Stanford University

Bulk Collection of Signal Intelligence: Technical Alternatives

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Abstract: The first Snowden disclosure was that Verizon was providing daily updates of telephony metadata to the NSA. This caused great consternation, and resulted in two government studies, one by the President's NSA Review Committee and one by the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board.  Both concluded the collection should be ended. The President asked Office of the Director of National Intelligence to produce a report "assessing the feasibility of creating software that would allow the intelligence community more easily to conduct targeted information acquisition rather than bulk collection."  This talk reports on that work, which considered the issue from the angle of technical alternatives, and concluded that there is no technical replacement for bulk data collection, but that software can enhance targeted collection and automate control of data usage. This talk will discuss that report, conducted by the National Research Council, explaining what the report says — and what it doesn't say.

About the Speaker: Susan Landau is Professor of Cybersecurity Policy in the Department of Social Science and Policy Studies at Worcester Polytechnic Institute. Landau has been a senior staff Privacy Analyst at Google, a Distinguished Engineer at Sun Microsystems, a faculty member at the University of Massachusetts at Amherst and at Wesleyan University. She has held visiting positions at Harvard, Cornell, and Yale, and the Mathematical Sciences Research Institute. Landau is the author of Surveillance or Security?  The Risks Posed by New Wiretapping Technologies (MIT Press, 2011), and co-author, with Whitfield Diffie, of Privacy on the Line: The Politics of Wiretapping and Encryption (MIT Press, 1998, rev. ed. 2007). She has written numerous scientific and policy research papers, and has also published in other venues, including Science, Scientific American, and the Washington Post. Landau has testified in Congress on cybersecurity and on electronic surveillance. Landau currently serves on the Computer Science Telecommunications Board of the National Research Council.  A 2012 Guggenheim fellow, Landau was a 2010-2011 fellow at the Radcliffe Institute for Advanced Study, the recipient of the 2008 Women of Vision Social Impact Award, and also a fellow of the American Association for the Advancement of Science and the Association for Computing Machinery.  She received her BA from Princeton, her MS from Cornell, and her PhD from MIT.

Encina Hall (2nd floor)

Susan Landau Professor of Cybersecurity Policy in the Department of Social Science and Policy Studies Speaker Worcester Polytechnic Institute
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Illuminating Dark Networks with Data

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Abstract: Jason Payne, Palantir's Philanthropy Engineering Lead and Stanford Computer Science BS 2005, will discuss how the fusion and analysis of data sets, including open and public data, can shed light on transnational criminal enterprises. Examples will include human trafficking, weapons trafficking, environmental crime to include ivory poaching, and human tissue trafficking. The talk will also include a discussion on how governmental, commercial, and social sector entities can collaborate, while respecting privacy and civil liberties, to address pressing problem sets around the world.

Encina Hall (2nd floor)

Jason Payne Philanthropy Engineering Lead Speaker Palantir
Seminars

Strategies of Nuclear Proliferation

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Abstract: How do states pursue nuclear weapons? This paper develops a typology of strategies of nuclear proliferation, a theory for why states select one strategy over others, and conducts a preliminary test of the theory against the record of nuclear proliferators. Knowing how states pursue nuclear weapons provides important areas of leverage for nonproliferation policies. 

About the Speaker: Vipin Narang is an Associate Professor of Political Science at MIT and member of MIT’s Security Studies Program. He received his Ph.D. from the Department of Government, Harvard University in May 2010, where he was awarded the Edward M. Chase Prize for the best dissertation in international relations. He holds a B.S. and M.S. in chemical engineering with distinction from Stanford University and an M. Phil with Distinction in international relations from Balliol College, Oxford University, where he studied on a Marshall Scholarship. He has been a fellow at Harvard University’s Olin Institute for Strategic Studies, a predoctoral fellow at Harvard University’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, and a junior faculty fellow at Stanford University’s Center for International Security and Cooperation. His research interests include nuclear proliferation and strategy, South Asian security, and general security studies. His work has been published in several journals including International Security, Journal of Conflict Resolution, and International Organization. His book "Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era" was published by Princeton University Press in 2014.

Encina Hall (2nd floor)

Vipin Narang Associate Professor of Political Science at MIT Speaker Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Seminars

Nuclear Dominoes, U.S. Nonproliferation Policy, and the NPT

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Abstract: What explains why the United States abandoned nuclear sharing schemes like the Multilateral Force in the 1960s, ultimately adopting a universalistic nonproliferation policy and the NPT? This paper argues that increased fears of nuclear domino effects caused by the 1964 Chinese nuclear tests were a crucial motivating factor, convincing policymakers that proliferation could not be contained to allied states and therefore had to be opposed across the board. As evidence for this claim, I draw heavily on archival evidence from the Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson administrations. The paper demonstrates that when nuclear domino effects were perceived to be relatively weak in the 1950s and early 1960s, the United States favored expanding nuclear sharing arrangements; when fears of nuclear domino effects increased post-1964, this caused policymakers to turn away from these policies and conclude the NPT.

About the Speaker: Nicholas Miller is an assistant professor in the Department of Political Science and Watson Institute for International Studies at Brown University. His research focuses primarily on the causes and consequences of nuclear proliferation. He is currently working on a book manuscript that combines archival sources and quantitative analysis to examine the historical development and efficacy of U.S. nonproliferation policy. His work has been published in the American Political Science Review, International Organization, the Journal of Conflict Resolution, and Security Studies. He received his PhD in Political Science from MIT in 2014.

 


Nuclear Dominoes, US Nonproliferation Policy, and the NPT
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Nuclear Dominoes, US Nonproliferation Policy, and the NPT
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Encina Hall (2nd floor)

Nicholas Miller Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science and Watson Institute for International Studies Speaker Brown University
Seminars

Ordinary Guys: Why Integrating Immigrants Probably Won't Prevent Terrorism

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Abstract: Imagine two guys. Second-generation Muslim-American Ahmad feels threatened by the ‘corrupting influences’ within his suburban factory town, detests his mother’s ‘western’ ways, and seeks out a radical imam for guidance. In contrast, Palestinian-born Mike worked as an Intel engineer, married an American Christian, and played company softball in his spare time. If only one is a terrorist, it is easy to pick out which one. Right? Wrong. Maher “Mike” Hawash served a six-year sentence for conspiring to aid the Taliban. Ahmad Mulloy is the fictional protagonist of John Updike’s novel, Terrorist.

It is easy to assume that terrorists are poorly integrated or disconnected from society. But this talk argues that such assumptions about the ‘typical terrorist’ are not only wrong, but dangerous. I argue that better immigrant integration will not stop terrorism – because most terrorists are just as well, if not better, integrated into western societies than other immigrants. Further, policies that exacerbate differences between immigrants and the native-born actually may facilitate radicalization of new terrorists; they provide new fuel for the argument that immigrants, and especially Muslims, are being disproportionately targeted.

About the Speaker: Betsy Cooper is a Law and International Security Postdoctoral Fellow with CISAC, working on projects related to state immigration policy. Dr. Cooper recently finished serving as a Yale Public Interest Fellow, working with the Department of Homeland Security's Office of Policy on Comprehensive Immigration Reform and related issues. She is a 2012 graduate of Yale Law School, after which she clerked for Judge William Fletcher on the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Dr. Cooper is the author of over twenty manuscripts and articles on US and European immigration and refugee policy, and has consulted for Atlantic Philanthropies (Dublin, Ireland), the Prime Minister's Strategy Unit in London, the World Bank, and a number of immigration think tanks. In addition to her law degree, Betsy holds a DPhil in Politics from Oxford University, an M.Sc. in Forced Migration from Oxford University, and a B.A. in Industrial and Labor Relations from Cornell University.

Encina Hall (2nd floor)

Betsy Cooper

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Betsy Cooper is the founding Director of the Aspen Policy Academy. A cybersecurity expert, Dr. Cooper joined the Aspen Institute after serving as the Executive Director of the Berkeley Center for Long-Term Cybersecurity at the University of California, Berkeley. 

Previously, Dr. Cooper served at the U.S. Department of Homeland Security as an attorney advisor to the Deputy General Counsel and as a policy counselor in the Office of Policy. She has worked for over a decade in homeland security consulting, managing projects for Atlantic Philanthropies in Dublin, the Prime Minister’s Strategy Unit in London, and the World Bank, and other organizations. 

In addition, Dr. Cooper has clerked for Berkeley Law professor and Judge William Fletcher on the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. She completed a postdoctoral fellowship at Stanford’s Center for International Security and Cooperation (where she currently is a nonresident affiliate), as well as a Yale Public Interest Fellowship. Dr. Cooper has written more than twenty manuscripts and articles on U.S. and European homeland security policy. She is also a Senior Advisor at Albright Stonebridge Group. 

Dr. Cooper earned a J.D. from Yale University, a D.Phil. in Politics from Oxford University, an M.Sc. in Forced Migration from Oxford University, and a B.A. in Industrial and Labor Relations from Cornell University. She speaks advanced French. She is based in the San Francisco Bay Area.

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Betsy Cooper Law and International Security Postdoctoral Fellow, CISAC Speaker CISAC
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World Order Politics: The Carter Administration’s Bid for a New U.S. Foreign Policy (and What We Can Learn From It)

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Please note new location in the

Reuben Hills Conference Room ("East" Conference Room)

Encina Hall, 2nd floor

Abstract: In 1977, the Carter administration began working to implement a new guiding strategy for US foreign policy, oriented toward the promotion of human rights and the management of economic interdependence among the advanced industrialized countries. Carter’s world order politics reflected both the oversights of the Nixon years and the influence of the Trilateral Commission. To manage economic globalization, the Carter administration promoted policy cooperation, its efforts culminating in the Bonn summit of the G-7 in 1978. To promote human rights, the Carter administration devised guidelines for tethering military and financial aid to foreign nations to human rights standards, and applied them with particular rigor in Latin America. By late 1978, however, Carter’s world order politics was already encountering difficulties: the administration’s human rights policy lacked consistency; policy coordination failed to stabilize the liberal world economy; and Iran, a longtime US ally, was imploding.

About the Speaker: Daniel Sargent is assistant professor of history at the University of California, Berkeley. He received his BA from Christ’s College, Cambridge in 2001 and his PhD from Harvard University in 2008. He has held fellowships at the Olin Institute for Strategic Studies at Harvard University and at International Security Studies at Yale University. He is the author of A Superpower Transformed: The Remaking of American Foreign Relations in the 1970s (Oxford University Press, 2015) and a co-editor of The Shock of the Global: The 1970s in Perspective (Harvard University Press, 2010). He is now working on two book-length projects: a history of international economic governance in the modern era and a study on the uses of history and historical thinking in U.S. foreign policy. To purchase A Superpower Transformed: The Remaking of American Foreign Relations in the 1970s, please follow this link to Oxford University Press.

 


Chapter 8, "World Order Politics"
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World Order Politics: The Carter Administration’s Bid for a New U.S. Foreign Policy (and What We Can Learn From It)
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Encina Hall (2nd floor)

Daniel Sargent Assistant Professor of History Speaker University of California - Berkeley
Seminars

Analytic Methods for Minimum Risk Nuclear Capabilities

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Abstract: The development and maintenance of a nuclear weapons arsenal is primarily about managing risk trade-offs. However, there is no integrated method for performing the high-level risk analysis that would allow for the more explicit examination of those trade-offs, or the testing of assumptions and alternatives. Quantitative risk analytic methods can provide powerful insights to policy and decision makers by explicitly examining estimates of consequences, disparate uncertainties, interdependencies, and trade-offs. Even the initial process of framing a formal risk analysis can provide increased clarity and valuable insights. I will present the current status of my efforts to construct a first version of a quantitative risk analytic method and the associated models. I will also discuss some of the challenges that must be addressed to fully implement those models, and my plans for further development. 

About the Speaker: Jason C. Reinhardt is a national security systems analyst, and is currently pursuing a Ph.D. in Risk Analysis from Stanford University’s Department of Management Science and Engineering Engineering Risk Research Group, focusing on nuclear weapons arsenal management. Specifically, he is developing quantitative risk models to examine the trade-offs faced by nuclear armed nations in the process of disarmament. He is also pursuing research aimed at modeling and quantifying the catastrophic risks posed by near earth asteroid encounters. Other research interests include game theoretic applications to risk analysis and management, as well as adversary models. While at CISAC, he hopes to engage subject matter and policy experts to strengthen his modeling and analysis of nuclear weapon arsenal risk.

Prior to beginning his current studies, Jason managed a group of experts at Sandia National Laboratories that focused on technical studies to guide policy and decision makers across government. He joined Sandia National Laboratories in August of 2002, and has worked on a diverse set of projects both as an engineer and as an analyst, including the development of instrumentation for in-situ atmospheric measurement, embedded systems design, borders security analyses, and nuclear counter-terrorism strategy development.

He has worked extensively with the Department of Homeland Security on nuclear matters, and has also worked with the Department of Energy, the Department of Defense, the intelligence community, and within the national laboratory enterprise on a diverse array of national security projects. He has participated in the planning and hosting of international conferences and engagements, briefed congressional representatives, and served as a subject-matter expert on the topics of border security and nuclear and radiological defense.

Jason holds a B.S. in Electrical Engineering from the Purdue School of Electrical Engineering at Indianapolis, and a M.S. in Electrical Engineering from Stanford University.

 

 

Encina Hall (2nd floor)

Jason Reinhardt

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Jason C. Reinhardt is a national security systems analyst, and is currently pursuing a Ph.D. in Risk Analysis from Stanford University’s Department of Management Science and Engineering Engineering Risk Research Group, focusing on nuclear weapons arsenal management. Specifically, he is developing quantitative risk models to examine the trade-offs faced by nuclear armed nations in the process of disarmament. He is also pursuing research aimed at modeling and quantifying the catastrophic risks posed by near earth asteroid encounters. Other research interests include game theoretic applications to risk analysis and management, as well as adversary models. While at CISAC, he hopes to engage subject matter and policy experts to strengthen his modeling and analysis of nuclear weapon arsenal risk.

Prior to beginning his current studies, Jason managed a group of experts at Sandia National Laboratories that focused on technical studies to guide policy and decision makers across government. He joined Sandia National Laboratories in August of 2002, and has worked on a diverse set of projects both as an engineer and as an analyst, including the development of instrumentation for in-situ atmospheric measurement, embedded systems design, borders security analyses, and nuclear counter-terrorism strategy development.

He has worked extensively with the Department of Homeland Security on nuclear matters, and has also worked with the Department of Energy, the Department of Defense, the intelligence community, and within the national laboratory enterprise on a diverse array of national security projects. He has participated in the planning and hosting of international conferences and engagements, briefed congressional representatives, and served as a subject-matter expert on the topics of border security and nuclear and radiological defense.

Jason holds a B.S. in Electrical Engineering from the Purdue School of Electrical Engineering at Indianapolis, and a M.S. in Electrical Engineering from Stanford University.

Jason Reinhardt MacArthur Nuclear Security Predoctoral Fellow Speaker CISAC
Seminars

Modern Surveillance

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Abstract: NSA stands for National Security Agency, but the agency is at odds with itself in its security mission. Undermining global encryption standards, intercepting Internet companies' data center transmissions, using auto-update to spread malware, and demanding law enforcement back doors in products and services are all business as usual. What legal basis does NSA and FBI have for these demands, and do they make the country more or less safe?

About the Speaker: Jennifer Granick started as the Stanford Law School Center for Internet and Society's (CIS) Director of Civil Liberties in June of 2012. She became an affiliate at the Center for International  Security and Cooperation in July 2012. 

Jennifer returned to Stanford after stints as General Counsel of entertainment company Worldstar Hip Hop and as counsel with the internet boutique firm of Zwillgen PLLC. Before that, she was the Civil Liberties Director at the Electronic Frontier Foundation. Jennifer practices, speaks and writes about computer crime and security, electronic surveillance, consumer privacy, data protection, copyright, trademark and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.

From 2001 to 2007, Jennifer was Executive Director of CIS and taught Cyberlaw, Computer Crime Law, Internet intermediary liability, and Internet law and policy. Before teaching at Stanford, Jennifer spent almost a decade practicing criminal defense law in California. She was selected by Information Security magazine in 2003 as one of 20 "Women of Vision" in the computer security field. She earned her law degree from University of California, Hastings College of the Law and her undergraduate degree from the New College of the University of South Florida.

Encina Hall (2nd floor)

Jennifer Granick Director of Civil Liberties at Stanford Center for Internet and Society Speaker Stanford University
Seminars

Cybersecurity at the United Nations

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Abstract: With the development of cyber capabilities by an increasing number of states, policymakers as well as scholars have been calling for the negotiation of a new international treaty to regulate cyber warfare. This paper provides an account and analysis of relevant debates in the United Nations with a focus on the position of four states – Russia, China, the US and the UK. Discussions have been concentrated in the First Committee of the General Assembly which has been seized with the issue since 1998 when the Russian Federation submitted a proposal for an international convention to govern the use of information and communication technologies for military purposes. While these efforts towards a wholesale international treaty have not materialized, Russia and China continue to advocate a change in the legal status through the promulgation of additional norms. In contrast, the US and the UK have been firm supporters of applying current legal regimes, including the UN Charter and the Geneva Conventions, to the use of cyber capabilities by states. In advancing these positions, two powerful narratives have emerged each emphasizing different aspects of the cybersecurity debate.

 

About the Speaker: Elaine Korzak is a postdoctoral cybersecurity fellow at CISAC. She earned her Ph.D from the Department of War Studies at King´s College London in 2014. Her thesis examined the applicability and adequacy of international legal frameworks to the emerging phenomenon of cyber attacks. Her analysis focused on two legal areas in particular: international law on the use of force and international humanitarian law. Elaine holds both an MA in International Peace and Security from King´s College London and an LL.M in Public International Law from the LSE. Her professional experience includes various governmental and non-governmental institutions, including NATO´s Cyber Defence Section as well as the European Commission´s Directorate-General on Information Society and Media.

 


Encina Hall (2nd floor)

Elaine Korzak, PhD, LLM

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Elaine Korzak is a research scholar at the Berkeley Risk and Security Lab (BRSL) at UC Berkeley where she focuses on international cybersecurity governance. She is also an affiliate at the Center for Long-Term Cybersecurity (CLTC) at UC Berkeley and the Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC) at Stanford University.

Her research covers international legal, policy, and governance aspects in cybersecurity, including norms and international law governing state conduct in cyberspace, cybersecurity negotiations at the United Nations, and the international regulation of commercial spyware. Her work has appeared in the Oxford Handbook of Cyber Security, the Routledge Handbook of International Cybersecurity, the Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, and RUSI Journal.

Previously, Elaine was a cybersecurity postdoctoral fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC) and a national fellow at the Hoover Institution, both at Stanford University, before leading the Cyber Initiative at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey (MIIS). She holds a PhD in War Studies and an MA in International Peace and Security from King’s College London, as well as an LL.M. in Public International Law from the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE).

 

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The Enduring Role of US Nuclear Weapons

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Due to the combination of a great response and our space constraints, this event is now full. We regret that we cannot accept any more RSVPs.

Lunch and seating are reserved for our registered guests.

 

Abstract: On April 5, 2009, President Obama stated his intent to seek "...the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons". He is not the first US President to state such a desire (President Reagan, among others), and he acknowledged that the goal "will not be reached quickly--perhaps not in my lifetime". President Obama proposed reducing the number and role of nuclear weapons in US national security strategy as key steps toward achieving this goal.

While such a world is appealing, nuclear weapons remain woven into the fabric of US national security strategy as the ultimate guarantor of US and Allied security. Originally constructed by the US to end a war, the unique physical and psychological power of nuclear weapons rapidly made them a political tool to prevent or constrain conflict in the ensuing decades of the Cold War. United States foreign policy was underpinned by deterrence and assurance concepts that were both based on nuclear weapons and that defined their primary roles.

To be sure, the strategic context for nuclear weapons has changed since the end of the Cold War and the threat of sudden massive nuclear attack has receded. Significant reductions have been made to the deployed US nuclear force, the weapon stockpile, and the very specialized industrial base that supports it. Modifications have been made to employment concepts. New concepts of tailored deterrence have emerged that include highly capable US conventional forces, limited missile defenses, and space and cyberspace capabilities. 

But nuclear weapons continue to influence the security relationships and behaviors between major nations, and the primary deterrence and assurance role of US nuclear weapons remains at the foundation of US national security. Recent global events remind us that other nations continue to value the influence their nuclear weapons provide and, absent a viable replacement, US nuclear weapons will be needed for a very long time to come. Sustaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent will be a challenge that has to be met.   

 

About the Speaker: General C. Robert "Bob" Kehler is the 2014-2015 Lee Lecturer at CISAC.

Prior to his retirement in December 2013, he was the Commander of United States Strategic Command at Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska.  In that role he was directly responsible to the Secretary of Defense and President for the plans and operations of all U. S. forces conducting global strategic deterrence, nuclear alert, global strike, space, cyberspace and associated operations.  While in command, he crafted and implemented critical elements of policies and plans to deter strategic attacks against the U.S. and its key allies, and led a joint team of over 60,000 military and civilians to 100% mission success in multiple, high-stakes global operations.  He also integrated Department of Defense (DOD) activities for global missile defense, combating weapons of mass destruction, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.  His forces directly supported combat operations in Southwest Asia and North Africa.

General Kehler’s military career spanned almost 39 years of service that included important operational and staff assignments.  He was one of a very few officers to command at the squadron, group, wing, major command, and combatant command levels, and he had a broad range of operational experience in Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM), space launch, space control, space surveillance and missile warning units.  Before taking command of Strategic Command, General Kehler commanded Air Force Space Command where he organized, trained, and equipped over 46,000 professionals conducting mission-ready nuclear missile, space, and cyberspace operations.  In that role, he designed the Air Force’s inaugural blueprint, operating concept, organizational structure, and personnel program to meet rapidly growing cyberspace challenges. 

His staff assignments included tours with the Air Staff, Strategic Air Command, Air Force Space Command, and the Joint Staff.  He was also assigned to the Secretary of the Air Force’s Office of Legislative Liaison where he was the point man on Capitol Hill for matters regarding the President’s ICBM Modernization Program.  As Director of the National Security Space Office, General Kehler integrated the activities of a number of DOD and Intelligence Community organizations on behalf of the Undersecretary of the Air Force and Director, National Reconnaissance Office. 

He entered the Air Force in 1975 as a Distinguished Graduate of the Pennsylvania State University R.O.T.C. program, has master’s degrees from the University of Oklahoma in Public Administration and the Naval War College in National Security and Strategic Studies, and completed executive level programs at Carnegie-Mellon University, Syracuse University, and Harvard University.

General Kehler’s military awards include the Defense Distinguished and Superior Service Medals, the Distinguished Service Medal (2 awards), Legion of Merit (3 awards), and the French Legion of Honor (Officer).  He wears Command Space and ICBM Operations Badges.  His other honors include the Thomas D. White Space Award (recognizing outstanding contributions to space) and the H. H. Arnold Award (for the most significant contribution by a military member for national defense), both presented by the Air Force Association. 

General Kehler serves as a Trustee of the Mitre Corporation, is on the Board of Directors of the Inmarsat Corporation, and is Chairman of the Board of BEI Precision Systems and Space Company.  He is a Distinguished Alumnus of the Pennsylvania State University, where he also serves as a member of the Advisory Board for Outreach and Online Education.  A Senior Fellow of the National Defense University and an Associate Fellow of the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, he has testified before numerous Congressional Committees and has spoken widely on matters of national security.  His articles have appeared in The Naval War College Review and Joint Forces Quarterly.  Time permitting; he enjoys playing the guitar, golf, and target shooting.

Encina Hall (2nd floor)

C. Robert “Bob” Kehler

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*Please contact Tracy Hines (tmhines23@stanford.edu) for any inquires regarding General Kehler.

Prior to his retirement on January 1, 2014, General Kehler was the Commander of United States Strategic Command at Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska.  In that role he was directly responsible to the Secretary of Defense and President for the plans and operations of all U. S. forces conducting global strategic deterrence, nuclear alert, global strike, space, cyberspace and associated operations.  While in command, he crafted and implemented critical elements of policies and plans to deter strategic attacks against the U.S. and its key allies and led a joint team of military members and civilians to 100% mission success in multiple, high-stakes global operations.  He also integrated Department of Defense (DOD) activities for global missile defense, combating weapons of mass destruction, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.  His forces directly supported combat operations in Southwest Asia and North Africa.

General Kehler’s military career spanned almost thirty-nine years of service that included progressively important operational and staff assignments.  He commanded units at the squadron, group, wing, major command, and combatant command levels, and had a broad range of operational experience in Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles, space launch, space control, space surveillance and missile warning.  Before taking command of Strategic Command, General Kehler commanded Air Force Space Command (predecessor to U.S. Space Force) where he organized, trained, and equipped airmen conducting mission-ready nuclear missile, space, and cyberspace operations.  His command designed the Air Force’s inaugural blueprint, operating concept, organizational structure, and personnel program to meet emerging cyberspace challenges. 

His staff assignments included tours with the Air Staff, Strategic Air Command, Air Force Space Command, and the Joint Staff.  He was also assigned to the Secretary of the Air Force’s Office of Legislative Liaison where he was the point man on Capitol Hill for matters regarding the President’s ICBM Modernization Program.  As Director of the National Security Space Office, General Kehler integrated the activities of a number of DOD and Intelligence Community organizations on behalf of the Undersecretary of the Air Force and Director, National Reconnaissance Office. 

General Kehler entered the Air Force in 1975 as a Distinguished Graduate of the Pennsylvania State University R.O.T.C. program, has master’s degrees from the University of Oklahoma in Public Administration and the Naval War College in National Security and Strategic Studies, and completed executive level programs at Carnegie-Mellon University, Syracuse University, and Harvard University.

Since his retirement, General Kehler has continued to apply his expertise as a consultant, corporate director and trustee, and senior advisor and fellow to a number of prominent public, private, and educational institutions. He writes and speaks on matters of national security. Bob and his late wife have two adult sons and two grandsons. Time permitting, he enjoys playing the guitar and golf.

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General C. Robert Kehler USAF (ret.), Lee Lecturer Speaker
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