Martha Crenshaw, a senior fellow at CISAC and FSI and one of Stanford's leading experts on terrorism, says the terrorist group known as ISIS poses a danger to the United States if it grows more powerful. But that organization, she adds, may be overreaching in its ruthlessness and religious zealotry. Crenshaw answers questions in this Stanford Report interview with the Stanford News Service.

Meanwhile, the U.S. government has not found a way to deal with the larger Iraq conflict that now involves ISIS, says Crenshaw, who founded and runs the Mapping Militant Organizations project. 

CISAC Co-Director Amy Zegart writes in The American Interest that a strong and rising China, as well as a weak an unstable one, should concern the United States. But perhaps most troubling is the uncertainty about which scenario will eventually play out, and Washington’s strategic orientation toward Europe and the Middle East.

CISAC Co-Director Amy Zegart writes in The American Interest that the United States should be concerned about both a strong and rising China, as well as a weak and unstable one. But perhaps most troubling of all, she writes, is the uncertainty about which scenario will eventually play out – and Washington’s strategic orientation toward Europe and the Middle East.

“Today opinions range between nervous hope that everything will turn out all right to outright fear that things will be worse than we can possibly imagine,” she says. “Part of the fear stems from the fact that that the U.S. and China are both literally and figuratively worlds apart, with vastly different political and cultural histories.”

Regardless of these vast differences and uncertainties in China, Zegart argues, Asia will be the most important strategic region for American national security in the 21^st century.

The United States and Russia should keep working together to stop the spread of nuclear weapons even while disagreeing on issues like Ukraine, Stanford scholars say.

In a recent article in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Professor Siegfried Hecker and researcher Peter Davis advocate continued U.S.-Russia collaboration on nuclear weapon safety and security.

"The Ukraine crisis has exacerbated what had already become a strained nuclear relationship," Hecker said in an interview. "As one of our Russian colleagues told us, nuclear issues are global and accidents or mishaps in one region can affect the entire world."

Hecker is a professor in the Department of Management Science and Engineering and a senior fellow at CISAC and the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies. Over the past 20-plus years, he has worked with Russian scientists to help stop nuclear proliferation. He and Davis returned from a trip this spring to Russia, where they met with nuclear scientists.

"We agreed that we have made a lot of progress working together over the past 20-plus years, but that we are not done," they wrote in the journal essay.

Hecker and Davis described Moscow as a reluctant partner in talks on nuclear proliferation. As for the United States, it actually backed away from cooperation first. A House of Representatives committee recently approved legislation that would put nuclear security cooperation with Russia on hold. And though the White House has opposed this, the Energy Department has issued its own restrictions on scientific interchanges as part of the U.S. sanctions regime against Russia.

But, Hecker said, "Cooperation is needed to deal with some of the lingering nuclear safety and security issues in Russia and the rest of the world, with the threats of nuclear smuggling and nuclear terrorism, and to limit the spread of nuclear weapons."

Washington does not have to choose between the two. It still can pressure Moscow on Ukraine while cooperating on nuclear issues, Hecker and Davis wrote.

They called for further nuclear arms reductions between the two countries, rather than a resumption of the nuclear arms race that took place in the mid-20th century.

Changing relationship

Hecker and Davis acknowledged that the U.S.-Russian relationship overall is changing.

"We realize … that the nature of nuclear cooperation must change to reflect Russia's economic recovery and its political evolution over the past two decades," they wrote.

For example, due to the strained relationship, nuclear proliferation programs must change from U.S.-directed activities to more jointly sponsored collaborations that serve both countries' interests.

As they noted, one huge problem is that Russia still has no inventory or record of all the nuclear materials the Soviet Union produced – or where those materials might be today.

"Moreover, it has shown no interest in trying to discover just how much material is unaccounted for. Our Russian colleagues voice concern that progress on nuclear security in their country will not be sustained once American cooperation is terminated," Hecker and Davis said.

Iran is a flashpoint

America needs Russia to help in its effort to stop Iran from building a nuclear weapon, Hecker and Davis wrote. Russia is a close ally of Iran: "Much progress has been made toward a negotiated settlement of Iran's nuclear program since President Hassan Rouhani was elected in June, 2013. However, little would have been possible without U.S.-Russia cooperation."

In a June 2 interview in the Tehran Times, Hecker said that the only way forward for Iran's nuclear program is transparency and international cooperation. He suggested that the country follow the South Korean model of peaceful nuclear power.

"In my opinion, South Korea will not move in a direction of developing a nuclear weapon option because it simply has too much to lose commercially. That is the place I would like to see Tehran. In other words, it decides that a nuclear program that benefits its people does not include a nuclear weapons option," he told the interviewer.

Hecker said that it is not in Russia's interest to have nuclear weapons in Iran so close to its border.

"Washington, in turn, needs Moscow, especially if it is to develop more effective measures to prevent proliferation as Russia and other nuclear vendors support nuclear power expansion around the globe," Hecker said.

In February, the Iranian government republished an article by Hecker and Abbas Milani, the director of Iranian Studies at Stanford University. The story ran in Farsi on at least one official website, possibly indicating a genuine internal debate in Tehran on the nuclear subject. Hecker and Milani described such a "peaceful path" in another essay on Iranian nuclear power.

Hecker is working with Russian colleagues to write a book about how Russian and American nuclear scientists joined forces at the end of the Cold War to stymie nuclear risks in Russia.

Media Contact

Siegfried Hecker, Freeman Spogli Institute: (650) 725-6468, shecker@stanford.edu

Clifton B. Parker, Stanford News Service: (650) 725-0224, cbparker@stanford.edu

U.S. Army Col. Tracy Roou is a senior military fellow at CISAC this year. She is researching security cooperation with challenging governments and preparing for her next assignment in the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Policy. She recently met with former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld in Washington, D.C., at the headquarters of the Rumsfeld Foundation. They discussed military cooperation as a tool of foreign and defense policy. Here, she shares her thoughts about that meeting and what it meant to her personally as a military officer, as well as to her research.

CISAC has given me the platform to learn from two former U.S. Secretaries of Defense, William J. Perry and Donald Rumsfeld. They happen to be the first and the last secretaries of defense to visit Uzbekistan, where I recently served as defense attaché. Their deep insight into the complicated world of policymaking and the military’s ability to provide capabilities and build relationships as a tool of foreign policy in the former Soviet Union, has added greatly to my understanding of strategic thinking in that part of the world.

The chance to meet with Rumsfeld to discuss military cooperation with challenging governments was an incredible opportunity for my research, but also a true honor and a highlight of my Army career. I was well aware of his reputation as a tough interview. The meeting started with his questions about me, my career and family, and my year at CISAC as a U.S. Army War College Fellow. After I described the depth of expertise at CISAC and Stanford about strategic thinking and military policy, he jokingly asked why I needed to meet with him.

It was clear that Secretary Rumsfeld still keeps an intense battle rhythm. But he was gracious, generous with his time and open to all of my questions. A large bust of Winston Churchill sits in the corner of his conference room, where we met for an hour.

Our session covered many areas, but mostly focused on the former Soviet Union and U.S. military cooperation in that region. In the context of foreign policy with challenging governments, Rumsfeld said: “Linking U.S. diplomacy and the military – even when powers will try to pull them apart – is very important.”

Rumsfeld has been back in the news, with a new documentary about his work and leadership in public service, especially overseeing the Iraq War. Though some are saying he was evasive and impenetrable in the documentary, “The Unknown Known,” I found him to be open and engaging when discussing U.S. foreign policy in the former Soviet States and Russia, which is the focus of my research.

Few remember that as a young U.S. congressman, Rumsfeld was a co-sponsor of the Freedom of Information Act, a landmark tool granting American citizens and reporters the ability to push for government transparency. With his memoir, “Known and Unknown,” his declassified papers give insight on many tough policy decisions with challenges to the to the government, many of which can be found on his website, The Rumsfeld’s Papers.

I learned that the Rumsfeld Foundation helps young leaders in government, business and academia in Central Asia and the Caucuses better understand the concepts of a market economy, a civilian-led military and a free and open government. The foundation helps microfinance organizations working with the world’s poorest people and it grants fellowships to graduate students interested in public service.

“I had spent a lot of time in Central Asian Republics and felt that they did not have a good connection among themselves, nor did they have much connection or awareness of the Unites States,” Rumsfeld says in a video on his foundation website. “So we’ve established a fellowship program to bring over 10 or 12 Central Asian fellows, mid-career people so that they’ll develop relationships and go away with a better understanding of what the United States of America is all about and the kind of opportunities that free systems offer.”

Following our meeting, I was given a tour of foundation offices, which are filled with photographs and presidential letters of various periods in his life in public service, starting as a U.S. Navy pilot. As I left, I noted the two cabinet chairs from his two terms as secretary of defense sitting at the entryway.

I came away from my meeting with Rumsfeld with the realization that our 13^th and 21^st secretary of defense is as nuanced and complex as many of the policy and security issues he tackled in his extraordinary career. At the end of our meeting, he agreed to a photograph together, next to the Churchill bust, as well as another meeting.

In his book, “Rumsfeld’s Rules,” he refers to a quote by Churchill: “The inherent vice of capitalism is the unequal sharing of blessings; the inherent virtue of socialism is the equal sharing of miseries.” 

In a rare and exclusive interview in the Tehran Times, CISAC and FSI Senior Fellow Siegfried Hecker tells Iranian journalist Kourosh Ziabari that the only way forward for the country’s nuclear program is transparency and international cooperation.

The interview comes during an unprecedented period of rapprochement between Washington and Tehran. Several days after his inauguration last August, President Hassan Rouhani called for the resumption of negotiations with the so-called P5+1, a group of six world powers using diplomatic efforts to monitor Iran’s energy program.

In September, President Barack Obama called Rouhani, marking the highest-level contact between the United States and Iran since 1979 hostage crisis.

The P5+1 and Iran are drafting a comprehensive nuclear agreement to ensure that Tehran is not building a nuclear bomb, but trying to expand its nuclear energy program. The International Atomic Energy Agency has given Iran until Aug. 25 to provide more details about the possible military dimensions of its nuclear program.

In the interview, Ziabari did not pull any punches with Hecker.

“You’ve argued that Iran doesn’t possess sufficient uranium reserves like Japan, and its uranium enrichment program is not cost-effective,” Ziabari asks. “However, you know that Iran’s nuclear program was first launched in 1950s as part of the U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower’s Atoms for Peace program. At that time, the United States thought that it’s beneficial to help Iran with its nuclear energy program, because Iran was an ally, but now, Iran is a foe, and does not need nuclear power anymore. Is it really like that?”

You can read Hecker's response and the entire the Q&A in its entirely on Ziabari’s website.

In Feburary, the Iranian government republished an article in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists by Hecker and Abbas Milani, director of Iranian Studies at Stanford University. The story ran in Farsi on at least one official website. That could reflect, the scholars say, a genuine internal debate in Tehran regarding the future of its nuclear program.

In this commentary in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, CISAC's Siegfried Hecker and Peter Davis argue that the United States should continue cooperating with the Russians on nuclear security despite worsening ties over Moscow's actions in Ukraine. The two countries hold the key to preventing the proliferation of nulcear weapons and global nuclear terrorism.

"And, if nuclear power is to provide clean electricity in more places around the world, Russia and the United States must share a common goal of making sure this spread happens safely and without exacerbating proliferation concerns," they write.

Early this month, Hecker answered questions about a recent trip to Russia for a nuclear security conference, in a CISAC story.

In this commentary in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, CISAC's Siegfried Hecker and Peter Davis argue that the United States should continue cooperating with the Russians on nuclear security despite worsening ties over Moscow's actions in Ukraine. They argue it is in the best interest of both countires to prevent the proliferation of nulcear weapons and global nuclear terrorism.

President Barack Obama announced this week that the United States would complete its pullout of troops from Afghanistan by the end of 2016, leaving 9,800 troops by the end of this year and cutting that in half by 2015. A small force will remain to protect the U.S. embassy in Kabul and help with local security. The president said this would free up combat troops for emerging terrorism threats in the Middle East and North Africa and effectively put an end to the longest war in U.S. history.

Ret. U.S. Army Lt. Gen. Karl Eikenberry, who was U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan from 2009-2011, answers a few questions about the way forward. Eikenberry is the William J. Perry Fellow in International Security at CISAC.

Critics say the drawdown is too dramatic and rapid and could seriously diminish the progress NATO and its allies have made in the country. What is your view?

I think the drawdown schedule is militarily sound and responsible. First, the commander on the ground has indicated his support for the timelines. Second, by the end of 2016 – the announced target date for completion of the military drawdown – our armed forces will have operated in Afghanistan for over 15 years. It will be time for the Afghan government, with continued U.S. and international material and security assistance support, to take full responsibility for the defense of its country. In fact, the president's announcement represents the culmination of combined U.S., NATO, and Afghanistan planning that began in 2010.

Third, militant extremists in distant lands often effectively exploit the presence of U.S. armed forces serving in their county to rally support for their cause. At some point, large scale U.S. military deployments can become counterproductive, undermining efforts to develop accountable responsible governance and security forces.     

Are the Afghans ready to take over the security operations in their country?

U.S. and NATO military forces have been complimentary about the performance of the Afghan National Army and Police since they began in 2012 to assume greater responsibility for securing their country. Certainly, the Afghan security forces did well protecting the recent April 5th presidential election. Their major challenges will be ensuring adequate international monetary support (perhaps $3 billion a year for some years to come) and adapting to a tactical environment in which they will not have access to U.S. and NATO firepower, logistics, communications, and intelligence. Combat against the Taliban will be more equal contests.

There are concerns that the Taliban is sitting in the wings, just waiting for the withdrawal of American troops. Are those concerns valid?  

I have heard this argument since I first served in Afghanistan in 2002. I don't buy it. By 2016 we'll be in the 15^th year of a military mission that began in 2001. Will another 15 years be adequate to prove we can "wait them out?" It is time for the Afghans to take charge of their own destiny. Furthermore, the Taliban are not a cohesive movement; there is not a centralized Taliban command "waiting in the wings." Last, the Taliban are not the primary threat to Afghan stability.The greater challenges are Pakistan's policies towards Afghanistan, Afghanistan national political reconciliation, and massive government corruption. 

What is the legacy that the United States leaves behind?

Most Afghans have told me over the years that the greatest U.S. legacy will be democracy and all that has brought. If Afghanistan is able to strengthen its political institutions and stabilize the country in the years after foreign forces return to their homes, I would agree that the introduction of democracy will be what we are remembered for. 

Rod Ewing, chairman of the federal Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board, recently led a delegation of five board members and staff to China to learn about Beijing’s efforts to develop a deep-mined geologic repository for high-level radioactive waste.

During the visit to Beijing, the delegation met with officials at the China Atomic Energy Authority (CAEA) and the Ministry of Environmental Protection (MoEP). They also met with scientist and engineers at four scientific organizations and research institutes: the Chinese National Nuclear Organization (CNNC), Beijing Research Institute for Uranium Geology (BRIUG), the China National Nuclear Engineering Company (CNPE), and the Chinese Institute for Atomic Energy (CIAE).

“We had very complete summary presentations of the Chinese approach to nuclear waste management and the status of their present research and siting program for a geologic repository for high-level nuclear waste,” said Ewing, who is a senior fellow at FSI and CISAC’s Frank Stanton Professor in Nuclear Security.

Ewing was appointed by President Barack Obama in 2012 to serve as the chair of the Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board, which is responsible for the technical review of Department of Energy activities related to transporting, packaging, storing and disposing of spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste.

The delegation had an extended discussion with Xu Dazhe, Ewing’s counterpart as chairman of the CAEA. The visit in Beijing ended with a full-day technical exchange between scientists and engineers from both countries, as well as participants from institutes outside of Beijing and members of the NWTRB

The U.S. delegation visited a museum of uranium mineral, including a specimen of the first uranium ore discovered in Guangxi in 1954. The specimen had been presented to Chairman Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai – marking the beginning of China’s nuclear industry.

The delegation heads to the remote northwestern region of Beishan to see China's proposed site for a nuclear waste repository. Photo Credit: Rod Ewing

The delegation then traveled to Beishan to examine the granite host rock in the remote northwestern Gansu Province, which is a potential site for an underground research laboratory and geologic repository for nuclear waste.

“Both countries can learn from one another, saving time and money for each country,” said Ewing, a professor of Geological and Environmental Sciences in the School of Earth Sciences at Stanford. “Nuclear waste management is an international effort in which cooperation is essential.”

China is pursing an aggressive campaign to expand its nuclear energy capacity and as part of an effort to meet growing energy demands, as well as to reduce air pollution from coal-fired plants. There are some 20 nuclear power reactors in China and another 28 under construction, according to the World Nuclear Association.

China has a policy of reprocessing its nuclear fuel and will be disposing of vitrified, high-level radioactive waste. The U.S. delegation was particularly interested in work on the properties of the vitrified waste in a disposal environment and understanding the Chinese strategy for disposal of HLW in a granitic host rock.

The Chinese are investigating a number of sites in granite in the Beishan region, located along the ancient Silk Road. Once a suitable site is located, the first step would be to establish an underground research laboratory for detailed scientific and engineering studies that will be required for a final geologic repository.

Mary Lou Zoback, a seismologist and consulting professor in the Geophysics Department at Stanford, was one of five board members on the trip. She was impressed that China intends to take five years to build an underground research laboratory and then conduct 20 years of testing before opening a repository.

The United States has been stalled for years in its proposed plan to build a similar deep geological repository for spent nuclear reactor fuel and radioactive waste at Yucca Mountain, adjacent to the Nevada Test Site. Environmentalists and local residents have opposed the project – factors that China routinely ignores.

“I think the most valuable thing in making the visit to China and visiting the site is really to gain an understanding of their program and also their general philosophy toward siting what, in this country, has been an extremely controversial project,” Zoback said. “They chose a remote area and they really haven’t even consulted with any of the surrounding towns – and that’s not what we do here. But I was extremely impressed that they recognized the need for this lab and would allow 20 years for all the scientific investigation that would be carried out to make sure it was safe.”

The Beishan region has five granitic sites that are being investigated as potential host rocks for the underground laboratory and possible repository. Board members discussed the geology and characteristics of the site with Chinese scientists and examined rock core and data that have been generated by their research program.

In addition to detailed investigations of granite, the Chinese also consider clay as a medium for a geologic repository and very deep borehole disposal, reaching proposed depths of up to 3 miles. One of the important issues is the methodology for the comparison of sites within a single type of geology or across different types of geology. The U.S. has a wide variety of geologies that may be suitable for disposal, including granite, clay, salt and volcanic tuff.

“The U.S. approach can be informed by the Chinese strategy,” Ewing said.

You can see more photos on the CNNC website.