CISAC Central Conference Room, 2nd floor, Encina Hall
CISAC Conference Room
CISAC Central Conference Room, 2nd floor, Encina Hall
Through research and track-two diplomacy, CISAC scholars seek to identify policy oriented, cooperative measures aimed at fostering effective dialogue between Pakistan and India in an effort to enhance nuclear safety and security in the region.
Until recently, analysts of civil war focused their attention on the negotiation of peace agreements and paid scant attention to the implementation process. Rather legalistically, they assumed that a contract between state and insurgent leaders would remain binding in the post-agreement phase. In the 1980s and 1990s, however, negotiated agreements in such countries as Angola, Cambodia, Liberia, and Rwanda collapsed and resulted in new deadly violence. In some cases more blood was shed after the failure to implement a peace accord than before the peace negotiations began.
This paper examines the impact on global warming of development and structural changes in the electricity sector of Guangdong Province, China, together with the possible effect of international instruments such as are generated by the Kyoto Protocol on that impact. The purpose of the paper is three-fold: to examine and analyze the data available, to put that data into an explanatory economic and institutional framework, and to analyze the possible application of international instruments such as CDMs in that locality. Our plans are to supplement this work with similar work elsewhere in China.
This research contributes to two groups of existing studies. First, several researchers have studied China's energy industry, including the utility sector, in the context of global greenhouse gas emissions and abatement policies. Not much attention has been paid to the electricity sectoral development at the sub-national level and its regional differences. Yet, important decisions are taken and important constraints operate at the sub-national level. Second, since the Kyoto Protocol provided for the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) as a policy instrument to involve developing countries in carbon emissions abatement in 1997, a number of studies have focused on the operation of CDM. Applying CDM is challenging because its rule of additionality requires that a "baseline" estimate be made of what developing countries, including China, would do to reduce carbon emissions in the absence of CDM. Minimizing moral hazard and other incentive problems is a daunting task. The studies to date have focused on discussions of general embedded problems and desirable principles for applying the additionality rule. However, how to identify baseline factors in specific economies and evaluate their impact on the energy sector decisions in terms of transaction or institutional costs remain unsettled questions.
This study is a first step towards filling that gap. By investigating Guangdong's electricity sector, we hope to highlight new characteristics of Guangdong's electricity market and institutions, which may have been neglected from large model and highly aggregated approaches. At the same time, by examining the economic and institutional features of the decision making process in Guangdong's electricity sector, we hope to get a better understanding of the factors affecting possible baselines and to draw some preliminary implications for CDM and other carbon abatement policy instruments. This study may also provide a reference for other regional analyses and permit some preliminary implications for baseline and abatement policy studies to be drawn.
The United States has a global security strategy, in deeds if seldom clearly in words. The U.S. security strategy is to enlarge the areas of the world that it can control militarily and to weaken all states outside those areas. The strategy does not rely solely on military means, but enlarged military control is the end and military means--armed interventions, alliance extensions, arms sales--usually lead the way. Aside from a 1992 Pentagon trial balloon, which was poorly received though accurate enough as far as it went, and a few other statements, the strategy has been manifested via a series of consistent actions rather than formal statements.
Along with this overall strategy, the United States also has policies regarding nuclear weapons. Some of these policies are stated, some are tacit. The stated policies include de-emphasizing nuclear weapons, discouraging nuclear proliferation, and pursuing nuclear arms reductions, a comprehensive test ban, and other nuclear-arms-control measures. The tacit policy is reliance on deterrent nuclear forces to limit escalation of conventional conflicts and to offset the nuclear forces of other powers.
These two policies, military enlargement and reliance on nuclear stability and arms control, are not compatible. Continued enlargement backed or led by military force will not support de-emphasis of nuclear weapons, let alone nuclear disarmament. It may not support nuclear nonproliferation even among allies, depending on whether the United States is seen to become overextended or overcommitted at home or abroad. Military enlargement weakens support for several of the arms-control measures on the U.S. agenda. Enlargement is also likely to lead to crises that will test the stability of nuclear deterrence more seriously than it has been tested since the early years of the Cold War.
In this paper I first remind the reader of the main components of the U.S. military enlargement strategy. Next I describe why other states, given the U.S. enlargement strategy, find and will continue to find nuclear weapons useful. These states are not all potential opponents. Third, I explain how the U.S. enlargement strategy undermines nuclear arms control. What is more important, I show why it will inevitably lead to nuclear crises. Last, I discuss the alternative strategy of military restraint and show how it would ensure U.S. influence for a longer time and with greater safety than the present strategy of unilateral U.S. military enlargement.
The Project on Peace and Cooperation in the Asian-Pacific Region has been a cornerstone of research at the Center for International Security and Cooperation for three decades. It supports initiatives on security cooperation and tension reduction in the Asia-Pacific region with special emphasis on China and Korea. Currently, it focuses on Asian nuclear issues and Northeast Asia regional peace issues.
As part of a response to growing government concern over the threat of cyber attacks directed against critical national infrastructures, the National Security Agency (NSA) contracted with Stanford University in 1998 to undertake a multi-track program to provide a forum, develop information, and to analyze options for addressing this threat.
The program explores the applicability of international policy instruments, such as the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) sanctioned at Kyoto in 1997, to decisions regarding and prospects for energy sector modernization in provinces of China. Much of the cheapest ways to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions is to take advantage of low-cost opportunities for reductions wherever they arise in the world. Nevertheless, there is much uncertainty as to whether the CDM is the most practical and reliable way to ensure GHG reductions in developing countries.
