The January 3, 2026, U.S. “Operation Absolute Resolve” in Venezuela to capture and remove President Nicolás Maduro has raised urgent questions about its repercussions for the U.S.-China competition, Taiwan Strait security, American strategic priorities in the Indo-Pacific region, and U.S. allies and partners.

In two new episodes of the APARC Briefing series, Stanford scholars Larry Diamond, the Mosbacher Senior Fellow in Democracy at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI) and William L. Clayton Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, and APARC faculty affiliate Oriana Skylar Mastro, a center fellow at FSI, join host Kiyoteru Tsutsui, the director of APARC, to unravel what happened in Venezuela and the implications of the U.S. actions in Latin America for Taiwan, security and alliances in the Indo-Pacific, and U.S. relations with stakeholders in the region.

Both scholars agree that the U.S. mission in Venezuela is a precedent that likely emboldens rather than deters China in its Taiwan calculus, warning that the shift it represents in U.S. national security policy might detract from American capabilities in the Indo-Pacific region at a crucial moment. They also provide sobering advice for U.S. allies struggling to adjust to rapidly shifting geopolitical realities under the second Trump administration.

A Shocking Action in World Affairs

There is no dispute that the Maduro government has been deeply authoritarian, deeply corrupt, and deeply illegitimate, says Diamond, author of Ill Winds: Saving Democracy from Russian Rage, Chinese Ambition, and American Complacency. Yet the United States “has probably violated international law to intervene forcibly in the internal affairs of Venezuela and remove its political leader," creating enormous implications for the international community. If it does not pursue a strategy of systemic democratic change in Venezuela, “all of this will have been for naught, and it will have paid a tragic price in terms of international precedent and international legitimacy,” Diamond argues.

Beijing is already using the operation as a "discourse power win," depicting the United States as crushing sovereignty and international law, Mastro notes. Moreover, in addition to Venezuela, President Trump continues to make statements about Greenland, reiterating its importance for U.S. national security and his interest in acquiring the territory, which has alarmed European partners and exacerbated strains with NATO.

“For the first time since WWII, some European countries have declared the United States to be a security threat,” Mastro says. “So I am curious to see if the Chinese try to bring along the Venezuela case as well, to convince U.S. allies and partners to distance themselves from the United States, which would have significant repercussions for the global order and for the United States' role in it.”

A Risky Strategic Reorientation

By unilaterally bypassing international norms to wield power in its own "backyard," the United States may have set a precedent that China can now exploit to justify its own ambitions in Taiwan as a legitimate exercise of regional dominance.

Diamond remarks on this line of thought: “If the United States, as a hegemon, can just do what it wants to arrest and remove a leader, in its kind of declared sphere of influence, what's to stop Xi Jinping from doing the same in his sphere of influence, and with a democratic system in Taiwan, whose sovereignty he does not recognize?” 

On the other hand, many commentators have argued that Operation Absolute Resolve serves as a deterrent to Chinese aggression. Granted, there is no doubt that the operation was a remarkably successful military attack showcasing the capabilities of U.S. special forces, notes Mastro, who, alongside her academic career, also serves in the United States Air Force Reserve, for which she currently works at the Pentagon as deputy director of research for Global China Strategy. Nevertheless, she emphasizes that the United States cannot carry out a similar attack in Asia.

“There is no situation in which we ‘neutralize’ Chinese air defenses and then somehow do some sort of infiltration,” says Mastro, author of Upstart: How China Became a Great Power. The U.S. intervention in Venezuela, therefore, “does not tell us a lot, operationally, about what the United States is capable of in a contingency via China.”

More troubling, Mastro identifies the Venezuela operation as demonstrating a fundamental shift in U.S. strategic priorities, with the raid conducted just weeks after the Trump administration released its 2025 National Security Strategy, which prioritizes restoring “American preeminence in the Western Hemisphere.” Mastro characterizes it as “the one region where U.S. dominance faces no serious challenge.” Thus, Venezuela suggests “the Trump administration means business about the renewed focus on the Western Hemisphere, and, unfortunately, that makes me concerned that there might be strategic neglect of the Indo-Pacific moving forward,” she points out.

Diamond stresses that, virtually throughout the entire presidency of Xi Jinping, dating back to 2012, China has been rapidly building up its military capabilities, prioritizing those specifically suited for coercing, isolating, or potentially seizing Taiwan. Against this backdrop, “I am much more fearful about the future of Taiwan in the week following U.S. military action on January 3 in Venezuela than I was before that action.” 

Mastro agrees with this assessment about the ripple effects of the operation in Venezuela. “I would say that it probably emboldens China.”

Frank Advice for U.S. Allies

For U.S. allies in the Indo-Pacific, including Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and Australia, as well as allies and partners in Europe, both scholars offer pragmatic counsel for coping with the Trump administration.

Diamond urges U.S. allies to manage Trump diplomatically while staying focused on core interests, namely, prioritizing the preservation of the alliances and strengthening autonomous defense capabilities to demonstrate commitment and hedge against potential U.S. retrenchment.

“It takes constant, energetic, proactive, imaginative, relentless, and in some ways deferential working of the relationship, including the personal relationship between these leaders and Donald Trump [...] The future will be better if the leaders of these countries internalize that fundamental lesson about Trump.”

Mastro is equally direct about the limited alternatives ahead of U.S. allies: "You don't really have an option. That Chinese military – if it gives the United States problems, it definitely gives you problems. There's no hope for a country like Taiwan without the United States. There's no hope for Australia without the United States."

Counterintuitively, U.S. assertiveness may indicate its insecurity about the balance of power with China. “It seems to me that the United States also needs to be reassured that our allies and partners support us [...] And if we had that confidence, maybe the United States would be less aggressive in its use of military force.”

Watch the two APARC Briefing episodes:

🔸 What the U.S. Raid in Venezuela Means for Taiwan and Asia - with Larry Diamond >

🔸 Does Venezuela Provide China a Roadmap for Taiwan? – with Oriana Skylar Mastro >

This opinion piece originally appeared in The New York Times. 

Over the past 15 years, China has expanded its once-minimal military presence in the South China Sea into a significant one. Beijing has laid claim to nearly all of the strategic waterway, a vital shipping lifeline for the global economy that is rich in energy and fishery resources. China has used nonmilitary assets such as its Coast Guard, fishing vessels and maritime militia to bully its neighbors, blockade their ships and build Chinese military bases on disputed islands.

America is partly to blame. It has condemned China’s behavior, but, eager to avoid escalation, has consistently refrained from standing up militarily, which has only further emboldened Beijing. A new approach is needed. The United States must take real action to strengthen alliances and confront China before it eventually takes control of this hugely important body of water without firing a shot. 

Like any unchallenged bully, China has become increasingly aggressive. Last month, Chinese Coast Guard personnel attacked a Philippine supply vessel with axes and other crude weapons — Manila says a Filipino sailor and several others were injured — in one of the worst acts of violence between China and its rivals in the South China Sea in years. The incident took place near the Sierra Madre, a rusting World War II-era ship that the Philippines had beached 25 years ago at Second Thomas Shoal to assert its territorial claim. The shoal lies about 120 miles off the Philippine island of Palawan and is well within the nation’s exclusive economic zone.

China also had past territorial confrontations in the South China Sea or other waters on its periphery with Vietnam, the United States, Australia, Japan and Taiwan. In 2012, China took control of the disputed Scarborough Shoal from the Philippines, and run-ins between China and the Philippines have grown in number and intensity in recent years. In late May, President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. of the Philippines warned that any Filipino deaths caused by a “willful act” by a foreign force in the South China Sea would be “very close to what we define as an act of war.”

Concern has grown in Manila, Beijing and Washington that tensions in the South China Sea — perhaps even more than Taiwan — could trigger a conflict with China. These fears are overblown. I study Chinese military strength and strategy, and I’m convinced that if the United States were to take a more assertive stance in the South China Sea, Beijing would be likely to back down to avoid a war it knows it would lose.

China may enjoy military advantages in a potential conflict with Taiwan, which is just off the mainland. But its position is less secure in the South China Sea. Over the past 15 years China has built more than two dozen military outposts on disputed islands. Among the largest — at Mischief Reef, Fiery Cross Reef and Subi Reef — there are air strips, fighter jets, radar systems, and laser and jamming equipment. But so far China lacks sufficient antiaircraft and anti-ship missile systems in the region to deny U.S. forces the ability to operate, which leaves the Chinese bases vulnerable to air and naval bombardment.

And the South China Sea is vast — about half the size of the continental United States. The Sierra Madre is around 800 miles from the Chinese mainland. A conflict there would require the People’s Liberation Army to mount joint air and naval resupply operations and to refuel its fighters across great distances — something it has never done and is not equipped for.

If the Philippines is in the fight, treaty obligations would trigger the participation of the United States, which would have access to nine Philippine air and naval bases, greatly enhancing its already considerable ability to project military power in the region. China does have “carrier-killer” ballistic missiles based on its mainland. But U.S. carriers could still send fighters into parts of the South China Sea from outside the range of those missiles. In conjunction with land-based fighters operating from the Philippines, the United States could gain crucial air superiority over a Chinese surface fleet.

China has spent huge sums on its aircraft carrier program and has two in operation, with two more in development. But those still cannot rival the number or capabilities of nuclear-powered U.S. carriers, which are larger, support more aircraft and need to refuel only about every 20 years. China’s carriers need to be refueled about every six days. And learning how to effectively conduct carrier operations takes time; the Chinese have only just begun.

It’s telling that China has been careful to use Coast Guard and civilian vessels in its encounters with neighbors rather than hard military assets — the latter would signal an escalation that Beijing is not yet willing to embark on.

But there is another very good reason China is unlikely to risk war with the United States: It doesn’t need to. Its brinkmanship and use of nonmilitary assets to intimidate its Asian neighbors has been more than enough to take China from almost no military presence in the South China Sea in the late 2000s to a significant force today.

America should call China’s bluff and press its military advantage. This could include escorting Philippine resupply vessels headed to Second Thomas Shoal or even conducting some supply missions itself or with allies like Australia and Japan. This would send China the powerful message that its intimidation will no longer go unchallenged, while allowing Manila to remain visibly in the lead but part of a more enduring coalition. To save face for China, Washington could present operations like these as exercises or training to minimize pressure on Beijing to respond.

Manila is a strategically vital player in America’s regional competition with China. The United States and the Philippines should strengthen their alliance to allow for more U.S. bases in the Philippines and a stronger U.S. commitment to help defend against Chinese incursions into Philippine waters. Closer relations could also make it easier for the United States to resupply Taiwan from Philippine bases during a conflict with China and open the door for enhanced military cooperation with other South China Sea nations, whose fear of an unrestrained Beijing may be deterring them from taking that step. If China determines that its provocations are likely to draw in the United States, it might begin to moderate its behavior .

Of course, anything is possible — Beijing may respond with a full-on military escalation, a daunting prospect that should not be taken lightly. But that risk is low for a Chinese military whose own doctrine is to avoid any war in which victory is not ensured.

Neither U.S. option — standing up to China or backing down — is attractive. But unless the United States asserts itself, China will continue chipping away with its tactics of bluster and intimidation until its military presence in the South China Sea becomes so dominant that it no longer fears war.

The United States can re-establish a favorable balance of power, but it must act now.

An economist by training, Khanna advocates for new trade policies and strategic business partnerships to be front and center in U.S. diplomacy with China. This “rebalancing,” as Khanna termed it, is a call for both countries to pursue a fuller, more robust economic development strategy while continuing to engage with each other.

Drawing inspiration from President John F. Kennedy’s commencement address at American University in 1963, Khanna urged listeners not to view “conflict as inevitable, accommodation as impossible, and communication as nothing more than an exchange of threats,” when it comes to managing the U.S.-China relationship.

Instead, Khanna outlined four key principles he believes will be crucial to navigating the tense years ahead. These include:

1. An economic reset to reduce trade deficits and tensions
2. Open lines of communication
3. Effective military deterrence
4. Respect for Asian partners and robust economic engagement with the world

Khanna is clear-eyed that these goals will take time to realize. Bringing jobs back to the United States will require large investments in domestic infrastructure. Leaders in Washington will need patience, persistence, and help from partners outside of politics to bridge communication gaps and ensure Beijing picks up its phones in moments of tension. Reallocating defense spending in a way that is fair both to American taxpayers and partners like Taiwan will need cooperation from lawmakers on both sides of the aisle.

But Khanna is confident that these barriers can be overcome. 

“I believe a constructive rebalancing with China can maintain the peace,” he told the audience. “It will not happen overnight. It will not happen with one president or one congressman. But it will happen if all of us - military and business leaders, educators, unions, activists, foreign policy experts and students work toward this goal. [We will win by] helping our own nation flourish and by putting our system and our promise of freedom on display for the world to see.”

Click the link to read Congressman Khanna's full remarks on
"Constructive Rebalancing with China."