The majority of Russia's current strategic nuclear force will become obsolete shortly after the turn of the century. Hence, Russian strategic force modernization is essential if Russia is to remain a nuclear power on a par with the United States. Numerous uncertainties, especially financial uncertainties, prevent accurate estimates of Russia's future strategic force structure. Nevertheless, under the START I Treaty, Russia can probably maintain a force with slightly more than 4,000 strategic nuclear warheads over the next two decades-about half the number of the United States. Under START II, Russia is likely to maintain a strategic force of between 1,800 and 2,500 warheads, compared to 3,500 warheads for the United States. Therefore, Russia's main interest in ratifying the START II Treaty would be to pursue a START III Treaty that limits both sides to between 2,000 and 2,500 strategic nuclear warheads. This is the least expensive way to retain rough parity with the United States. Several reasons have been educed for why Russia should not ratify the START II Treaty, namely, because the Treaty allows a U.S. advantage in reconstitution capability and prompt hard-target-kill capability. However, these advantages are neither so great nor so consequential that Russia should reject the START II Treaty for these reasons alone. If Russia ratifies the START II Treaty, and presumably a follow-on START III Treaty, Russia's future strategic nuclear force will appear a lot different than its Soviet predecessor due to the reduced emphasis on land-based ICBMs. Nevertheless, the Russian force should remain a highly survivable, stable force-assuming Russian leaders allocate sufficient resources to ensure that their ballistic missile submarines, mobile ICBMs, and bombers can survive all plausible counterforce threats.

From the preface:

"Events in recent years have caused heightened concern about the security of weapons-usable nuclear material. The possibility of illicit trafficking in, or seizure of, such material, leading to nuclear terrorism, is a worry for all states and their citizens. And given the relatively small quantities required, material obtained in one part of the world could be made into a weapon in another and threaten lives in a third. It is truly a global problem.

Since the beginning of the nuclear era, the physical protection of fissile material has been a responsibility of the individual states possessing the material. These states have different organizational approaches for providing physical protection; and while cognizant of recommended general standards, they tend to follow their own practices, shaped by custom, costs, and threat perception. Moreover, the existence of military as well as civil programs in some states adds another dimension
to the physical protection issue.

Because physical protection is a sovereign matter and not part of an international regime (except for transit of civil material across borders), there has been less attention in much of the world community to the issues of physical protection than to the other elements of nuclear safeguards and controls. (An important exception to this situation is the effort being made to assist the states of the former Soviet Union in the disposition of their weapons-usable nuclear materials.) The lack of a general dialog about a problem of growing concern motivated us to hold a three-day workshop at Stanford University to develop a better understanding of some of the important underlying questions and issues, and to undertake a comparative examination of states' approaches to physical protection. We were pleased to have knowledgeable participants from a number of the countries and regions where physical protection of fissile materials is, or will become, a day-to-day matter.

The results of the workshop are reported in these Proceedings. It is our hope that this work will stimulate further analysis and discussion, and lead to greater interest in international standards, cooperation, and supporting programs.

James E. Goodby
1996-1997 Payne Distinguished Lecturer
Stanford University

Ronald F. Lehman II
Director of the Center for Global Security Research
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory

William C. Potter
Director, Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Monterey Institute of International Studies"

Proceedings of a conference, "Preventing Deadly Conflict: Strategies and Institutions," held in Moscow Aug. 14-16, 1996," that was a joint undertaking of the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, the Institute of Universal History of the Russian Academy of Sciences and the Center for International Security and Arms Control at Stanford University.

Dr. Lapidus, who co-edited the report, wrote the conclusion, "Lessons from the Russian Experience."

This report on non-binding, non-treaty approaches to arms control draws upon research and discussion at the Center for International Security and Arms Control during 1990 and 1991, after the Cold War had ended but before the disintegration of the Soviet Union. It was apparent at the time that the traditional approach to arms control--through detailed treaties resulting from long negotiations--might not be adequate to deal with the new situation in which arms reductions could be made quickly but coordination would still be needed in order to preserve stability. We examined the possibility of using reciprocal unilateral measures (RUMs) in place of treaties as a mechanism for achieving arms control.

A striking example of the approach we were recommending was when Presidents Bush and Gorbachev announced major withdrawals of non-strategic nuclear weapons in September and October 1991 (We describe the Bush-Gorbachev RUMs in this paper.) The strategic picture changed dramatically soon after those measures were announced. The Soviet Union was replaced by the Russian Federation and 14 other newly independent states. For several years, the treaty method worked well in U.S.-Russian arms control, alongside other forms of cooperation such as the Nunn-Lugar program. We put aside our work on RUMs.

Although we are far from a resumption of the Cold War, U.S.-Russian relations are no longer as cooperative as they were in the early 1990s. Besides, the treaty method has slowed almost to a standstill. We have therefore returned to the draft final report of 1991 and drawn from it the history we thought is relevant to the current problem of reducing the strategic nuclear threat Russia and the United States pose to each other--and to the rest of the world.

The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists has grown up along with world politics and has, since 1945, offered a special perspective on issues of peace, security, and global well-being. Now its unique blend of international commentary on the arms race, accessible articles on scientific dimensions of politics, and acute political journalism is presented here in a way particularly suited to students of international relations and security studies. Widely known for his creative work in international affairs education, George A. Lopez joins with the former managing editor of the Bulletin, Nancy J. Myers, to select recent articles best illustrating a wide range of issues on peace and security. The volume editors shape and supplement these articles specifically for classroom use. Each chapter includes several thematically linked articles supplemented with maps, data charts, photos, editorial cartoons, and discussion questions. Completing the package of pedagogical features for the volume is a master chart of key terms and concepts in international relations showing their connection to the articles. This new text-reader zeroes in on the core of any international relations course and brings the controversies alive with informed, international voices and new views on age-old questions about the arms race, peace, security, and the prospects for a post-nuclear world politics.

Features articles from the Bulletin of the Atomic Sientists, a unique teaching resource, selected and edited especially for students of international studies. Provides chapter introductions and thematic overviews by leading IR scholar and teacher linking these articles to core course content. Includes maps, figures, tables, high impact photos, and clever, specially-commissioned editorial cartoons. Presents discussion questions framed to show how text-reader content illuminates IR theory and current events. Offers a master chart of key IR terms and concepts as they appear within the reader. Incorporates a wide diversity of international authors, topics, and perspectives. Combines historical perspective with current events. Unlike other readers, Peace and Security is thematicaly unified and cohesive. prospects for a post-nuclear world politics.

Georgia--The Search for State Security

David Darchiashvili's working paper traces the attempts of the modern Georgian state to deal with issues of national security since independence. Darchiashvili outlines the nature of contemporary national security dilemmas for post-Soviet Georgia. The paper examines Georgia's present security threats, as well as its current relationships with Russia and the other countries of the region. The paper also presents an in-depth discussion of the situation of civil-military relations in Georgia and the impact of these relations on state security. The author analyzes the roots of Georgia's problems in developing a coherent and practical security policy. He proposes that the ad hoc character of current security policy has resulted in passivity in dealing with threats such as ethnic conflicts, including the war in Abkhazia. In his conclusion Darchiashvili makes a recommendation for the elaboration of a consistent national security concept for Georgia. The author proposes that this security concept will need to include a framework for relations between society and the military. According to Darchiashvili, in order to attain this goal Georgia needs to maintain internal stability and to secure support from international institutions.

European Security and Conflict Resolution in the Transcaucasus

Nerses Mkrttchian's working paper examines the issue of security in the Transcaucasus since the fragmentation of Europe's international landscape, and the emergence of a new cooperative European security system that followed the disappearance of the continent's political line of separation. Mkrttchian proceeds to analyze the security issues in the Transcaucasus region within broader European, Eurasian, and post-Soviet contexts. The paper examines the current security structure of Europe, its relationship to Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), and how these new security structures can affect the regional conflicts in the Transcaucasus. Mkrttchian analyzes the prospects for establishing regional cooperation on security issues in the Transcaucasus, and the role of international organizations in this process. The author points to the need for the development of "cross-dimensional" cooperation as a way to resolve conflicts in the region.

There is a growing logjam of arms control treaties waiting for approval in both the Russian State Duma and the U.S. Senate. Without decisive action, this logjam will probably prevent approval by the world's two largest military powers of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START II) of 1993, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty of 1996 (CTBT), amendments to the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, and the protocols of the Treaty of Pelindaba (creating an African nuclear-weapon-free zone (NWFZ)) and the Treaty of Rarotonga (creating a South Pacific NWFZ) before the end of the century. It will also prevent progress towards START III and further bilateral nuclear reductions.