Abstract: In November 1998, ‘mujahideen’ warriors climbed the heights above Kargil in Indian held Kashmir, crossed the Line of Control, and occupied Indian military posts. These ‘mujahideens’ were really Pakistani soldiers clad in civilian garb on a secret mission. This was the beginning of the war in Kargil between two nuclear neighbors (India and Pakistan). This study critically evaluates the relationship between ‘learning’ and risk-prone behavior of Pakistan in the midst of technological maturation. Should we be confident and rely on nuclear deterrence and believe that Kargil-like crisis will never happen again? This talk will explain the story of Kargil from a theoretical lens of nuclear learning, demonstrating how difficult it has been for Pakistan to learn appropriate lessons given the firewalls of convictions, cover-ups, and confirmation biases.
Speaker bio: Sannia Abdullah is a political scientist. Her doctoral thesis is on nuclear learning in South Asia with special reference to India-Pakistan crisis behavior. She is associated with Quaid-i-Azam University in the Department of Defense and Strategic Studies as a permanent faculty member. At CISAC, she is working on her book manuscript focusing on the evolution of Pakistan's nuclear behavior and its deterrence logic. Prior to joining CISAC, she was a visiting research scholar at Cooperative Monitory Center, Sandia National Labs (NM) where her research focuses primarily nonproliferation issues in South Asia. In 2016, she presented her research at Atlantic Council on Pakistan’s pursuit of full spectrum deterrence strategy and posture, conceptual nuances, and implied ramifications and at ISAC-ISSS, Annual Conference, University of Notre Dame. She was invited to deliver lectures at the USAFA on Pakistan’s deterrence stability and maturing force posture. She expressed her academic views at different forums including Pentagon, Lawrence Livermore National Labs, Congressional Budget Office and in some Think Tanks in Washington D.C. She had been a Nonproliferation Fellow at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS), in Monterey and a SWAMOS alumni of Columbia University (2011). Since 2010, Dr. Abdullah has been part of several Track-II dialogues and had an opportunity to learn decision-making trends through her regular participations in Table Top Exercises exploring escalation control and deterrence stability in South Asia.
Abstract: This research investigates why and how regional nuclear powers come to develop specific kind of nuclear delivery systems, especially a submarine-based ballistic missile (SSBN) force. In the second nuclear age, as new nuclear states develop sophisticated delivery systems including SSBNs, understanding the logic and process of their nuclear force development is essential for both regional and international security. The origins and development process of India’s nuclear submarine program suggests that nuclear force development is a historically contingent process. This data-driven research, based on newly declassified archival documents from the Indian archives and extensive oral history interviews, refutes teleological narratives that either argue for technological determinism or the need for projecting nuclear deterrence as the primary causal variables. By situating India’s nuclear submarine program in the organizational routines of its nuclear scientific bureaucracy, bureaucratic politics of its military-scientific complex and the military socialization of the Indian Navy, this research explains India’s most secretive military-scientific programs. This comprehensive empirical research, currently based on a single case study, also addresses an important theoretical question in the field of international security studies: why states develop specific kinds of weapon systems, including those for nuclear weapons delivery?
Speaker bio: Prior to joining CISAC as a Nuclear Security Postdoctoral Fellow, Yogesh Joshi was an Associate Fellow in the Strategic Studies Program at the Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi. He recently received his PhD from Jawaharlal Nehru University specializing in Indian foreign and security policy.
At CISAC, Yogesh is finishing a book manuscript on the history of India's nuclear submarine program. His research traces the origins, process and development of India's nuclear submarine program using multi-archival sources and extensive oral history interviews. Yogesh’s data-driven research posits that India’s nuclear submarine program was riddled with shifting motivations, ambivalent rationales and halting progress. Rather than being driven by a single coherent strategic plan, India stumbled upon a submarine-based nuclear deterrent. By situating the nuclear submarine program in India’s Cold War security policy, its nuclear policy, its naval strategy in the Indian Ocean, the bureaucratic politics of its military-scientific complex and its quest for technological prestige, this research is an attempt to understand path-dependency in one of India’s most secretive military-scientific programs. It not only has implications for explaining India's nuclear program and policy but also provides an avenue to explain the process of decision-making behind state's pursuance of specific kinds of nuclear delivery systems. This research is supported by the MacArthur foundation.
He has held fellowships at George Washington University, King’s College London and Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington DC. His research has appeared or is under review in Asian Security, International History Review, International Affairs, Survival, US Naval War College Review, Comparative Strategy, Harvard Asia Quarterly, India Review, Asia Policy, Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs, War on the Rocks, World Politics Review and The Diplomat. He has co-authored two books: The US ‘Pivot’ and Indian Foreign Policy: Asia's Emerging Balance of Power (Palgrave Macmillan, 2015) and India in Nuclear Asia: Regional Forces, Perceptions and Policies (Orient Blackswan (South Asia), forthcoming 2018; also forthcoming in fall 2018 by Georgetown University Press for the rest of the world). A short introduction on India’s Nuclear Policy was recently commissioned by Oxford University Press and has been accepted for publication in 2018. A monograph titled 'India’s Evolving Nuclear Force and Implications for U.S. Strategy in the Asia-Pacific' was published by the Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College in 2016.
Dr. Yogesh Joshi is the Indian Community Endowed Chair at the School of Politics, Security and International Affairs and Director of the India Center at the University of Central Florida. His research focuses on military technological diffusion among rising powers, conventional military and nuclear strategy, and alliance politics, with an empirical focus on India, South Asia, and the Indo-Pacific.
Before joining UCF, Dr Joshi led the National Security and Foreign Policy program at the Institute of South Asian Studies at the National University of Singapore. He also taught at Yale-NUS College. He was a MacArthur and Stanton Nuclear Postdoctoral Fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University. He is also an alumnus of the Summer Workshop on the Analysis of Military Operations and Strategy, Columbia University, International Nuclear History Boot Camp, Woodrow Wilson Center, and Strategic Forces Boot Camp, Dartmouth University. He has a Doctorate in International Politics from Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.
Dr Joshi is co-author of three books: India and Nuclear Asia: Forces Doctrines and Dangers (Georgetown University Press, 2018), Asia’s Emerging Balance of Power: The US ‘Pivot’ and Indian Foreign Policy (Palgrave Macmillan, 2016) and India’s Nuclear Policy: A Short Introduction (Oxford University Press, 2018). His research has been published or is under review in International Security, Cold War History, Security Studies, The Washington Quarterly, Survival, Asian Security, India Review, US Naval War College Review, International Affairs, Contemporary Strategy, Diplomacy and Statecraft, Asia Policy, International History Review and Harvard Asia Quarterly.
Dr. Yogesh Joshi is the Indian Community Endowed Chair at the School of Politics, Security and International Affairs and Director of the India Center at the University of Central Florida. His research focuses on military technological diffusion among rising powers, conventional military and nuclear strategy, and alliance politics, with an empirical focus on India, South Asia, and the Indo-Pacific.
Before joining UCF, Dr Joshi led the National Security and Foreign Policy program at the Institute of South Asian Studies at the National University of Singapore. He also taught at Yale-NUS College. He was a MacArthur and Stanton Nuclear Postdoctoral Fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University. He is also an alumnus of the Summer Workshop on the Analysis of Military Operations and Strategy, Columbia University, International Nuclear History Boot Camp, Woodrow Wilson Center, and Strategic Forces Boot Camp, Dartmouth University. He has a Doctorate in International Politics from Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.
Dr Joshi is co-author of three books: India and Nuclear Asia: Forces Doctrines and Dangers (Georgetown University Press, 2018), Asia’s Emerging Balance of Power: The US ‘Pivot’ and Indian Foreign Policy (Palgrave Macmillan, 2016) and India’s Nuclear Policy: A Short Introduction (Oxford University Press, 2018). His research has been published or is under review in International Security, Cold War History, Security Studies, The Washington Quarterly, Survival, Asian Security, India Review, US Naval War College Review, International Affairs, Contemporary Strategy, Diplomacy and Statecraft, Asia Policy, International History Review and Harvard Asia Quarterly.
In the next decade and a half, China and India will become two of the world’s indispensable powers—whether they rise peacefully or not. During that time, Asia will surpass the combined strength of North America and Europe in economic might, population size, and military spending.
A shadowy terror group smuggles a crude nuclear bomb into the United States, then detonates it right in the heart of Washington D.C., setting off a 15 kiloton explosion.
Eighty thousand Americans are killed instantly, including the president, vice president and most of the members of Congress, and more than a hundred thousand more are seriously wounded.
News outlets are soon broadcasting a message they’ve all received from a group claiming responsibility.
It says there are five more bombs hidden in five different cities across the America, and one bomb will be set off each week for the next five weeks unless all American troops based overseas are ordered to immediately return to the U.S. homeland.
The nation is thrown into chaos, as millions scramble to flee the cities, clogging roads and choking telecommunications systems.
The stock market crashes, before trading is halted altogether.
Martial law is declared, amid widespread looting and violence.
That was just one of the nightmare scenarios for a potential nuclear disaster that former U.S. Secretary of Defense William J. Perry vividly described as he delivered the Center for International Security and Cooperation’s annual Drell Lecture on Wednesday.
“My bottom line is that the likelihood of a nuclear catastrophe today is greater than it was during the Cold War,” Perry said.
Most people were “blissfully unaware” of the danger that simmering conflicts in geopolitical flash points around the globe – including Russia, China, North Korea, Iran and Pakistan – could easily turn nuclear, Perry told the Stanford audience.
A new nuclear arms race with Russia
Perry said he had tried to foster closer cooperation between the U.S. and Russia when he headed the Pentagon during the mid ‘90s and helped oversee the joint dismantling of four thousand nuclear weapons.
“When I left the Pentagon, I believed we were well on the way to ending forever that Cold War enmity, but that was not to be,” he said.
William J. Perry shares a video depicting the threat of nuclear terrorism with a Stanford audience.
Since then, relations between the West and Russia have soured badly, prompting Russia to modernize its nuclear arsenal and assume a more aggressive nuclear posture.
“They’re well advanced in rebuilding their Cold War nuclear arsenal, and it is Putin’s stated first priority,” Perry said.
“And they have dropped their former policy of no first use of nuclear weapons, and replaced it with a policy that says nuclear weapons will be their weapon of choice if they are threatened.”
While Perry said he believed Russian president Vladimir Putin did not want to engage in a military conflict with NATO forces, he said he was concerned about the possibility of Russia making a strategic miscalculation and stumbling into a conflict where they might resort to the use of tactical nuclear weapons.
“If they did that there’s no way of predicting or controlling the escalation that would follow thereafter,” Perry said.
Chinese economic problems increasing tensions
In Asia, a slowing Chinese economy could exacerbate domestic political tensions over issues such as wealth inequality and pollution, and encourage Chinese leaders to divert attention from problems at home by focusing on enemies abroad.
“China has had more than 10 percent growth now for almost three decades, but I think there’s trouble ahead,” Perry said.
“The time-proven safety valve for any government that’s in trouble is ultra-nationalism, which in the case of China translates into anti-Americanism and anti-Japanese.”
China has seen a major growth in military expenditures over the last decade, and it has used that investment to build a blue water navy and develop effective anti-ship missiles designed to drive the U.S. Navy hundreds of miles back from the Chinese coastline.
One potential flash point for a conflict between China and the U.S. are the artificial islands that China has been building in the disputed waters of the South China Sea.
“In a sense, China is regarding the South China Sea as a domestic lake, and we regard it and most other countries regard it as international waters, so their actions have been challenged by the U.S. Navy and will continue to be challenged,” Perry said.
North Korea’s growing nuclear threat
Meanwhile, China’s neighbor North Korea has continued to defy the international community and conducted another nuclear test in January.
“North Korea is today building a nuclear arsenal, and I would say clearly it’s of the highest priority in their government, and they have adopted outrageous rhetoric about how they might use those nuclear weapons,” Perry said.
William J. Perry delivers the Drell Lecture in an address entitled "A National Security Walk Around the World."
North Korea followed up its latest nuclear test with a satellite launch earlier this month – an important step towards developing an intercontinental ballistic missile that could threaten the United States mainland.
“These missiles today have only conventional warheads that are of no significant concern, but they are developing nuclear warheads,” Perry said.
“They already have developed a nuclear bomb, and the latest test, as well as tests to come, will be designed to perfect a bomb small enough and compact enough and durable enough to fit into a warhead. If they succeed in doing that, then the bluster will become a real threat.”
Perry said he hoped China and the United States could combine forces and adopt a “carrot and stick” diplomatic approach to force North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons program – with the United States offering aid and international recognition, and China threatening to cut off supplies of food and aid.
He said he expected to see “more acting out” from the North Korean regime in the coming months, in the form of further nuclear and rocket tests.
Like it or not, the Iran deal is the only deal we’ll get
The landmark deal reached last year, where Iran agree to curtail its nuclear program in exchange for the lifting of economic sanctions, was a better resolution than Perry had expected to the negotiations, but it has met with significant resistance from groups he described as “strange bedfellows.”
“The opposition in Israel and the United States opposed the deal because they fear it will allow Iran to get a bomb,” Perry said.
“Whereas the opposition in Iran opposed the deal because they fear it will prevent Iran from getting a bomb. Both cannot be right.”
Many Republican presidential hopefuls have publicly stated on the campaign trail that they would withdraw from the deal if they got elected to the White House, but Perry said that would be a strategic mistake.
“The opposition in the United States has a simple formula – we should withdraw from the deal, we should reinstate sanctions, and we should renegotiate a better deal,” Perry said.
“Let me be as blunt as I can, this is a pure fantasy. There is not the remotest possibility that the sanction could be reapplied if the United States withdraws from this deal, because the day we withdraw from the deal, our allies are gone, the sanctions are gone, there will be no renegotiations without sanctions, so this deal, like it or not, is the only deal we will ever get.”
Another “Mumbai” attack could spark regional nuclear war
Nuclear rivals India and Pakistan have more than a hundred nuclear weapons on each side, as well as the missiles to deliver them, and a conventional military conflict between them could quickly escalate into a regional nuclear war, Perry said.
Another large-scale terror attack, like the coordinated assault in Mumbai that killed more than 163 people in 2008, could lead India to retaliate militarily against Pakistan (which India blames for encouraging the terror groups operating in Pakistani territory).
Perry said he was concerned that Pakistan would then use tactical nuclear weapons against invading Indian troops, and that India might then respond with a nuclear attack of its own on Pakistan.
“So this is the nightmare scenario of how a regional nuclear war could start,” Perry said.
“A nightmare that would involve literally tens of millions of deaths, along with the possibility of stimulating a nuclear winter that would cause widespread tragedies all over the planet.”
A ray of hope
Despite all the potential for nuclear disaster in the current geopolitical environment, Perry said he was still hopeful that nuclear catastrophe could be avoided.
"While much of my talk today has a doomsday ring to it, that truly is not who I am,” Perry said.
“I’m basically an optimist. When I see a cloud, I look for a ray to shine through that cloud.”
One important step toward reducing the nuclear threat would be improving relations between the U.S. and Russia, he said.
“My ray of sunshine, my hope, is I believe we can still reverse the slide in U.S. Russia relations, he said.
“We must begin that by restoring civil dialog. We must restore cooperation between the United States and Russia in areas where we have mutual interest…If we succeed in doing that, then we can work to stop and reverse the drift to a greater and greater dependence on nuclear weapons.”
Perry ended his speech by urging the audience to keep striving to rid the world of the threat of nuclear weapons.
“We must pursue our ideals in order to keep alive our hope – hope for a safer world for our children and for our grandchildren,” he said.
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William J. Perry answers questions from the audience during the annual Drell Lecture at Stanford, as CISAC co-director David Relman (right) looks on.
The United States and India continue to expand strategic ties and areas of collaboration in unprecedented ways. This of course has not come without constraints or significant obstacles. Under the Obama Administration, the relationship has arguably been elevated to a new level of cooperation, but space remains for a potentially significant further expansion of both ties and collaboration on all levels. This will have strategic implications for both nations, their neighbors, and the overall region itself.
As the U.S.-India relationship continues to grow into the 21st century, a new regional construct has the potential for developing along with it. At the confluence of India's Act East foreign policy and the United States' strategic rebalance to Asia lies the relatively undefined domain of the Indo-Pacific. This seminar will touch upon the efforts of the Obama Administration to further this "defining partnership of the 21st century", and then delve into the potential future of the Indo-Pacific and the strategic implications and challenges of a developing Indo-Pacific reality from political, economic, security, and technological perspectives
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Philip James Reiner is an Affiliate at Stanford University’s Center for International Security and Cooperation, an Adjunct Senior Fellow with the Asia-Pacific Security Program at the Center for a New American Security, and serves as a consultant to both the private and public sectors. He previously served as Senior Director for South Asia at the National Security Council (NSC), where he successfully led U.S. government efforts to revitalize the U.S.-India bilateral relationship, and oversaw two head-of-state level engagements including the groundbreaking visit of President Obama as Chief Guest at India’s Republic Day celebrations in January 2015. Prior to his appointment as Senior Director, Mr. Reiner served at the NSC for three years, first as Director for Pakistan and then as Senior Advisor for Afghanistan and Pakistan. In these capacities, he helped to manage the war-time requirements of effectively staffing the President, the National Security Advisor, and senior White House and NSC leadership, while helping to lead team efforts to sustain an international coalition of more than 40 countries in Afghanistan, with functional focus on both counterterrorism and countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. He also played an instrumental role in managing significant bilateral and regional crises and helping to reset and rebalance U.S.-Pakistan relations after the tensions of 2011.
Prior to joining the White House, Mr. Reiner worked in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy at the Pentagon, where he received the Office of the Secretary of Defense Medal for Exceptional Civilian Service; and at Raytheon Space and Airborne Systems. Mr. Reiner holds a Master’s degree in International Relations from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, and a Bachelor of Arts in Comparative Religions with a minor in History from the University of California at Santa Barbara. He currently resides in the San Francisco Bay Area with his wife and daughter.
This event is co-sponsored by the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Centerand theCenter for International Security and Cooperation
Philip James Reiner
Former Senior Director for South Asia, National Security Council
The history of nonproliferation failures in Israel, India, Pakistan, and North Korea are reviewed in the light of the nuclear agreement with Iran. The paper shows that the circumstances in each case are special and not comparable to the situation in the Iranian case. Thus, while the Iran agreement has some weaknesses, past nonproliferation failures should not be considered predictive of a future failure in this case. But there are lessons to be learned from such failures that should inform U.S. nonproliferation policy generally.
Retired Pakistani Lt. Gen. Khalid Kidwai told an audience of some 50 South Asia and nuclear experts at Stanford that India and Pakistan need a joint strategic vision to attain permanent peace and economic stability on the Subcontinent.
Kidwai, addressing a CISAC seminar on March 30, 2015, said the enmity between India and Pakistan - born from the partition of the subcontinent in 1947 that effectively divided Hindus and Muslims into two separate nations - will never be resolved until people are brought out of abject poverty.
"The obvious is not sinking into our regional calculations," he said. "The obvious is the elephant in the room: sustained socioeconomic progress."
More than 22 percent of Pakistan's 196 million people are living in poverty and 46 percent of its rural population falls below the global poverty line, according ot the Sustainable Development Policy Institute.
"Conflict resolution without socioeconomic progress will never work," said Kidwai, who is one of the most decorated generals in Pakistan. "There is no running away from this stark reality. For 68 years we have blustered and blundered our way through solutions, leaving 1.5 billion people condemned to hunger, filth and squalor."
He offered hope, in that there are two relatively new, democratically elected leaders now leading the nuclear-armed neighbors, which have gone to war three times since partition. Narendra Modi became India's 15th prime minister last year; Pakistan elected a new president, Nawaz Sharif, the year before that. They represent two political parties with strong elctroal mandates.
"We are waiting for the two leaderships to grasp, sit together, explore conflict resolution and go for it in a manner that all partners on all sides win," Kidwai said. "It needs vision, statesmanship and guts."
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Kidwai is advisor to Pakistan's National Command Authority and was the inaugural director general of the country's Strategic Plans Division, which he headed for 15 years. He conceived and executed Islamabad's nuclear policy and deterrence doctrines. He also is the architect of Pakistan's civilian nuclear energy and space programs.
Kidwai, who was hosted by CISAC's Siegfried Hecker, told the Stanford audience that he wanted to dispel what he called "two fallacious counter-narratives that have taken root in our neighborhood."
The first, he said, is that Pakistan supports and conducts terrorism inside India. "What would Pakistan attempt to achieve from this strategy?" he said, adding that the Mumbai terrorist attacks of 2008 were not backed by Islamabad. On that day, 10 Pakistani men associated with the terrorist group Lashkar-e-Taiba killed 164 people during four days of attacks throughout the city. India has repeatedly accused Islamabad of supporting the terrorists; Islamabad said non-state actors were responsible for the attacks.
"Terrorism is not a Pakistani invention," he said. "What would Pakistan attempt to achieve from this strategy?"
The second myth, he said, is that the Pakistani military purposely keeps tensions at a high boil in an effort to boost its defense budget.
"Nothing could be further from the truth," he said. "The Pakistan Army is all for an equitable, just and ordinary peace with India. We recognize that war is not an option."
Kidwai believes the presence of nuclear weapons in South Asia is a stabilizing force and that any new peace initiatives lay with India.
India conducted its first "peaceful" nuclear explosion, code-named "Smiling Buddha," in May of 1974; it would then conduct five nuclear tests in May 1998. Seventeen days after the first of those tests, Islamabad announced that it had detonated six nuclear devices, which happened to match the Indian total.
Today, India is believed to have between 90 and 110 nuclear warheads; Pakistan has between 100 to 120, according to the Arms Control Association.
Kidwai said the tried-and-tested concept of Mutually Assured Destruction has maintained a tenuous truce between the two nations. MAD follows the theory of deterrence, where the threat of using nuclear weapons against the enemy prevents the enemy's use of those same weapons.
He considered the concept of space for limited conventional war highly problematic and explained that Pakistan opted to develop a variety of short-range, low-yield nuclear weapons as a defensive deterrence response to what he called an aggressive Indian doctrine.
Kidwai assured the Stanford audience that Pakistan's nuclear weapons were safe, secure and under complete institutional and professional control.
"For the last 15 years, Pakistan has taken its nuclear security obligations very seriously," he said. "We have invested heavily in terms of money, manpower, weapons and preparedness."
Kidwai was challenged about the deterrence utility of tactical, or battlefield, nuclear weapons compared to the increased security and safety risks of their potential deployment. Although Kidwai made a convincing case for improved security of Pakistan's nuclear assets during his tenure at the Strategic Plans Division, concerns were nevertheless expressed because of Pakistan's challenging internal security environment.
About the Speaker: Lieutenant General (retired) Khalid Kidwai is advisor to Pakistan’s National Command Authority and pioneer Director General of Pakistan’s Strategic Plans Division, which he headed for an unprecedented 15 years. He is one of the most decorated generals in Pakistan and was awarded the highest civil award Nishan-i-Imtiaz, as well as Hilal-i-Imtiaz and Hilal-i-Imtiaz (Military). Winner of the Sword of Honor at Pakistan’s Military Academy, he later saw frontline combat action in erstwhile East Pakistan and was a prisoner of war in Pakistan’s 1971 war with India. General Kidwai conceived, articulated, and executed Pakistan’s nuclear policy and deterrence doctrines into a tangible and robust nuclear force structure. General Kidwai is also the architect of Pakistan’s civilian Nuclear Energy Program and National Space Program.
Encina Hall (2nd floor)
Khalid Kidwai
advisor to Pakistan’s National Command Authority
Speaker
Abstract: I seek to explain Pakistan’s persistent revisionism towards India even though it has bequeathed mostly failures, brought international opprobrium upon Pakistan, and has imperiled the viability of the state. I argue that the answer lies in the strategic culture of the army. Drawing upon six decades of the army’s publications, I derive the lineaments of the army’s strategic culture to understand how it views its threats and the best means to manage them. I find that the army relies upon non-state actors under a nuclear umbrella and a highly stylized form of Islam to create and sustain a civilizational conflict with India, almost always posited as “Hindu.” The army uses Islam to sustain domestic support for this conflict, buttress the morale of the troops, and to contextualize the Pakistan army within the historical landscape of Islamic war fighting. From the army's distorted view of history, the army is victorious as long as can resist India's purported hegemony and the territorial status quo. I conclude that Pakistan is an ideological or greedy state in the parlance of Charles Glaser, rather than a purely or mostly security-seeking state. The international community must develop policy instruments to contain the myriad threats posed by Pakistan.
About the Speaker: C. Christine Fair is an Assistant Professor in the Security Studies Program within Georgetown University’s Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service. She previously served as a senior political scientist with the RAND Corporation, a political officer with the United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan in Kabul, and a senior research associate at USIP’s Center for Conflict Analysis and Prevention. Her research focuses on political and military affairs in South Asia (Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka). Her most recent book is Fighting to the End: The Pakistan Army’s Way of War (Oxford University Press). Additionally, she has as authored, co-authored and co-edited several books, including Pakistan’s Enduring Challenges (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2015), Policing Insurgencies: Cops as Counterinsurgents (Oxford University Press, 2014); Political Islam and Governance in Bangladesh (Routledge, 2010); Treading on Hallowed Ground: Counterinsurgency Operations in Sacred Spaces (Oxford University Press, 2008); The Madrassah Challenge: Militancy and Religious Education in Pakistan (USIP, 2008), Fortifying Pakistan: The Role of U.S. Internal Security Assistance (USIP, 2006); and The Cuisines of the Axis of Evil and Other Irritating States (Globe Pequot, 2008), among others. Dr. Fair is a frequent commentator in print (New York Times, Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, The National Review among others) as well on television and radio programs (CBS, BBC, Al Jazeera, CNN, Voice of America, Fox, Reuters, BBC, NPR, among others).
William J. Perry shares a video depicting the threat of nuclear terrorism with a Stanford audience.
William J. Perry delivers the Drell Lecture in an address entitled "A National Security Walk Around the World."
