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For spring quarter 2022, CISAC will be hosting hybrid events. Many events will offer limited-capacity in-person attendance for Stanford faculty, staff, fellows, visiting scholars, and students in accordance with Stanford’s health and safety guidelines, and be open to the public online via Zoom. All CISAC events are scheduled using the Pacific Time Zone. 

SEMINAR RECORDING

Virtual to Public. Only those with an active Stanford ID with access to William J. Perry Conference Room in Encina Hall may attend in person. 

Arzan Tarapore
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Debak Das
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India accidentally fired a cruise missile into Pakistan on March 9, 2022. The missile was not armed and only damaged some property. (No lives were lost.) Both sides projected calm in the incident’s aftermath. The Indian government issued a brief statement noting that the missile launch was “a technical malfunction” during routine maintenance. It also ordered “a high-level court of inquiry.” Pakistan publicly called out India’s mistake, asked for an explanation, and called for a “thorough and transparent investigation” to be conducted jointly by both countries. Cool heads prevailed.

Read the rest at the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists

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BrahMos Missile.
BrahMos Missile.
Photo Credit: Mubeenk02 Accessed via Wikipedia. CC BY-SA 3.0.
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India accidentally fired a cruise missile into Pakistan on March 9, 2022. The missile was not armed and no lives were lost. Both sides projected calm in the incident’s aftermath. Still, the incident raises questions about the safety of India’s cruise missile systems, especially given the real risk of accidental escalation between nuclear-armed adversaries.

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* Please note all CISAC events are scheduled using the Pacific Time Zone.

 

Seminar Recording:  https://youtu.be/ISsBNJEKP70

 

About the Event: This chapter builds on my earlier writing during the West African Ebola outbreak, in which I argue that health security paradigms and militarized health interventions engender “defensiveness” in landscapes of care, while they also intensify already securitized landscapes and relationships of development and humanitarian aid. In this chapter, I include insights about the US-authored Global Health Security Agenda (GHSA), to suggest that the Government of Sierra Leone’s 2014 adoption of the agenda has helped to strengthen containment and control paradigms at the expense of care, and to prioritize the collection and management of disease event data over other pressing concerns related to health care delivery (cf. Benton 2015). Specifically, I analyze global health security policy discourse and practice outlined in the GHSA and militarized health interventions as they travel and settle in four disparate sites: a rural clinic in eastern Sierra Leone (see Kardas-Nelson and Frankfurter 2018); abandoned and repurposed treatment centers; the Imperial War Museum’s temporary exhibit “Fighting Extremes: From Ebola to Isis;” and US and Sierra Leonean political rhetoric explicitly linking Ebola virus disease and terrorism (whether by metaphor, analogy, or literal means). Reading across these sites, I show how projects of counter-terrorism and humanitarianism subtend global health policy, and become institutionalized in and through the everyday management of public health provision.

 

About the Speaker: Adia Benton is an associate professor of Anthropology and African Studies at Northwestern University, where she is affiliated with the Science in Human Culture Program. She is the author of the award-winning book, HIV Exceptionalism: Development through Disease in Sierra Leone, and is currently writing a book about the West African Ebola outbreak.

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Adia Benton Associate Professor of Anthropology Northwestern University
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Ryan A. Musto
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In September 1964, at the summit of the Non-Aligned Movement in Cairo, Sri Lanka’s Prime Minister Sirimavo Bandaranaike proposed that the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) be turned into a Zone of Peace (IOZP).  Specifically, she called for the eradication of military bases from the area and the Ocean’s denuclearization. India, a neighboring littoral state, immediately supported the initiative and became one of its greatest champions through the end of the 1970s. Scholars have claimed that India’s enthusiasm stemmed from its non-aligned foreign policy and enduring commitment to Prime Minister’s Jawaharlal Nehru’s moralpolitik (27-28).  But as Yogesh Joshi argues in his exemplary article, such interpretations miss the mark.

Read the rest at  H-Diplo

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Ryan A. Musto reviews former CISAC Fellow Yogesh Joshi’s work on India’s use of selective alignment with the Great Powers to advance its regional ambitions in the 1960s and 1970s.

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* Please note all CISAC events are scheduled using the Pacific Time Zone.

 

Seminar Recording:  https://youtu.be/RZZT4lXaG1w

 

About the Event: What lies at the origins of major wars?

I argue that major wars are caused by the attempts of great powers to escape their two-front war problem: encirclement. To explain the causal mechanism that links encirclement to major war, I identify an intervening variable: the increase in the invasion ability of the immediate rival. This outcome unfolds in a three-step process: double security dilemma, war initiation, and war contagion.

Encirclement is a geographic variable that occurs in presence of one or two great powers (surrounding great powers) on two different borders of the encircled great power. The two front-war problem triggers a double security dilemma (step 1) for the encircled great power, which has to disperse its army to secure its borders. The surrounding great powers do not always have the operational capability to initiate a two-front war (latent encirclement) but, when they increase their invasion ability (actualized encirclement), the encircled great power attacks (war initiation, step 2). The other great powers intervene due to the rival-based network of alliances for preventing their respective immediate rival from increasing its invasion ability (war contagion, step 3).

I assess my theory in the outbreak of WWI. This article provides ample support to the claim that major wars are caused by a great power that has the limited goal of eliminating its two-front war problem. These findings have important implications for the prospects of major wars, since I anticipate that in the long term China will face the encirclement of India and Russia.

View Draft Paper

 

About the Speaker: Andrea Bartoletti holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Chicago. His research interests span on international security and IR theory with a focus on the origins of major wars, polarity and war, U.S. grand strategy in the Indo-Pacific region, and great powers' intervention in civil wars.

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Andrea Bartoletti Postdoctoral Fellow Stanford University
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Authorities don’t seem to understand the real threat from cyber-operations.

The Nuclear Power Corporation of India Limited (NPCIL) has now confirmed that there was a cyberattack on the Kudankulam Nuclear Power Plant (KKNPP) in Tamil Nadu, India, in September. The nuclear power plant’s administrative network was breached in the attack, but did not cause any critical damage. KKNPP plant officials had initially denied suffering an attack and officially stated that KKNPP “and other Indian nuclear power plants are stand alone and not connected to outside cyber network and Internet. Any cyberattack on the Nuclear Power Plant Control System is not possible.”


So what really happened at Kudankulam? Here’s what you need to know.

1. The nuclear power plant and the cyberattack

The KKNPP is the biggest nuclear power plant in India, equipped with two Russian-designed and supplied VVER pressurized water reactors with a capacity of 1,000 megawatts each. Both reactor units feed India’s southern power grid. The plant is adding four more reactor units of the same capacity, making the Kudankulam Nuclear Power Plant one of the largest collaborations between India and Russia.

 

Read the Rest at The Washington Post

 

 

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First proposed in 1964 by the Sri Lankan prime minister, the Indian Ocean Zone of Peace [IOZP] entailed eradication of foreign military bases from the Indian Ocean region as well its denuclearisation. During the Cold War, India was one of the most vehement supporters of IOZP. If some saw India’s interests in the IOZP as another manifestation of Nehruvian idealism, others viewed it as a part of its non-aligned foreign policy. This analysis argues otherwise. India’s record on IOZP reveals a policy of selective alignment with Great Powers and its adaptation to the principles of power politics in international relations. India’s support for the presence of one or the other Great Powers in the Indian Ocean region found premise on balancing those it considered hostile to its national security interests. In public, India supported the call for IOZP as dictated by its non-aligned foreign policy; privately, New Delhi remained highly sceptical and often worked to IZOP’s detriment. Under the cloak of IOZP, India not only pursued diplomatic alignment with Great Powers but also ensured that its own regional ambitions remain unchecked. In this picture, India’s role was not only supportive of the Cold War but to the extent it could use the opportunities provided by superpower rivalry in the region to further its own ends, even determinative of the process.

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Diplomacy and Statecraft
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Yogesh Joshi
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Asfandyar Mir
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Political scientist Asfandyar Mir has studied security affairs in South Asia for years. Now a postdoctoral fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University, Mir explains the latest developments, old conflicts, and potential conflagrations in the ongoing crisis between nuclear-armed rivals India and Pakistan.

RFE/RL: Where do you see the military situation moving after India and Pakistan engaged in what appears to be retaliatory air strikes and cross-border shelling?

Asfandyar Mir: The current stand-off between India and Pakistan hasn't fully de-escalated, but it isn't as tense as it was some days ago. After Pakistan retaliated with air strikes against India on February 27, the crisis intensified -- it appeared the Indian government was considering a follow-on retaliation. In that backdrop, Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan's gesture of returning the Indian Air Force pilot, captured by Pakistan after his plane was shot down, lowered the political temperature, eased the situation somewhat. That said, military forces on both sides remain mobilized in large numbers, and the Indian government still hasn’t given a clear-cut signal of wanting to de-escalate.

RFE/RL: Do you see the current leadership in India and Pakistan as capable of deescalating given the domestic pressures they currently face?

Mir: The leadership of the two countries has different political incentives. On the Indian side, Prime Minister [Narendra] Modi still has incentives to re-escalate. He is going into a national election. His government’s economic performance has been weak, so he appears to be relying more on foreign policy issues like confronting Pakistan -- an issue the Indian electorate cares about. Pakistan’s shooting down of the Indian aircraft and capturing of the air force pilot also deeply embarrassed him and his political party, the Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP).

On the Pakistan side, two leaders matter: Prime Minister Imran Khan and chief of the country's powerful army, General Qamar Bajwa. After the first Indian military raid, both were left embarrassed before their key domestic audiences: Khan in front of his voter base and Bajwa in front of his officer corps.

 

However, Pakistan's retaliatory strikes not only reversed that damage but enhanced their domestic political standing. Now both the leaders want a deescalation. Khan has made his first move to deescalate. He is also insisting with a dialogue offer to India on terrorism on India's terms. What he hasn’t done and could do to defuse the situation is a crackdown against the group behind the February 14 terror attack, Jaish-e-Muhammed.

Khan, however, would need Bajwa’s support for such a crackdown. It remains unclear whether Bajwa would agree. The Pakistani military hasn’t acted against Pakistan-based jihadis operating in Kashmir. Instead, it has seen them as valuable allies in confronting India in Kashmir.

RFE/RL: What happens to the Kashmir issue now?

Mir: We remain very far from any meaningful progress on the dispute over Kashmir. In recent years, India has intensified its crackdown in Kashmir against violent and non-violent separatist groups. India also employs a heavy-handed counterinsurgency strategy, which frequently targets the civilian population. As a result, resentment in the Kashmiri population toward the Indian state remains very high. The Indian government continues to see a coercive approach instead of a political approach involving concessions as the way forward in the disputed region.

Pakistan also remains firm in its territorial claim over Kashmir. Given India’s unwillingness to make concessions and the deep alienation in the region toward the Indian state, Pakistan is likely to continue political and military support for the insurgency in Kashmir.

RFE/RL: What dangers do jihadi groups present to Pakistan?

Mir: It is commonly assumed that jihadi groups operating against India in Kashmir pose a direct threat to Pakistan. This was true a decade ago, when factions of Kashmir-focused jihadi groups defected toward transnational jihadis like Al-Qaeda. It appears that the process has stopped. Major Kashmir-focused jihadi groups based in Pakistan do not challenge the Pakistani government. These groups have also consolidated control over their cadres, preventing fragmentation toward Al-Qaeda and [the ultra-radical] Islamic State (IS).

This is not to say there are no indirect bad effects of such groups on Pakistan. These groups spawn a large jihadi infrastructure, which is a source of radicalization in the country. Pakistan continually faces international opprobrium, even from its allies like China privately, for allowing such groups to operate from its territory.

RFE/RL: What has the international community's role been in the current crisis?

Mir: [U.S.] President [Donald] Trump made an important statement in Hanoi on February 28, suggesting that the U.S. government has been involved in mediating an end to the India-Pakistan crisis. Besides the U.S., Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, China, and Russia have sought to deescalate the tensions.

Overall, Pakistan is under pressure from the international community for not doing enough to curb anti-India jihadi groups. Still, it is striking that beyond condemnation, the U.S. and other major powers have not pledged any material support to the Indian government like sanctions against Pakistani leadership or military support for Indian operations.

RFE/RL: Did nuclear weapons play a role in the current crisis?

Mir: Nuclear weapons have played a role. Following the first Indian air strike on February 26, the Pakistani military spokesman stated that the government was activating the body which decides the deployment and use of nuclear weapons. This was a clear-cut signal by Pakistan that it would use nuclear weapons if the crisis exacerbated. I believe that deterred a sizable Indian response after Pakistan conducted its retaliatory strikes on February 27.

 

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Bio: Dr. Arvind Gupta recently retired as India's Deputy National Security Advisor. In his capacity as Deputy NSA, he also headed India's National Security Council Secretariat from 2014 until 2017. Previously, he was the Director General of the Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis (IDSA), a thinktank funded by India's Ministry of Defence. Dr. Gupta joined the Indian Foreign Service in 1979 and served at India's diplomatic missions in Moscow, London and Ankara. At the Ministry of External Affairs in New Delhi, he dealt with Afghanistan, the Soviet Union, Russia, Kashmir, and the Central Asian affairs. He is an honorary professor in the Department of Defence and National Security Studies, Panjab University. He has an MSc in Physics from the University of Delhi and a Ph.D. in International Relations from Jawaharlal Nehru University. He is currently the Director of Vivekananda International Foundation (VIF), a Delhi-based independent, non-partisan think tank focussing on foreign policy, defense and security-related issues from an Indian perspective. His most recent book How India Manages its National Security was published by Penguin Random House in 2018.

Book Overview: In this authoritative and comprehensive survey of the challenges a changing global security environment poses to India, former deputy national security advisor Arvind Gupta outlines the important aspects of the country's security apparatus and how they interface to confront internal and external conflicts. We have today a turbulent Middle East to the west; a rising and assertive China to the north; Pakistan in the grip of the military and the militants across our border and an increasingly militarizing Indian Ocean region surrounding us. Additionally, climate change, cyber security and the vulnerability of our space assets are major areas of concern. Anything that weakens a nation weakens its security, which makes the issues of food, water, health, economics and governance critically significant. Arvind Gupta draws on his long experience in these areas to argue that instead of tactical remedies, a strategic, coherent, institutional approach is needed to deal with these challenges. Strengthening the National Security Council, for instance, could be one way forward.

How India Manages Its National Security explains with great clarity and thoroughness the concept and operation of India's national security apparatus. This book will be of great interest to practitioners, analysts and laymen alike and offer an important voice in the discussion on how national security challenges should be resolved in the decades to come.

Arvind Gupta Director Vivekananda International Foundation
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This article argues that China’s rise and its growing military power have intensified the Sino-Indian security dilemma. For a long time after the 1962 war, India’s military posture along the India–China border was mostly defensive in nature and could be characterized as imposing “deterrence by denial.” However, over the last decade, China’s growth trajectory coupled with rapid modernization of its military called into question the efficacy of this approach. India now feels much more vulnerable to China’s increasing military power both on the land frontier as well as in the maritime domain. The increasing intensity of this security dilemma has informed a consequent shift in India’s military strategy vis-à-vis China to one of “deterrence by punishment.” Theoretically, this article examines how changes in the severity of a security dilemma can lead to changes in military strategy. While doing so it explains India’s current military strategy to deal with the challenge posed by China.

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