International Relations

FSI researchers strive to understand how countries relate to one another, and what policies are needed to achieve global stability and prosperity. International relations experts focus on the challenging U.S.-Russian relationship, the alliance between the U.S. and Japan and the limitations of America’s counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan.

Foreign aid is also examined by scholars trying to understand whether money earmarked for health improvements reaches those who need it most. And FSI’s Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center has published on the need for strong South Korean leadership in dealing with its northern neighbor.

FSI researchers also look at the citizens who drive international relations, studying the effects of migration and how borders shape people’s lives. Meanwhile FSI students are very much involved in this area, working with the United Nations in Ethiopia to rethink refugee communities.

Trade is also a key component of international relations, with FSI approaching the topic from a slew of angles and states. The economy of trade is rife for study, with an APARC event on the implications of more open trade policies in Japan, and FSI researchers making sense of who would benefit from a free trade zone between the European Union and the United States.

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About the Event: When and how could technological advances undermine nuclear deterrence? Recent scholarship asserts that new remote sensing technologies may soon provide the capabilities needed to detect, track, and precisely target the delivery systems that constitute a nuclear-armed state’s second-strike capabilities. If true, this would have profound consequences for nuclear force structure planning and arms control. Even if such predictions are not technically feasible, exaggerated expectations generated by strategic interests or social influences could still negatively impact acquisition and force structure decisions critical to strategic stability and arms control policy. However, there has been remarkably little detailed, technical analysis to verify, refute, or qualify these claims. Furthermore, there is a lack of consensus around what type of capability would truly render a second strike vulnerable, injecting ambiguity into and ultimately constraining efforts to anticipate the disruption of new technologies.

This research informs these gaps through a mixed, sociotechnical approach. First, it provides a technical assessment of the likelihood that new sensing methods will significantly enhance accuracy in applications critical for targeting second-strike capabilities (i.e., the detection and tracking of nuclear submarines, and inertial navigation to improve missile accuracy). Second, it considers strategic narratives and social dynamics that have historically shaped conceptions of vulnerability used to justify second strike requirements. In doing so, it also identifies factors that are informing current debates over deterrence and mutual vulnerability requirements amidst technological innovation and yields a more dynamic set of policy recommendations aimed at deflating hype and mitigating arms-racing risks. This more integrated method for assessing how new technologies will impact nuclear deterrence is especially important as concerns over a great power competition reinvigorate interest in strategies that promote rapid technology innovation.

About the Speaker: Lindsay Rand is a Postdoctoral Fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University. Prior to Stanford, Lindsay was a Stanton predoctoral fellow in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. In her time at UMD, she was also the instructor of record for an undergraduate nuclear policy course and the Catherine Kelleher research fellow at the Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM). She also has experience working as an adjunct research associate at the RAND Corporation, a research associate at the Center for Global Security Research at Lawrence Livermore National Lab, a NSF fellow on the DHS Science and Technology Directorate quantum technology task force, and a research intern at the Naval Research Laboratory.

Her research draws on my interdisciplinary background in physics and policy to explore how social, political, and technological changes have contributed to the cyclical reconception of "vulnerability" in nuclear strategy and policymaking. In her dissertation, she analyzed the implications for nuclear deterrence due to quantum sensing, and leveraged technical analyses and historical case studies of previous emerging technologies to develop an integrated socio-technical analytic framework.

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William J. Perry Conference Room

Lindsay Rand
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About the Event: What are the domestic drivers of Iran’s nuclear strategy? Since the U.S. withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), Iran has adopted an incrementally more assertive approach in expanding various aspects of its nuclear program and limiting the IAEA’s monitoring and verification activities. Although Iran has not made the political decision to obtain a nuclear weapon, according to U.S. officials, Iran could produce enough fissile material for one bomb in less than two weeks. Experts argue that Iran’s nuclear advances are a bargaining tactic to extract economic concessions from Washington. However, as Iran approaches threshold status, its political calculations are also shifting, signaling more risk tolerance than before. The failure of the JCPOA has undermined bottom-up pressure in the form of elections and civil society movements, which had previously moderated Iran’s foreign policy. The ascendance of a hawkish government in Tehran in 2021 combined with Iran’s growing military capability within the emerging multipolar world order has hardened the Islamic Republic’s bargaining position, inching it toward the weaponization option.

About the Speaker: Mohammad Ayatollahi Tabaar is Associate Professor of International Affairs at Texas A&M University's Bush School of Government and Public Service and a visiting scholar at the Harvard Kennedy School’s Project on Managing the Atom. He is the author of Religious Statecraft: The Politics of Islam in Iran (Columbia University Press, 2018). His articles and commentaries have appeared in Security StudiesJournal of Strategic StudiesForeign AffairsForeign Policy, and the New York Times. Mohammad has a B.A. in social sciences from the University of Tehran, an M.A. in international relations from the University of Chicago, and a Ph.D. in government from Georgetown University. He is currently working on a book project on Iran's nuclear politics.

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William J. Perry Conference Room

Mohammad Tabaar
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About the Event: Despite the territorial demise of the Islamic State, threat assessments over the prospect of its resurgence remain divorced from a rigorous investigation into how it came to establish de-facto statehood in the first place. What explains how a single armed group out of many came to achieve such an astounding hegemonic feat, let alone in such short order? To the extent a consensus exists on its territorial success, conventional opinion emphasizes organizational sources of rebel power – hard, soft, and institutional – combined with the structural permissiveness of the environment. But contrary to widespread belief, the Islamic State was not established as a result of military victory. Instead, it was borne out of a unique and rapid acquisition of a pre-existing Iraqi rebellion, awarding it with a rebel monopoly in Iraq and an autonomous zone of territorial control to enact statehood. This model of consolidation was made viable in 2014 as a result of the organization’s complex embeddedness within Iraq’s Sunni community – a condition that had not existed in its participation in the Syrian rebellion or for its organizational predecessor, al-Qaeda in Iraq, in the earlier years of the Iraqi rebellion.

About the Speaker: Ramzy Mardini is a postdoctoral fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University and an associate at the Pearson Institute for the Study and Resolution of Global Conflicts at the University of Chicago.

His research interests include international security, conflict and conflict resolution, and the politics and security of the Middle East. Based on over three years of fieldwork across multiple countries, his book project examines the role and interplay of social networks on processes of rebellion, with an empirical focus on the Islamic State. His work has been supported by the U.S. Department of Education, the Minerva Research Initiative at the U.S. Department of Defense, and the Smith-Richardson Foundation, and was a 2019-2020 USIP-Minerva Peace Scholar at the United States Institute of Peace in Washington, D.C. and a 2018-2019 Fulbright Fellow in Jordan and Turkey.

Apart from his academic studies, Mardini was a nonresident fellow at the Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East at the Atlantic Council; an adjunct fellow at the Iraq Institute for Strategic Studies; a research analyst on Iraq at the Institute for the Study of War; a Middle East analyst at the Jamestown Foundation; and a research assistant on Iran at the Center for Strategic Studies at the University of Jordan in Amman. He was also a consultant at the Dialogue Advisory Group, an Amsterdam-based organization that facilitates political dialogue between armed actors to reduce violence in active conflicts. From 2010-2011, he served at The White House within the Office of the National Security Advisor to the Vice President, and previously at the Executive Office of the President and the U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs. He is the editor of two books, Volatile Landscape: Iraq and its Insurgent Movements and also The Battle for Yemen: Al-Qaeda and the Struggle for Stability, and has written commentary for the New York Times, Financial Times, Washington Post, among others.

He received a Ph.D., M.A., M.A. from the University of Chicago, where he was a William Rainey Harper Fellow within the Department of Political Science and studied international relations and comparative politics. He graduated summa cum laude with research distinction from Ohio State University. He was born in Dayton, Ohio. 

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William J. Perry Conference Room

Ramzy Mardini
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About the Event: In the prelude to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, American intelligence had concluded the impending Russian efforts would succeed. A Department of Defense official reportedly noted that the collapse of Ukraine “might take a few days longer” than the Russians expected, but not much longer. The Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) was expected to lead the Russian military assault, eliminating Ukraine’s air defense and paving the way for Russian troops to capture Kyiv. However, in hindsight, the expectations were inflated and misinformed. What explains the failure of VKS to acquire and hold air dominance over a much weaker Ukrainian Air Force? I explore three causal factors to understand the failures of the VKS—Ukrainian resolve and innovativeness, Russian culture and its impact on the doctrine and role of VKS in Russian national security, and the role of information and intelligence integration in airpower projection.

About the Speaker: Jaganath Sankaran is an assistant professor in the Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs at The University of Texas at Austin and a non-resident fellow in the Foreign Policy program at the Brookings Institution. He works on problems at the intersection of international security and science & technology. He has published in International Security, Contemporary Security Policy, Journal of Strategic Studies, Journal of East Asian Studies, Asian Security, Strategic Studies Quarterly, Arms Control Today, Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, and other outlets. The RAND Corporation and the Stimson Center have also published his research. He has served on study groups of the National Academies of Sciences (NAS) and the American Physical Society (APS) Panel on Public Affairs examining missile defenses and strategic stability. 

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William J. Perry Conference Room

Jaganath Sankaran
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About the Event: U.S. residents and international affairs elite surveyed for this project report significant reliance on news reporting for information on international affairs. They also acknowledge major gaps in international affairs coverage. Do these gaps predictably influence fundamental knowledge and perceptions of international affairs? We begin by analyzing tens of millions of recently published articles and find that 1) many major international issues receive minimal major news media attention, and 2) that many international issues, when they are reported on, are depicted in a manner that deviates from underlying empirical realities (e.g. reporting effectively stops even as crises continue). Through a series of surveys, we then analyze how these reporting patterns influence the knowledge and perceptions of international affairs of two distinct populations: 1) U.S. residents; and 2) international affairs professionals consisting of a) international relations faculty at colleges and universities across the United States, b) current and former senior U.S. government officials who collectively served across (at least) three presidential administrations on issues relating to U.S. trade, development, or national security, and c) international affairs-focused staffers at major U.S. think tanks. Results point to significant causal effects of news media reporting practices on respondents' knowledge and perceptions of international affairs. More broadly, we argue that the major news media’s role as an international affairs actor is omitted in  much international relations theorizing and empirical work.

About the Speakers: Andrew Shaver is an assistant professor of political science at the University of California, Merced. He is also the founding director of the Political Violence Lab. He previously completed postdoctoral research fellowships at Stanford University's Political Science Department and, separately, at Dartmouth College and earned his PhD in Public Affairs (security studies) from Princeton University's School of Public and International Affairs. His research focuses broadly on contemporary sub-state conflict and appears in the American Political Science Review, American Economic Review, Annual Review of Sociology, International Organization, and Journal of Politics, amongst other outlets. Professor Shaver previously served in different foreign affairs/national security positions within the U.S. Government, including spending nearly one and a half years in Iraq during the U.S.-led war with the Pentagon. 

Professor Shaver will be joined by Shawn Robbins, an undergraduate at the University of California, Irvine and research intern with the Political Violence Lab.

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William J. Perry Conference Room

Andrew Shaver
Shawn Robbins
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About the Event: What is a better question than where did SARS-CoV-2 come from?  
Why can we routinely forbid research with live smallpox but not influenza or coronavirus?
Why do well-intentioned elected officials believe centralized DNA synthesis screening will improve biosecurity?
How can we create or strengthen trust in biotechnology-based operations, transactions, and offerings?
We live today within a collapsing biosecurity bubble, inflated by standing down the US offensive bioweapons program under Nixon but deflating since.
Can we responsibly steward development and deployment of 21st century biotechnologies, sufficient to enable planetary-scale flourishing, without veering into Hobbesian despair? 
What lessons can be learned from what the physics and policy communities did or did not accomplish in the 1930s?  
Or the internet leaders did or failed to do in the 1980s?  
Or the AI community failed to do in the 2010s?
Are there practical paths forward besides reacting to unilateral innovators and actors?

About the Speaker: Drew Endy is a bioengineer at Stanford University who studies and teaches synthetic biology. His goals are civilization-scale flourishing and a renewal of liberal democracy. Prof. Endy helped launch new undergraduate majors in bioengineering at both MIT and Stanford and also the iGEM — a global genetic-engineering “Olympics” enabling thousands of students annually. His past students lead companies like Ginkgo Bioworks and Octant. He is married to Christina Smolke CEO of Antheia the essential medicine company. Endy served on the US National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) the Committee on Science Technology & Law (CSTL) the International Union for the Conservation of Nature’s (IUCN) Synthetic Biology Task Force and, briefly, the Pentagon’s Defense Innovation Board (DIB). He currently serves on the World Health Organization’s (WHO) Advisory Committee on Variola Virus Research. Esquire magazine recognized Drew as one of the 75 most influential people of the 21st century.
 

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William J. Perry Conference Room

Drew Endy
Seminars
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About the Event: India and China have engaged in strategic competition of varying intensity for several decades, which sharpened after a border crisis beginning in 2020. Since that crisis, and contemporaneous events such as the COVID pandemic, India and China have struggled to find a new equilibrium. In this presentation, Ambassador Gokhale will share his views on the broad premises upon which China's India policy appears to be based, the reasons for the current impasse in bilateral relations after 2020, and how India's relations with China are likely to evolve over the next 10 years.

About the Speaker: Ambassador Vijay Gokhale retired in 2020 as India’s senior-most diplomat. In an Indian Foreign Service career spanning almost 40 years, he served in Hong Kong, Beijing, and Taipei, as well as several other posts across Asia, before becoming India's Ambassador to China (2016-2017) and Foreign Secretary (2018-2020). He is now a Distinguished Professor at Symbiosis, Pune, and a nonresident Senior Fellow at Carnegie India, and has written three books and several policy papers on India-China relations.
 

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Reuben W. Hills Conference Room

Vijay Gokhale
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About the Event: Why are some foreign policy advisers more influential than others? A new wave of scholarship illuminates why advisers gain influence generally but says little about which advisers get their way. We argue that foreign policy decision-making can be viewed as a “battle of the advisers” and that individual dispositions and effort give some advisers advantages over others. To test our theory, we introduce an original dataset that systematically codes adviser recommendations across a random sample drawn from over 2,000 foreign policy deliberations with the U.S. president between 1947 and 1988. Our findings show that hawkish advisers enjoy greater influence and that advisers who expend more effort before meetings enjoy greater influence—but that these are non-overlapping sets of individuals. Hawks and hawkish messages win because they garner deference from others, especially conservative leaders inclined to venerate traits associated with hawkishness. Contrary to existing accounts, the findings suggest that more experience or social connections do not grant advisers heightened influence.

About the Speaker: Robert Schub is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at Rutgers University. His research addresses international security with an emphasis on (1) the senior officials who make decisions regarding war and peace and (2) the uncertainty they confront when making these decisions. His work studies how the information bureaucracies provide affects the assessments leaders form and how the counsel advisers offer shapes the decisions leaders make. In other work, he studies the individuals who bear the costs of war with a focus on racial dimensions of burden sharing and service-member attitudes toward conflict. His research has appeared in the American Political Science Review, International Organization, International Studies Quarterly, and the Journal of Conflict Resolution among other outlets.

He was previously an Assistant Professor at the University of Nebraska, postdoctoral fellow at the University of Oxford, predoctoral fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School, and received a PhD in Government from Harvard University.  

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William J. Perry Conference Room

Robert Schub
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About the Event: In the past, it was assumed that men, as good citizens, would serve in the armed forces in wartime. In the present, however, liberal democratic states increasingly rely on small, all-volunteer militaries deployed in distant wars of choice. While few people now serve in the armed forces, our cultural myths and narratives of warfare continue to reproduce a strong connection between military service, citizenship, and normative masculinity.

In Support the Troops, Katharine M. Millar provides an empirical overview of "support the troops" discourses in the US and UK during the early years of the global war on terror (2001-2010). As Millar argues, seemingly stable understandings of the relationship between military service, citizenship, and gender norms are being unsettled by changes in warfare. The effect is a sense of uneasiness about the meaning of what it means to be a "good" citizen, "good" person, and, crucially, a "good" man in a context where neither war nor military service easily align with existing cultural myths about wartime obligations and collective sacrifice. Instead we participate in the performance of supporting the troops, even when we oppose war—an act that appears not only patriotic and moral, but also apolitical. Failing to support the troops, either through active opposition or a lack of overt supportive actions, is perceived as not only offensive and inappropriately political, but disloyal and dangerous. Millar asserts that military support acts as a new form of military service, which serves to limit anti-war dissent, plays a crucial role in naturalizing the violence of the transnational liberal order, and recasts war as an internal issue of solidarity and loyalty. Rigorous and politically challenging, Millar provides the first work to systematically examine "support the troops" as a distinct social phenomenon and offers a novel reading of this discourse through a gendered lens that places it in historical and transnational context.

About the Speaker: Katharine Millar is an Associate Professor of International Relations in the Department of International Relations at the London School of Economics.

Her broad research interests lie in examining the gendered cultural narratives underlying political violence and the modern collective use of force.  Her on-going research examines gender, race, sexuality and the transnational politics of death; gender and cybersecurity; and the politics of hypocrisy. Dr Millar is also researching the relationship between grief, mass death, and social order in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic. Dr Millar has also published on female combatants, gendered representations of violent death, military and civilian masculinity, and critical conceptions of militarism.

Dr Millar's recent book, Support the Troops: Military Obligation, Gender, and the Making of Political Community, was published in 2022 by Oxford University Press. The book examines the relationship between support the troops discourses and gendered, normative citizenship in the US and UK during the early years of the so-called Global War on Terror. It outlines a theory connecting gendered notions of political obligation with the transformation of civil-military relations, and the normative use of violence, in contemporary liberal democracies.

Dr Millar is an Associate Editor at the journal Security Dialogue and an associated researcher with the Centre for Women, Peace and Security (formerly the Steering Committee) at the London School of Economics. She has participated in consultation processes regarding the UN's Women, Peace, and Security Agenda for the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the NATO Defense College and the NATO Defence Education Enhancement Project (DEEP). She also does policywork with various international organisations and international non-governmental organisations on gendered elements of cybersecurity and cybersecurity governance.

Dr Millar has frequently been recognised for Inspiring Teaching in the LSE Students' Union student-nominated teaching awards.

Previously, Dr Millar was at the University of Oxford, where she held a Social Science and Humanities Research Council of Canada doctoral fellowship at Somerville College, and lectured in Politics at St. Anne's College. Before entering the academy, Dr Millar worked as a policy researcher for a major Canadian political party. She holds a Masters of International Studies from the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva, Switzerland, and a Bachelor of Arts (Honours) from the University of Alberta, Edmonton, Canada.

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William J. Perry Conference Room

Kate Millar
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From June 23 to 25, the world watched as Yevgeny Prigozhin, head of the private militia Wagner Group, ordered his fighters to  seize the military headquarters in the Russian city of Rostov-on-Don, demanded the resignation of Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and Chief of General Staff Valeriy Gerasimov, and advanced his forces toward  Moscow.

The rebellion posed the most significant threat to President Vladimir Putin’s power in his 23-year tenure as Russia’s leader. While the mutiny was abruptly called off following a deal brokered by Belarusian president Aleksandr Lukashenko, the effects continue to reverberate throughout Russia, Eastern Europe, and beyond.

Much is still unknown about the mutiny, Prigozhin’s exile in Belarus, and internal disputes within the Kremlin. But long-time Putin watchers and Russia experts agree that the events of the weekend have significantly weakened Putin’s image as an authoritarian strongman and sole commander of Russia.  

Below, scholars from the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies offer their analysis of how the mutiny may impact Russia, Putin’s power, and the war in Ukraine.



Ongoing Problems for Putin

Kathryn Stoner

Writing in Journal of Democracy, Kathryn Stoner, the Mosbacher DIrector of the Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law, explains how the rebellion is both a symptom and cause of Putin’s instability as a leader:

“Putin’s rule relies on individual loyalties rather than institutionalized, transparent chains of command and responsibility. This allows him to retain unrivaled control over a hierarchy of patron-client relationships and to change policies quickly before any real internal elite opposition can coalesce. But the result of such a system is that it operates at the mercy of shifting loyalties and is therefore inherently fragile. The Prigozhin rebellion, therefore, is a symptom of this latent instability within Putinism.”

Stoner, who has written previously about the conditions that lead to regime changes in autocracies, offered her insights in The Atlantic on how Putin might try to recoup from the embarrassment caused by the rebellion:  

“What does all of this tell us about what might now be going on in Russia and how Putin might pursue the war in Ukraine going forward? While to us Putin may look weak and ineffective, he will undoubtedly use his control over the Russian media to pin the rebellion on Ukraine, NATO, and Russia’s other enemies. He may even take credit for avoiding mass casualties in a civil war by making a deal with Prigozhin. Spinning the story as best he can, Putin himself will survive, although his carefully crafted myth of competence will be damaged. Over time, this might erode elite confidence, although it is unlikely to result in an open coup attempt anytime soon.”

Stoner believes that there is “much still to learn about all that has transpired,” but that one thing is certain: Putin’s ill-considered war in Ukraine has weakened his grip on Russia.

“Although this is not the end of the war or of Putin,” she says, “the Wagner rebellion might yet prove the beginning of the end of both.”

Kathryn Stoner

Kathryn Stoner

Mosbacher Director of the Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law (CDDRL)
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Impacts on Russia, Ukraine, and Beyond

Michael McFaul

The implications of the 72-hour mutiny will last much longer and extend much further beyond Rostov and Moscow, says FSI Director and former U.S. ambassador to Russia Michael McFaul.

Speaking with Madeline Brand of KRCW, McFaul outlined the difficult situation Putin now finds himself in.

“This whole series of events has made Putin look a lot weaker than he looked three or four days ago. The very fact that the Wagner group exists is a sign of weakness. Putin needs them because he couldn’t rely on his armed forces.”

Elaborating further on Putin’s dilemma, McFaul says:

“As those mercenaries were getting closer to Moscow, Putin went on TV and sounded very macho, calling Prigozhin’s men traitors and promising to crush them, but then four hours later, he capitulates and starts to negotiate. And now he’s given another speech where it sounds like he’s pleading with these mercenaries to lay down their weapons and join the Russian forces. That clearly shows he hasn’t resolved this Wagner crisis yet.”

McFaul predicts that Putin’s remaining partners are also taking note of his fumbled reaction to the rebellion.

“​​If you’re Xi Jinping watching this, the big bet you made on Putin as a partner in opposing the West is looking really problematic right now.”

What Chinese officials fear most, McFaul explained to MSNBC’s Jonathn Capehart, is instability and dissolution, both internally and amongst their neighbors. Historically, the collapse of the Soviet Union was a catastrophic event for Chinese Communist Party officials, and a lesson the current leadership is loath to repeat.

McFaul asserts that, “The longer Putin’s war in Ukraine goes, the more probable it becomes that Russia becomes more unstable. The longer this war goes on, the more likely it is we could see something like this play out over and over again. So I would hope that Xi Jinping understands that putting pressure on Putin to end the war in Ukraine is the best way to prevent chaos on China's borders.”

There are also important lessons the United States and its allies need to consider when evaluating the kind of support they are willing to give Ukraine as the war wears on.

“Putin capitulated very fast, and I think that says a lot about how he’s going to fight in Ukraine and whether he needs an ‘off ramp’ like we’ve been saying. We’ve heard all of these arguments that if he’s backed into a corner he’ll never negotiate. Well, this weekend Putin was in a corner, and he didn't double down. He didn't escalate. He negotiated,” McFaul observes.

Continuing this thought on his Substack, McFaul emphasized that, “The lesson for the war in Ukraine is clear. Putin is more likely to negotiate and end his war if he is losing on the battlefield, not when there is a stalemate. Those who have argued that Ukraine must not attack Crimea for fear of triggering escalation must now reevaluate that hypothesis. The sooner Putin fears he is losing the war, the faster he will negotiate.”

Or, as McFaul writes in Journal on Democracy, “Anything that weakens Putin is good for Ukraine. It is as simple as that.”  

Michael McFaul Headshot

Michael McFaul

Director of the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies
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Fallout on Nuclear Security and Norms

Rose Gottemoeller

Throughout the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, there have been concerns about nuclear sabre rattling by Putin and Kremlin-backed propagandists. Writing in the Financial Times, Rose Gottemoeller, the Steven C. Házy Lecturer at CISAC and former Deputy Secretary of NATO offered this insight:

“The fixation with nuclear apocalypse seems to be the symptom of a wider anxiety that the west is bent on Russian dismemberment because of its aspirations in Ukraine. The Kremlin argues that it only wanted to resume its ancestral right to a Slavic heartland, but that the U.S. and NATO are seeking as punishment Russia’s full and complete destruction as a nation state.”

Gottemoeller has been quick to condemn Putin’s casual threats of nuclear use and clear in her recommendations to the U.S. administration and its allies to find constructive ways to keep nuclear arms talks open despite the war in Ukraine and setbacks like Russia’s suspension of its participation in the New START Treaty.

The Wagner takeover of Rostov-on-Don adds a new layer to the security concerns surrounding Russia’s nuclear posture. Looking at the evolution of Putin’s nuclear rhetoric over the last 18 months, Gottemoeller writes:

“Putin embraced nuclear weapons to keep the United States and its NATO allies off his back and out of his way as he pursued his adventure in Ukraine. It did not work out that way. The United States and NATO were not ready to fight inside Ukraine, but they were willing to do everything else to support Kyiv’s cause — economic, political, security and military assistance to ensure Russia’s defeat. Nuclear weapons failed Putin as a guarantee against external meddling.”

Turning to the events of the last week, Gottemoeller continues:

“We learned on June 24 that they are no help to him internally, either. He could not brandish nuclear weapons in the face of the Wagner Group uprising . . . Nuclear weapons are not the authoritarian’s silver bullet when his power is strained to the breaking point — far from it. In fact, they represent a consummate threat to national and global security if they should fall into the wrong hands in the course of domestic unrest.”

In light of Prigozhin’s mutiny, she urges global leaders to “focus on the problem, stop loose nuclear talk, and put new measures in place to protect, control and account for nuclear weapons and the fissile material that go into them.” 

Woman smiling

Rose Gottemoeller

Steven C. Házy Lecturer at the Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC)
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The Unknown Unknowns of the Settlement

Steven Pifer

Major questions remain about the deal struck between Putin, Prigozhin, and Lukashenko. While Lukashenko has confirmed that the Wagner boss is now in Belarusian territory, it is unclear — and many feel, unlikely — that he will stay there in quiet retirement. 

Weighing in on Twitter, Steven Pifer, an affiliate at the Center for International Cooperation and Security and The Europe Center, and a former U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine, acknowledged, “We likely do not know all carrots and/or sticks that were in play to lead to Prigozhin’s decision to end his mutiny . . . Something does not add up.”

Following up in Politico, Pifer added:

“The ‘settlement’ supposedly brokered by President Alexander Lukashenko of Belarus leaves Putin, who was invisible during the day except for a short morning TV broadcast, as damaged goods. It provided the impression that all was forgiven, likely because the Russian president feared the prospect of Prigozhin’s troops parading in Moscow — even if they lacked the numbers to take control of the capital. It is harder to understand Prigozhin. His demands went unmet, yet he ordered his troops back to garrison, accepted that they might join the Russian army that he detests, and meekly set off for Belarus. There clearly is more behind this ‘settlement’ than we understand.”

Man smiling

Steven Pifer

Affiliate at the Center for International Security and Cooperation and The Europe Center
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Understanding Russia and the War in Ukraine

For more commentary and analysis from FSI scholars about the war in Ukraine and events in Russia, follow the link to our resources page, ‘Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine’

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Crew onboard a 'Terminator' tank support fighting vehicle during a Victory Day military parade in Red Square marking the 75th anniversary of the victory in World War II, on June 24, 2020 in Moscow, Russia.
Crew onboard a 'Terminator' tank support fighting vehicle during a Victory Day military parade in Red Square marking the 75th anniversary of the victory in World War II, on June 24, 2020 in Moscow, Russia.
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Scholars at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies offer insight on what Yevgeny Prigozhin’s mutiny may signal about Russia, Putin’s power, and the war in Ukraine.

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