Two of the 10 Stanford University undergraduates who completed CISAC's Interschool Honors Program in International Security Studies this year earned awards for their theses.

Sheena Elise Chestnut, a political science major, received a Firestone Medal for her thesis, "The 'Sopranos State'? North Korean Involvement in Criminal Activity and Implications for International Security." The Firestone Medal recognizes the top 10 percent of Stanford University's undergraduate honors theses.

Jessica McLaughlin, a management science and engineering major, received the William J. Perry Award for her thesis, "A Bayesian Updating Model for Intelligence Analysis: A Case Study of Iraq's Nuclear Weapons Program." The Perry Award recognizes excellence in policy-relevant research in international security studies.

In a June graduation ceremony outside Stanford University's Encina Hall, CISAC faculty member Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, CISAC Postdoctoral Fellow Tonya L. Putnam, and CISAC Co-Director Scott D. Sagan presented students with certificates and thesis awards.

At a CISAC Directors' Seminar on June 1, Chestnut and McLaughlin presented their award-winning theses to an audience of 50 fellow students, faculty members and guests. Chestnut also gave a special seminar at CISAC in May, hosted by APARC and the Preventive Defense Project at CISAC.

The names, majors and thesis titles of eight others who completed the CISAC honors program are

Zack Cooper, public policy, Roman and British Experiences with Maritime Piracy and Implications for Combating Terrorism Today

Nina Hsu, political science, Chinese Assistance in the Pakistani Nuclear Program

Sohan Japa, biomechanical engineering, A Path to Peril: Understanding the Technical Hurdles of Biological Weapon Production

Bradley Larson, political science, Soft Power: US Foreign Aid Post-9/11

Frances Lewis, international relations, The Yellow Light Reactor: An Explanation of the Stop and Go Progress at Bushehr

Victor Marsh II, international relations, A Responsibility to Consult? Local Policy Ownership During Transitional Governance

Christopher Williams, physics, Closing the Nuclear Fuel Cycle: A Component Based Analysis of Options for Spent Fuel Management"

Ming Zhu, international relations, Power and Cooperation: Understanding the Road Towards a Truth Commission

Begun in 2000 to help develop the next generation of security specialists, CISAC's honors hrogram accepts 12 to 14 Stanford undergraduates each year, from any disciplines. Those selected attend a two-week CISAC honors college in Washington, D.C., complete an internship with a security-related organization, attend a year-long core seminar on international security research and produce an honors thesis with policy implications for international security. After fulfilling their individual department course requirements and completing the honors program, participants graduate in their major with an honors certificate in international security studies.

May 2005 opened with a bleak couple of weeks for the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Delegates from 189 countries struggled to settle on an agenda for the seventh 5-year review of the Treaty, North Korea announced a new extraction of plutonium from its reactor to make nuclear weapons, and Iran stood firm against European attempts to dissuade it from pursuing a nuclear energy program that could be diverted for weapons-making. Yet CISAC's George Bunn, in an interview with BBC's "The World," cautioned against despair.

As the first general counsel to the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Bunn has watched the NPT weather many diplomatic storms since it entered into force in 1970. Far from a failure, the treaty prevented nuclear weapons from becoming a commonplace in nations' defense programs, he said.

"I think that if there were no NPT, there would be something like 35 to 40 countries with nuclear weapons," Bunn explained. "When you think that at the time of our negotiations in the 60s, Sweden and Switzerland both had programs to explore the possibility of making nuclear weapons"--ambitions that the NPT helped dissuade--the treaty has provided incalculable benefits to world security. "If Sweden and Switzerland had nuclear weapons, think how many other countries would have them," he added.

Today the treaty's main weakness is its focus on states' possession of nuclear weapons, at a time when terrorists' ambitions to acquire the weapons is a major concern. At the treaty's outset, "terrorism wasn't perceived by us as a threat. The treaty hardly deals with the threat of terrorism," Bunn said.

The radio interview with George Bunn and his son Matthew Bunn, also a nuclear arms expert, is available at the link below. (Windows Media Player is required.)

Of the Pentagon's $419.3 billion budget request for next year, only about $10.5 billion - 2 percent - will go toward basic research, applied research and advanced technology development. This represents a 20 percent reduction from last year, a drastic cutback that threatens the long-term security of the nation. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld should reconsider this request, and if he does not, Congress should restore the cut.

These research and development activities, known as the "technology base" program, are a vital part of the United States defense program. For good reason: the tech base is America's investment in the future. Over the years, tech base activities have yielded advances in scientific and engineering knowledge that have given United States forces the technological superiority that is responsible in large measure for their current dominance in conventional military power.

Research into basic understanding of methods for reducing radar signatures in the 1970's, for example, gave rise to "stealth" technology. Advances in electronic sensor technology enable the vast collection of information from satellites, and past work on computer systems permits distribution of this information in near real-time to military commanders. The combination of near-real-time intelligence and precision munitions are the heart of the so-called "revolution in military affairs" that avoids large and costly systems and approaches.

These advances require years of sustained effort by university, industry and government researchers. If the Pentagon does not make the required investments today, America will not have dominant military technology tomorrow.

The technology base program has also had a major effect on American industry. Indeed, it is the primary reason that the United States leads the world today in information technology. American companies not only draw heavily on the Pentagon's work, but they have also come to depend on it. The research and development programs of many of America's major information technology companies are almost exclusively devoted to product development.

It was the investment of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency in a network known as ARPA-net in the 1960's and 70's, for example, that gave rise to the Internet. The JPEG file format for digital images is based on software and standards developed by the Pentagon. The global positioning satellite system, first developed for precision-guided munitions, is now used in many cellphones and has the potential to revolutionize our air traffic control system. America's ability to translate the Pentagon's technology base into commercial achievement is the envy of the world.

Of course, the administration and Congress need to make tough budget choices. But to shift money away from the technology base to pay for Iraq, other current military operations or research on large, expensive initiatives, is to give priority to the near term at the expense of the future. This is doubtful judgment, especially at a time when the nature of the threat confronting America is changing. New threats, like catastrophic terrorism and the spread of weapons of mass destruction, urgently call for new technology.

There should be no doubt that basic research will continue to make a contribution. Robotics, artificial intelligence, biotechnology, brain and cognitive sciences, nanotechnology, large-scale modeling and simulation: all these fields can have a huge impact. If properly supported, basic technology work is likely to lead to unprecedented results.

Mr. Rumsfeld has long championed the need to transform the military and exploit new technology. He has supported the technology base in the past and has urged the adoption of a more long-term view of security needs. He should, then, be willing to review and reverse the Pentagon's request for reducing its technology base. He should understand that short-term budget requirements for the armed services always tend to push out the technology base program - unless the Pentagon leadership supports it.

Perhaps the reason for this year's reduction is the mistaken belief that a one-year gap in financing does not matter, because innovation takes so long. But tech base advances occur because of stable financing. Fluctuating budgets cause wasted effort.

It is possible that Congress will restore the cuts in technology base programs and correspondingly reduce some other part of the defense budget. But Mr. Rumsfeld should not depend on Congress. It would be vastly better if the Pentagon understood the importance of the tech base effort, and acted on that understanding.

The Department of Defense's technology base programs have been an important factor in giving America the dominant military force in the world. They have also helped many American information technology companies become successful. The Pentagon should maintain its dedication to these programs, and that will require leadership from the secretary of defense - as well as support from Congress.

John Deutch, a professor of chemistry at M.I.T., was deputy secretary of defense from 1994 to 1995. William J. Perry was secretary of defense from 1994 to 1997.

The nine nations that possess nuclear weapons have enough plutonium and high-enriched uranium collectively to build more than 100,000 additional nuclear weapons, according to a new report aimed at controlling the spread of such weapons and the materials to make them.

This considerable surplus of nuclear-explosive, or fissile, materials threatens global security, as other nations or terrorists seek the means to build nuclear weapons. "Despite a compelling security requirement to keep nuclear weapons out of the hands of terrorists and additional countries," the report warns, "not nearly enough is being done today to achieve this objective."

A group of 23 nuclear experts, convened by Stanford University's Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC) and Princeton University's Program on Science and Global Security (PS&GS), issued the report, "Preventing Nuclear Proliferation and Nuclear Terrorism: Essential Steps to Reduce the Availability of Nuclear-Explosive Materials."

The report details which nations currently have the means to produce nuclear weapons and how much fissile material they possess. "This distribution of fissile material defines the critical tasks facing the international community," the report states. It calls for nations to cooperate on seven steps.

At the top of the report's "to-do list for the international community" is closing what some see as a gaping loophole in the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)--the ability of a nation to acquire nuclear weapons capabilities and then withdraw from the NPT without penalty. So the report first proposes that the U.N. Security Council establish sanctions to impose against any country that withdraws from the NPT and attempts to build weapons using fissile materials and facilities obtained under the treaty for ostensibly peaceful purposes.

The NPT, in effect since 1970, will undergo its seventh 5-year review by more than 180 member states May 2-27 in New York. The report, issued in time for this review, recommends six additional steps for consideration by the conference delegates and other nuclear nonproliferation specialists:

-- "strengthen international physical security standards;

-- "stop the uncontrolled spread of uranium enrichment plants," and "subject all enrichment plants to an extra layer of multinational monitoring;"

-- declare a moratorium on building new plants to reprocess spent nuclear fuel that could be diverted to weapons production;

-- "conclude a verified global treaty ending all further production of fissile materials for weapons;

-- "dispose of much more of the excess fissile materials recovered from dismantled Cold War weapons; and

-- "phase out the use of high-enriched uranium (HEU) as a reactor fuel," in favor of low-enriched uranium, which cannot be made into nuclear weapons without further enrichment.

Some of the study group's recommendations "have been on the international agenda for decades," the report points out, but "most are barely moving forward, if not completely stalled. These measures urgently need high-level attention."

"All of the report's proposals focus on weapons-usable fissile materials--highly enriched uranium and plutonium--because they are the essential materials for nuclear weapons," said CISAC Co-Director Christopher F. Chyba, who led the study with PS&GS Co-Directors Harold Feiveson and Frank von Hippel. "They and the technologies to produce them must be much more strictly controlled if further nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism are to be prevented. The report lays out a series of steps to do so," Chyba added.

The researchers intended to strengthen similar proposals under discussion. The report "gives technical details and support to policy ideas on the control of nuclear explosive materials and their means of production that Mohamed ElBaradei (director-general of the International Atomic Energy Agency) and others have been forwarding," explained Feiveson.

While the report emphasizes physical security measures geared toward reducing the supply of nuclear weapons materials, its authors acknowledge that "demand-side measures" are "equally important." A comprehensive strategy to halt nuclear proliferation must also "address the reasons that certain states choose to pursue nuclear weapons," the report states.

The research group of scientists, political scientists, and international legal experts from leading research and regulatory institutions met at Stanford University in August 2003 to begin their assessment of the global stock of nuclear weapons and the nuclear-explosive materials needed to make them and to outline a plan for limiting the spread of these materials. They continued to refine their recommendations, to produce their report in time for this year's NPT review.