping.

Annan created the 16-member blue-ribbon panel, made up mostly of former government leaders and ministers, in the wake of widespread heated criticism of the United Nations following the U.S.-led war in Iraq. In Annan's annual report to the General Assembly in 2003, he said, "Rarely have such dire forecasts been made about the U.N. ... We have reached a fork in the road ... a moment no less decisive than 1945 itself, when the U.N. was founded." The panel was charged with analyzing global security threats and proposing far-reaching reforms to the international system.

On December 2 the panel, chaired by former Thai prime minister Anand Panyarachun, issued its 95-page report: "A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility." The document identifies six major threats to global security:

-War between states;

-Violence within states, including civil wars, large-scale human rights abuses, and genocide;

-Poverty, infectious disease, and environmental degradation;

-Nuclear, radiological, chemical, and biological weapons;

-Terrorism; and

-Transnational organized crime.

Although states do not face these threats equally, a collective security system must take all member states' threats seriously and deal with them equitably, the report noted. It specifically mentioned the world's appallingly slow response to AIDS.

The report makes 101 recommendations for collective prevention and response to the threats, including ways to reform the United Nations. Annan described these in a December 3 editorial in the International Herald Tribune as "the most comprehensive and coherent set of proposals for forging a common response to common threats that I have seen."

The document also reaffirms the right of states to defend themselves-even preemptively-when an attack is imminent, and it offers guidelines to help the Security Council decide when to authorize the use of force. Stedman said other significant proposals involve improving biosecurity, strengthening nuclear nonproliferation, and defining terrorism. Panel members agreed that any politically motivated violence against civilians should be regarded as terrorism and condemned.

The panel was very critical of the Human Rights Commission, a body that has often harmed the United Nations' reputation by permitting the membership of some of the worst human-rights violators, including Cuba, Libya, and Sudan. The report also discussed the need for new institutions, such as a peace-building commission, that would support countries emerging from conflict.

Scott Sagan, co-director of CISAC, described the report as hard-hitting, although he said he would have tried to extend the withdrawal clause of the nonproliferation treaty from three months to a year. "I think it's the beginning of some major changes that will be helpful," he said. "We need to get states to work together to reform the U.N. rather than sniping at it."

CISAC was closely involved in the panel's work and was named in a cover letter accompanying the report from Panyarachun to Annan. Co-director Chris Chyba served on the panel's 30-member resource group, providing expertise on nuclear nonproliferation and bioterrorism. Bruce Jones, a former CISAC Hamburg Fellow, acted as Stedman's deputy, and Tarun Chhabra, a graduate of CISAC's undergraduate honors program and recent Marshall Scholarship recipient, worked as a research officer. Political science Professors David Laitin and James Fearon, and SIIS Senior Fellow David Victor, provided, respectively, expertise on terrorism, civil wars, and the environment, Stedman said. "There is an immense amount of Stanford influence in the report," he added.

CISAC also hosted a nuclear nonproliferation workshop for the panel on campus last March and helped organize a meeting during the summer in Bangkok. SIIS co-hosted a conference on governance and sovereignty on campus in April and a meeting at Oxford University in June. CISAC provided workspace to give the research team a quiet place to focus on writing the report's first draft in August.

The report has attracted intense international media interest in part because it calls for expanding the U.N. Security Council, its top decision-making group, from 15 to 24 members. The panel was unable to agree on one proposal and offers two options that would make the council more representative and democratic. "I believe either formula would strengthen the legitimacy in the eyes of the world, by bringing its membership closer to the realities of the 21st century-as opposed to those of 1945, when the U.N. Charter was drafted," Annan wrote in the International Herald Tribune.

According to Stedman, the media has highlighted the Security Council's proposed expansion because so many nations have a stake in it. "But in the absence of a new consensus on international peace and security, expansion of the council will not be effective," he explained.

In March, Annan will use the report to inform a series of proposals he will present to the 191 U.N. member states. These, in turn, will be submitted to a summit of world leaders before the General Assembly convenes next September in New York. Stedman said he has been asked to stay on for another year as a special advisor to the secretary general to keep the United Nations "on message" during negotiations.

Engagement by the United States, which has openly questioned the institution's relevance, will be critical to implementing the report's recommendations, said Stedman, who added that the superpower can benefit from a revamped United Nations. "Putting threats to the United States into a global framework makes it more secure," he said.

Stedman noted that one of the most disturbing aspects of the panel's consultations was listening to government representatives from civil-society organizations dismiss the seriousness of bio- and nuclear terror threats against the United States. "They were essentially denying this as a real threat to American security," he said. "I said it's as real a threat to the U.S. as other threats are to you."

When Stedman accepted the job, he thought he would spend 80 percent of his time on research and writing and 20 percent on consultations and negotiating. In fact, he said, it was the other way around. "It's unlike anything I've ever done," he said. "It's been a blast." In contrast to academia, where a researcher presents his or her best findings and defends them, Stedman was faced with 16 people who would push back, reject, or accept his work. "I had to work to change language to include their concerns," he said. "My biggest concern at the beginning was that the report would be based on the lowest common denominator. It's not."

Stedman said the panel members remained open-minded throughout the year. "They showed flexibility, listened to arguments, and changed their minds," he said. "Our job was to be as persuasive, rigorous, and comprehensive in our analysis as we were able to achieve."

In the end, Stedman said, the report belongs to the panel. "Parts of what the exercise shows is that access to those making policy is really important," he said. "If you do really good work and you have access, you have a chance of being heard. Kofi Annan gave me that opportunity."

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How does the resource base of a rebel group impact its membership, structure, and behavior? While scholars, analysts, and policy makers increasingly link natural resources to the onset and duration of civil war, this article explores how resource endowments shape the character and conduct of rebel groups. This article identifies a rebel "resource curse" much like the one that undermines state institutions in resource-rich environments. While the presence of economic endowments makes it possible for leaders to recruit on the basis of short-term rewards, these groups are flooded with opportunistic joiners who exhibit little commitment to the long-term goals of the organization. In resource-poor environments, leaders attract new recruits by drawing on social ties to make credible promises about the private rewards that will come with victory. Opportunistic joiners stay away from these movements, leaving a pool of activist recruits willing to invest their time and energy in the hope of reaping large gains in the future.

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Two of the 10 Stanford University undergraduates who completed CISAC's Interschool Honors Program in International Security Studies this year earned awards for their theses.

Sheena Elise Chestnut, a political science major, received a Firestone Medal for her thesis, "The 'Sopranos State'? North Korean Involvement in Criminal Activity and Implications for International Security." The Firestone Medal recognizes the top 10 percent of Stanford University's undergraduate honors theses.

Jessica McLaughlin, a management science and engineering major, received the William J. Perry Award for her thesis, "A Bayesian Updating Model for Intelligence Analysis: A Case Study of Iraq's Nuclear Weapons Program." The Perry Award recognizes excellence in policy-relevant research in international security studies.

In a June graduation ceremony outside Stanford University's Encina Hall, CISAC faculty member Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, CISAC Postdoctoral Fellow Tonya L. Putnam, and CISAC Co-Director Scott D. Sagan presented students with certificates and thesis awards.

At a CISAC Directors' Seminar on June 1, Chestnut and McLaughlin presented their award-winning theses to an audience of 50 fellow students, faculty members and guests. Chestnut also gave a special seminar at CISAC in May, hosted by APARC and the Preventive Defense Project at CISAC.

The names, majors and thesis titles of eight others who completed the CISAC honors program are

Zack Cooper, public policy, Roman and British Experiences with Maritime Piracy and Implications for Combating Terrorism Today

Nina Hsu, political science, Chinese Assistance in the Pakistani Nuclear Program

Sohan Japa, biomechanical engineering, A Path to Peril: Understanding the Technical Hurdles of Biological Weapon Production

Bradley Larson, political science, Soft Power: US Foreign Aid Post-9/11

Frances Lewis, international relations, The Yellow Light Reactor: An Explanation of the Stop and Go Progress at Bushehr

Victor Marsh II, international relations, A Responsibility to Consult? Local Policy Ownership During Transitional Governance

Christopher Williams, physics, Closing the Nuclear Fuel Cycle: A Component Based Analysis of Options for Spent Fuel Management"

Ming Zhu, international relations, Power and Cooperation: Understanding the Road Towards a Truth Commission

Begun in 2000 to help develop the next generation of security specialists, CISAC's honors hrogram accepts 12 to 14 Stanford undergraduates each year, from any disciplines. Those selected attend a two-week CISAC honors college in Washington, D.C., complete an internship with a security-related organization, attend a year-long core seminar on international security research and produce an honors thesis with policy implications for international security. After fulfilling their individual department course requirements and completing the honors program, participants graduate in their major with an honors certificate in international security studies.

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We developed a mathematical model of a cows-to-consumers supply chain associated with a single milk-processing facility that is the victim of a deliberate release of botulinum toxin. Because centralized storage and processing lead to substantial dilution of the toxin, a minimum amount of toxin is required for the release to do damage. Irreducible uncertainties regarding the dose-response curve prevent us from quantifying the minimum effective release. However, if terrorists can obtain enough toxin, and this may well be possible, then rapid distribution and consumption result in several hundred thousand poisoned individuals if detection from early symptomatics is not timely. Timely and specific in-process testing has the potential to eliminate the threat of this scenario at a cost of less than 1 cent per gallon and should be pursued aggressively. Investigation of improving the toxin inactivation rate of heat pasteurization without sacrificing taste or nutrition is warranted.

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Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
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Lawrence M. Wein
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When Norwegian and U.S. scientists launched the Black Brant XII sounding rocket from a small island off Norway's northwest coast on January 25, 1995, they intended for it to harmlessly collect scientific data about the Northern Lights. But when Russia's early warning system radars detected the rocket, they generated an alarm that entered the nuclear forces command and control system and reached the highest levels of government. An accidental nuclear war was never a possibility--by the time the alarm reached Russian President Boris Yeltsin, the rocket had been properly identified--but the incident clearly demonstrated the dangers of a launch-on-warning posture.

A Cold War hangover, launch-on-warning was designed to provide additional protection to nuclear forces by ensuring that a retaliatory attack could be initiated before a first strike obliterated its targets. Implementing launch-on-warning required substantial investment into a network of early warning radars and satellites--plus a command and control system that would allow missiles to be on constant "hair-trigger alert." Its cost proved high enough that only two nuclear powers--the United States and Soviet Union--established a launch-on-warning capability. Nearly 15 years after the Soviet Union's collapse, neither the United States nor Russia have abandoned it.

Numerous proposals have tried to address launch-on-warning concerns. Most point to the Black Brant XII incident as evidence that the precipitous decline of the Russian early warning and command and control systems is the main problem. The argument is simple: If the early warning system was unreliable a decade ago when it was in relatively good shape, imagine how bad the situation is today, after years of decline. Accordingly, many believe the remedy lies in helping Russia compensate for the disrepair, either by creating arrangements that would allow Russia and the United States to share their early warning data, or by providing direct assistance to Russia that would allow it to upgrade its system. These proposals are misguided. Repairing the Russian early warning system would actually increase the danger of an accidental launch.

The reason for this is that the role of the Russian early warning system today is marginal at best. Even in its prime, the system could not provide the data necessary for a launch-on-warning strike. The radar network has always had serious gaps in coverage and the space-based segment of the system was not designed to detect sea-launched missiles. In addition to this, a series of problems plagued the system during its development and early deployment stages. As a result, the Soviet military learned to regard the alarms it generated with suspicion.

The system's deterioration has only added to doubts about its ability to provide a reliable warning. The breakup of the Soviet Union left most of the radars outside Russian territory. At present, Russia operates only three early warning satellites, while minimally reliable coverage of U.S. territory requires at least five. No second-generation satellites, which would expand coverage to the oceans, are operational today. This leaves Russia with an early warning system it can't really trust.

The lack of trust is exactly the reason why the decline of the system is much less dangerous that it may seem. The continued disrepair erodes confidence in the system's performance further and makes it much less likely that an alarm (whether real or false) would be acted upon. Attempts to repair or upgrade the system, on the other hand, would only increase the danger of miscalculation, since such actions would introduce new elements into an already complex system and boost confidence in its performance.

By the same logic, the United States should not be complacent about its early warning system simply because it is thought to be more robust and reliable than its Russian counterpart. High confidence in the U.S. system could make a technical malfunction--should one ever occur--an extremely dangerous event, since U.S. operators would be unlikely to question the information provided by the system.

The best way to deal with the dangers of accidental launch is to remove missiles from hair-trigger alert, for example by introducing physical barriers that would prevent a launch on warning. Technical solutions that have been suggested include removing warheads from missiles or limiting submarine patrol areas. None of these measures have been implemented, since they involve intrusive and cumbersome verification provisions that neither side is willing to accept. What these proposals don't take into account though is that the main goal of de-alerting--reducing the risk of accidental launch--does not require transparency or verification. If a missile does not have a warhead, it won't be able to leave a silo regardless of whether or not one can verify it. In this respect de-alerting is quite different from disarmament, where verification rightfully belongs.

Moreover, transparency could make de-alerting potentially dangerous. Reducing a missile's readiness for all the world to see could create instability during a crisis. If one country decides to bring its missiles back into operation, its counterpart might feel the need to do the same lest its forces remain unprepared for a launch. This might create a rush to re-alert forces, and the dangers associated with re-alerting could outweigh any de-alerting benefits. Ideally, de-alerting measures should be completely undetectable. This approach would remove missiles from the launch-on-warning equation while minimizing the instabilities associated with re-alerting.

With the verification hurdle removed, there is no reason why the United States and Russia should not make a public commitment to de-alert their strategic arsenals. They don't even need to do it together. De-alerting is beneficial even when done unilaterally. Of course, there will be plenty of questions about the value of commitments that are neither enforceable nor verifiable. But the value would be quite real--thousands of missiles would no longer be on hair-trigger alert. And the next time Norway launches a scientific sounding rocket, we can all breathe a little easier.

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Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
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May 2005 opened with a bleak couple of weeks for the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Delegates from 189 countries struggled to settle on an agenda for the seventh 5-year review of the Treaty, North Korea announced a new extraction of plutonium from its reactor to make nuclear weapons, and Iran stood firm against European attempts to dissuade it from pursuing a nuclear energy program that could be diverted for weapons-making. Yet CISAC's George Bunn, in an interview with BBC's "The World," cautioned against despair.

As the first general counsel to the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Bunn has watched the NPT weather many diplomatic storms since it entered into force in 1970. Far from a failure, the treaty prevented nuclear weapons from becoming a commonplace in nations' defense programs, he said.

"I think that if there were no NPT, there would be something like 35 to 40 countries with nuclear weapons," Bunn explained. "When you think that at the time of our negotiations in the 60s, Sweden and Switzerland both had programs to explore the possibility of making nuclear weapons"--ambitions that the NPT helped dissuade--the treaty has provided incalculable benefits to world security. "If Sweden and Switzerland had nuclear weapons, think how many other countries would have them," he added.

Today the treaty's main weakness is its focus on states' possession of nuclear weapons, at a time when terrorists' ambitions to acquire the weapons is a major concern. At the treaty's outset, "terrorism wasn't perceived by us as a threat. The treaty hardly deals with the threat of terrorism," Bunn said.

The radio interview with George Bunn and his son Matthew Bunn, also a nuclear arms expert, is available at the link below. (Windows Media Player is required.)

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