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Abstract: Senior policy makers often talk as though cyber conflict poses the same kind of existential threat as does nuclear conflict.  Sober analysis reveals the silliness of this claim, but nonetheless, an understanding of nuclear conflict can help to structure thinking about cyber conflict.  Specifically, I will present some preliminary work on the proposition that nuclear and cyber conflict are similar in that the same questions arise in each, but that the answers to these questions are for the most part entirely different.  I hope that feedback from this seminar will help me to refine this work if I’m on the right track (or abandon it if I’m not).

About the Speaker: Dr. Herb Lin is senior research scholar for cyber policy and security at the Center for International Security and Cooperation and Research Fellow at the Hoover Institution, both at Stanford University.  His research interests relate broadly to policy-related dimensions of cybersecurity and cyberspace, and he is particularly interested in and knowledgeable about the use of offensive operations in cyberspace, especially as instruments of national policy.  In addition to his positions at Stanford University, he is Chief Scientist, Emeritus for the Computer Science and Telecommunications Board, National Research Council (NRC) of the National Academies, where he served from 1990 through 2014 as study director of major projects on public policy and information technology, and Adjunct Senior Research Scholar and Senior Fellow in Cybersecurity (not in residence) at the Saltzman Institute for War and Peace Studies in the School for International and Public Affairs at Columbia University.  Prior to his NRC service, he was a professional staff member and staff scientist for the House Armed Services Committee (1986-1990), where his portfolio included defense policy and arms control issues. He received his doctorate in physics from MIT.

Encina Hall (2nd floor)

CISAC
Stanford University
Encina Hall, C236
Stanford, CA 94305-6165

650-497-8600
0
Senior Research Scholar at the Center for International Security and Cooperation
Hank J. Holland Fellow in Cyber Policy and Security, Hoover Institution
HerbertLin.jpg

Dr. Herb Lin is senior research scholar at the Center for International Security and Cooperation and Research Fellow at the Hoover Institution, both at Stanford University.  His research interests relate broadly to the impact of emerging technologies on national security, especially in the digital domain (cyber, artificial intelligence, information warfare and operations), and has written extensively on the role of offensive operations in cyberspace as instruments of national policy.  In addition to his positions at Stanford University, he is Chief Scientist, Emeritus for the Computer Science and Telecommunications Board, National Research Council (NRC) of the National Academies, where he served from 1990 through 2014 as study director of major projects on public policy and information technology.  From 2016 to 2025, he was a member of the Science and Security Board of the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists. In 2016, he served on President Obama’s Commission on Enhancing National Cybersecurity and in  2021 on the Aspen Commission on Information Disorder.  Prior to his NRC service, he was a professional staff member and staff scientist for the House Armed Services Committee (1986-1990), where his portfolio included defense policy and arms control issues. He received his doctorate in physics from MIT.

Avocationally, he is a longtime folk and swing dancer and a lousy magician. Apart from his work on cyberspace and cybersecurity, he is published in cognitive science, science education, biophysics, and arms control and defense policy. He also consults on K-12 math and science education.

Date Label
Herb Lin Senior Research Scholar Speaker CISAC
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Abstract: Although anthropogenic impacts on biodiversity are recognized, human impacts on animal life are an under-appreciated form of global environmental change. For example, among terrestrial vertebrates, 322 species have
 become extinct since 1500, and populations of the remaining species show 25% average decline in abundance. Invertebrate patterns are equally dire: 
monitored populations show close to 50% mean abundance decline. Such animal declines
will cascade onto ecosystem functioning and human well-being, including risks to human health. I will discuss how defaunation is both a pervasive component of the current anthropogenic erosion of Earth’s biological diversity and also a major driver of global ecological change of significance for society.

About the Speaker: Rodolfo Dirzo earned his M.Sc. and his Ph.D. from the University of Wales, UK, and he is currently a professor of biology at Stanford, and Director of Stanford’s Center for Latin American Studies. His research on the ecology of plant and animals in tropical ecosystems examines the significance of biodiversity loss in terms of ecosystem functioning and ecosystem services to society. He is member of the US National Academy of Sciences. He is committed to education at all levels, including elementary and high schools from underserved communities in the Bay Area. 

Anthropogenic impact on animal life and its consequences for ecosystem functioning and ecosystem services
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Encina Hall (2nd floor)

Rodolfo Dirzo Speaker Bing Professor in Environmental Science; Senior Fellow, Woods Institute for the Environment
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Abstract:  Foreign aid for health in low- and middle-income countries has increased five-fold over the past 25 years.  Between 2005 and 2010, health aid made up more than 30% of all health spending in low-income countries.  Global health is also an increasingly important component of U.S. foreign aid, rising steadily from under 4% of all U.S. non-military aid in 1990 to 22.7% in 2011.  There is growing evidence for the role of health aid in improving health among recipient countries, but is that it?  In this talk I will address the arguments for and against health as a focus of aid efforts and present initial evidence on the role of health aid on human capital and economic development.

Eran Bendavid
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Abstract: Prison systems can play numerous roles in a society's security in terms of the separation of criminals from the general population, rehabilitation of criminals prior to reentry in society, and deterrent effects on criminal behaviors. Yet, prison systems also create a set of obligations for the state towards prisoners including responsibility for their health and healthcare and a set of related challenges in terms of infectious disease control. Densely populated with high volumes of entry, movement, exit and reentry, prison systems have historically provided breeding grounds for infectious diseases and acted as epidemic lenses with important consequences for society at large. This talk considers two health policy case studies involving infectious diseases in prisons: 1) Tuberculosis and Multidrug Resistance in the former Soviet Union; 2) Chronic Hepatitis C Virus in the United States. In both, new more expensive and efficacious technologies are evaluated in terms of their effectiveness, costs, cost-effectiveness with consideration given to affordability and the specific ethics of making such decisions for incarcerated individuals.

About the Speaker: Jeremy Goldhaber-Fiebert, PhD, is an Assistant Professor of Medicine, a Core Faculty Member at the Centers for Health Policy/Primary Care and Outcomes Research, and a Faculty Affiliate of the Stanford Center on Longevity and Stanford Center for International Development. His research focuses on complex policy decisions surrounding the prevention and management of increasingly common, chronic diseases and the life course impact of exposure to their risk factors. In the context of both developing and developed countries including the US, India, China, and South Africa, he has examined chronic conditions including type 2 diabetes and cardiovascular diseases, human papillomavirus and cervical cancer, tuberculosis, and hepatitis C and on risk factors including smoking, physical activity, obesity, malnutrition, and other diseases themselves. He combines simulation modeling methods and cost-effectiveness analyses with econometric approaches and behavioral economic studies to address these issues. Dr. Goldhaber-Fiebert graduated magna cum laude from Harvard College in 1997, with an A.B. in the History and Literature of America. After working as a software engineer and consultant, he conducted a year-long public health research program in Costa Rica with his wife in 2001. Winner of the Lee B. Lusted Prize for Outstanding Student Research from the Society for Medical Decision Making in 2006 and in 2008, he completed his PhD in Health Policy concentrating in Decision Science at Harvard University in 2008. He was elected as a Trustee of the Society for Medical Decision Making in 2011.

Encina Hall (2nd floor)

Jeremy Goldhaber-Fiebert Assistant Professor of Medicine, CHP/PCOR Core Faculty Member Speaker Stanford University
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Abstract: In January 2010, inspectors with the International Atomic Energy Agency noticed that centrifuges at an Iranian uranium enrichment plant were failing at an unprecedented rate. The cause was a complete mystery—apparently as much to the technicians replacing the centrifuges as to the inspectors observing them.

Then, five months later, a seemingly unrelated event occurred: A computer security firm in Belarus was called in to troubleshoot some computers in Iran that were crashing and rebooting repeatedly and found some malicious code on them. At first, the firm’s analysts believed the code was simply a routine piece of malware. But as they and other experts around the world investigated, they discovered a mysterious virus of unparalleled complexity.

They had, they soon learned, stumbled upon the world’s first digital weapon. For Stuxnet, as it came to be known, was unlike any other virus or worm built before: Rather than simply hijacking targeted computers or stealing information from them, it escaped the digital realm to wreak actual, *physical *destruction on a nuclear facility.

Author Kim Zetter, a senior writer for WIRED magazine, recently published a book on Stuxnet. In this presentation, she'll tell the story about Stuxnet's planning, execution and discovery and why the attack was so unique and sophisticated. She'll also discuss the repercussions of the assault and how critical infrastructure in the U.S. is susceptible to the same kind

About the Speaker: Kim Zetter is an award-winning investigative journalist and author who covers cybersecurity, cybercrime, cyber warfare, privacy and civil liberties. She has been covering computer security and the hacking underground since 1999, most currently as a staff reporter for Wired, where she has been reporting since 2003. She was a finalist for an Investigative Reporters and Editors award in 2005 for a series of investigative pieces she wrote about the security problems with electronic voting machines and the controversial companies that make them. In 2006 she broke a story for Salon about a secret NSA room at an AT&T facility in Missouri that was believed to be  siphoning internet data from the telecom’s network operations center. In  2007 she wrote a groundbreaking three-part story for Wired on the cybercriminal underground, which exposed the world of online carding  markets and the players behind them. In 2010, she and a Wired colleague broke the story about the arrest of Bradley Manning, the former Army intelligence analyst accused of leaking millions of classified U.S. government documents to WikiLeaks. In 2011, she wrote an extensive feature about Stuxnet, a sophisticated digital weapon that was launched by the U.S. and Israel to sabotage Iran’s uranium enrichment program.  She recently completed a book on the topic.

Kim Zetter's book on Stuxnet, Countdown to Zero Day: Stuxnet and the Launch of the World's First Digital Weapon, can be purchased by following this link

Encina Hall (2nd floor)

Kim Zetter Senior Writer Speaker Wired Magazine
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Abstract: The “unsinkable” RMS Titanic sank on April 14, 1912, in the North Atlantic Ocean on its maiden voyage from Southampton, UK, to New York City.  There was no single cause for the loss of the Titanic; rather the improbable combination of errors in human design and judgment, combined with unforeseeable circumstance, led to the loss of over 1,500 lives.  The failure appears to have occurred over a range of spatial and temporal scales – from the atomic-scale processes of the embrittlement of iron rivets to global-scale fluctuations in climate and ocean currents. Regardless of the specific combination of causes, this failure in design and practice led to impressive improvements in both.  Disaster and tragedy are harsh teachers, but critical to improvement and progress.

The important question for the nuclear waste management community is: How do we learn and improve our waste management strategies in the absence of the benefit of failure? A geologic repository “operates” over a very distant time fame, and today’s scientists and engineers will never have the benefit of studying the failed system. In place of failure followed by improvements, we only can offer a general consensus on disposal strategies and their effectiveness.  However, it may well be that consensus leads to complacency and compromise, both of which may be harbingers of a failed repository.  I will discuss these issues in the context of recent accidents and the release of radioactivity at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, a geologic repository in southeastern New Mexico.

About the Speaker: Rod Ewing is the Frank Stanton Professor in Nuclear Security in the Center for International Security and Cooperation in the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies and a Professor in the Department of Geological and Environmental Sciences in the School of Earth Sciences. Ewing’s research focuses on the back-end of the nuclear fuel cycle, mainly nuclear materials and the geochemistry of radionuclides with application to permanent geologic disposal. He is the past president of the International Union of Materials Research Societies. Ewing has written extensively on issues related to nuclear waste management and is a co-editor of Radioactive Waste Forms for the Future (1988) and Uncertainty Underground – Yucca Mountain and the Nation’s High-Level Nuclear Waste (2006). He received the Lomonosov Gold Medal of the Russian Academy of Sciences in 2006. In 2012, he was appointed by President Obama to chair the Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board, which provides scientific and technical reviews of the Department of the Energy’s programs for the management and disposal of spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste. In 2015, he will receive the Roebling Medal of the Mineralogical Society of America.

Encina Hall (2nd floor)

CISAC
Stanford University
Encina Hall, E203
Stanford, CA 94305-6165

(650) 725-8641
0
1946-2024
Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies
Frank Stanton Professor in Nuclear Security
Professor of Geological Sciences
rodewingheadshot2014.jpg MS, PhD

      Rod Ewing was the Frank Stanton Professor in Nuclear Security and Co-Director of the Center for International Security and Cooperation in the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies and a Professor in the Department of Geological Sciences in the School of Earth, Energy and Environmental Sciences at Stanford University. He was also the Edward H. Kraus Distinguished University Professor Emeritus at the University of Michigan, where he had faculty appointments in the Departments of Earth & Environmental Sciences, Nuclear Engineering & Radiological Sciences and Materials Science & Engineering.  He was a Regents' Professor Emeritus at the University of New Mexico, where he was a member of the faculty from 1974 to 1997. Ewing received a B.S. degree in geology from Texas Christian University (1968, summa cum laude) and M.S. (l972) and Ph.D. (l974, with distinction) degrees from Stanford University where he held an NSF Fellowship.    His graduate studies focused on an esoteric group of minerals, metamict Nb-Ta-Ti oxides, which are unusual because they have become amorphous due to radiation damage caused by the presence of radioactive elements. Over the past thirty years, the early study of these unusual minerals has blossomed into a broadly-based research program on radiation effects in complex ceramic materials.  In 2001, the work on radiation-resistant ceramics was recognized by the DOE, Office of Science – Decades of Discovery as one of the top 101 innovations during the previous 25 years. This has led to the development of techniques to predict the long-term behavior of materials, such as those used in radioactive waste disposal.

      He was the author or co-author of over 750 research publications and the editor or co-editor of 18 monographs, proceedings volumes or special issues of journals. He had published widely in mineralogy, geochemistry, materials science, nuclear materials, physics and chemistry in over 100 different ISI journals. He was granted a patent for the development of a highly durable material for the immobilization of excess weapons plutonium.  He was a Founding Editor of the magazine, Elements, which is now supported by 17 earth science societies. He was a Principal Editor for Nano LIFE, an interdisciplinary journal focused on collaboration between physical and medical scientists. In 2014, he was named a Founding Executive Editor of Geochemical Perspective Letters and appointed to the Editorial Advisory Board of Applied Physics Reviews.

      Ewing had received the Hawley Medal of the Mineralogical Association of Canada in 1997 and 2002, a Guggenheim Fellowship in 2002, the Dana Medal of the Mineralogical Society of America in 2006, the Lomonosov Gold Medal of the Russian Academy of Sciences in 2006, a Honorary Doctorate from the Université Pierre et Marie Curie in 2007, the Roebling Medal of the Mineralogical Society of America in 2015, Ian Campbell Medal of the American Geoscience Institute, 2015, the Medal of Excellence in Mineralogical Sciences from the International Mineralogical Association in 2015, the Distinguished Public Service Medal of the Mineralogical Society of America in 2019, and was a foreign Fellow of the Royal Society of Canada. He was also a fellow of the Geological Society of America, Mineralogical Society of America, Mineralogical Society of Great Britain and Ireland, American Geophysical Union, Geochemical Society, American Ceramic Society, the American Association for the Advancement of Science and the Materials Research Society. He was elected a Fellow of the National Academy of Engineering in 2017.

      He was president of the Mineralogical Society of America (2002) and the International Union of Materials Research Societies (1997-1998). He was the President of the American Geoscience Institute (2018). Ewing had served on the Board of Directors of the Geochemical Society, the Board of Governors of the Gemological Institute of America and the Science and Security Board of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.

      He was co-editor of and a contributing author of Radioactive Waste Forms for the Future (North-Holland Physics, Amsterdam, 1988) and Uncertainty Underground – Yucca Mountain and the Nation’s High-Level Nuclear Waste (MIT Press, 2006).  Professor Ewing had served on thirteen National Research Council committees and board for the National Academy of Sciences, Engineering and Medicine that have reviewed issues related to nuclear waste and nuclear weapons. In 2012, he was appointed by President Obama to serve as the Chair of the Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board, which is responsible for ongoing and integrated technical review of DOE activities related to transporting, packaging, storing and disposing of spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste; he stepped down from the Board in 2017.

https://profiles.stanford.edu/rodney-ewing

Co-director of the Center for International Security and Cooperation
CV
Rodney C. Ewing Frank Stanton Professor in Nuclear Security Speaker CISAC, Stanford University
Seminars
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Abstract: Snow is a vital resource for people and ecosystems. Global warming is widely projected to decrease snow accumulation throughout snow-dependent regions by 2100, potentially affecting water, food, and energy supplies, seasonal heat extremes, and wildfire risk. However, over the next few decades, the snow response is more uncertain, largely because of uncertainty about how global warming will influence precipitation. This tension—the gap between the informational requirements of adaptation and the ability of climate science to provide it—is one of the key challenges in making climate impacts assessments policy-relevant. Leveraging a unique climate model experiment, our research identifies the ‘irreducible uncertainty’ in global warming’s impact on snow in the Northern Hemisphere. These results provide a platform to discuss future water availability and security, people’s adaptive response to climate change, and both the limits and opportunities to propagating climate impacts into human systems at the scales most useful for policy.

About the Speaker: Justin Mankin is a PhD candidate in the Emmett Interdisciplinary Program in Environment & Resources (E-IPER) in Stanford’s School of Earth Sciences.

His research aims to constrain the uncertainty essential to understanding and responding to climate change’s impacts on people. His work focuses on two of the major sources of uncertainty in climate impacts assessments: the chaos of the climate system and the complexity of how people respond to climate stress. His hope is that his research can help inform the adaptation and risk management decisions people undertake in response to the uncertain threats from climate change.

Prior to Stanford he served as an intelligence officer. In 2011, he was asked to return to Afghanistan to serve as an anti-corruption advisor to NATO’s ISAF. He holds degrees from Columbia University (BA, MPA) and from the London School of Economics (MSc).

 


Influence of temperature and precipitation variability on near-term snow trends
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Encina Hall (2nd floor)

Justin S. Mankin Predoctoral Science Fellow Speaker CISAC
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Abstract: The increasing frequency of cyber attacks and technological change have amplified the potential adverse effects of successful, large-scale cyber attacks. While detecting the source of cyber threats is difficult, technological capabilities are making it easier. Along with my co-author, Kevin Risser, I argue that the ability to identify cybersecurity threats provides a mechanism for deterrence since prospective hackers take into account the expected costs of punishment—that is, penalties upon being caught by either their government or international authorities. In particular, we discuss the extent to which cyber threat attribution technologies and security infrastructures affect military strategies. First, we contextualize our argument through a lens of standard mutual assured destruction and deterrence theory. While there are parallels between the two, cybersecurity threats are fundamentally different because of their diffuse and mobile nature. Second, we build a game-theoretic model to illustrate our insight that attribution provides a deterrent. Our model provides a closed-form relationship between the prospective hacker’s beliefs of evading attribution and the expected benefits/costs of an attack. We close our paper with considerations of future research.

About the Speaker: Christos Makridis is a Ph.D. candidate at Stanford University’s Management Science & Engineering department researching macro and public economics. He is also the Editor of the UNESCO-sponsored Global Water Forum’s economics section, and a Non-Resident Fellow at the North American Research Partnership. Christos studies the quantitative effects of a wide range of public policy interventions, such as tax policy on productivity and environmental policy on pollution abatement, in stochastic dynamic general equilibrium models. Christos holds a B.S. in Economics and Minor in Mathematics from Arizona State University.

 


Cybersecurity and Military Strategy: The Effectiveness of Attribution as a Deterrence
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Encina Hall (2nd floor)

Christos Makridis PhD Candidate Speaker Department of Management Science & Engineering, Stanford University
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Abstract: The presentation is concerned with the intellectual history and analysis of the emergence of ‘classic COIN’. Between 1954 and 1961, French, British and US counterinsurgency practitioners repeatedly exchanged field experiences, distilling a corpus of ‘best practices’ for fighting rebellions in the Third World. These were not apart from a certain interpretative framework of the problem they dealt with. As they were standardized and assembled into a more structured whole, a shared counterinsurgency ‘paradigm’ emerged, intended not only in the Kuhnian sense of a set of conceptual assumptions, but also of a theoretical model serving as the basic pattern for a segment of military operations. This was to manifest itself in a sequence of works of military art elaborated between 1962 and 1970, the COIN ‘classics’, which distinguished themselves for expounding a structural grievances-based understanding of insurgency, for outlining an integrated operational model focused on persuasive and administrative rather than coercive means and, last but not least, for adopting a ‘psycho-culturalist’ analytical framework radically different from that of the mainstream strategic thought of the time.

 

About the Speaker: Niccolò Petrelli is a postdoctoral fellow at CISAC. Before joining CISAC in 2013, Niccolò was a military research fellow at the Military Center for Strategic Studies (Ce.Mi.S.S.) within the Center for Advanced Defense Studies (CASD) at the Italian Ministry of Defense and a visiting scholar at the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT) in Herzliya, Israel.

Niccolò received his Ph.D in Political Science from the University of Roma Tre in 2013 writing a dissertation on the impact of strategic culture on the Israeli approach to counterinsurgency. His works have been published, among others, in the Journal of Strategic Studies and Small Wars & Insurgencies. His research interests include the theory and practice of counterinsurgency, strategy development and implementation, defense and strategic analysis, cultural approach to IR and modern military thought.

Encina Hall (2nd floor)

Niccolo Petrelli Postdoctoral Fellow Speaker CISAC
Seminars
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Abstract: This paper contributes to a burgeoning literature on civilian targeting in civil war by arguing that rebel war aims can offer critical insight into who targets civilians, and when.  Specifically, I argue that secessionists are less likely than non-secessionist rebel groups to target civilians in civil war, for two reasons.  First, secessionists, who have the greatest military capacity in their claimed region, are unlikely to target civilians meant to comprise the population of their desired state. And second, secessionists are especially, and increasingly, aware of and concerned with their reputation with respect to the international community.  I test these claims using an original data set on civil wars from 1816 to 2007, as well as a case study of the South Moluccan separatist movement.

 

About the Speaker: Tanisha Fazal is Associate Professor of Political Science and Peace Studies at the University of Notre Dame. Her research focuses on questions around sovereignty, international law and norms, and political violence. Her book, State Death: The Politics and Geography of Conquest, Occupation, and Annexation won the 2008 Best Book Award of the American Political Science Association's Conflict Processes Section. Additional work has been published in journals such as the British Journal of Political Science, International Organization, International Security, International Studies Review, and Security Studies. She is currently completing a book manuscript on belligerents' historical and strategic use of the laws of war. More information can be found on Professor Fazal's website: http://www.tanishafazal.com/

Secessionism and Civilian Targeting
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Encina Hall (2nd floor)

 

Tanisha Fazal Associate Professor of Political Science and Peace Studies Speaker University of Notre Dame
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