This article originally appeared on 38 North.

My reply to the frequently asked question if Kim Jong Un will ever give up North Korea’s nuclear weapons is, “I don’t know, and most likely he doesn’t know either. But it is time to find out.” However, insisting that Kim Jong Un give a full declaration of his nuclear program up front will not work. It will breed more suspicion instead of building the trust necessary for the North to denuclearize, a process that will extend beyond the 2020 US presidential election.

However, the time it will take to get to the endpoint should not obscure the progress that has already been made. Since this spring, Kim Jong Un has taken significant steps to reduce the nuclear threat North Korea poses. He has declared an end to nuclear testing and closed the nuclear test tunnels by setting off explosive charges inside the test tunnel complex. He also declared an end to testing intermediate- and long-range missiles including intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). I consider these as two of the most important steps toward reducing the threat North Korea poses and as significant steps on the path to denuclearization.

Whereas the North still poses a nuclear threat to Japan and South Korea as well as US military forces and citizens in the region, the threat to the United States has been markedly reduced. In my opinion, North Korea needs more nuclear and ICBM tests to be able to reach the United States with a nuclear-tipped missile. Freezing the sophistication of the program is a necessary precursor to rolling it back in a step-by-step process.

At the September 2018 inter-Korean summit in Pyongyang, Kim also told President Moon that he would commit to dismantling the Yongbyon nuclear complex if the US takes commensurate measures—unspecified, at least in public. The Yongbyon complex is the heart of North Korea’s nuclear program. Shutting it down and dismantling it would be a very big deal because it would stop plutonium and tritium production (for hydrogen bombs) and significantly disrupt highly enriched uranium production.

Yet, Kim’s actions have been widely dismissed as insignificant or insincere by both the left and the right of the American political spectrum. In many of these quarters, the sincerity of Kim’s denuclearization promise is judged by whether or not he is willing to provide a full and complete declaration and to agree on adequate verification measures. But Kim’s willingness to provide a full declaration at this early stage tells us little about his willingness to denuclearize. Moreover, I maintain that insisting on this approach is a dead end, certainly as long as Washington continues to apply “maximum pressure” instead of moving to implement the steps on normalizing relations that President Trump agreed to in the June Singapore statement.

A full declaration is a dead end because it is tantamount to surrender, and Kim has not surrendered, nor will he. A complete account of North Korea’s nuclear weapons, materials, and facilities would, in Kim’s view, likely be far too risky in that it would essentially provide a targeting list for US military planners and seal the inevitable end of the nuclear program and possibly his regime.

Furthermore, a declaration must be accompanied by a robust verification protocol. That, in turn, must allow inspections and a full accounting of all past activities such as production and procurement records as well as export activities. And, once all these activities are complete, an inspection protocol must provide assurances that activities that could support a weapons program are not being reconstituted. This would be a contentious and drawn-out affair.

It is inconceivable that the North would declare all of its nuclear weapons, their location, and allow inspections of the weapons or of their disassembly up front. But in addition to the weapons themselves, a nuclear weapon program consists of three interlocking elements: 1) the nuclear bomb fuel, which depending on the type of bomb includes plutonium, highly enriched uranium (HEU), and forms of heavy hydrogen—deuterium and tritium; 2) weaponization—that is, designing, building and testing weapons, and; 3) delivery systems, which in the case of North Korea appear to be missiles, although airplane or ship delivery cannot be ruled out. Each of these elements involves dozens of sites, hundreds of buildings, and several thousand people.

Let me give an example of what is involved just for verification of plutonium inventories and means of production. Plutonium is produced in reactors by the fission of uranium fuel. We estimate that most of the North’s plutonium has been produced in its 5 MWe (electric) gas-graphite reactor at the Yongbyon complex. A complete declaration must provide for the entire operations history (along with its design and operational characteristics) going back to its initial operation in 1986 to correctly estimate how much plutonium was produced.

In addition, North Korea has operated the Soviet-supplied IRT-2000 research reactor at the Yongbyon site since 1967. Although little plutonium has likely been produced there, this would have to be verified by providing the complete operating history along with performance characteristics since its initial operation. North Korea has also constructed an experimental light water reactor (ELWR) that is likely not yet operational. Its status would have to be checked to see if it was configured to favor weapon-grade plutonium production. Finally, North Korea began to build but never completed 50 MWe and 200 MWe gas-graphite reactors, whose construction operations were stopped by the Agreed Framework in 1994. Their status would have to be verified.

The 5 MWe reactor fuel consists of natural uranium metal alloy fuel elements. Tracking the entire history of fuel fabrication would be an important verification step for plutonium production. It starts with uranium ore mining, milling and conversion to uranium oxide. This is followed by a few additional steps to produce the uranium metal that is formed into fuel elements for the reactor to produce plutonium. Some of these same steps would also be used, but then complemented by turning the uranium into a compound that serves as the precursor gas (uranium hexafluoride) for centrifuge enrichment to produce low enriched uranium for light water reactors or highly enriched uranium for bombs.

A complete and accurate accounting of fuel produced would also likely show a discrepancy that indicates that more fuel was produced at Yongbyon than was consumed. The difference could be accounted for by the fuel that North Korea produced for the gas-graphite reactor it built in Syria, a project that was terminated by Israel’s air raid on the Al Kibar site in September 2007. North Korea is unlikely to acknowledge the illicit construction of the Syrian reactor as part of its own plutonium declaration.

Once produced in the reactor, plutonium has to be extracted from the used or spent fuel after a sufficient period of time that allows the spent fuel to cool thermally and radioactively. The extraction or separations process is accomplished in a reprocessing facility using mechanical and chemical methods. The North’s reprocessing facility became operational in the early 1990s. All of its operations records would have to be examined and verified. In addition, it is likely that some small amount of plutonium that may have been produced in the IRT-2000 reactor was separated in the hot cell facilities in that complex. Its records would have to be examined and verified.

After plutonium is separated, it must be purified, alloyed, cast and machined into final bomb components. Each of these steps generates residue and waste streams that must be monitored and assessed for their plutonium content. Based on my visits to Yongbyon and discussions with the North’s technical staff, I believe that the steps beginning with delivery of yellowcake to Yongbyon (from the uranium mining and milling sites), plus all steps for fuel fabrication, reactor production of plutonium, spent fuel cooling, reprocessing, plutonium purification and alloying into metal ingots are conducted at Yongbyon.

During my visits to Yongbyon, I was told that the plutonium ingots are then taken off site (of an undeclared location) in which the plutonium is cast into bomb components—which would then be followed by machining and assembling into pits, the plutonium cores of the weapons. In 2010, I was also told that all plutonium residues and wastes from reprocessing and plutonium metal preparation were still stored at Yongbyon (under questionable safety conditions). Very little had been done to prepare the spent fuel waste for final disposition. This is likely still the case and, hence, most of the reprocessing facility must remain operational after the rest of Yongbyon is shut down in order to prepare the hazardous waste for safe, long-term disposition. This will also complicate the plutonium inventory verification.

A complete declaration must also include how much plutonium was used during underground testing. In addition to the six known tests at Punggye-ri, North Korea also claims to have conducted “subcritical” experiments (stopping just short of a nuclear detonation), which I consider to be unlikely. If it did, however, North Korea would have to declare the amount of plutonium used and its current state, particularly since such experiments could leave plutonium in a usable form unlike the case for nuclear detonations. To verify the nuclear test history of plutonium, as well as for highly enriched uranium, it would be necessary to provide information or allow drill-back inspections into the test tunnels at Punggye-ri to ascertain the type and amount of nuclear material used in the test.

To complicate matters even further, if one or more of the North’s test devices failed to produce a nuclear explosion, then plutonium (or HEU) could still be resident in the tunnels. Both the United States and Russia experienced such test failures. This is also possibly the case for North Korea because there is still some uncertainty as to whether or not a nuclear test was conducted in May 2010 when a faint seismic signal was observed from the test area. For the most part, the jury is still out on that event, but the North would now have to allow inspections and verification.

It should be apparent that the declaration plus commensurate verification of the amount of plutonium North Korea possesses, which I believe is only between 20 and 40 kilograms, will be an enormous job. I cannot see it being accomplished in the current adversarial environment and certainly not within the timeframe that has been specified by the US government.

A similar sequence of declarations, inspections, and verification measures would have to be developed for the other bomb fuels, namely HEU and the hydrogen isotopes, deuterium and tritium. Verification of HEU inventories and means of production will be particularly contentious because very little is known about the centrifuge facility at the Yongbyon site. As far as we know, my Stanford colleagues and I are the only foreigners to have seen that facility, and then only in a hurried walk-through in 2010. In addition, there exists at least one other covert centrifuge site.

The situation is even more problematic for the second element of the North’s nuclear program, that of weaponization, which includes bomb design, production, and testing because we know nothing about these activities or where they are performed. Although we have some information regarding the nuclear test site at which six nuclear tests were conducted, we do not know if there are other tunnel complexes that have been prepared for testing.

The third element includes all of the North’s missiles and its production, storage and launch sites and complexes. These will also represent a major challenge for complete and correct declarations, inspections and verification.

Once all of the elements have been declared and the dismantling begins, then the focus will have to change to verifying the dismantlement and assessing the potential reversibility of these actions—a challenge that is not only difficult, but one that must be ongoing.

Verification was one of the sticking points during the 2007-2008 diplomatic initiative pursued late in the George W. Bush administration. In 2008, the North turned over copies of 18,000 pages of operating records of the reactor and reprocessing facilities in Yongbyon. The veracity of that disclosure has never been established because diplomatic efforts fell apart when the United States insisted on more declarations up front and North Korea accused Washington of having moved the goal posts. That declaration constituted only a small part of what I outlined above as being necessary for a full accounting of plutonium, not to mention the other components of North Korea’s nuclear program. That was 10 years ago, and much has happened since to make future declarations and verification much more problematic.

At this time, the level of trust between Pyongyang and Washington required for North Korea to agree to a full, verifiable declaration up front does not exist. Hence, my colleagues Robert Carlin and Elliot Serbin and I have suggested a different approach. Negotiations should begin with an agreed end state: North Korea without nuclear weapons or a nuclear weapon program. Civilian nuclear and space programs would remain open for negotiation and possible cooperation. But all facilities and activities that have direct nuclear weapons applicability must eventually be eliminated.

Rather than insisting on a full declaration up front, the two sides should first agree to have the North take significant steps that reduce the nuclear threat it poses in return for commensurate movements toward normalization—the details of which would have to be worked out during negotiations. A good next step for the North would be the destruction of the 5 MWe plutonium production reactor, which would be part of the package that Kim proposed to Moon at the Pyongyang Summit. If these actions are matched by US steps toward normalization as pledged in the Singapore statement, they will serve to build the trust required for the North to initiate a phased declaration process that initially covers operations in Yongbyon and eventually includes the entire nuclear program discussed above.

Unfortunately, the strategic opening created by the Singapore and North-South summits has not been followed by such tactical steps to get the negotiation process off the ground. The North and the South are ready to create a commonly acceptable path forward, but we have the worst of environments in Washington. The Trump team claims progress is being made but insists on maintaining maximum pressure. The North’s Foreign Ministry has pointed outthat the “improvement of relations and sanctions are incompatible.” Also, most US North Korea watchers are either wedded to old think that you can’t negotiate with Pyongyang or they are determined to prove President Trump’s claims on North Korea wrong.

With nuclear tensions on the Korean Peninsula dramatically reduced, it is time to find out if Kim’s drive to improve the economy will eventually lead to denuclearization. He may determine that his nuclear arsenal poses a significant hindrance to economic development that outweighs the putative benefits it confers. Washington and Seoul should work together to encourage rather than inhibit this potential shift.

This interview was first published in the Korea JoongAng Daily; the post below was originally posted in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.

In a recent interview in Seoul, nuclear scientist Siegfried S. Hecker said demilitarization of North Korea might be wiser than a complete denuclearization and the process could be sped up by converting its nuclear and missiles program into joint civilian-use projects.

He said that if North Korean leader Kim Jong-un dismantles the Yongbyon nuclear facility, “That is a big deal; it would be a major positive, signal that they are serious. Because without plutonium, they will really not be able to have major improvements in their nuclear weapons program.”

In May, Hecker proposed a 10-year road map for denuclearizing North Korea in three stages: a halt, roll back and elimination. He has estimated that denuclearization of the North could take up to 15 years, but that could be shortened depending on the political situation.

Hecker advocates shortening the time frame through the conversion of North Korea’s military nuclear and missile program into civilian use with the involvement of South Korea and the United States, and possibly China and Russia as well. This could be in areas as such as building nuclear reactors for electricity generation and medical isotopes and joint space programs.

“When you do it cooperatively, then that’s when verification becomes possible, because you’re there, you’re talking with the people, seeing the facilities,” said Hecker on such joint civilian nuclear projects. “It’s the only way I can see shortening that time frame significantly.”

He went onto encourage building “trust and a cooperative spirit” to prevent North Korea’s concealment of its nuclear weapons in the future.

“If the United States and South Korea stay together, clearly locked together in a strong alliance, we’ll be able to handle anything North Korea can do, and we can take a chance to see whether he’s really serious,” he said, referring to North Korean leader Kim.

Since 2004, Hecker has made seven trips to North Korea. In his first visit, he recounts holding in his hand North Korean plutonium in a sealed glass jar at its Yongbyon nuclear complex. He is also one of the few Americans who has visited its uranium enrichment facility, which he and a team did in 2010.

Hecker warned that last year we were on the “precipice of war,” welcoming efforts by South Korean President Moon Jae-in, U.S. President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim since the beginning of this year to engage in dialogue and summit meetings. He added that “it’s worth finding out” if North Korean leader Kim is serious about his pledges to complete denuclearization. Hecker later Thursday made a speech at Yonsei University as a part of its William J. Perry lecture series entitled: “North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons: A Treasured Sword or An Unnecessary Burden?”

The following are edited excerpts of the interview with the JoongAng Ilbo and JoongAng Daily newspapers.

What do you think of the dramatic change in President Trump’s attitude to North Korea in his UN General Assembly speech Tuesday compared to last year’s speech?

A. From my perspective, it’s a very welcome change. Since I’m a technical nuclear specialist, I would say that 2017 was a very dangerous year. It was dangerous because of the technical advances that North Korea made with its nuclear programs, namely the big nuclear test, the ICBM [intercontinental ballistic] missile tests. That was dangerous, and then on top of that, the political rhetoric was extremely dangerous … However, so many things happened in 2018, and the most important is that politically, we stepped away from the precipice of war, and that’s good news …What happened is a number of really important political steps initiated to some extent by Kim Jong-un and President Moon but also apparently welcomed by President Trump.

How do you view the United States’ demand for North Korea to submit a list of nuclear weapons, materials and facilities as a first step toward substantive denuclearization, while North Korea demands a declaration to end the 1950-53 Korean War?

From my perspective, what’s more important first is to take steps that I call risk reduction. For example: no nuclear testing, no long-range missile tests and no more plutonium [production]. Perhaps a list of the Yongbyon facilities would be possible early on. But the full declaration, I think, is not yet possible. And then the end-of-war declaration, clearly that’s a political matter; the U.S. has to decide as to when to do that. Just like eventually there has to be a full declaration [by North Korea], eventually there has to be an end-of-war declaration.

At the inter-Korean summit in Pyongyang last week, Kim agreed to permanently dismantle the Tongchang-ri missile engine test site and missile launch pad under the observation of outside experts. Can this be considered as a meaningful progress toward denuclearization?

That’s not the ICBM launch site, and so whereas it’s important, it’s not the most important for missile launches because the North Koreans have launched their missiles from unprepared sites. So, what I found most surprising is for Chairman Kim to say that he’s going to essentially decommission that site that was scheduled to be used for future satellite launches … and I would have thought North Korea would want to retain a peaceful space program. But having international inspectors there is good because it’s a confidence-building step.

North Korea said it is willing to take additional steps such as permanent dismantlement of the Yongbyon nuclear site if the United States takes a corresponding measure. Should Washington consider this proposal seriously?

Of course it should consider that seriously, but it’s a conditional proposal. So to me, the most important part would be: Can one begin to take the steps that demonstrate that they are actually dismantling parts of Yongbyon? Yongbyon is a huge facility. For example, it would be very important to first stop and then dismantle the 5-megawatt plutonium production reactor. If they did that, I would say that’s a really big deal … it would be a major positive signal that they are serious.

Some say that the Yongbyon nuclear facility is already old and aging, so North Korea’s proposal is not meaningful.

It helps to have been there: I don’t agree with that. Yes, the Yongbyon facilities are old, but they are operable.

Contrary to your estimation that it could take 15 years to denuclearize North Korea, the United States and North Korea are talking about the completion of denuclearization by the end of Trump’s first term as president in 2021. Is this a feasible goal?

It would be very nice; I don’t think it’s possible. First of all, the political situation has now improved substantially, because we’re talking to each other, but one still has to build the trust to convince the North Koreans they can actually get rid of those substantial facilities. And I think that will take more than a few years. The technical matters will also take some time. My three-stage proposal was recognizing the difficulties in agreeing to actually take significant steps. I believe that immediate elimination of all nuclear weapons is not going to happen. So instead, let’s do this in a reasonable way. First halt – in other words, don’t make it worse. Second, take specific steps to roll back, reduce the threat – so no nuclear, no missile testing, no more plutonium. They’ve already done the first two. And then, understanding what the issues are with the uranium enrichment, because they have one facility we know of. I was in that facility for centrifuges in 2010. We know they have more facilities. I think it may be doable in 10 years, but again, it depends on political situations.

Trump said in a press conference Wednesday that he is not in a hurry and no longer playing a “time game” with North Korea. Has he realized denuclearization cannot be resolved in a short period of time?

I think the president and his team understand that it takes time … What’s happened in 2018 was taking us away from the precipice of war. The political climate has toned down substantially, especially as just indicated with President Moon’s summit with Kim Jong-un. And because of that, politics has created space that now allows you to step back and do things in a more deliberate, sensible manner, and so now you have more time … to do that sort of negotiation correctly.

In your June 25 Foreign Policy article, you claimed that helping North Korea to convert North Korea’s military nuclear and missile program into civilian use is the best way to solve the North Korean nuclear issue.

My view is, how can we shorten that 10-year time frame, and I believe that in an adversarial situation it won’t be possible because they would have to make a declaration, we’d have to verify the declaration, the verification isn’t just one time, you have to continue to watch the facilities, the people, what happens to all those things … What benefit can be in denuclearization for the North Koreans from the nuclear and technical standpoint? First of all, say what we are after: Denuclearization should really mean demilitarization. In other words, everything in the nuclear complex and the missile complex that feeds the military program, that has to go. In order to get them to agree to that, then we actually turn around, in particular jointly with South Korea, and say we’re going to help you convert the military to peaceful use. And we’re going to it together. That’s the key … Because that means we’ll have South Koreans, Americans in Yongbyon, helping them to convert. When you do it cooperatively, then that’s when verification becomes possible, because you’re there, you’re talking with the people, seeing the facilities. It’s the only way I can see, shortening that time frame significantly.

North Korea declared the completion of its nuclear arsenal and is no longer conducting nuclear or missile tests. Do you think that North Korea actually secured the ICBM capability to hit the U.S. mainland?

The bottom line is that I do not believe that North Korea today can deliver a nuclear-tipped ICBM to the United States, anywhere in the United States. And the reason for that is that they have the components, the pieces of what’s needed, but they have not done enough testing to pull those pieces together. However, to me, the issue is: Do they have a deterrent, the nuclear capability, to keep the U.S. out? I believe that they already have a deterrent: They most likely can put a nuclear warhead on the Scud and Rodong missiles that can reach South Korea and Japan.

North Korea’s blowing up of the Punggye-ri test site was not just a performance?

I think it was a substantial step. Could they can make more tunnels, yes, but it’s going to take much more time.

Note: This interview by  Changsop Pyon originally appeared in Korean at SisaIN.

SisaIN: You suggested that the best way for denuclearization is to convert N. Korea's nuclear and missile programs for civilian use rather than total denuclearization. Is it because 'total denuclearization' or 'complete denuclearization' as agreed between Trump and Kim Jung Un is impossible to achieve under any circumstances?

Hecker: Total or complete denuclearization will be difficult to achieve because North Korea will likely insist on retaining a peaceful nuclear program (such as nuclear medicine and nuclear electricity) and peaceful space program to launch satellites. Elimination of the military programs may be possible, but it will require a phased approach that will take years. In addition, verification of the elimination of the military programs will be almost impossible unless North Korea is prepared to cooperate.

SisaIN: You suggested a 10-year road map on denuclerization marked by “halt, roll back and eliminate’ North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs.  Assuming this process would be going on, what would be the incentives or compensations for the US to give to North Korea? Completion of peace treaty and normalization, in addition to economic assistance and sanctions relief during the 10-year time frame?

Hecker: An agreement with Pyongyang should be structured to achieve denuclearization and normalization. It should be agreed in the beginning that denuclearization would occur in phases to halt, roll back and eventually eliminate the nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons program. As we indicated in our ten-year roadmap, that will take time. Our proposed approach of conversion from military to civilian nuclear programs constitutes an important step toward normalization. Additional steps toward normalization, such as some sanctions relief, potential assistance with energy supply, and an end-of-war declaration will have to be phased with Pyongyang taking significant steps to roll back its weapons program.

SisaIN: The Trump administration is putting a high priority on verification of N. Korea’s nuclear weapons and programs under the banner of ‘FFVD (final, fully verified denuclearization). You introduced the new concept of 'cooperative conversion' for the best chance of the verifiable denuclearization of N. Korea's nuclear programs. 'Cooperative' in the sense that S. Koreans and Americans are working together with their N. Korean scientists and engineers to eliminate the nuclear weapons. Is this 'cooperative conversion' possible without them building mutual trust first?

Hecker: We believe that ‘cooperative conversion’ will allow the two sides to build trust. In other words, it would be the nuclear program that would now catalyze building trust, whereas in the past it has been the greatest source of conflict. With American and South Korean technical personnel on the ground working closely with North Korean nuclear experts to advance civilian programs, they will be able to learn much more about the nature and extent of the North’s entire program and see facilities that might otherwise escape them.

SisaIN: Can any agreement to eliminate nuclear weapons without cooperation be verified?

Hecker: Without cooperation, we also see no way that the elimination of all nuclear weapons and weapons programs can be verified. The magnitude of the North’s nuclear and missile programs and the closed nature of the country will make verification of complete denuclearization virtually impossible. It will not be possible for inspectors, especially in an adversarial environment, to get unfettered access to all of North Korea’s facilities to verify that it has not secretly kept a few nuclear weapons, a few kilograms of plutonium, or one or more covert uranium centrifuge facilities. But cooperation on converting Pyongyang’s nuclear infrastructure will help.

SisaIN: As you admitted, this civilian nuclear and space programs would be highly controversial in the US because of North Korea's possible retention of nuclear capability. The United States had the bitter experience with this back in 2002, when James Kelley confronted the North with the evidence of its secret nuclear program in violation of 1994 Agreed Framework. So, how can the US make sure the North would not make the same mistake again?

Hecker: We believe the situation in October 2002 was more complex than just stating that North Korea cheated. It is true that the North was covertly pursuing uranium enrichment while freezing the plutonium complex in Yongbyon. However, Pyongyang can also accuse Washington of not keeping its Agreed Framework and October 2000 Joint U.S.-North Korea Communiqué commitments to normalize relations. Although there were some difficult times during the Clinton administration years of the Agreed Framework, these difficulties were resolved by the end of 2000. However, the Bush administration was determined to end the Agreed Framework in 2001 and 2002. Adding North Korea to the Axis of Evil, for example, was certainly not in keeping with the U.S. government’s commitment to normalize relations. Consequently, it is no surprise that Pyongyang views Washington’s promises to normalize as insincere as Washington views Pyongyang’s promises to denuclearize.

Military to civilian conversion actions will certainly have to be monitored by international inspections. Converting programs and facilities cooperatively will also give U.S. and South Koreans much better access to allow more complete verification. Moreover, we believe that it is important that the conversion activities be allowed to proceed sufficiently far that Pyongyang would have too much to lose should it back out of its agreement. In other words, the more North Korea would benefit from nuclear conversion and from other normalization actions, the greater a price it would have to pay to break out. Consequently, the more reason it will have to keep agreements.

SisaIN: Regarding N. Korea's retention of its nuclear capability, there is the issue of what to do with their thousands of nuclear scientists and engineers among other things. As long as they are physically inside North Korea, can the Kim Jung Un regime use them anytime to restart their nuclear programs?

Hecker: Civilian conversion would help to take care of this problem. The energies of the nuclear scientists and engineers would be focused on doing good things for their country – such as nuclear medicine and nuclear electricity, along with helping to dismantle the military complex and clean up the complex. During my various visits to Yongbyon, I had such discussions with their nuclear officials. They expressed a strong desire to have their technical personnel contribute to peaceful uses of atomic energy.

SisaIN: You described the 10-year road map as an 'interim' step short of completed nuclearization, designed to "reduce the nuclear threat significantly." Does it mean that the current denuclearzation talks should focus on reducing North Korea's nuclear threat significantly, not complete denuclearization?

Hecker: The road map integrates the short and long term actions to reduce the greatest military threats first and then eliminate all of the military threats in the longer term. Cooperative conversion would allow complete military denuclearization while providing assistance with civilian nuclear and space programs.

SisaIN: The Trump administration wants some sort of specific and fast denuclearization such as getting their nuclear warheads or nuclear weapons out of North Korea, etc. Is this possible? If not, what would be your idea for 'fast' denuclearization that could satisfy the US demands?

Hecker: First, taking nuclear weapons out of North Korea is too dangerous. They should be verifiably disassembled in North Korea by the same North Korean technical experts that assembled them in order to avoid an accidental nuclear detonation. Once safely disassembled, all components besides the plutonium or highly enriched uranium bomb fuel can be disposed of quite readily. Plutonium and highly enriched uranium should be either shipped out of the country or otherwise verifiably disposed.

As for fast denuclearization, what is important is to begin to roll back the nuclear weapons program. First, make sure that it does not get worse – so no more nuclear tests, no more long-range missile tests and no more production of plutonium or highly enriched uranium. With our concept of civilian conversion, the North should be encouraged to speed up the timetable we laid out in our roadmap. In other words, some of the North’s actions in the roadmap should be front-loaded. North Korea has already done some of that by closing the nuclear test site. Several other actions such as making the 5 MWe reactor permanently inoperable could follow quickly. These actions would reduce the military threat and could speed up the timetable.

SisaIN: When you observe President Trump's current denuclearization negotiation with North Korea, what do you think is the best possible realistic goal he can achieve during his term?

Hecker: Following the opening created by the initiatives of President Moon Jae-in and Chairman Kim Jong-il, President Trump has already taken the most important step to meet with Chairman Kim at the Singapore summit and move the Korean peninsula away from the brink of war. If his administration supports civilian conversion over the next two years, he could dramatically reduce the threat posed by North Korea’s nuclear program and create the conditions that will help to bring an end to seven decades of enmity on the Korean Peninsula – it would be a historic achievement.

STANFORD, Calif. — When President Trump abruptly canceled the summit with North Korea last week, it overshadowed the closing of North Korea’s nuclear test site just a few hours before. Although it is not irreversible, blowing up the site’s tunnels, sealing the entrances and removing test site facilities and equipment was nevertheless a serious step toward denuclearization. What possessed North Korean leader Kim Jong Un to take this step now?

Read the rest in the Washington Post's World Post 

Immediate denuclearization of North Korea is dangerous to both North Korean and American interests, say Stanford scholars in a new research report. Instead, they advocate for phased denuclearization to take place over 10 years or more, allowing the United States to reduce the greatest risks first and address the manageable risks over time.

Young Russian and U.S.-based scholars from a variety of science and social science disciplines met at Stanford to tackle emerging issues in nuclear security.

How can a new generation of scholars from around the world work together to prevent the use of nuclear weapons, from nuclear terrorism to developments in North Korea? A summit hosted at Stanford’s Center for International Security and Cooperation sought answers to that question—and more.

The third meeting of the Stanford-National Research Nuclear University MEPhI (Moscow Engineering Physics Institute) Young Professionals Nuclear Forum, held May 2-4 at CISAC, brought together young Russian and U.S.-based scholars from a variety of science and social science disciplines to explore how to use thoughtful, cooperative approaches to solve these pressing international nuclear security issues.

Dr. Siegfried Hecker, a senior fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, emeritus, and an internationally recognized expert in nuclear risk reduction, organized the summit. Opening the forum, Dr. Hecker stressed that while U.S.-Russian relations continue to be complicated and cooperation in the nuclear sphere has virtually come to a stop, “the younger generation of nuclear professionals should be prepared to collaborate again once the relations between the two governments turn for the better.”

The group of Stanford and Russian scholars took part in two day-long exercises. Day one included an exercise in risk analysis of the threat of radiological terrorism from the perspective of the attacker, tasking the participants with comparing the risks of carrying out an attack using a radiological dispersal device versus carrying out an attack on a spent nuclear fuel cask. On the second day, scholars engaged in a detailed simulation of U.S. and North Korean approaches to the denuclearization of North Korea to be discussed at the proposed June summit between the U.S. and North Korea. CISAC affiliates Larry Brandt, Chaim Braun, and former national lab experts Len Connell (SNL) and James Toevs (LANL) joined Dr. Hecker to advise the teams.

Working in mixed groups of Russian and Stanford scholars, one group represented the U.S. perspective; the other the North Korean. They explored the risks of maintaining or eliminating different nuclear facilities and activities in North Korea. In the exercise, it quickly became clear that the North Korean team was aiming to keep a hedge for the future and not give away all nuclear options. Meanwhile, the U.S. team sought to eliminate much of the immediate risk posed by North Korea’s nuclear program, claiming some peaceful nuclear facilities and activities might eventually be possible but they cannot allow North Korea the ability to reconstitute its weapons quickly.

So—who won the exercise?

For Dr. Hecker: “nobody won.” That wasn’t the point. But, he said,  “what was really interesting was that they came up with really reasonable compromises—on both the North Korean and American sides.”

View photos from the summit

About CISAC

The Center for International Security and Cooperation tackles the most critical security issues in the world today. Founded in 1983, CISAC has built on its research strengths to better understand an increasingly complex international environment. It is part of Stanford's Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI). Though scholarly research, fellowships, and teaching, CISAC is educating the next generation of leaders in international security and creating policy impact on a wide variety of issues to help build a safer world.

John W. Lewis, a Stanford political scientist who pioneered new ways of thinking about U.S.-China relations and launched some of the first Asian study programs in higher education, died Monday at his home on the Stanford campus. He was 86.

 

 

Lewis was a prolific scholar and one of the preeminent China specialists of his generation. His deep commitment to using insights from academic research to inform policy deliberations and solve important problems related to international relations and security led him to establish several centers and institutes at Stanford. These institutions supported collective undertakings involving scholars and officials from all over the globe and inspired dozens of graduate students to follow Lewis’ lead to make a tangible difference toward a more peaceful world.

He founded and directed the Center for East Asian Studies from 1969 to 1970, the Northeast Asia-United States Forum on International Policy (now the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center), from 1983 to 1990, and, along with theoretical physicist Sidney Drell, co-founded Stanford’s Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC) in 1983, serving as a co-director until 1991. Stanford’s Center for International Security and Arms Control, CISAC’s precursor, was founded by Lewis and Drell in 1970. Lewis also led CISAC’s Project on Peace and Cooperation in the Asian-Pacific Region.

Expert on Asia

Lewis, the William Haas Professor of Chinese Politics, Emeritus, and a senior fellow at CISAC and the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI), joined the Stanford faculty in 1968 after teaching for seven years at Cornell University, coming to campus as an expert on China at the apex of public unrest regarding the Vietnam War. As a teacher, he helped lead an interdisciplinary course on nuclear arms and disarmament and engaged in simulated arms control talks with students.

In addition to his work on China, Lewis was a pioneer in dealing with North Korea. He visited the North in 1986 and numerous times thereafter, always with the deep conviction that it was vitally important to listen and learn.  He opened doors long closed by inviting North Korean, South Korean and U.S. officials to meet at Stanford in the early 1990s, and afterwards hosted official North Korean delegations.

He was invited to visit the North Korean nuclear center at Yongbyon after the collapse of the U.S.-North Korea Agreed Framework in 2002.  This and subsequent visits with Stanford colleagues provided virtually the only direct information on developments at the site, said Thomas Fingar, a Shorenstein APARC Fellow at FSI.

Sig Hecker, a CISAC senior fellow and the former director of the Los Alamos National Laboratory, recalls traveling to North Korea with Lewis in January 2004, a significant time in the country’s nuclear program.

“I would never have gone to North Korea without John,” Hecker said. “He had developed a relationship that allowed us to establish an effective means of communication during the times our governments were not talking. I had worked closely with John on North Korea ever since. He was incredibly knowledgeable and had an intensity that motivated everyone around him.”

Passion for peace

Lewis was extremely active in his retirement, visiting his CISAC office in Encina Hall daily, writing books, giving lectures and archiving his materials. While recovering from a recent fall, Lewis was constantly on the phone with colleagues and continued to collaborate until he lost his ability to speak, said his daughter, Amy Tich, BA ’85.

Above all, he was an advocate of peace, education and talking with – and learning about – the nature of one’s perceived rivals, such as China and North Korea, instead of allowing misinformation and misunderstandings to spread. The word “cooperation” in the title of CISAC emanates from this belief.

How ironic, said Tich, that her father’s death came at a time when relations between the U.S. and North Korea over the North’s nuclear tests are filled with tension.

“He had amazing relationships all across Asia,” Tich said. “He believed in what he was doing to the core of his being. He wanted world peace, to save the world from nuclear war.”

John’s son, Stephen Lewis, AB ’80, MS ’80, MBA ’84, said, “He lived a remarkable life. He made enormous strides in Korean relations and Chinese relations. And he did it with a sense of humor and humility that earned him the right to push because only from pushing through issues do you get answers.”

A Renaissance scholar

Lewis was the Renaissance scholar who bridged the gap between the academic and policy worlds. In the 1970s, he was a major player in the restoration of academic exchanges with China and established ties between U.S. and Chinese academic and governmental institutions that continue today.

In the 1980s, he built enduring ties with the Institute for Far Eastern Studies in Moscow that enhanced understanding and collaboration among Americans, Russians, and Chinese.  He launched a project to gather medical expertise at Stanford to deal with North Korea’s severe drug-resistant tuberculosis problem, a project that took him twice to Mongolia to explore the possibility of a regional effort against TB.

Lewis was never satisfied with simply having a problem discussed, said Fingar. He ended every meeting with assembled experts on North Korean issues with a prodding, “A useful discussion. Now, what can we do?”

Lewis helped American business executives, academics, government officials and military officers establish contacts and networks in China. He also led two congressional delegations to Asia. In recognition of his impact, Lewis was invited to serve on the Committee on International Security and Arms Control of the National Academy of Sciences; the Joint Committee on Contemporary China of the Social Science Research Council; and the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations.

The Stanford scholar also did consulting work for the Los Alamos National Laboratory, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, the U.S. Department of Defense, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, and the Office of Technology Assessment of the U.S. Congress.

Born in King County, Washington, in 1930, Lewis gained his first exposure to international issues and institutions as a teenage page at the San Francisco meeting that established the United Nations. His interest in China was inspired by the stories and achievements of missionary relatives who built schools for Chinese girls. After graduating from Deep Springs College (California) in 1949, Lewis earned  his bachelor’s degree (1953), master’s degree (1958) and doctorate (1962) at UCLA. His service as a gunnery officer in the U.S. Navy (1954-1957) kindled his interest in security issues and Korea.

Publications, research

Lewis wrote and co-authored numerous influential books on Asia and international security, including Leadership in Communist China (1963); and  The United States in Vietnam (1967) (with George Kahin); and China Builds the Bomb (1988).

“John’s numerous books about Chinese decision-making regarding nuclear weapons and the Korean War were path-breaking,” said Scott Sagan, a professor of political science and senior fellow at CISAC and FSI. “His work permitted us to see behind ‘the bamboo curtain’ and understand Mao [Zedong] and his successors with more clarity than was possible before.”

Lewis received numerous letters from colleagues and former students in his final days and Tich read all of them to him. Among the praise bestowed on Lewis was his “ability to inspire in me and others profound curiosity and dedication to scholarship,” that he provided “a model of how to bring values to bear on scholarship and global citizenship,” and “[He] represented the perfect mix of academic research and real-time involvement with the world.”

CISAC co-director and FSI Senior Fellow Amy Zegart remembers Lewis’ generosity and enthusiasm.

“I can still remember knocking on John’s door as a young grad student 20 years ago and sheepishly asking if he might be willing to conduct a directed reading course with me about China’s foreign policy,” Zegart said. “He said ‘yes’ immediately. His generosity of spirit and commitment to teaching still infuse CISAC today, and will shape Stanford students for generations to come. It is a true honor to co-direct the center that John and Sid Drell created.”

Lewis is survived by Jacquelyn Lewis, his wife of 63 years; his children Stephen Lewis, Amy Tich and Cynthia Westby; and five grandchildren, Brian, BA ’15, Taryn, Kylie, Katie and Rhys.

In keeping with his life-long commitment to teaching students and training successors, the family requests that anyone wishing to honor Professor Lewis do so by contributing to the John and Jackie Lewis Fund at Stanford University, which supports funding for Stanford graduate students and postdoctoral fellows  doing research on matters related to Asia. Donations to the fund should be made out to Stanford University and sent to the John and Jackie Lewis Fund, in care of Scott Nelson, Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, 616 Serra Street, Stanford, California, 94305.

In an oral history interview with the Stanford Historical Society, Lewis recounts his earlier days on campus and the impact of his career. Videos of an 80th birthday celebration for Lewis can be found here.

In a Q&A with Elisabeth Eaves at The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, CISAC's Siegfried Hecker explains how the latest North Korean nuclear test is different, what North Korea's capabilities are now and how the U.S. could respond.