Two former Department of Defense (DoD) officials shared the stage at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI), where they discussed the decision to remove U.S. troops from northern Syria, women in the military, and the importance of public service.

Ash Carter — who served as secretary of defense from 2015 to 2017 — told Joe Felter — former deputy assistant secretary of defense for South and Southeast Asia — that he emphasized the importance of tradition and had high standards for good conduct from his employees when he was at the head of the DoD, which had 1.3 million active-duty employees in 2016, and is the largest employer in the world.

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“Even if you come into an organization and take over and your judgement is that it’s really quite broken, it’s still worth finding the things that it is good at and making the people proud of the things that they are already good at,” Carter said.

Felter asked Carter about a topic on the minds of some in Silicon Valley — the possible development of autonomous weapons — and whether the liability for harm should lie with the developer of technology, or those who make the decision to execute the use of the weapon.

“It’s going to be a shared responsibility,” Carter said. “The key thing is not to get lost in AI is human responsibility — AI is an aid to human decision-making, but at the end of the day, somebody is responsible.”

When asked about the relationship between tech companies and the government, Carter said he had encountered some tech leaders who didn’t think government mattered during the earlier days of his government service, but added that he has noticed a different attitude from young people today.

“My students know that something’s wrong in the relationship between tech and society… it brings a lot of great stuff, but it has brought some real darkness too, and we need to get on top of that,” Carter said. “And that’s how they want to spend their lives.”

When Felter asked Carter what he would say to a graduating Stanford student to encourage him or her to pursue a career in public service, Carter didn’t have to think twice before responding.

“I’d say, ‘Look, the building smells like your high school, the pay is terrible, and work conditions can be awful. But the mission is the best. And you’ll wake up every morning and be a part of something that is meaningful.’”

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Following the death of ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and the decision by President Donald Trump to remove U.S. troops from northern Syria, there are many questions surrounding the future of the region, which is controlled in part by Al-Qaeda-affiliated extremists, former Special Presidential Envoy for the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS Brett McGurk told Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies Director Michael McFaul on the World Class podcast.



ISIS initially gained momentum in Syria in 2012, when the government had eroded and a state of anarchy was developing, said McGurk, who is the Payne Distinguished Lecturer at the Center for International Security and Cooperation. “Starting in 2012 and 2013, thousands of foreign extremist fighters were pouring into Syria, looking for extremist groups to join. And Baghdadi’s guys — which became ISIS — basically took advantage of this.”

By 2014, ISIS controlled a territory with about eight million people and had revenues of about $1 billion a year, McGurk noted.

“I was an early advocate that we needed military force almost immediately,” he said. “To get someone recruited right into Syria, then go blow himself up at a kid’s soccer game, or an ice cream shop — if you have that pipeline, you know you have something pretty serious.” 

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The Anti-ISIS Strategy
In the summer of 2014, President Barack Obama decided to take action, with a few conditions: first, that the coalition against ISIS would be broad, and include countries outside of the United States; second, that U.S. troops would work with local partners in Iraq and Syria to fight the terror group; and third, that the coalition would share the costs and burdens associated with the military campaign.

“The campaign launched during the third week of August or so during that summer, and it was a real war,” McGurk said. “It was a very difficult, town-by-town struggle, but a successful war.”

The Death of al-Baghdadi
While al-Baghdadi will be replaced by a successor, the former ISIS leader is “somewhat irreplaceable,” said McGurk. He claimed to be a caliph — a religious leader in Islam believed to be a successor to the Prophet Mohammed — and in 2014 declared the territory controlled by ISIS in Iraq and Syria a caliphate, or Islamic state.

“People around the world who pledge allegiance to ISIS pledge allegiance to him — so Baghdadi is a unique figure,” McGurk said. “His removal from the scene is excellent news.”

Related: Read Brett McGurk’s thoughts on what it takes for U.S. foreign policy to succeed in the Middle East

Eighteen years ago, al-Qaeda operatives hijacked planes, toppled buildings, terrified an entire nation, and killed nearly 3,000 innocents. That the elaborate 9/11 plot went undetected will forever be remembered as one of the intelligence community’s worst failures. For many U.S. intelligence officials, memories of that day remain fresh, searing, and personal. Still hanging over the entrance to the CIA’s Counterterrorism Center is a sign that reads, “Today is September 12, 2001.” It’s a daily reminder of the agency’s determination to prevent future attacks—but also of the horrifying costs when intelligence agencies adapt too slowly to emerging threats.

For a decade after the Soviet Union’s collapse, the CIA and the FBI were mired in Cold War structures, priorities, processes, and cultures even as the danger of terrorism grew. My research has shown that even though many inside and outside U.S. intelligence agencies saw the terrorist threat coming and pressed for change years earlier, they could not get the necessary reforms enacted. The shock of 9/11 finally forced a reckoning—one that led to a string of counterterrorism successes, from foiled plots to the operation against Osama bin Laden. But now, nearly two decades later, America’s 17 intelligence agencies need to reinvent themselves once more, this time in response to an unprecedented number of breakthrough technologies that are transforming societies, politics, commerce, and the very nature of international conflict.

Read the Rest at The Atlantic.

Brett McGurk, the former Special Presidential Envoy for the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL, has had a busy summer. Between working on a new book contract, travelling to international security conferences on two continents and prepping for his upcoming class — “Presidential Decision-Making in Wartime” — which will be taught this fall at Stanford, the Payne Distinguished Lecturer at the Center for International Security and Cooperation sat down with the Freeman Spogli Institute to reflect on what he’s learned about Middle Eastern politics this summer.

FSI: You recently attended a number of conferences focused on international security. Tell us a little about where you’ve been and the conferences you participated in.

Sure. I was recently at a conference in Beijing sponsored by the Carnegie Foundation for International Peace that focused on China in the Middle East. This was a good opportunity to reconnect with former officials and experts on China and also to discuss with Chinese officials and academics how Beijing views its emerging role in the Middle East region. This is an important topic, and we intend to develop it further here at Stanford FSI through a combination program with CISAC and the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center. I recently published an article in the Atlantic on some of the themes from Beijing.

I also attended the Oslo Forum in Norway, which brings together top diplomats from around the world engaged in mediating the most difficult conflicts. UN envoys from Syria and Libya, for example, participate, as do leaders working on Yemen and other seemingly intractable crises. The main takeaway from that important conference was that there is a window of opportunity right now for active U.S. diplomacy to help de-escalate what are in effect proxy wars between regional powers. Libya is increasingly a conflict between long-time U.S. allies, with Turkey and Qatar on one side and UAE and Egypt on the other side. Yemen is a humanitarian catastrophe and UN mediation has opened the door to ceasefires and a path for winding down the war, which some of our key allies now support. 

Iran and extremists like al Qaeda and ISIS take advantage of proxy wars and vacuums – so it’s in our interests both from a humanitarian, geostrategic, and national security perspective to use diplomacy and other tools to end these conflicts. That was the focus of the Norway meetings.

In spectacular #Oslo today for the 2019 #OsloForum. Look forward to reconnecting with former counterparts and friends from around the globe, many trying largely on their own to mediate some of the world’s most intractable conflicts. @NorwayMFA pic.twitter.com/0DmTY7swW6

— Brett McGurk (@brett_mcgurk) June 18, 2019

To what extent did the U.S. participate in the Oslo Forum?

I was struck that the United States was largely absent. There were no U.S. officials at the Forum, for the first time as I can recall, and total lack of clarity on U.S. goals and objectives. On Syria, the top UN Envoy, Geir Pederson, attended as did a number of parties to the Syrian conflict, including from the Syrian Democratic Forces, which played a key role in defeating ISIS. 

There is some hope that Syria is approaching a stage for a meaningful political settlement; I’ve expressed some skepticism on that, again, due largely to questionable U.S. intent and commitment and the facts on the ground and in the region, which leave Washington with few good options. The sooner we acknowledge that reality the better because the situation can still get much worse. My recent article in Foreign Affairs delves into those issues in some detail.

You were at the Herzliya Conference in Israel. Did Iran’s nuclear program dominate the agenda? What else was top of mind for the conference organizers, presenters, and people in attendance?

Yes, I attended the annual security conference sponsored by Israel’s Institute for Policy and Strategy. It’s become a go-to event for assessing the direction of Middle East politics and Israeli policies in a difficult part of the world. I used to attend as a sitting official and it was great to be there as a private citizen.

Flying from San Francisco to Tel Aviv for the annual @HerzliyaConf which has become a go-to event for thinkers and practitioners on the Middle East. Look forward to reconnecting with former colleagues and new friends. @FSIStanford @CarnegieMEC pic.twitter.com/0se7WvGCG1

— Brett McGurk (@brett_mcgurk) June 28, 2019

Much of the focus this year, of course, was on Iran – but also on the internal situation inside Israel, President Donald Trump’s much-delayed Middle East peace plan, and the rift I mentioned earlier between Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and UAE on one side, with Turkey and Qatar on the other side. 

There was also an open question and significant discussion over whether current U.S. policies are worsening tensions in the region. Much of that will depend on whether the core White House assumption driving its Iran policy is correct. That assumption holds that maximum pressure against Iran will force Iran back to the negotiating table that Trump himself left and result in a better nuclear deal and more responsible Iranian behavior in the region. If that assumption is false, and Iran reacts to unilateral American pressure by forging stronger ties with China and Russia, restarting its illicit nuclear activities, and increasing its malign behavior in the region – then U.S. policy may have precisely the opposite effect than its stated intent. That would require Trump to either double down on pressure, to include military pressure, or back down from what is now a zero-sum bargaining position. 

For more on Brett McGurk’s policy recommendations on Iranian nuclear ambitions, read his Op-Ed in Bloomberg News.

On stated U.S. intent, there was also quite a bit of discussion about U.S. objectives, given that Trump says one thing and his national security team says something else, often within the same 24-hour time span.  This uncertainty, I would argue, is breeding more instability, not less.

There was an interesting “war game” conducted at the Herziliya Conference, which simulated direct negotiations between U.S. and Iranian officials. The game ended without producing an agreement. What do you make of that?

I participated in that war game. Having confronted the Iranians from the shadows and in direct face-to-face negotiations, I would say this simulation was fairly accurate and its findings important. My first conclusion was that it’s highly unlikely the Iranians are going to return to the table under the current circumstances and without some up-front concession (such as reinstating some waivers to allow limited export of oil) by the Trump administration.  Nobody likes that answer, but it’s a realistic assessment of Iranian decision-making and important if the U.S. objective is truly – as Trump says – to get back to the negotiating table for a better nuclear deal. 

I read recently that the Emir of Qatar, who visited Trump in the Oval Office in mid-July, told the president the same thing.  So even our close friends in the region have this assessment. It means, if you want to get back to the negotiating table, then you need to create a pretext with some up-front steps, to be taken both from Washington and from Tehran.  A creative package, for example, might offer some limited sanctions relief and also demand release of Americans held in Iranian prisons. Absent something like that, relying on pressure alone, there are unlikely to be any talks.

How did the simulated negotiations between the U.S. and Iran unfold?

Presuming you get to the stage of talks, which was the focus of the simulation, the position of the two sides are irreconcilable. Iran was willing to consider some amendments to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action – but from the U.S. side, that was insufficient. We demanded, as Secretary of State Mike Pompeo has demanded, a total abandonment of Iran’s enrichment program, defunding proxy militias throughout the region, cabining the ballistic missile program, and other measures. The talks totally broke down after a number of rounds, and risks of a conflict increased significantly. It’s better to have no talks than ill-prepared talks where the U.S. is not even clear on what it’s hoping to achieve or has demands that are known non-starters.

The only silver lining was that if the goal is a strengthened nuclear deal that truly blocks Iran’s path to a weapon in perpetuity, while allowing a civilian program, then it’s achievable. Trump has said that’s the goal. If so, there is a path. But that’s a far more limited goal than what has been discussed by his national security team. The more ambitious objectives are unlikely to be met, and without a realistic objective, the talks themselves are unlikely to get off the ground.

A more comprehensive approach for Iran: 1) Naval coalition to protect shipping; 2) On-ramp to strengthen nuke deal; 3) Diplomacy to de-escalate proxy wars; 4) Treat Iranian people as allies (end travel ban); 5) Keep focus on ISIS: don't leave Iraq/Syria. https://t.co/BBNVtbLEhn

— Brett McGurk (@brett_mcgurk) June 26, 2019

Have you participated in “war games” like this one before?

I don’t like the phrase “war game” because it suggests something trite like a game or reenactment; in fact, simulations like this are among the best tools we have to predict the future and prepare for contingencies in foreign policy. Even with all the tools and information available to a policy-maker at the most senior level, humans can’t predict the future. Well-run simulations alert you to policy adjustments that may be necessary. We used them quite a bit during the campaign to defeat ISIS and to good effect. A famous war game, SIGMA II, run out of the Pentagon in 1965 predicted perfectly what would happen if the U.S. pursued its graduated pressure campaign against North Vietnam – a quagmire that sucked in multiple U.S. divisions.

So these simulations are important. I hope the administration is conducting them on Iran, though I tend to doubt they are, at least not at the highest levels. Sound foreign policy depends on setting clear and achievable objectives, marshaling the resources for achieving them, and regularly testing assumptions to make adjustments as circumstances warrant.

I recently published an essay in Foreign Affairs on the misalignment of ends and means with respect to Trump’s foreign policies in Syria, Venezuela, and Iran. That’s generally a recipe for either a failed policy or unintended consequences that box presidents into decisions they don’t want to make: either double down on resources or ratchet back objectives.

Did you have a chance to reconnect with old friends from your many years as a U.S. diplomat in the Middle East?

I did, and I also caught up with a number of former colleagues still serving in the Trump administration. They are a dedicated group and doing all they can under difficult circumstances. I could not hide my enthusiasm for being out of Washington and out here at Stanford. Stanford is just an incredible place to think deeply and differently about the issues now confronting our nation and the world.

You start teaching in the Ford Dorsey Master’s in International Policy program in the fall quarter.  Can you tell us a bit about your course?

Sure. In the fall I will teach “Presidential Decision-Making in Wartime.” It’s a course about how the most consequential decisions – war and peace – are made in reality, particularly since 9/11. We will dive into the essential laws of strategy such as setting clear objectives, aligning ends, ways, and means, and what happens when those essential laws are ignored. I hope it will give students the tools to ask the right questions if they are ever in the Situation Room with a chance to influence the course of history for the better. 

Most debacles have this same basic flaw of ignoring what I call the iron law of strategy and alignment of ends, ways, and means. Even for students not heading towards a national security career, the tools and elements of strategic thinking are broadly applicable. 
 

China is making a risky bet in the Middle East. By focusing on economic development and adhering to the principle of noninterference in internal affairs, Beijing believes it can deepen relations with countries that are otherwise nearly at war with one another—all the while avoiding any significant role in the political affairs of the region. This is likely to prove naive, particularly if U.S. allies begin to stand up for their interests.

In meetings I attended earlier this month in Beijing on China’s position in the Middle East, sponsored by the Carnegie-Tsinghua Center, Chinese officials, academics, and business leaders expressed a common view that China can avoid political entanglement by promoting development from Tehran to Tel Aviv. China may soon find, however, that its purely transactional approach is unsustainable in this intractable region—placing its own investments at risk and opening new opportunities for the United States.

Over the past three years, China has charted an ambitious future in the Middle East by forging “comprehensive strategic partnerships” with Iran, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt. This is the highest level of diplomatic relations China can provide, and Beijing believes these four countries anchor a neutral position that will prove more stable over the long term than that of the United States. China has also made massive investments in infrastructure throughout the region, including in Israel, where China is now the second-largest trading partner behind the United States.

China’s interests in the Middle East are both structural and strategic. Structurally, China needs the natural resources of the region, whereas the United States—now the world’s largest oil producer—does not. China is also seeking new markets to absorb its excess industrial capacity, and sees the Middle East poised for growth after decades of wars, woeful infrastructure, and popular discontent. Strategically, together with Russia, China is taking advantage of the uncertainty produced by ever-shifting U.S. policies, including zero-sum prescriptions for Iran and Syria that are unlikely to produce desired outcomes anytime soon. Regional governments in turn have welcomed China’s embrace, and its offer of investment without pressure to politically reform or respect human rights.

China’s President Xi Jinping previewed this more assertive Middle East strategy in a landmark address in Cairo three years ago. There, he declared that China does not seek a “sphere of influence” in the region—even while sinking nearly $100 billion in investments there through ports, roads, and rail projects. He alleged China rejects “proxy” contests—even while concluding a strategic partnership with Iran, the main sponsor of proxies in the region. And he warned against “all forms of discrimination and prejudice against any specific ethnic group and religion”—even while reportedly forcing 1 million Muslims into reeducation camps in China’s Xinjiang province.

Such contradictions can be maintained only so long as traditional U.S. allies in the region now welcoming Chinese investment allow them to be maintained. These U.S. allies do not shy from asserting their broader interests with Washington or expressing disagreement where policies diverge, and it is time they do the same with Beijing.

As the United States questions Chinese investment and intentions, particularly in the areas of technology and ports such as Israel’s Haifa, it can also challenge traditional allies as to whether they are granting China a free ride on what remains a largely U.S.-led security architecture. Such an arrangement should be as unacceptable to American partners in the region as it is to Washington. At the very least, these partners, together with Washington, can demand that Beijing utilize its emerging influence—particularly with Tehran and Damascus—to pursue measures that promote longer-term stability.

Read the rest at The Atlantic.