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In June 2025, Ukraine’s security services staged an audacious strike inside Russia. They infiltrated the country and hid short-range attack drones in cargo trucks near a slew of Russian air bases as far away as the Amur region on the border with China. Most of these bases were home to Russian strategic heavy bombers—aircraft capable of carrying nuclear weapons. Using Russia’s mobile phone network, Ukrainian operatives remotely launched the drones, successfully destroying at least ten of the bombers and damaging a total of 41 planes, including some used for nuclear command and control, according to Ukrainian assessments.

Known as Operation Spider’s Web, this assault was a remarkable gambit. The most significant aspect of the attack, however, was not its astonishing cost ratio—as one analyst put it, “a single drone costing just $500 destroyed a strategic bomber worth tens of millions of dollars”—or its ingenuity in hijacking Russian telecommunications, but the fact that it could happen at all. As part of its long-standing doctrine, Moscow had insisted that a conventional attack on its strategic assets could provoke a nuclear response. But that did not stop Kyiv. Ukraine was willing to go after Russia’s nuclear capabilities, and Russia was unable to prevent their destruction.

Continue reading at foreignaffairs.com

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Speaking in India on May 22, Secretary of State Marco Rubio suggested the Trump administration would step back from its bid to mediate an end to the Russia-Ukraine war: “We just, over the last few months, just sort of sensed that there wasn’t a lot of progress being made, but maybe dynamics will change. And if they do, we stand ready to play whatever constructive role we can play. If someone else would like to handle it, they should.”

President Trump’s mediation effort has failed. That should not come as a surprise. The administration has mishandled the negotiations, and Trump refuses to back his diplomacy with pressure on the recalcitrant party, the Kremlin.

Continue reading at thehill.com

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Washington Steps Back from Russia-Ukraine Mediation, and it’s Not a Bad Thing
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On August 15, President Donald Trump welcomed Vladimir Putin to the Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson in Anchorage, Alaska. It was the first time since their sideline meeting in 2019 at the G20 meeting in Osaka, Japan that the two leaders have met, and the first time Putin has traveled to the United States since the United Nations General Assembly in New York in 2015.

While President Volodymyr Zelenskyy of Ukraine met with President Trump in Washington, DC the following  week, some observers have expressed trepidation over the prospect of a deal being made between Russia and the United States without the input of Ukraine.

Writing for Brookings ahead of the summit, Steven Pifer, an affiliate at the Center for International Security and Cooperation and The Europe Center, and a former U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine warned:

“Putin will seek to trap Trump into endorsing a position that incorporates the major elements of long-standing Russian demands. If Trump agrees, he will suffer unflattering comparisons to Neville Chamberlain, who agreed to surrender a large part of Czechoslovakia to Nazi Germany in 1938. While the Czechoslovakian government concluded it had no choice and accepted the territorial loss, the Ukrainians will say no. They will not embrace their own capitulation.”

So how did the meeting in Anchorage actually play out?

In commentary on social media, FSI Director and former U.S. Ambassador to Russia Michael McFaul summarized the talks in the context of the Yalta Conference, an agreement between the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union made in the waning months of WWII that quickly fell apart when Joseph Stalin broke promises made to Western leaders to maintain and support democratic elections in Eastern Europe.

Speaking on NPR’s Morning Edition, McFaul elaborated on his concerns: 

“What I think the worst outcome would be is if President Trump starts negotiating on behalf of the Ukrainians without the Ukrainians in the room. Trump needs something tangible, and I hope that doesn't make him too anxious to start negotiating on behalf of the Ukrainians because that would be a disaster. If he jams President Zelenskyy with something he can't accept, that would be the worst of all outcomes.”

Pifer echoed his relief about the lack of discussion over particulars about Ukraine between the two leaders, but also pointed out that the broadest goal of the meeting also hadn’t been met.

“The good news is, President Trump didn’t give away the store. I was concerned he might get into bargaining on details about Ukraine without the Ukrainians there, which would be to their detriment. But it seems Mr. Trump failed in his stated goal to achieve a ceasefire between Russia and Ukraine,” said Pifer. 

But even without a concrete policy outcome, Pifer says the Alaska meeting was an optical victory for Russia: 

“The significance for Vladimir Putin is that the meeting happened in the first place. Since Russia launched its invasion of Ukraine back in 2022, there’s been a boycott by Western leaders of any kind of face-to-face meeting with Putin. And by hosting him in Alaska, Trump broke that boycott. That is being played up in Moscow as a huge victory that Putin has been legitimized again.”

On Monday, August 18, President Zelenskyy and a cadre of other European leaders met with President Trump at the White House to discuss the Friday meeting and reinforce Europe’s positions and redlines against capitulation to Russian demands.

In analysis for Foreign Policy, Pifer outlined the stakes of this follow-up meeting for the European delegation:

“Zelenskyy and his European colleagues face a tricky challenge. They have to diplomatically offer suggestions to walk Trump back from a position that he does not appear to understand would be bad for Ukraine, bad for Europe, and bad for American interests. And they have to do so without setting off an explosion that could disrupt U.S.-Ukrainian and U.S.-European relations.”

McFaul is also cautious about the tone and tack of the discussions moving forward:

“I think it’s a good thing [the Europeans and Trump] are talking about security guarantees,“ he told Alex Witt on MSNBC. “But the devil is in the details. We keep hearing something about ‘NATO-like security guarantees.’ Why not just NATO security guarantees?"

The argument for building a lasting ceasefire in Ukraine based on NATO membership is a proposal McFaul has long supported.

“This notion that these guarantees are going to be something like NATO but less than NATO . . . if I were the Ukrainians, that would make me nervous. They had guarantees like that in 1994 called the Budapest Memorandum, and it meant nothing. It didn’t stop Putin from invading in 2014, and it didn’t stop him from launching a full-scale war in 2022,” McFaul reminded viewers.

“To me,” he argues, “it has to be NATO, not NATO-lite. The only way to do real, credible security guarantees for Ukraine is membership in NATO.”

In assessing the White House meeting with President Zelenskyy and European leadership, Rose Gottemoeller, the William J. Perry lecturer at CISAC and former deputy secretary of NATO, is cautiously optimistic. 

“This was a major step along the road, and it was vital that the Europeans were there as well as Ukraine,” she told the CBC.

A seasoned negotiator with direct experience working on high-level diplomacy with Russia, Gottemoeller is no stranger to the long process of dealmaking with the Kremlin.

“There are many steps to get through. We are not there yet. As much as Trump would like to walk out of the Oval Office and say, ‘We got the deal done,’ I think there will be many more hoops to jump through before that is possible.”



Additional insights from our scholars on the Trump-Putin summit and White House meeting with Zelenskyy and other European leaders can be found at the following links:

Russia, Ukraine, and Trump on Katie Couric
Trump Meets with Putin: Experts React in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
There Are No Participation Trophies in High-Stakes Diplomacy on Substack

 

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Displaying Weakness to the Kremlin

For a U.S. administration claiming that it wants to restore American power in order, among other things, to negotiate from a position of strength, the past week has not advanced the cause.
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Vladimir Putin and Donald Trump in conversation on the tarmac of the Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson on August 15, 2025 in Anchorage, Alaska.
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FSI scholars Michael McFaul, Steven Pifer, and Rose Gottemoeller analyze the Alaska meeting between Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin and its implications for Ukraine’s security and sovereignty.

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Vladimir Putin and Donald Trump in conversation on the tarmac of the Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson on August 15, 2025 in Anchorage, Alaska.
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After the Trump-Putin Summit, Is Ending the Ukraine-Russia War Any Closer?
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