President Volodymyr Zelensky visits Washington next week, with the highlight being a White House call on President Joe Biden. That offers the opportunity to reinvigorate the U.S.-Ukraine relationship at the highest level, following four years of Donald Trump.

This can be a very good meeting for the Ukrainian president. He should, however, take care in what he seeks. If he wants to return home with a clear success and having boosted U.S.-Ukraine relations, he should not ask for things he knows—or should know—he cannot get. Moreover, the more convincing the message that he brings regarding Kyiv’s commitment to domestic reform, the better will be his time in Washington.

Aug. 31 will be Mr. Zelensky’s first time to the White House, even though Trump offered him such a visit more than two years ago. Sadly, the former president showed no understanding of the import of Ukraine for American national interests and instead sought to extort Kyiv into interfering in U.S. politics.

When it comes to Ukraine, Biden gets it. The discussions between the presidents will undoubtedly focus on the two central challenges facing Kyiv. First, the conflict that Russia has inflicted on Ukraine since 2014, which has claimed some 14,000 lives. Zelensky can expect a strong reiteration of American support for Ukraine, including for non-recognition of Moscow’s illegal seizure of Crimea and for a settlement in Donbas that restores Ukrainian sovereignty.

The tricky part for Zelensky will turn on the specific asks he makes.

In the past, the Ukrainian president has called for a NATO membership action plan (MAP). In one sense, that is not unreasonable. Ukraine has made as much progress as many other new alliance members had made when they received MAPs.

NATO members, however, remain reluctant to put Ukraine, when it is engaged in a low-intensity war with Russia, on a membership track—despite the fact that NATO has stated that the question of membership is between the alliance and the prospective member, not any third party, i.e., not the Kremlin. That may seem unfair in Kyiv, but it is the reality.

So Zelensky should not seek a MAP. He could ask for an intensified and continuing discussion on the practical steps that Kyiv should take now so that, when a window opens for progress toward membership, Ukraine is fully ready to seize it. Mr. Zelensky can, in effect, have a MAP … if he accepts that it will not be called a MAP.

Ukraine—the biggest potential loser when Nord Stream 2 begins operation—understandably opposes it. Biden opposes it as well but remains unready to sanction German or European companies and risk a rift with Berlin and Brussels. (Kyiv should not want such a rift, which would erode U.S.-European Union unity on supporting Ukraine and sanctions against Russia.)

Zelensky thus should not urge sanctioning European companies to block the pipeline. He should instead ask how Washington, working with Berlin, intends to build with specifics on the July U.S.-German statement on supporting Ukraine, Europe’s energy security and climate goals and ensure that Russia will not use the pipeline against Kyiv. He could also propose continuing the discussion begun on Aug. 23 by the Ukrainian, German and American energy ministers about steps to strengthen Ukraine’s energy security.

Many in Kyiv have expressed frustration with the lack of progress toward settling the Donbas conflict in the “Normandy process” led by the Germans and French, and some even suggest alternative formats. Washington does not want to displace Berlin and Paris, and it benefits Kyiv to keep those key European Union members engaged. Still, Zelensky can and should press Biden to engage U.S. diplomacy more forcefully in support of the Germans and French.

He also may have an opening to ask for more. Washington reportedly has considered contingency military assistance for Ukraine. Given the Russian build-up last April, which was only partially drawn down, and the prospect that the September Zapad exercise will bring even more Russian troops close to Ukraine’s border, new U.S. military assistance would send a powerful signal of U.S. commitment to Ukraine as well as bolster its defensive capabilities.

The second central challenge facing Kyiv is putting in place the critical mass of reforms that will allow Ukraine’s economy to accelerate growth and realize its full potential, including encouraging open competition, strengthening the rule of law, curbing the outsized political and economic influence of the oligarchs, and beating back corruption. Kyiv’s record over the past two years has been mixed. These questions concerned  Biden when he had the senior lead on Ukraine in the Obama administration. If  Zelensky brings a credible, compelling message of his commitment to reform accompanied by specific ideas, he will find a receptive audience.

Zelensky’s U.S. visit can produce a major success for him and for U.S.-Ukraine relations. He should position himself to achieve such an outcome. That requires not overreaching by setting the bar impossibly high. And it means bringing a persuasive vision for how Kyiv will realize the ambitions of the Ukrainian people to become a prosperous democracy and a “normal” European state.

Steven Pifer is an affiliate of Stanford’s Center for International Security and Cooperation and a former U.S. ambassador to Ukraine.

Originally for Kyiv Post

President Volodymyr Zelensky reportedly will soon travel to Paris to meet with French President Emmanuel Macron. That is a trip very much worth making. After German Chancellor Angela Merkel steps down this fall, Zelensky may find himself more dependent on Macron, both in the Normandy format and for leadership in the European Union regarding the conflict that Russia has inflicted on his country.

The sooner Zelensky gets to Paris, the better.

First, he could ask Macron to call explicitly on Vladimir Putin to deescalate the tensions Russia has caused by its large and continuing build-up of military forces near Ukraine.

On April 3, the German and French foreign ministries issued a statement calling for restraint on “all sides”—a wrongly balanced appeal given that Russian actions provoked the crisis.  Merkel corrected this on April 8, when she spoke with Putin and “demanded that this [Russian] build-up be unwound in order to de-escalate the situation.” Macron has yet to speak in such clear terms.

Second, Zelensky should strengthen Macron’s understanding of the conflict and Ukraine’s position.  The Germans and French have for six years sought to broker a settlement between the Ukrainians and Russians in the Normandy format, with Merkel playing the lead role.  Later this year, when she steps down, the leadership of that process may well pass from Berlin to Paris.

Ukrainians often express frustration with the Normandy format and the Minsk II agreement that it produced in February 2015.  The terms of the agreement were never fully implemented, and thousands of Ukrainians have since died.  Berlin and Paris have not found the key to getting Russian and Russian proxy forces to leave Donbas, to say nothing of occupied Crimea.  (In fairness, it is not clear that anyone could have.)

However, the Normandy process has kept the two large continental European powers engaged in trying to resolve the conflict. That is to Kyiv’s advantage. The Minsk II agreement has provided the basis for sustaining European Union sanctions on Russia, sanctions that have proven far more resilient than many would have predicted when EU member states first approved them in 2014.

Merkel and German diplomats deserve credit for maintaining EU unity on sanctions, despite calls from some member states to move back toward business as usual with Moscow.  She has taken a greater interest in the Russia-Ukraine conflict than Macron or his predecessor.  That reflects in part her background, having been raised in the German Democratic Republic, her understanding of Russia, and her command of Russian.

But Merkel steps down this fall after 16 years as chancellor. While the German election is still more than five months off, most predictions suggest one of two coalitions will result: a combination of the Christian Democratic Union/Christian Socialist Union and Greens Party, or a grouping of the Greens, the Social Democratic Party, and Free Democratic Party.

In the first combination, the likely candidates for chancellor are Armin Laschet and Markus Soeder.  Both come from what was West Germany.  Neither has real experience with or appears to have shown particular interest in the Russia-Ukraine conflict.  Either might question the investment that Merkel put into the Normandy discussions, given that they have not succeeded and offer little pay-off in terms of German domestic politics.

In the second combination, the chancellor likely would come from the Greens.  That could bode well for Kyiv, as the Greens are skeptical about Russia, criticize Moscow’s human rights record, and oppose the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline.  However, the Greens have been out of government since 2005, and they might need time to get up to speed.

If the new German chancellor is uninterested in or needs time to engage in a meaningful manner, leadership within the Normandy format will move to Paris, something the Kremlin likely would welcome.  Macron has taken a less harsh tone on Russian misbehavior.  He has sought to regenerate links with Moscow.  For example, before the 2019 G7 summit in France, he hosted Putin for a bilateral meeting, seemingly seeking to make Paris a bridge between Moscow and the rest of the G7.

A pro-Russian tilt, even a small one, in the duo heading up the Normandy format process is hardly in Kyiv’s interest.  Zelensky needs to make his strongest possible case to Macron as regards the realities of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, for continuing to steward the Normandy format with Merkel’s steadiness, and for not succumbing to Putin’s blandishments, which would come at Ukraine’s expense.

Originally for Kyiv Post

BERLIN — Over the past week, Russia has reinforced its military presence on the Crimean peninsula, moved military units close to the Russia-Ukraine border and announced military “readiness checks.” Most likely, this is just a ploy to unnerve the government in Kyiv and test the West’s reaction. 

But it could be something worse. If the Kremlin is weighing the costs and benefits of a military assault on Ukraine, Europe and the United States should ensure that Moscow does not miscalculate because it underestimates the costs. 

Read the rest at Politico

In a December 2020 New York Times interview, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky welcomed Joe Biden’s election as U.S. president. Zelensky observed that Biden “knows Ukraine better than the previous president” and “will really help strengthen relations, help settle the war in Donbas, and end the occupation of our territory.”[1]

While Zelensky’s comments may prove overly optimistic, there is little reason to doubt that the Biden presidency will be good for Ukraine. The incoming president knows the country, and he understands both the value of a stable and successful Ukraine for U.S. interests in Europe and the challenges posed to Ukraine and the West by Russia. That might—might, not will, but might—help break the logjam on the stalemated Donbas conflict, which Zelensky of course would welcome. Perhaps less welcome to the Ukrainian president may be Biden’s readiness to play hardball to press Kyiv to take needed but politically difficult reform and anti-corruption steps. Ukraine’s success as a liberal democracy depends not just on ending its conflict with Russia but also on combating corruption and advancing still necessary economic reforms.

U.S.-Ukraine Relations under Trump

In one sense, U.S. policy toward Ukraine during the Trump administration had its strengths. It continued political and military support for Kyiv, including the provision of lethal military assistance that the Obama administration had been unwilling to provide. It maintained and strengthened Ukraine-related sanctions on Russia. And it took further steps to bolster the U.S. and NATO military presence in central European states on Ukraine’s western border.

However, Donald Trump never seemed committed to his administration’s policy. His primary engagement on Ukraine was his bid to extort Kyiv into manufacturing derogatory information on his Democratic opponent, a bid that led to his impeachment.[2] Beyond that, Trump showed no interest in the country and consistently refused to criticize Vladimir Putin, who has inflicted more than six years of low-intensity war on Ukraine.

The Biden presidency will end this dichotomy in Washington’s approach to Kyiv. The president and his administration will align on policy. That new predictability will mean that Ukrainian officials no longer have to worry about late night presidential tweets or the subjugation of U.S. policy interests to the president’s personal political vendettas.

Two Challenges Confronting Ukraine

As Biden takes office, two principal challenges confront Ukraine. The conflict with Russia poses the first.[3] In March 2014, in the aftermath of the Maidan Revolution, Russian military forces seized Crimea. Weeks later, Russian security forces instigated a conflict in Donbas, masked poorly as a “separatist” uprising. The Kremlin provided leadership, funding, heavy weapons, ammunition, other supplies and, when necessary, regular units of the Russian army. Now in its seventh year, that conflict has claimed the lives of some 13,000 people.

While Moscow illegally annexed Crimea, it has not moved to annex Donbas. It appears instead to want to use a simmering conflict in that eastern Ukrainian region as a means to put pressure on, destabilize and disorient the government in Kyiv, with the goal of making it harder for the government to build a successful Ukrainian state and draw closer to Europe. (Moscow has interfered elsewhere in the post-Soviet space to try to maintain a Russian sphere of influence.)

Without the Kremlin’s cooperation, Kyiv on its own cannot resolve the conflict in Donbas, and Crimea poses an even harder question. However, meeting the second of the challenges facing Ukraine—implementation of reforms and anti-corruption measures needed to build a fair, robust and growing economy—lies largely within Kyiv’s purview. Unfortunately, after a good start by Zelensky and his first government, reforms have stagnated, oligarchs retain undue political and economic influence (including within Zelensky’s Servant of the People party), and the judicial branch remains wholly unreconstructed.[4] Among other things, this depresses much-needed investment in the country.

Progress Toward a Resolution in Donbas?

The Biden presidency might well play a more active role in the moribund negotiating process regarding Donbas. As co-chairs of the “Normandy process,” German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President Emmanuel Macron have had little success of late in implementation of the 2015 Minsk agreement, which laid out a path to a settlement and restoration of full Ukrainian sovereignty over Donbas.[5] Unfortunately, it appears that the Kremlin calculates that the benefits of keeping Kyiv distracted currently outweigh the costs, including of Western sanctions.

Zelensky believes that a more active U.S. role could change that calculation and inject momentum into the process. At a minimum, the Biden presidency should appoint a special envoy to coordinate with the Germans and French, and, more broadly, with the European Union, Britain, Canada and others on Western support for Ukraine and sanctions against Russia. That position has gone unfilled since September 2019.

Whether Biden, who will face many demands on his time, will choose to engage personally is a different question. He knows Ukraine, having traveled there six times when he served as vice president. And, unlike Trump, who sought quick victories, Biden understands that solving a question like Donbas would require an investment of his time over a sustained period. It would make sense if it became clear that his engagement would shake up things in a way that would increase the prospects of a settlement and return of Donbas to Ukrainian sovereignty.

At first glance, the Kremlin might not welcome that kind of U.S. involvement, but there are good arguments for it. First of all, the United States is Ukraine’s strongest Western supporter, and Washington’s voice carries considerable weight in Kyiv. Second, Russia’s current conflict against Ukraine is not just about Donbas; it is also about Ukraine’s place in Europe, that is, where the country fits between Russia and institutions such as the European Union and NATO.[6] Addressing that question will require diplomatic finesse. Given the trans-Atlantic relationship, which will be revived under Biden, it is difficult to see such a geopolitical discussion taking place without American participation.

As for Crimea, Ukraine cannot at present muster the political, diplomatic, economic and military leverage to effect the peninsula’s return. Still, the U.S. government knows how to do non-recognition policy.[7] It did so for five decades with regard to the Baltic states’ incorporation into the Soviet Union. The Biden presidency will remain supportive of Kyiv’s claim to Crimea and not recognize its annexation by Russia—and the White House will express this view.

Domestic Reform

After an encouraging start on reform, Zelensky wavered in 2020. He has to do more, and Biden can be helpful, though in a manner the Ukrainian president may not appreciate. A big part of the problem is that Zelensky himself seems to have lost his way. Ruslan Ryaboshapka, his reformist first prosecutor general, observed that “Instead of fighting oligarchs, [Zelensky] chose to peacefully coexist with them.”[8] Biden could well prove the kind of friend that Ukraine needs now: supportive but direct with Zelensky on what must be done, and ready to push him to take politically hard measures that he might prefer to avoid.

Biden has already shown that he can do this. As vice president in the Obama administration, he had the lead on U.S. engagement with Ukraine. When necessary, he applied “tough love,” famously withholding a one-billion-dollar loan guarantee until then-President Petro Poroshenko fired a prosecutor general who was viewed widely, inside and outside of Ukraine, as corrupt.[9]

A dose of such tough love now seems necessary with Kyiv. One question concerns access to low interest credits under Ukraine’s stand-by agreement with the International Monetary Fund.[10] The IMF conditions disbursements of those credits on how Ukraine implements reform commitments that it made to secure the agreement. The Biden administration should, and almost certainly will, back the IMF in insisting that Ukraine needs to deliver on its commitments in order to secure additional disbursements.

Likewise, the Biden administration should make more bilateral U.S. assistance conditional on Ukraine tackling particular reforms. In doing so, it should consult and coordinate closely with the European Union, which has greater assistance resources available. Introducing a higher degree of conditionality to Western assistance programs could usefully ratchet up the pressure on the leadership in Kyiv to take reform steps that are in the country’s broader interest but opposed by key oligarchs or political groups who stand to lose from such reforms.

Priority should go to encouraging reform of the judicial branch, including the Constitutional Court, which has a core of judges who appear beholden to special interests. The high court reversed earlier laws requiring members of parliament and government officials to disclose their assets and could threaten other reforms.[11]

At home, the Biden administration can assist Ukraine by implementing a ban on anonymous shell companies by requiring disclosure of who actually forms companies in the United States as contained in the Corporate Transparency Act, part of the National Defense Authorization Act.[12] This will make it more difficult for corrupt Ukrainians to shelter ill-gotten gains in U.S. assets.

The Biden presidency is good news for Ukraine and those who wish to see it develop into a modern European state. It will mean more high-level but hard-nosed U.S. support. That could lead to greater progress on reform within the country. And, with some imaginative diplomacy and luck, it might even help break the logjam with Russia over resolving the fate of Donbas.

[1] Kramer, Andrew E. “With Trump Fading, Ukraine's President Looks to a Reset With the U.S.” The New York Times. The New York Times Company, December 19, 2020. https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/19/world/europe/trump-zelensky-biden-ukr....

[2] Nichols, Tom. “Trump Is Being Impeached over an Extortion Scheme, Not a 'Policy Dispute'.” USA Today. Gannett Satellite Information Network, January 30, 2020. https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2020/01/30/trump-impeachment-blac....

[3] Masters, Jonathan. “Ukraine: Conflict at the Crossroads of Europe and Russia.” Council on Foreign Relations. Council on Foreign Relations, February 5, 2020. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/ukraine-conflict-crossroads-europe-and-....

[4] Iliyas, Boktakoz. “Anti-Corruption Backtracking in Ukraine – Has Ze Reform Moment Passed?” Control Risks. Control Risks Group Holdings Ltd., December 17, 2020. https://www.controlrisks.com/our-thinking/insights/anti-corruption-backt....

[5] “Ukraine Walks a Tightrope to Peace in the East.” International Crisis Group, January 29, 2020. https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/eastern-europe/ukraine/ukraine-walks-tightrope-peace-east.; “Ukraine Ceasefire: New Minsk Agreement Key Points.” BBC News. BBC, February 12, 2015. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-31436513.

[6] Tefft, John F. “ Reflections on Russia, Ukraine and the U.S. in the Post-Soviet World.” American Foreign Service Association, n.d. https://www.afsa.org/reflections-russia-ukraine-and-us-post-soviet-world.

[7] Pompeo, Michael R. “Crimea Is Ukraine.” U.S. Department of State. U.S. Department of State, February 26, 2020. https://www.state.gov/crimea-is-ukraine-3/.

[8] Kranolutska, Daryna, and Volodymyr Verbyany. “Ukraine's Leader Is Being Broken by the System He Vowed to Crush.” Bloomberg.com. Bloomberg, December 16, 2020. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-12-17/ukraine-s-leader-is-b....

[9] Subramanian, Courtney. “Explainer: Biden, Allies Pushed out Ukrainian Prosecutor Because He Didn't Pursue Corruption Cases.” USA Today. Gannett Satellite Information Network, October 3, 2019. https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2019/10/03/what-really-happ....

[10] “IMF Executive Board Approves 18-Month US$5 Billion Stand-By Arrangement for Ukraine.” International Monetary Fund. International Monetary Fund Communications Department, June 9, 2020. https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2020/06/09/pr20239-ukraine-imf-exec....

[11] “Ukraine's Constitutional Court Attacks Anti-Corruption Laws.” The Economist. The Economist Newspaper, November 14, 2020. https://www.economist.com/europe/2020/11/14/ukraines-constitutional-cour....

[12] Pearl, Morris. “Commentary: Congress Just Passed the Most Important Anti-Corruption Reform in Decades, but Hardly Anyone Knows about It.” Fortune. Fortune Media IP, December 26, 2020. https://fortune.com/2020/12/26/ndaa-2021-shell-companies-corporate-trans....

Originally for Stanford International Policy Review

The New Europe Center, a Ukraine-based think tank, asked six American experts to comment on the implications of the U.S. presidential election for Ukraine.  The following is Steven Pifer's contribution.

For Americans, the November 3 presidential election will be the most significant vote in many decades.  The election also will have consequences for Ukraine:  Whether Donald Trump or Joe Biden sits in the White House at the end of the day on January 20, 2021 will matter greatly for U.S. policy toward Ukraine and Europe.

Since Ukraine regained its independence in 1991, the United States has proven a strong and supportive partner.  Presidents Clinton, Bush and Obama each saw a stable, independent, democratic Ukrainian state with a robust market economy as in the U.S. interest, including in contributing to a more stable and secure Europe.  Washington thus has provided substantial political, economic and—particularly since 2014—military support to Kyiv.  It has sanctioned Russia for its aggression in Crimea and Donbas and sought to bolster NATO in the face of a growing Kremlin challenge to Western security.

The Trump administration has largely continued these policies.  It has provided Kyiv reform and military aid, including lethal military assistance.  It has applied additional sanctions on Russia, albeit under pressure from Congress.  And it has taken steps to strengthen the U.S. military presence in NATO, at least until recently.

However, it has never been clear that Mr. Trump himself supports these policies.  His principal engagement on Ukraine was his attempted extortion of Kyiv to advance his personal political prospects, an effort that led to his impeachment.  While his administration has taken a tough line on Russia, Mr. Trump seems incapable of criticizing Vladimir Putin or Russian misdeeds.  He apparently thinks that Ukraine, not Russia, interfered in the 2016 U.S. presidential election, ignoring the conclusions of the U.S. intelligence community, the Mueller investigation and the Republican-led Senate Intelligence Committee.

Mr. Trump’s disdain for NATO has long been clear, going back to the 1980s.  In June, he decided to withdraw 10,000 U.S. troops from Germany, apparently out of pique at Chancellor Merkel’s refusal to attend a G7 summit at Camp David.  Senior Pentagon officials scrambled for weeks to offer military justifications for the drawdown, but those that they provided did not survive serious scrutiny.

If Mr. Trump is re-elected, he will not have to worry about facing the voters in another election campaign.  He will cement his control of the Republican Party, leaving Republicans in the Senate and House of Representatives less able to block his bad instincts.  What accommodations would he make with Mr. Putin?  Would he be inclined, as he suggested in 2016, to recognize Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea and lift economic sanctions?   Would he withdraw the United States from NATO, as many former U.S. officials fear?  The Alliance’s collapse would be a huge gift to Mr. Putin and leave Ukraine in a precarious geopolitical position.

It will be different if Mr. Biden is elected (full transparency:  the author fervently hopes for this).  The United States would have a president who understands the U.S. interest in a successful Ukraine and who knows the country well from his time as vice president.  He would be the kind of friend that Ukraine needs, supportive but also ready to press the Ukrainian leadership to take necessary reform steps.  He recognizes the security challenge that Russia presents to Ukraine and the West, and he realizes the importance of a strong trans-Atlantic relationship with a robust NATO at its core.  And Mr. Biden might prove a president who could bind some of the differences that so badly divide Americans today.  An America more unified at home would be a stronger international actor.

Whether Mr. Trump or Mr. Biden wins the elections will mean very different things for U.S. policies affecting Ukraine.  That said, the American electorate will decide the next president largely on domestic issues, such as the Trump administration’s handling of COVID19 and the economy.  Ukraine has no role to play in this, and Ukrainian officials should continue to do all that they can to avoid their country becoming a political football in the U.S. campaign.

* * * * *

Steven Pifer is a William Perry Research Fellow at Stanford University’s Center for International Security and Cooperation and a former U.S. ambassador to Ukraine.

Since regaining its independence in the aftermath of the Soviet Union’s collapse nearly 30 years ago, Ukraine has sought to build links with the West. This includes ties with institutions such as NATO, with which Ukraine has established a distinctive partnership. Kyiv has been keen on deepening those ties. Its interest in becoming a NATO member has continued to grow since 2014, as it views NATO as a means to protect Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial integrity from its aggressive neighbor, Russia.

Although NATO-Ukraine cooperation has intensified, and the Alliance maintains its “open door” policy, NATO members appear reluctant to put Ukraine on a membership track. Despite the fact that Russia continues a low-intensity conflict against Ukraine—and occupies Ukrainian territory—Kyiv can expand its practical cooperation with NATO. However, in the near term, Kyiv will have to keep its expectations about membership modest.

Read the rest at Turkish Policy Quarterly

Vital Interests: Steven, thanks for talking to us about Ukraine in the Vital Interests Forum . As a former Foreign Service officer you have expertise in this region and served as its Ambassador from 1998 to 2000 - a time when Ukraine was emerging as an independent nation. For our readers who aren't necessarily knowledgeable about Ukrainian history and geopolitics, can you provide some background?

Steven Pifer: Sure. I'd say the starting point actually goes back about 1,000 years. With Ukraine and Russia you have two countries whose history, culture, language, and religion are really intertwined. They both go back to the 10th Century, they both claim Kievan Rus’ as their founding state. Really,  from 1654 until 1991, with the exception of a couple of very chaotic years after the end of World War I, Ukraine was part of the Russian empire.

When the Soviet Union broke up in 1991, the part that the Russians missed most was Ukraine. Russians referred to Ukrainians as “little Russians,” which  was never very popular with Ukrainians, but many in Russia saw the two as a single country.

I remember a conversation I had with a Russian deputy foreign minister, probably in 1994 or 1995. This was a pretty modern guy. He understood things had changed, but said to me, "Up here in my head, I understand and I acknowledge that Ukraine is an independent country. Here in my heart, it's going to take a long time." I think that reflects the attitude of a lot of Russians, most importantly Vladimir Putin.

The last time Mr. Putin was in Kviv was in July 2013. That was four months before the Maiden Revolution began. He was there to mark the 1025th anniversary of Kievan Rus’ accepting Christianity, which of course, had a huge impact on the Orthodox Church, both in Ukraine and in Russia. He gave a speech in which he said, "We are one people, we Russians and Ukrainians." That was really tone deaf; many Ukrainians heard that as denying their culture, their history, their language. 

Part of this Russian approach is emotional for Mr. Putin and Russians - they didn't want to lose Ukraine. Part is a reflection of what we've seen particularly over the last 10 to 12 years: Russia actively trying to assert a sphere of influence in the post-Soviet space. I don't believe that Vladimir Putin wants to rebuild the Soviet Union, because Russia does not want to subsidize these other countries.

What Mr. Putin does want is a sphere of influence, or as Dmitry Medvedev, who was President back in 2008, called it, "A sphere of privileged interests in the post-Soviet space.” That means countries such as Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova and others in Central Asia should defer to Moscow on issues that Moscow considers key to Russian interests. That certainly means, how close you can get to institutions such as the European Union and NATO.

The tension that you now see between Russia and Ukraine is Russia trying to assert that sphere of influence and trying to pull Ukraine back into its orbit, whereas it's clear since the Maidan Revolution that the majority of Ukrainians see their future as a fully integrated European state.

Read the rest of the interview at Fordham's Vital Interests Forum

Volodymyr Zelensky swept to victory in Ukraine’s spring 2019 presidential election because he promised renewed reform and a real fight against corruption.

Today, the reality looks quite different.

Zelensky has fired a reformist prime minister and cabinet, replaced a prosecutor general who had begun weeding out bad eggs among prosecutors, and triggered the resignation of a National Bank of Ukraine head who had won plaudits for steering an independent course. Speculation runs rampant in Kyiv that oligarchs are reasserting control.

Ukrainians can be forgiven for thinking they have seen this movie before. They have. Ukraine’s past 30 years are filled with episodes of rising hopes turning to disappointment.  Zelensky should ask himself whether Ukraine and he personally can afford another one.

After winning the presidential election in July 1994, Leonid Kuchma appointed an economic team with strong reform credentials.  That fall, he laid out a program to accelerate the transition to a market economy, liberalize prices, cut the tax rate, and slash the government’s budget deficit.  In 1995, however, he reversed course. Lacking the critical mass of reforms that energized growth in Ukraine’s western neighbors, Ukraine’s economy weakly hobbled along.

Following his reelection in November 1999, Kuchma turned to Victor Yushchenko, a recognized reformer, to serve as prime minister.  I recall hosting a Christmas holiday party in Kyiv the evening that the Verkhovna Rada (parliament), Ukraine’s parliament, confirmed Yushchenko; my Ukrainian guests were practically giddy with optimism.  Unfortunately, those hopes turned to naught. By June 2000, the presidential administration and Yushchenko’s cabinet of ministers were at war with one another instead of working together for change. Less than a year later, the Rada voted Yushchenko out.

Yushchenko later had another turn, becoming president in January 2005 following the Orange Revolution.  Many hoped he would finally get Ukraine on track to becoming a modern European state. He appointed as his prime minister Yuliya Tymoshenko, the most effective minister in his cabinet in 2000. Unfortunately, the two never got in sync on a reform program, and new infighting broke out between the presidential administration and cabinet of ministers.  Things did not improve with new prime ministers or with Tymoshenko’s return to the job. Ukrainians became so dissatisfied with Yushchenko’s presidency that, in the January 2010 presidential election, he placed fifth, drawing a mere 5.45 percent of the vote.

In May 2014, in the aftermath of the Maidan Revolution, Petro Poroshenko won the presidential election on the first ballot, something that had not happened since 1991. He and his first prime minister, Arseniy Yatsenyuk, adopted early reforms. They cleaned up the government’s finances, introduced critical price reform at Naftogaz, put the banking sector on a solid footing, and secured a large International Monetary Fund program.  But the pace of reform slowed in early 2016 after Poroshenko fired Yatsenyuk and other pro-reform ministers. By the summer, visitors to Kyiv could hear Ukrainians voice frustration over the failure—more than two years after the Maidan—to take real steps to reduce corruption and curb the outsized political and economic influence of the oligarchs.

Poroshenko and his political team apparently missed that rising disaffection. Campaigning on an anti-corruption message, Zelensky routed Poroshenko in the April 2019 presidential run-off, winning 73.2 percent of the vote.

This latest episode of hope-to-disappointment with Zelensky comes at a difficult time for Ukraine.  Mired in a war with Russia, the Ukrainian president cannot bring peace to Donbas without Vladimir Putin’s help, but the Kremlin appears intent on continuing the conflict.

Reform and the struggle against corruption, however, are fights that Zelensky can control.  If he turns away from them, he risks losing support in the West, particularly in Europe, where calls for a return to business as usual with Moscow are growing in EU member states. Zelensky should worry that, after 30 years of failure to rein in corruption and the oligarchs, Europeans may well begin to wonder whether Ukraine’s political elite is incapable of change.  Few things would damage Ukraine more than if its friends in the West begin to question whether the country is worth the trouble—and simply give up.

If Zelensky does not worry about his country’s future, perhaps he should worry about his political prospects.  Just thirteen months after assuming office, his approval rating plummeted to 38 percent in June, a far cry from the 71 percent he enjoyed last September.  His apparent reversal on corruption and long-needed economic reforms undoubtedly contributed to that.

Zelensky can still turn things around and become the pro-reform, anti-corruption champion that he promised Ukrainian voters.  Kyiv is full of reformers who can help him. However, if he does not change course, he most likely will follow in the footsteps of Yushchenko and Poroshenko — one-term presidents turned out by an electorate badly disillusioned with their failed promises.

Originally for Kyiv Post

President Volodymyr Zelensky and his government in Ukraine face two fundamental challenges: ending the conflict with Russia and implementing domestic reform. Overcoming these challenges appeared hard enough at the start of 2020. COVID-19 is only making that more difficult.

Ukraine finds itself in the seventh year of a war imposed on it by the Kremlin. Russian troops seized Crimea in March 2014, and Russian and Russian proxy forces have sustained a conflict in the eastern Ukrainian region of Donbas, which has claimed some 13,000 lives.

While Moscow has sought to draw Ukraine back into Russia’s orbit, there is little reason to believe that it will succeed. Nothing has done more than Kremlin policy over the past six years to push Ukraine toward the West and away from Russia. Moscow thus has used the Donbas conflict to destabilise Kyiv—to make it more difficult for Ukraine to succeed and pursue its goal of integrating with Europe.

As COVID-19 hit both Ukraine and Russia in March, some (this author included) hoped it might change some of the calculations in the Kremlin. Faced with a pandemic, falling prices for its energy exports, and an economy tumbling into recession, might Moscow rethink its policy in Donbas? A settlement would ease Russia’s political isolation and lead to a lifting of Western sanctions, which some economists estimate have cut Russian gross domestic product by 1.0-1.5% per year over the past six years.

As of June, however, Moscow’s policy appears unchanged. Russian and Russian proxy forces continue low-intensity fighting in Donbas. The appointment of a new Kremlin point-person on Ukraine did not visibly affect policy, which is determined by Vladimir Putin.

German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President Emmanuel Macron, both grappling with COVID-19 and its economic consequences, have not followed up on the December ‘Normandy format’ summit with Zelensky and Putin. As the pandemic consumes the leaders’ attention, they and others – such as senior U.S. officials – show little bandwidth or readiness to press to change the cost-benefit calculation in the Kremlin and persuade Moscow to take up a different course that might bring peace in Donbas.

Therefore there is little reason to expect a diplomatic breakthrough, a fact that Zelensky and his team increasingly seem to recognise. The Ukrainian president has raised the idea of a “Plan B” if no progress is made by the end of the year. One suggested variant for a “Plan B” would entail virtually walling off the occupied part of Donbas and pushing the entire economic and social burden on to Russia.

The sad reality is the likely near-term scenario for Donbas is continuing simmering conflict. (As for Crimea, while not a hot conflict, it will burden Ukrainian-Russian and West-Russian relations for years if not decades to come.)

COVID-19 has made matters more complex, both for Zelensky politically on the domestic front as well as sinking the economy into recession. Kyiv recognised the need for an IMF stand-by program and access to low-interest credits. The Rada (parliament) enacted legislation to lift the moratorium on the sale of agricultural land and safeguard nationalised banks from efforts by former owners to regain control—both key conditions for an IMF stand-by agreement worth up to $5 bn. On June 9, the IMF executive board approved the agreement.

While the long-needed reforms on agricultural land and banking were most welcome, it was not clear whether their adoption reflected a genuine commitment to dramatic reform or, as with past Ukrainian leaders, the need to secure IMF credits. Both Ukrainians and the country’s friends in the West are looking for signs Zelensky will carry out the transformational agenda that carried him to an electoral landslide in April 2019, particularly with respect to curbing corruption.

Zelensky attaches priority to ending the conflict and restoring Ukrainian sovereignty in Donbas. But Kyiv cannot do that by itself. Moscow gets a vote, and the vote thus far favours keeping the conflict simmering. Whether Ukraine’s Western partners can mobilise additional pressure to change the Kremlin’s cost-benefit calculation at this point appears doubtful, at least in the near term.

If stalemated by Russia on Donbas, Zelensky can still take action on anti-corruption measures and other reforms to position the Ukrainian economy for strong growth as the pandemic eases. These are measures that he and his government control. To do so would deliver on the promises made to Ukrainian voters last year and solidify his reform credentials with his Western partners. Moreover, a more robust economy would bolster Zelensky’s position vis-à-vis the Kremlin, which hopes that domestic weakness will force him to compromise key Ukrainian principles and settle the Donbas conflict on Moscow’s terms.

Originally for Europe's World