About the Speaker: Lieutenant General (retired) Khalid Kidwai is advisor to Pakistan’s National Command Authority and pioneer Director General of Pakistan’s Strategic Plans Division, which he headed for an unprecedented 15 years. He is one of the most decorated generals in Pakistan and was awarded the highest civil award Nishan-i-Imtiaz, as well as Hilal-i-Imtiaz and Hilal-i-Imtiaz (Military). Winner of the Sword of Honor at Pakistan’s Military Academy, he later saw frontline combat action in erstwhile East Pakistan and was a prisoner of war in Pakistan’s 1971 war with India. General Kidwai conceived, articulated, and executed Pakistan’s nuclear policy and deterrence doctrines into a tangible and robust nuclear force structure. General Kidwai is also the architect of Pakistan’s civilian Nuclear Energy Program and National Space Program.

Abstract: Chevaline was the codename given to a highly-secret program begun in 1970 to improve the performance of the UK's force of Polaris submarine-launched ballistic missiles in order to give them the capability to overcome Soviet ABM defenses deployed around Moscow. After much technical difficulty, delays in project timescale and cost escalation the new system was finally introduced in 1982, but it had already attracted major criticism for the expenditure involved, claims of project mismanagement, the rationale that underpinned its development, and its concealment from proper parliamentary scrutiny. This lecture will explore the background to the program, why it ran into so many problems, and how it became one of the most controversial episodes in post-war British defense policy. An understanding of the problems confronted by the attempt to improve Polaris illuminates a number of key themes and issues that are of relevance to policymakers concerned with strategic weapons programs and project management.

About the Speaker: Matthew Jones’ current research focuses on British nuclear history during the Cold War. He has also written on many different aspects of US and British foreign and defense policy in the 20th century, and has a long-standing interest in empire and decolonization in South East Asia. Jones’ first book, Britain, the United States and the Mediterranean War, 1942-44 (Macmillan, 1996), examined strains in the Anglo-American relationship by strategic issues and command problems in the Mediterranean theater. His book, Conflict and Confrontation in South East Asia, 1961-1965: Britain, the United States, Indonesia, and the Creation of Malaysia (Cambridge University Press, 2002), looks at the federation of Malaysia during British decolonization in the early 1960s. After Hiroshima: The United States, Race, and Nuclear Weapons in Asia, 1945-1965 (Cambridge University Press, 2010) addresses US nuclear policies in Asia in the period of the Korean War, confrontation with China, and early engagement in Vietnam. His current project on UK nuclear policy encompasses the development of nuclear strategy within NATO, the Anglo-American nuclear relationship, and European responses to strategic arms control. In 2008, Jones was appointed by the Prime Minister to become the Cabinet Office official historian of the UK strategic nuclear deterrent and the Chevaline program, a commission that will lead to the publication of a two-volume official history exploring British nuclear policy between 1945 and 1982. Jones’s journal articles have appeared in Diplomatic History, Historical Journal, Journal of Cold War Studies, and English Historical Review. He gained his DPhil in Modern History at St. Antony’s College, Oxford, in 1992.

Abstract: Why do states provide nuclear weapons support to other states? This paper analyzes this question by examining China’s nuclear cooperation with Pakistan. Based on an original framework for explaining nuclear weapons support, I argue that two main factors drove China’s decision. First, China did not have to worry about cascade effects because India had already crossed the nuclear threshold. Second, Pakistan had major strategic value to China, and enjoyed a reputation for being a reliable partner. By arming Pakistan, China could maintain a favorable power balance in the region and prevent India from dominating South Asia. 

The paper also criticizes existing supply-side theories of nuclear proliferation. These theories also describe the strategic incentives for helping other states to develop nuclear weapon, but they have largely overlooked the disincentives. I also challenge some of the case-specific literature. This literature claims that China halted its support of Pakistan from the mid-1990s because it finally recognized the dangers of nuclear proliferation. In contrast, I argue that China has continued, albeit more subtly, to support Islamabad’s weapons program.

About the Speaker: Henrik Hiim is a Stanton Nuclear Security Predoctoral Fellow at MIT. His main research interests are Chinese foreign policy, East Asian security, and nonproliferation and arms control. His dissertation examines the evolution of China’s approach to nuclear nonproliferation, with a special emphasis on policies towards North Korea, Iran, and Pakistan. Henrik holds an M.A. in Political Science from the University of Oslo. He has also studied at Renmin University and Huazhong Normal University in China. During spring 2013, he was a visiting scholar at the School of International Studies at Beijing University. Henrik has worked as a journalist for several Norwegian newspapers.

Abstract: The first Snowden disclosure was that Verizon was providing daily updates of telephony metadata to the NSA. This caused great consternation, and resulted in two government studies, one by the President's NSA Review Committee and one by the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board.  Both concluded the collection should be ended. The President asked Office of the Director of National Intelligence to produce a report "assessing the feasibility of creating software that would allow the intelligence community more easily to conduct targeted information acquisition rather than bulk collection."  This talk reports on that work, which considered the issue from the angle of technical alternatives, and concluded that there is no technical replacement for bulk data collection, but that software can enhance targeted collection and automate control of data usage. This talk will discuss that report, conducted by the National Research Council, explaining what the report says — and what it doesn't say.

About the Speaker: Susan Landau is Professor of Cybersecurity Policy in the Department of Social Science and Policy Studies at Worcester Polytechnic Institute. Landau has been a senior staff Privacy Analyst at Google, a Distinguished Engineer at Sun Microsystems, a faculty member at the University of Massachusetts at Amherst and at Wesleyan University. She has held visiting positions at Harvard, Cornell, and Yale, and the Mathematical Sciences Research Institute. Landau is the author of Surveillance or Security?  The Risks Posed by New Wiretapping Technologies (MIT Press, 2011), and co-author, with Whitfield Diffie, of Privacy on the Line: The Politics of Wiretapping and Encryption (MIT Press, 1998, rev. ed. 2007). She has written numerous scientific and policy research papers, and has also published in other venues, including Science, Scientific American, and the Washington Post. Landau has testified in Congress on cybersecurity and on electronic surveillance. Landau currently serves on the Computer Science Telecommunications Board of the National Research Council.  A 2012 Guggenheim fellow, Landau was a 2010-2011 fellow at the Radcliffe Institute for Advanced Study, the recipient of the 2008 Women of Vision Social Impact Award, and also a fellow of the American Association for the Advancement of Science and the Association for Computing Machinery.  She received her BA from Princeton, her MS from Cornell, and her PhD from MIT.

Abstract: Jason Payne, Palantir's Philanthropy Engineering Lead and Stanford Computer Science BS 2005, will discuss how the fusion and analysis of data sets, including open and public data, can shed light on transnational criminal enterprises. Examples will include human trafficking, weapons trafficking, environmental crime to include ivory poaching, and human tissue trafficking. The talk will also include a discussion on how governmental, commercial, and social sector entities can collaborate, while respecting privacy and civil liberties, to address pressing problem sets around the world.

Abstract: How do states pursue nuclear weapons? This paper develops a typology of strategies of nuclear proliferation, a theory for why states select one strategy over others, and conducts a preliminary test of the theory against the record of nuclear proliferators. Knowing how states pursue nuclear weapons provides important areas of leverage for nonproliferation policies. 

About the Speaker: Vipin Narang is an Associate Professor of Political Science at MIT and member of MIT’s Security Studies Program. He received his Ph.D. from the Department of Government, Harvard University in May 2010, where he was awarded the Edward M. Chase Prize for the best dissertation in international relations. He holds a B.S. and M.S. in chemical engineering with distinction from Stanford University and an M. Phil with Distinction in international relations from Balliol College, Oxford University, where he studied on a Marshall Scholarship. He has been a fellow at Harvard University’s Olin Institute for Strategic Studies, a predoctoral fellow at Harvard University’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, and a junior faculty fellow at Stanford University’s Center for International Security and Cooperation. His research interests include nuclear proliferation and strategy, South Asian security, and general security studies. His work has been published in several journals including International Security, Journal of Conflict Resolution, and International Organization. His book "Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era" was published by Princeton University Press in 2014.

Abstract: What explains why the United States abandoned nuclear sharing schemes like the Multilateral Force in the 1960s, ultimately adopting a universalistic nonproliferation policy and the NPT? This paper argues that increased fears of nuclear domino effects caused by the 1964 Chinese nuclear tests were a crucial motivating factor, convincing policymakers that proliferation could not be contained to allied states and therefore had to be opposed across the board. As evidence for this claim, I draw heavily on archival evidence from the Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson administrations. The paper demonstrates that when nuclear domino effects were perceived to be relatively weak in the 1950s and early 1960s, the United States favored expanding nuclear sharing arrangements; when fears of nuclear domino effects increased post-1964, this caused policymakers to turn away from these policies and conclude the NPT.

About the Speaker: Nicholas Miller is an assistant professor in the Department of Political Science and Watson Institute for International Studies at Brown University. His research focuses primarily on the causes and consequences of nuclear proliferation. He is currently working on a book manuscript that combines archival sources and quantitative analysis to examine the historical development and efficacy of U.S. nonproliferation policy. His work has been published in the American Political Science Review, International Organization, the Journal of Conflict Resolution, and Security Studies. He received his PhD in Political Science from MIT in 2014.