This research project launched in 2009 traces the evolution of militant organizations and the interactions that develop among them over time. Findings have been presented in interactive maps on a separate website.
Whitfield Diffie is a consulting scholar at CISAC. He was a visiting scholar in 2009-2010 and an affiliate from 2010-2012. He is best known for the discovery of the concept of public key cryptography, in 1975, which he developed along with Stanford University Electrical Engineering Professor Martin Hellman. Public key cryptography, which revolutionized not only cryptography but also the cryptographic community, now underlies the security of internet commerce.
During the 1980s, Diffie served as manager of secure systems research at Northern Telecom. In 1991, he joined Sun Microsystems as distinguished engineer and remained as Sun fellow and chief security officer until the spring of 2009.
Diffie spent the 1990s working to protect the individual and business right to use encryption, for which he argues in the book Privacy on the Line, the Politics of Wiretapping and Encryption, which he wrote jointly with Susan Landau. Diffie is a Marconi fellow and the recipient of a number of awards including the National Computer Systems Security Award (given jointly by NIST and NSA) and the Franklin Institute's Levy Prize.
Condoleezza Rice is the Thomas and Barbara Stephenson Senior Fellow on Public Policy at the Hoover Institution and professor of political science at Stanford University.
From January 2005 to 2009, she served as the 66th secretary of state of the United States. Before serving as America's chief diplomat, she served as assistant to the president for national security affairs (national security adviser) from January 2001 to 2005.
Rice joined the Stanford University faculty as a professor of political science in 1981 and served as Stanford University's provost from 1993 to 1999. She was a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution from 1991 to 1993 and returned to the Hoover Institution after serving as provost until 2001. As a professor, Rice won two of the highest teaching honors: the 1984 Walter J. Gores Award for Excellence in Teaching and the 1993 School of Humanities and Sciences Dean's Award for Distinguished Teaching.
She has authored and coauthored several books, including Germany Unified and Europe Transformed: A Study in Statecraft (1995), with Philip Zelikow, The Gorbachev Era (1986), with Alexander Dallin, and Uncertain Allegiance: The Soviet Union and the Czechoslovak Army (1984).
Rice served as a member of the boards of directors for the Chevron Corporation, the Charles Schwab Corporation, the Transamerica Corporation, and the International Advisory Council of J.P. Morgan. She was a founding board member of the Center for a New Generation, an educational support fund for schools in East Palo Alto and East Menlo Park, California, and was vice president of the Boys and Girls Club of the Peninsula. In addition, she has served on several local and national boards of foundations and charitable organizations.
She currently serves as a member of the board of trustees of the John F. Kennedy Center for the Performing Arts. In addition, she is a fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.
Rice earned her bachelor's degree in political science, cum laude and Phi Beta Kappa, from the University of Denver in 1974; her master's from the University of Notre Dame in 1975; and her Ph.D. from the Graduate School of International Studies at the University of Denver in 1981.
CISAC Conference Room
Martha Crenshaw, a senior fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC), has been awarded $500,000 by the National Science Foundation to identify patterns in the evolution of terrorist organizations and to analyze their comparative development.
The three-year grant is part of the Department of Defense's Minerva Initiative launched in 2008, which focuses on "supporting research related to basic social and behavioral science of strategic importance to U.S. national security policy."
Crenshaw's interdisciplinary project, "Mapping Terrorist Organizations," will analyze terrorist groups and trace their relationships over time. It will be the first worldwide, comprehensive study of its kind-extending back to the Russian revolutionary movement up to Al Qaeda today.
"We want to understand how groups affiliate with Al Qaeda and analyze their relationships," Crenshaw said. "Evolutionary mapping can enhance our understanding of how terrorist groups develop and interact with each other and with the government, how strategies of violence and non-violence are related, why groups persist or disappear, and how opportunities and constraints in the environment change organizational behavior over time."
According to Crenshaw, it is critical to understand the organization and evolution of terrorism in multiple contexts. "To craft effective counter-terrorism strategies, governments need to know not only what type of adversary they are confronting but its stage of organizational development and relationship to other groups," Crenshaw wrote in the project summary. "The timing of a government policy initiative may be as important as its substance."
"Mapping Terrorist Organizations" will incorporate research in economics, sociology, business, biology, political science and history. It will include existing research to build a new database using original language sources rather than secondary analyses. The goal is to produce an online database and series of interactive maps that will generate new observations and research questions, Crenshaw said.
The results, for example, could reveal the structure of violent and non-violent opposition groups within the same movements or conflicts, and identify patterns that explain how these groups evolve over time. Such findings could be used to analyze the development of Al Qaeda and its Islamist or jihadist affiliates, including the Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan, she said.
The findings may also shed light on what happens when a group splits due to leadership quarrels or when a government is overturned, Crenshaw said. "Analysis that links levels of terrorist violence to changes in organizational structures and explains the complex relationships among actors in protracted conflicts will break new ground," the summary noted.
Extensive information on terrorist groups already exists, but it has been difficult to compile and analyze. Despite such obstacles, Crenshaw said, violent organizations can be understood in the same terms as other political or economic groups. "Terrorist groups are not anomalous or unique," she wrote. "In fact, they can be compared to transnational activist networks."
Crenshaw should know. Widely respected as a pioneer in terrorism studies, the political scientist was one of a handful of scholars who followed the subject decades before the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001. She joined CISAC in 2007, following a long career at Wesleyan University, where she was the Colin and Nancy Campbell Professor of Global Issues and Democratic Thought. In addition to her research at Stanford, Crenshaw is a lead investigator at START, the Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and the Response to Terrorism at the University of Maryland.
End goal
Crenshaw wants to use the findings to better analyze how threats to U.S. security evolve over time. "Terrorist attacks on the United States and its allies abroad often appear to come without warning, but they are the result of a long process of organizational development," she wrote. "Terrorist organizations do not operate in isolation from a wider social environment. Without understanding processes of development and interaction, governments may miss signals along the way and be vulnerable to surprise attack. They may also respond ineffectively because they cannot anticipate the consequences of their actions." The project seeks to find patterns in the evolution of terrorism and to explain their causes and consequences. This, in turn, should contribute to developing more effective counter-terrorism policy, Crenshaw said.
Conflicts to be mapped
'Survival' editor's note:
In the June-July 2009 issue of the journal 'Survival,' Scott D. Sagan argued the current case for the United States to adopt a declaratory policy of nuclear no first use. 'Survival' invited four experts from Europe, Asia and North America to comment on Sagan's argument. The author concludes the debate with his own final thoughts.
Note from editor of Survival:
In the June-July 2009 issue of Survival, Professor Scott D. Sagan argued the current case for the United States to adopt a declaratory policy of nuclear no first use. Survival invited four experts from Europe, Asia and North America (listed below) to comment on Sagan's argument, with a final conclusion from the author:
Morton H. Halperin worked on nuclear issues in the Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon and Clinton administrations in the Department of Defense, the National Security Council and the State Department. He is a member of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States and senior advisor to the Open Society Institute. He has written numerous books and articles on nuclear policy.
Bruno Tertrais is a senior research fellow at the Paris-based Foundation for Strategic Research and a contributing editor to Survival. He is the author of War Without End (New York: The New Press, 2005).
Keith B. Payne is president and co-founder of the National Institute for Public Policy, head of the Graduate Department of Defense and Strategic Studies of Missouri State University, Washington, D.C. campus, a member of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Review of the United States, Policy Panel chairman of the U.S. Strategic Command's Senior Advisory Group, and a member of the Department of State's International Security Advisory Board.
K. Subrahmanyam is an Indian strategic analyst and journalist. He served as the director of the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses and has held a number of other government positions, including chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee.
Scott D. Sagan is professor of political science at Stanford University and co-director of Stanford's Center for International Security and Cooperation.
The global nuclear order is changing. Concerns about climate change, the volatility of oil prices, and the security of energy supplies have contributed to a widespread and still-growing interest in the future use of nuclear power. Thirty states operate one or more nuclear power plants today, and according to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), some 50 others have requested technical assistance from the agency to explore the possibility of developing their own nuclear energy programs. This surge of interest in nuclear energy - labeled by some proponents as ‘the renaissance in nuclear power' - is occurring simultaneously with mounting concerns about the healthy of the nuclear nonproliferation regime, the regulatory framework that constrains and governs the world's civil and military- related nuclear affairs. The question then arises: is it possible to have nuclear power without nuclear proliferation? The answer is not clear, for the technical, economic, and political factors that will determine whether future generations will have more nuclear power without more nuclear proliferation are exceedingly complex and interrelated. Dr. Sagan will outline the current state of nuclear power and nuclear proliferation, before examining the weaknesses and promise of existing research on the subject. He argues that a key aspect of ensuring a safe nuclear future will be the strengthening of the NPT through "shared responsibility" for disarmament.
Scott Sagan is a professor of political science and co-director of Stanford's Center for International Security and Cooperation. Before joining the Stanford faculty, Sagan was a lecturer in the Department of Government at Harvard University and served as a special assistant to the director of the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the Pentagon. He has also served as a consultant to the office of the Secretary of Defense and at the Sandia National Laboratory and the Los Alamos National Laboratory.
Sagan is the author of Moving Targets: Nuclear Strategy and National Security (Princeton University Press, 1989), The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons (Princeton University Press, 1993), and with co-author Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed (W.W. Norton, 2002). He is the co-editor of Peter R. Lavoy, Scott D. Sagan, and James L. Wirtz, Planning the Unthinkable (Cornell University Press, 2000) and the editor of Inside Nuclear South Asia (Stanford University Press, 2009). His most recent publications include "The Case for No First Use," Survival (June 2009) and "Good Faith and Nuclear Disarmament Negotiations" in George Perkovich and James A. Acton (eds.) Abolishing Nuclear Weapons: A Debate (Carnegie Endowment, 2009).
Allen S. Weiner is senior lecturer in law and co-director of the Stanford Program in International Law at Stanford Law School. He is also the co-director of the Stanford Center on International Conflict and Negotiation. His expertise is in the field of public international law and the foreign relations law of the United States. He is a seasoned international lawyer with experience in such wide-ranging fields as national security law, the law of war, international dispute resolution, and international criminal law. His current scholarship focuses on international law and the response to the contemporary security threats of international terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. For more than a decade he practiced international law in the U.S. Department of State, serving as an attorney-adviser in the Office of the Legal Adviser and as legal counselor at the U.S. Embassy in The Hague. In those capacities, he advised government policy-makers, negotiated international agreements, and represented the United States in litigation before the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal and the International Court of Justice. He teaches courses in public international law, international conflict resolution, and international security matters at Stanford Law School. He received a BA from Harvard College and a JD from Stanford Law School.
CISAC Conference Room
CISAC
Stanford University
Encina Hall, E202
Stanford, CA 94305-6165
Scott D. Sagan is Co-Director and Senior Fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation, the Caroline S.G. Munro Professor of Political Science, and the Bass University Fellow in Undergraduate Education at Stanford University. He also serves as Co-Chair of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences’ Committee on International Security Studies. Before joining the Stanford faculty, Sagan was a lecturer in the Department of Government at Harvard University and served as special assistant to the director of the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the Pentagon.
Sagan is the author of Moving Targets: Nuclear Strategy and National Security (Princeton University Press, 1989); The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons (Princeton University Press, 1993); and, with co-author Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: An Enduring Debate (W.W. Norton, 2012). He is the co-editor of Insider Threats (Cornell University Press, 2017) with Matthew Bunn; and co-editor of The Fragile Balance of Terror (Cornell University Press, 2022) with Vipin Narang. Sagan was also the guest editor of a two-volume special issue of Daedalus: Ethics, Technology, and War (Fall 2016) and The Changing Rules of War (Winter 2017).
Recent publications include “Creeds and Contestation: How US Nuclear and Legal Doctrine Influence Each Other,” with Janina Dill, in a special issue of Security Studies (December 2025); “Kettles of Hawks: Public Opinion on the Nuclear Taboo and Noncombatant Immunity in the United States, United Kingdom, France, and Israel”, with Janina Dill and Benjamin A. Valentino in Security Studies (February 2022); “The Rule of Law and the Role of Strategy in U.S. Nuclear Doctrine” with Allen S. Weiner in International Security (Spring 2021); “Does the Noncombatant Immunity Norm Have Stopping Power?” with Benjamin A. Valentino in International Security (Fall 2020); and “Just War and Unjust Soldiers: American Public Opinion on the Moral Equality of Combatants” and “On Reciprocity, Revenge, and Replication: A Rejoinder to Walzer, McMahan, and Keohane” with Benjamin A. Valentino in Ethics & International Affairs (Winter 2019).
In 2022, Sagan was awarded Thérèse Delpech Memorial Award from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace at their International Nuclear Policy Conference. In 2017, he received the International Studies Association’s Susan Strange Award which recognizes the scholar whose “singular intellect, assertiveness, and insight most challenge conventional wisdom and intellectual and organizational complacency" in the international studies community. Sagan was also the recipient of the National Academy of Sciences William and Katherine Estes Award in 2015, for his work addressing the risks of nuclear weapons and the causes of nuclear proliferation. The award, which is granted triennially, recognizes “research in any field of cognitive or behavioral science that advances understanding of issues relating to the risk of nuclear war.” In 2013, Sagan received the International Studies Association's International Security Studies Section Distinguished Scholar Award. He has also won four teaching awards: Stanford’s 1998-99 Dean’s Award for Distinguished Teaching; Stanford's 1996 Hoagland Prize for Undergraduate Teaching; the International Studies Association’s 2008 Innovative Teaching Award; and the Monterey Institute for International Studies’ Nonproliferation Education Award in 2009.
Stanford Law School
559 Nathan Abbott Way
Neukom Faculty Office Building, Room N238
Stanford, CA 94305-8610
Allen S. Weiner is senior lecturer in law and director of the Stanford Program in International Law at Stanford Law School. He is also the co-director of the Stanford Center on International Conflict and Negotiation. He is an international legal scholar with expertise in such wide-ranging fields as international and national security law, the law of war, international conflict resolution, and international criminal law (including transitional justice). His scholarship focuses on international law and the response to the contemporary security threats of international terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and situations of widespread humanitarian atrocities. He also explores the relationship between international and domestic law in the context of asymmetric armed conflicts between the United States and nonstate groups and the response to terrorism. In the realm of international conflict resolution, his highly multidisciplinary work analyzes the barriers to resolving violent political conflicts, with a particular focus on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Weiner’s scholarship is deeply informed by experience; for more than a decade he practiced international law in the U.S. Department of State, serving as an attorney-adviser in the Office of the Legal Adviser and as legal counselor at the U.S. Embassy in The Hague. In those capacities, he advised government policy-makers, negotiated international agreements, and represented the United States in litigation before the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, and the International Court of Justice. He teaches courses in public international law, international conflict resolution, and international security matters at Stanford Law School.
Weiner is the author of "Constitutions as Peace Treaties: A Cautionary Tale for the Arab Spring” in the Stanford Law Review Online (2011) and co-author (with Barry E. Carter) of International Law (6th ed. 2011). Other publications include “The Torture Memos and Accountability" in the American Society of International Law Insight (2009), "Law, Just War, and the International Fight Against Terrorism: Is It War?", in Intervention, Terrorism, and Torture: Contemporary Challenges to Just War Theory (Steven P. Lee, ed.) (2007), ”Enhancing Implementation of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1540: Report of the Center on International Security and Cooperation” (with Chaim Braun, Michael May & Roger Speed) (September 2007), and "The Use of Force and Contemporary Security Threats: Old Medicine for New Ills?", Stanford Law Review (2006).
Weiner has worked on several Supreme Court amicus briefs concerning national security and international law issues, including cases brought involving "war on terror" detainees. He has also submitted petitions before the United Nations Working Group on Arbitrary Detention on behalf of Vietnamese social and political activists detained by their governing for the exercise of free speech rights.
Weiner earned a BA from Harvard College and a JD from Stanford Law School.
Ambivalent nuclear technologies use or have a potential to produce nuclear weapon relevant materials like highly enriched uranium (HEU), plutonium, tritium and U233. It is important to assess the proliferation potential and measures to strengthen the proliferation resistance of these technologies as early as possible (preventively) to find alternative more proliferation resistant designs or at least to identify sensitive parameters or even critical parts that should trigger international safeguards and export controls.
The conclusions of different case studies investigating the proliferation resistance of nuclear technologies such as spallation neutron sources, tokamak fusion reactors and plutonium fuels will be briefly presented. The main part of the talk will focus on the minimization or elimination of civil HEU usage and the role of research reactor conversion to the use of low enriched uranium, which is intrinsically more proliferation resistant. The conversion of the German high flux research reactor FRM-II will serve as an example for the complex political and technological challenges and problems one has to face, especially, if proliferation concerns are not taken seriously in the research and design phase. These case studies of relatively disparate nuclear technologies have in common that they are neutron producing technologies and some questions regarding their proliferation potential can be addressed using neutronic codes.
Finally, the talk will briefly outline the future research of the next year addressing centrifuge technology as another case study to explicate on exemplary basis general criteria for the proliferation resistant use of nuclear technologies.
Matthias Englert is a
postdoctoral fellow at CISAC. Before joining CISAC in 2009, Matthias was a
researcher at the Interdisciplinary Research Group Science Technology and
Security (IANUS) and a PhD student at the department of physics at Darmstadt
University of Technology in Germany.
His major research interests include nonproliferation, disarmament, arms control, nuclear postures and warheads, fissile material and production technologies, the civil use of nuclear power and its role in future energy scenarios and the possibility of nuclear terrorism. His research during his stay at CISAC focuses primarily on the technology of gas centrifuges for uranium enrichment, the implications of its use for the nonproliferation regime and on technical and political measures to manage the proliferation risks.
Matthias has been participating in projects investigating technical aspects of the concept of proliferation resistance with topics spanning from conversion of research reactors, uranium enrichment with gas centrifuges, reducing plutonium stockpiles with reactor based options, spallation neutron sources and fusion power plants. Further research topics included fissile material stockpiles, fuel-cycles and accelerator driven systems. Although a substantial part of his professional work of the last years was quite technical he is equally interested in and actively studies the historical, social and political aspects of the use of nuclear technologies. Research interests include the dispute about Article IV of the NPT, the future development of the NPT regime, possibilities for a nuclear weapon free world, preventive arms control, and history and development of proliferation relevant programs. By studying contemporary theory in philosophy of the interaction of science, technology and society, Matthias acquired analytical tools to reflect on approaches describing or addressing the problem of ambivalent technology.
Matthias is a vice speaker of the working group Physics and Disarmament of the German Physical Society (DPG) and a board member of the German Research Association for Science, Disarmament and Security (FONAS).
Michael May is Professor Emeritus (Research) in the Stanford University School of Engineering and a senior fellow with the Institute for International Studies at Stanford University. He is the former co-director of Stanford University's Center for International Security and Cooperation, having served seven years in that capacity through January 2000. May is a director emeritus of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, where he worked from 1952 to 1988, with some brief periods away from the Laboratory. While there, he held a variety of research and development positions, serving as director of the Laboratory from 1965 to 1971. May was a technical adviser to the Threshold Test Ban Treaty negotiating team; a member of the U.S. delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks; and at various times has been a member of the Defense Science Board, the General Advisory Committee to the AEC, the Secretary of Energy Advisory Board, the RAND Corporation Board of Trustees, and the Committee on International Security and Arms Control of the National Academy of Sciences. He is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations and the Pacific Council on International Policy, and a Fellow of the American Physical Society and the American Association for the Advancement of Science. May received the Distinguished Public Service and Distinguished Civilian Service Medals from the Department of Defense, and the Ernest Orlando Lawrence Award from the Atomic Energy Commission, as well as other awards. His current research interests are in the area of nuclear and terrorism, energy, security and environment, and the relation of nuclear weapons and foreign policy.
Reuben W. Hills Conference Room
Michael May is Professor Emeritus (Research) in the Stanford University School of Engineering and a senior fellow with the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University. He is the former co-director of Stanford University's Center for International Security and Cooperation, having served seven years in that capacity through January 2000.
May is a director emeritus of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, where he worked from 1952 to 1988, with some brief periods away from the Laboratory. While there, he held a variety of research and development positions, serving as director of the Laboratory from 1965 to 1971.
May was a technical adviser to the Threshold Test Ban Treaty negotiating team; a member of the U.S. delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks; and at various times has been a member of the Defense Science Board, the General Advisory Committee to the AEC, the Secretary of Energy Advisory Board, the RAND Corporation Board of Trustees, and the Committee on International Security and Arms Control of the National Academy of Sciences. He is a member of the International Institute on Strategic Studies, and a Fellow of the American Physical Society and the American Association for the Advancement of Science.
May received the Distinguished Public Service and Distinguished Civilian Service Medals from the Department of Defense, and the Ernest Orlando Lawrence Award from the Atomic Energy Commission, as well as other awards.
His current research interests are nuclear weapons policy in the US and in other countries; nuclear terrorism; nuclear and other forms of energy and their impact on the environment, health and safety and security; the use of statistics and mathematical models in the public sphere.
May is continuing work on creating a secure future for civilian nuclear applications. In October 2007, May hosted an international workshop on how the nuclear weapon states can help rebuild the consensus underlying the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Proceedings and a summary report are available online or by email request. May also chaired a technical working group on nuclear forensics. The final report is available online.
In April 2007, May in cooperation with former Secretary of Defense William J. Perry and Professor Ashton Carter of Harvard hosted a workshop on what would have to be done to be ready for a terrorist nuclear detonation. The report is available online at the Preventive Defense Project. A summary, titled, "The Day After: Action Following a Nuclear Blast in a U.S. City," was published fall 2007 in Washington Quarterly and is available online.
Recent work also includes a study of nuclear postures in several countries (2007 - 2009); an article on nuclear disarmament and one on tactical nuclear weapons; and a report with Kate Marvel for the American Academy of Arts and Sciences on possible game changers in the nuclear energy industry.
Stanford's Center for International Security and Cooperation may be far from Washington, D.C., but its influence inside the Beltway has been underscored by five scholars tapped to serve in the Obama administration. Paul Stockton, Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, Michael McFaul, Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall and Jeremy Weinstein have all been closely affiliated with the center, known by its acronym CISAC, in the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI).
"I just can't tell you how often I've been in government meetings where the connection I have to people is CISAC," said McFaul, who was FSI's deputy director until he was named special assistant to President Barack Obama and senior director for Russian and Eurasian affairs at the National Security Council (NSC). McFaul, who also served as director of FSI's Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law (CDDRL), is a former CISAC scholar. "You know, CISAC is thick in the U.S. government," he said.
CISAC is an interdisciplinary research center that focuses on tackling some of the world's toughest security issues through developing innovative, policy relevant research and providing independent advice to governments. It also trains the next generation of security specialists through its undergraduate honors program and by offering fellowships for graduate students and mid-career experts.
Sherwood-Randall, a special assistant to Obama and the NSC's senior director for European affairs, works closely with McFaul. At Stanford, she participated in the Preventive Defense Project (PDP), which former U.S. Defense Secretary William Perry jointly heads at CISAC. "When I wrote my doctoral dissertation in the early 1980s, one of my conclusions was that relationships among the key players made a decisive difference in the practice and outcomes of statecraft," Sherwood-Randall said. "Nothing could be truer today. At the NSC, I work for National Security Advisor James L. Jones, whom I initially met while working on a PDP project."
Longstanding relationships continue with Weinstein, an associate professor of political science and CISAC and CDDRL faculty member working as the NSC's director for democracy. They also continue with Stockton, a CISAC senior research scholar and now assistant secretary of defense for homeland defense and Americas' security affairs. "The brain drain of Stanford scholars to Washington hurts CISAC from a narrow perspective," Stockton said. "On the other hand, it populates D.C. with people who are committed to serve in the administration and make a difference in U.S. security." Stockton said he looks forward to working with Cuéllar, another CISAC faculty member and Stanford Law School professor serving as special assistant to Obama on the White House Domestic Policy Council. "To be able to know someone of such terrific academic caliber but also a wonderful person who cares deeply about the challenges the United States faces is a gift," Stockton said.
In addition to colleagues, the five scholars said they bring the center's interdisciplinary intellectual rigor with them to Washington. "Working on CISAC projects and in the classroom, one learns the value of listening to different viewpoints and different ways of thinking," Cuéllar said. "You see what an anthropologist has to learn from and teach a physicist. That's profoundly relevant in this context, as lawyers, press secretaries, economists and policy analysts can sometimes cultivate - despite their best intentions - an enormous capacity to talk past one another." Cuéllar said doing CISAC policy-related work, law school research and teaching, and pro bono projects was good practice for the demands of his new job. "It helps prepare one for Washington," he said.
CISAC as a lab
For almost two decades, Lynn Eden, CISAC's associate director for research, has served as a mentor to scores of scholars, including those now in Washington. "I once asked Tino [Cuéllar], ‘Why are you here [at CISAC], spreading yourself thin?'" Eden recalled. "He said he just found it enormously stimulating."
According to Eden, CISAC aims to provide a stimulating academic environment. "But, we don't want to kid ourselves," she said about the Obama administration staffers. "They are terribly competent, exceedingly bright people. We have been thrilled to have them at CISAC. They would have been tremendously successful without being here. But it doesn't mean that their experience here hasn't enriched them."
Eden recalls that when McFaul returned from Oxford University in 1991 with a doctorate earned as a Rhodes scholar, he had to retool himself for U.S. academia. "I remember sitting with him in what was called the Annex, in Galvez House, which was a trailer," she said, referring to CISAC's former digs on Galvez Street. "We had a white board in the back. He went up to the board and I just peppered him. ‘What is your question? What is your argument? Do you mean this or this?'" Eden said. "I basically grilled him in an extremely friendly way so his argument made sense." Such conversations, a regular feature at CISAC, helped McFaul grow intellectually, Eden said. "In some ways, Mike is sui generis, but you do need a place to blossom," she added. "I think it was the right amount of support and challenge for him and it worked very well."
CISAC's value, according to those who move between the worlds of policymaking and academia, is that it allows people to accumulate intellectual capital. "There is no time to do policy development and intellectual exploration in D.C.," McFaul said. "Condi [Rice] told me two decades ago that you build up intellectual capital [in academia] and you spend it down in Washington."
Upon arrival at the NSC, McFaul said he was surprised at the role good analytical and scientific work plays in policy deliberations. "I've encountered CISAC's work in my job," he said. Big ideas, such as the Getting to Zero project to eliminate nuclear weapons that Perry jointly heads, have had a "profound influence" on the president, McFaul noted. "That's where the rubber hits the road."
Relevance in a changing world
Looking to the future, Washington's new residents said CISAC should continue to encourage scholars to think in innovative ways to help tackle complicated problems. "Doing that successfully is invaluable both for universities and for the policy world, and it's all too rare," Cuéllar said.
Stockton, who participated in CISAC's 25th anniversary celebration on May 29, said the center must remain committed to its three-part mission of producing policy-relevant research, influencing policymaking, and training the next generation of security specialists. "I hope that not just for the next 25 years but for many years beyond CISAC will maintain its leading role in combining those three initiatives," he said. "It also needs to look over the horizon to understand the emerging challenges to security and then attract the very best people to address them."
Sherwood-Randall, who previously served in the Clinton administration, said CISAC also should create more incentives for policy-oriented scholars to get real-world experience. "Nothing really prepares you for the first time you enter the Oval Office to brief the president of the United States," she said. "It is a bracing experience - and one that instills in you the keenest appreciation of the fact that there are no dress rehearsals in these jobs. You have to get it right the first time."
A version of this article first appeared in "Encina Columns," published by FSI in Summer 2009
Interest in nuclear disarmament has grown rapidly in recent years. Starting with the 2007 Wall Street Journal article by four former U.S. statesmen-George Shultz, Henry Kissinger, William Perry, and Sam Nunn-and followed by endorsements from similar sets of former leaders from the United Kingdom, Germany, Poland, Australia, and Italy, the support for global nuclear disarmament has spread. The Japanese and Australian governments announced the creation of the International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament in June 2008. Both Senators John McCain and Barack Obama explicitly supported the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons during the 2008 election campaign. In April 2009, at the London Summit, President Barack Obama and President Dmitri Medvedev called for pragmatic U.S. and Russian steps toward nuclear disarmament, and President Obama then dramatically reaffirmed "clearly and with conviction America's commitment to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons" in his speech in Prague.
There is a simple explanation for these statements supporting nuclear disarmament: all states that have joined the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) are committed "to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament." In the United States, moreover, under Clause 2 of Article 6 of the Constitution, a treaty commitment is "the supreme Law of the Land." To af1/2rm the U.S. commitment to seek a world without nuclear weapons is therefore simply promising that the U.S. government will follow U.S. law.
A closer reading of these various declarations, however, reveals both the complexity of motives and the multiplicity of fears behind the current surge in support of nuclear disarmament. Some declarations emphasize concerns that the current behavior of nuclear-weapons states (NWS) signals to non-nuclear-weapons states (NNWS) that they, too, will need nuclear weapons in the future to meet their national security requirements. Other disarmament advocates stress the growth of global terrorism and the need to reduce the number of weapons and the amount of fissile material that could be stolen or sold to terrorist groups. Some argue that the risk of nuclear weapons accidents or launching nuclear missiles on false warning cannot be entirely eliminated, despite sustained efforts to do so, and thus believe that nuclear deterrence will inevitably fail over time, especially if large arsenals are maintained and new nuclear states, with weak command-and- control systems, emerge.
Perhaps the most widespread motivation for disarmament is the belief that future progress by the NWS to disarm will strongly influence the future willingness of the NNWS to stay within the NPT. If this is true, then the choice we face for the future is not between the current nuclear order of eight or nine NWS and a nuclear-weapons- free world. Rather, the choice we face is between moving toward a nuclear- weapons-free world or, to borrow Henry Rowen's phrase, "moving toward life in a nuclear armed crowd."
There are, of course, many critics of the nuclear disarmament vision. Some critics focus on the problems of how to prevent nuclear weapons "breakout" scenarios in a future world in which many more countries are "latent" NWS because of the spread of uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing capabilities to meet the global demand for fuel for nuclear power reactors. Others have expressed fears that deep nuclear arms reductions will inadvertently lead to nuclear proliferation by encouraging U.S. allies currently living under "the U.S. nuclear umbrella" of extended deterrence to pursue their own nuclear weapons for national security reasons. Other critics worry about the "instability of small numbers" problem, fearing that conventional wars would break out in a nuclear disarmed world, and that this risks a rapid nuclear rearmament race by former NWS that would lead to nuclear first use and victory by the more prepared government.
Some critics of disarmament falsely complain about nonexistent proposals for U.S. unilateral disarmament. Frank Gaffney, for example, asserts that there has been "a 17 year-long unilateral U.S. nuclear freeze" and claims that President Obama "stands to transform the ‘world's only superpower' into a nuclear impotent." More serious critics focus on those problems-the growth and potential breakout of latent NWS, the future of extended deterrence, the enforcement of disarmament, and the potential instability of small numbers-that concern mutual nuclear disarmament. These legitimate concerns must be addressed in a credible manner if significant progress is to be made toward the goal of a nuclear-weapons-free world.
To address these problems adequately, the current nuclear disarmament effort must be transformed from a debate among leaders in the NWS to a coordinated global effort of shared responsibilities between NWS and NNWS. This essay outlines a new conceptual framework that is needed to encourage NWS and NNWS to share responsibilities for designing a future nuclear-fuel-cycle regime, rethinking extended deterrence, and addressing nuclear breakout dangers while simultaneously contributing to the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons.
