North Korea remains a puzzle to Americans. How did this country—one of the most isolated in the world and in the policy cross hairs of every U.S. administration during the past 30 years—progress from zero nuclear weapons in 2001 to a threatening arsenal of perhaps 50 such weapons in 2021?

Hinge Points brings readers literally inside the North Korean nuclear program, joining Siegfried Hecker to see what he saw and hear what he heard in his visits to North Korea from 2004 to 2010. Hecker goes beyond the technical details—described in plain English from his on-the-ground experience at the North's nuclear center at Yongbyon—to put the nuclear program exactly where it belongs, in the context of decades of fateful foreign policy decisions in Pyongyang and Washington.

Describing these decisions as "hinge points," he traces the consequences of opportunities missed by both sides.The result has been that successive U.S. administrations have been unable to prevent the North, with the weakest of hands, from becoming one of only three countries in the world that might target the United States with nuclear weapons. Hecker's unique ability to marry the technical with the diplomatic is well informed by his interactions with North Korean and U.S. officials over many years, while his years of working with Russian, Chinese, Indian, and Pakistani nuclear officials have given him an unmatched breadth of experience from which to view and interpret the thinking and perspective of the North Koreans.

For more information and purchasing please visit sup.org.

Visit the book website for an in-depth look at Dr. Siegfried S. Hecker time spent in North Korea.

North Korean officials, including Kim Jong Un, have made several statements in recent months that begin to bring clarity to the country’s evolving nuclear doctrine. Within those statements, there has been a notable emphasis on the role of tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s (or, North Korea’s) larger nuclear strategy and the potential for early nuclear use should conflict break out on the Korean Peninsula.

38 North Director Jenny Town recently met with Dr. Siegfried Hecker, Senior Fellow (emeritus) at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University, to discuss these developments and what they could mean for future North Korean nuclear activities, and potential new security challenges.

Read the rest at 38 North

North Korea currently has only one publicly known uranium mine—the Pyongsăn uranium mining and milling complex—that serves as a first step in the country’s pathway towards nuclear weapons.

Using a combination of multispectral imagery sourced from the European Space Agency’s Copernicus Sentinel-2 satellite and a review of geological analyses dating back to 1955, a new study from Stanford’s Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC) in Jane’s Intelligence Review by geological sciences postdoctoral fellow Sulgiye Park (PhD ’17) and CISAC honors student Federico Derby (BS ’19) looks for evidence of uranium mining in North Korea, going beyond what is currently available in open sources in order to estimate the uranium resources and their locations in North Korea.

The peer-reviewed CISAC study has identified around 18 additional sites in North Korea where the hyperspectral signatures and geological profile combine to suggest the possibility of uranium mining. Nevertheless, CISAC and Jane’s stress that the presence of these ‘hotspots’ does not imply the presence of an active uranium mine or related facility, but rather a site that warrants further analysis.

In this Q&A with Katy Gabel Chui, researchers Sulgiye Park and Federico Derby discuss their work on the project:

How did you land on this project? What made you think to look for more mining sites?

Sulgiye Park (SP) and Federico Derby (FD): Very little is known about the front-end of North Korea’s nuclear fuel cycle, particularly when it comes to the mining and milling processes of uranium production pathway. To date, assessments of this portion of North Korea’s nuclear fuel cycle have been mostly conducted through traditional (electro-optical) satellite imagery observations---the type of imagery that you can access through Google Earth, for instance.

We wanted to get a more complete grasp of North Korea's uranium mining and processing capacity by conducting a multi-disciplinary approach that combines both the visible signatures from multi-spectral satellite imagery and a geological dataset that contains information such as mineralogy and geochemistry. The two individual methods come together at the end to provide information that encapsulates the potential regions likely to host uranium deposits and mines.

What is multispectral imaging? How would it ordinarily be used, and how did you use it for this project?

SP and FD: Traditional electro-optical satellite imagery exploits only three portions of the electromagnetic spectrum; namely, the blue, green and red bands. In general, when using the term “multispectral” within the satellite imagery community, we are usually referring to a satellite system that covers a few to tens of different bands in the electromagnetic spectrum.

Multispectral imagery is used in a wide variety of industries, to measure things like water turbidity, crop healthiness, vegetation quality, etc. For this project, we focused on using spectral fingerprints. Basically, every object – whether it be a mineral, a living thing, water, etc. – has a(n in theory unique) spectral fingerprint. Spectral fingerprints are measured as the intensity of the object’s reflectance of light at a specific wavelength. Varying across wavelengths – hence the importance of having a multispectral system that can give you access to different ranges of the electromagnetic spectrum – you ultimately get a spectral curve that is unique to the item you are studying.

The spectral fingerprints you collect on a specific image can be compared to previously collected fingerprints stored in what is usually termed a spectral library, for classification purposes. Basically, if my spectral curve of a given pixel (or set of pixels) looks super similar to that of gold (for which I obtained a reference spectral curve from a spectral library), then it is probably gold. Obviously, this matching is performed in a more rigorous manner, but you get the idea of how the process works.

In this project, we used the Pyongsan uranium mine in North Korea (arguably the only well-identified uranium mine in the country) as my reference spectral curve. Essentially, using various imaging techniques, we traversed North Korea looking for pixels whose spectral curves are similar to that of the Pyongsan uranium mine. Those are the ‘hotspots’ we identified.

What most surprised you in both your work and your findings?

SP and FD: The fascinating match between the 'hotspots' identified through satellite imagery analysis and the geologic information available in maps and reports. The majority of the 'hotspots' appeared adjacent to the limestone formation from the Ordovician period (circa 445-485 Ma) that are in contact with a specific sedimentary rocks of upper Proterozoic group. Part of the geologic characteristics of the 'hotspots' regions were similar to what had been observed in the Pyongsan (the most well-known) uranium mine of North Korea.

What was most surprising in the work itself? What was difficult in doing the work?

SP and FD: It was surprising to see how much we still don't know about North Korea despite the amount of effort that had been invested. There is no consensus reached regarding the location and the total number of uranium mines in North Korea.

One of the bigger difficulties we had was finding credible geological data and information.

What is the one thing you think someone should take away from your study?

SP and FD: That there are still many unknowns. While our study identified multiple regions with spectral signatures similar to the uranium tailing piles at Pyongsan, verification of uranium presence is still needed.

What are you working on next?

SP: I am still working on using a geologic approach to glean information on the uranium mines of North Korea. The further evaluation aims to identify a qualitative upper limit of uranium ore grade (quality) and quantity pertaining to all the suspected uranium mines in North Korea.

FD: I co-founded a startup focused on developing deep learning models for credit risk analytics (in Latin America). However, I will still keep in touch with my CISAC peers!

Following the abrupt ending of the highly anticipated second bilateral summit between President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un in Hanoi, APARC and CISAC scholars evaluate the result of the summit, its implications for regional relations in Northeast Asia, and the opportunities moving forward towards the goal of denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.

This Q&A with Noa Ronkin features Andray Abrahamian, the 2018-19 Koret Fellow in Korean Studies at APARC, whose work with the nonprofit Choson Exchange has taken him to the DPRK nearly 30 times; Siegfried S. Hecker, top nuclear security expert, former Director of the Los Alamos National Laboratory, Research Professor of Management Science and Engineering, Emeritus, and Senior Fellow at CISAC/FSI, Emeritus; and Gi-Wook Shin, Professor of Sociology, William J. Perry Professor of Contemporary Korea, Director of APARC, and founding Director of the Korea Program.

In May 2018, Stanford Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC) scholars Siegfried Hecker, Robert Carlin, and Elliot Serbin released an in-depth report analyzing the nuclear history of North Korea between 1992 and 2017 alongside a historical research-based “roadmap” for denuclearization.

Since then, tensions between North Korea and South Korea have thawed. United States President Trump met with Kim Jong-un in Singapore in June, and another U.S.-North Korea summit is planned for later this month.

Today, the CISAC researchers release a 2018 update to their report, chronicling and analyzing historic developments in North Korea over the past year. In this Q&A with Katy Gabel Chui, CISAC Senior Fellow and former Director of the Los Alamos National Laboratory Siegfried Hecker shares what the team learned:

Your research demonstrates that South Korean, North Korean, and U.S. efforts in 2018 were able to lower tensions and the threat of war on the Korean Peninsula. How? What actions were most effective toward this end?

At the end of 2017, the Moon Jae-in administration in South Korea made secret overtures to the Kim Jong-un regime. Kim Jong-un responded positively in his 2018 New Year Speech, proposing to send North Korean athletes to the South as part of a joint delegation for the 2018 Winter Olympics in Seoul.  He also initiated serious diplomatic overtures to Washington. These efforts led to the North/South Summit in April and the historic Singapore Summit in June.

Yet, in spite of these positive initiatives, you did not rate U.S. and North Korean diplomacy at your highest level, why is that?

We stopped one level short for both (a G2 instead of a G3) because progress in talks that followed the summit quickly hit a wall when the US side called for the North to produce a full declaration of its nuclear weapons program, to which Pyongyang responded angrily. The rest of the year was up and down. Nevertheless, the Singapore Summit took the critical step away from the brink of war. The North and South also continued to make remarkable progress toward reconciliation with two more presidential summits.

Most of the focus in the U.S. has been on an apparent failure of North Korea to denuclearize. But you note in your research that the Singapore summit pledged normalization and denuclearization. Why has progress stalled?

First, denuclearization is a poorly defined concept. We should focus on the elimination of the North’s nuclear weapons, the means of production and means of delivery. Second, Washington has so far not taken steps toward normalization. It has insisted on maintaining maximum pressure and sanctions, which Pyongyang considers incompatible with normalization.

Nevertheless, you claim that the threat posed by North Korea was substantially reduced. What about the North’s nuclear capabilities – were these reduced in 2018?

The diplomatic initiatives have greatly reduced the threat. Our study, which looks at the details of how the capabilities have changed in 2018, concludes that the rapid escalation of overall capabilities in 2017 and prior years was halted and in some cases rolled back.

But your research also shows North Korea continued to operate its nuclear weapons complex in 2018, and that it is still producing plutonium and highly enriched uranium.

We are not surprised that North Korea has not halted its fissile materials production in absence of formal negotiations. Our analysis of open-source satellite imagery of the Yongbyon complex led us to estimate they may have added sufficient plutonium and highly enriched uranium for an additional 5 to 7 nuclear weapons on top of our 2017 estimate of approximately 30 weapons.

There have also been reports that it has continued to maintain, produce, and deploy its land-based ballistic missiles. These activities don’t look like the North is denuclearizing.

In our study, we look at the three requisites for a nuclear arsenal – fissile materials, weaponization (that is design, build, and test), and delivery. The North did continue to produce fissile materials. But it took the remarkable step to end nuclear testing and long-range missile testing at a time during which North Korea had been rapidly increasing the sophistication of its nuclear weapons and missiles and their destructive power and reach. Therefore, we conclude that the North not only halted that rapid advance but also rolled back the threat we judged the North’s nuclear and missile programs to pose in 2017.

It sounds like there is a long way to go to denuclearize. In May of last year, you released a framework for denuclearization of North Korea based around a “halt, roll back and eliminate” process. Where does North Korea stand, if anywhere, in that process today?

Our color charts track the progress. Contrary to what we have heard in the media, North Korea has actually halted and rolled back some nuclear activities, with the most important being the end of nuclear and missile testing, which in turn, has significant consequences. In fact, in 2018 it did not flight test missiles of any range. However, the road to final elimination will be long and difficult, especially because of the serious trust deficit between Washington and Pyongyang. We suggested a 10-year time frame last year.

Haven’t you also suggested a way to speed up that process?

Yes, we propose that North Korea, South Korea, and the U.S. explore cooperative efforts to demilitarize North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs and convert them to civilian nuclear and space programs. Such cooperation has the potential of accelerating the elimination of nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons program. It will, in the long term, also greatly improve the prospects of adequate verification.

How do you get North Korea to go along with any of these ideas?

That’s the job of our negotiators. When Special Representative Stephen Biegun was here at Stanford recently, he showed a lot of flexibility to have the U.S. phase denuclearization with normalization. I think that’s what it will take. But a lot of hard work lies ahead.

Full Report: A Comprehensive History of North Korea's Nuclear Program: 2018 Update

A version of this article appeared in China Newsweek (Chinese). Questions from Li Jing of China Newsweek in conversation with Siegfried Hecker (Interview from October 2018).

Recently, the leaders of the two Koreas met again, and they signed a joint declaration which they said would bring peace to the Peninsula. How do you like the meeting and the declaration? Do you think it helpful to the denuclearizing? If so, how will it help?

The meeting was very positive. It helped to bring the two Koreas closer together and moved them in the direction of bringing peace to the Peninsula. The declaration was also positive, but somewhat vague. It offered the promise of denuclearization, but the difficult work remains to be done. The agreement on military cooperation is a big step in helping to reduce tensions between the two Koreas.

According to your assessment, what kind of nuclear capability does the North Korea have? Is it a de facto nuclear power?

There are many uncertainties about North Korea’s nuclear capabilities. However, based on what we know about its nuclear complex and the six nuclear tests it conducted, North Korea may have sufficient nuclear material, that is, plutonium and highly enriched uranium, for approximately 20 to 60 nuclear weapons, with 30 being the most likely number.

North Korea has a wide array of missile capabilities. It is quite likely that North Korea has miniaturized nuclear warheads to fit on the short-range SCUD missiles and medium-range Nodong missiles and therefore may be able to reach all of South Korea and most of Japan. North Korea has demonstrated that it can launch ICBM’s (Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles), but it has done so only on high flight trajectories rather than normal trajectories. That means it must do more missile tests before it has a reliable ICBM. It has also not demonstrated that it can make a nuclear warhead sufficiently small, light, and robust to survive an ICBM flight.

I do not consider North Korea to be a nuclear weapon state, but it is a state with nuclear weapons, which does make it a de facto nuclear power.

Do you think the North Korea positive measures, including dismantling the Punggye-ri site, bears any substantial significance in terms of denuclearization? Were these measures reversible?

Stopping nuclear testing and ICBM testing were important positive steps. Closing the Punggye-ri nuclear testing tunnels was also an important step. Yes, these can be reversed, but a resumption of nuclear testing will now require much time and will be easily visible.

Since this year, the situation of the Peninsula issue has been improving very fast. Did you feel surprised by such a turn of the Peninsula situation?

The Year 2017 was very dangerous because of the technical advances that North Korea made with its nuclear programs, namely the big nuclear test in September and the ICBM missile tests. In addition, the political rhetoric was extremely dangerous. However, many positive things happened in 2018. The most important is that politically, we stepped away from the precipice of war, and that is good news, and somewhat unexpected.

It is reported that a second summit between the US and the DPRK may take place. If it is true, what fruit do you think the summit can yield? Do you think the first summit between President Trump and Kim Jung-un has opened the door to the denuclearization?

Yes, the Singapore Summit definitely opened the door to a resolution of the North Korean nuclear crisis and the possibility of the denuclearization of the Peninsula. The summit was made possible by President Moon Jae-in and Chairman Kim Jong-un taking important steps toward reconciliation. And, President Trump welcomed the opening and met with Chairman Kim. The Singapore declaration was very basic focusing on the overall objective of normalization and denuclearization. It left the difficult work for the future. A second summit should now agree on specific steps toward denuclearization and normalization.

The US insists on no relief of sanctions before complete denuclearization, but the DPRK seems expecting a step-to-step model. The positions of the two sides are very far apart. Do you think the two sides can find some space to make compromise in order to press ahead with the denuclearization?

I believe a step-by-step approach will be necessary, but on the North Korean side the steps will have to significantly reduce the risks its nuclear program poses. On the American side, the steps will have to make progress on normalization. These kind of steps for each side should be on the agenda for the second summit.

It has been reported that after the Singapore summit, the US has asked the DPRK to provide a list of its nuclear capabilities, which was rejected and regarded as confrontational by the DPRK. How much knowledge do the outside world have about the DPRK nuclear capability? Will a list mean a total surrender to the US?

From my perspective, what is more important is to first take concrete steps to reduce the nuclear risks. Two such steps, namely, no nuclear testing and no ICBM missile tests have already been taken by the DPRK. Next in importance is to stop plutonium production. That means to dismantle the 5 MW-electric reactor in Yongbyon and not start the Experimental Light Water Reactor under construction.

It may be appropriate to ask North Korea for a list of the Yongbyon facilities early in the negotiation process, but I believe a full declaration is not yet possible. The level of trust required for such a declaration does not yet exist. Eventually, North Korea will, of course, have to provide full declaration and agree to a strict verification regime.

Do you think the six party talks will still be significant after the DPRK and the US are holding bilateral talks?

It is not clear to me whether or not the six-party talks will be useful. However, it is very important that the other parties, namely, China, Russia and Japan, each play a supportive role in the denuclearization and normalization process. Those roles and that of the UN Security Council are yet to be defined.

You have predicted in a report that the DPRK will not abandon its nuclear capability at least in the coming 15 years. What are the major hindrances to a complete denuclearization of the DPRK? Is there any possibility for the related parties to persuade and press the country to start the denuclearization in the near future?

My Stanford University colleagues, Robert Carlin and Elliot Serbin, and I have published a comprehensive history of the North Korean nuclear program. Based on that history we developed a 10-year roadmap for denuclearization, rather than the 15 years quoted in the news media. Actually, it is better to call this a “framework,” because the real roadmap will have to be determined through negotiations.

It recommends three phases toward denuclearization. The first is to “halt” – that is, don’t make it worse. Second, take specific steps to “roll back”, reduce the threat - so no nuclear testing, no missile testing, no more plutonium. The uranium facilities will also have to be addressed, but that will take more time because only the Yongbyon centrifuge facility is known. North Korea has more centrifuge facilities that will eventually have to be addressed. The third phase is to “eliminate” all weapons and facilities that support the nuclear weapon program. Those facilities that would support only a civilian program will have to be addressed during negotiations. Our framework indicated that the first phase could take up to one year, the second would take possibly four more, and the third would be completed by the tenth year.

This process could be accelerated if sufficient trust can be developed between the DPRK and the United States. One possible way to build trust and speed up the process is to have the US and South Korea tell Chairman Kim that they are willing to help him convert his military nuclear and missile programs to civilian nuclear and space programs. Having American and South Korean technical specialists working side-by-side with DPRK specialists at their nuclear and space facilities would provide the best approach to verification of denuclearization.

And, let me also say, there is a potential role here for China as well as for Russia. China can help the DPRK with nuclear reactors for electricity and Russia could provide launch services for DPRK satellites.

Based on the current advancement of the DPRK’s denuclearization and the possibility of a fruitful second Trump-Kim summit, do you think the DPRK’s process of denuclearization goes in a way as reflected by the three-phase approach in the ten-year roadmap put forward by you? Which one of the three phases is the most important and which one is the most difficult?

So far, North Korea has begun the first phase of our ten-year roadmap, namely to begin to halt nuclear development. Pyongyang has stopped nuclear testing and stopped long-range missile testing and has promised to dismantle facilities at the Dongchang-ri Satellite Launching Station. The next important step is to stop reactor operations so as not to produce more plutonium. The Trump administration is pressing for a declaration of North Korea’s nuclear inventory as the next step in the process. While a declaration at some point would be consistent with the three-phrase approach, right now it would not be as valuable as halting operations at Yongbyon and may in fact be counterproductive. I hope that the next Trump-Kim summit will start the second phase, that is to seriously roll back the nuclear and missile programs. The most difficult step will be the last one – that is, to eliminate all military nuclear and missile programs. That will require the development of trust between the two parties and help from the other parties such as South Korea, China and Russia.

When the DPRK allegedly dismantled the Punggye Ri nuclear test site, there was no international technical personnel present on the spot to witness. Based only on media reports, do you think it is possible to confirm the site has been substantially dismantled?

During the 7 October Kim-Pompeo meeting, Chairman Kim apparently agreed to allow international inspectors to the test site. This is a very important step to build confidence that North Korea is taking serious actions to halt their nuclear program. The inspectors should be able to assess how complete the destruction of the tunnels is and what would be required to re-activate them. For North Korea to give up nuclear testing is one of the most important steps in denuclearization.

How does the international community effectively monitor the denuclearization measures such as suspension of nuclear tests and launch of missiles, suspension of uranium enrichment? Are these measures reversible? If they resume such activities, will it take a long time and be visible to the outside world?

Monitoring an end to nuclear testing and long-range missile launches is easy. It can be done with great confidence. Monitoring the operation of the plutonium-producing reactors is also very effective using commercial satellite imagery. There is no way to monitor uranium enrichment facility operation without cooperation from North Korea. Of course, most operations are reversible. However, resuming nuclear testing will be difficult if the tunnels are effectively destroyed. To make plutonium production irreversible, the reactors would have to be incapacitated (poisoned or destroyed). There is not much that can be done to confirm the suspension or prevent the resumption of uranium enrichment because no one outside of North Korea knows where all the facilities are.

How should the US compensate for the DPRK’s real denuclearization? What incentives can the international community provide to the DPRK in terms of creating a more beneficial environment?

I would not look at this as compensation – we should not be viewed as paying off the North Koreans to give up their nuclear weapon program. Besides, I believe that what they want most is security guarantees. For this, one has to ask the North Koreans what they require. Since Chairman Kim appears very serious about improving North Korea’s economy, I believe he will ask for relief of sanctions so they can develop their economy. The US should be prepared to match North Korea’s denuclearization actions with steps toward political normalization and sanctions relief.

Based on the interactions of different parties this year, especially the negotiations between the US and the DPRK, how probably do you think the DPRK leader Kim Jung-un will be committed to a complete denuclearization? Compared with his father, is he more confident and more steadfast in embarking on the road of focusing on economic development?

The history of negotiations is long and complicated. No one outside of North Korea really knows what Kim Jung-un is prepared to do. However, he has taken important and encouraging steps toward denuclearization and expressed his deep commitment to economic development. Since the actions taken by Kim Jung-un, President Moon Jae-in and President Trump in 2018 have moved us away from the brink of war, I think it is time to test just how far Chairman Kim is willing to go toward denuclearization and normalization. Time will tell.