Stanford University

Nuclear policy

Would the U.S. Drop the Bomb Again?

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If provoked, many Americans might well back nuclear attacks on foes like Iran and al Qaeda, according to new collaborative research from CISAC senior fellow Scott Sagan and Dartmouth professor Benjamin Valentino.

You can read more about their latest public opinion polling data, and its implications for the debate surrounding President Obama's upcoming visit to Hiroshima, in a column they co-authored for the Wall Street Journal.

 

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Candles and paper lanterns float on the Motoyasu River in front of the Atomic Bomb Dome at the Peace Memorial Park, in memory of the victims of the bomb on the 62nd anniversary of the Hiroshima bomb, on August 6, 2007 in Hiroshima. Japan.
Candles and paper lanterns float on the Motoyasu River in front of the Atomic Bomb Dome at the Peace Memorial Park, in memory of the victims of the bomb on the 62nd anniversary of the Hiroshima bomb, on August 6, 2007 in Hiroshima. Japan.
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CISAC Honors Students Prize-Winning Presentations

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- To ensure an accurate headcount for lunch, RSVPs are required - 

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To Be Announced Honors Student CISAC Honors Program in International Security Studies

Benjamin Mittelberger

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CISAC Honors Student
benmittelberger_rsd16_003_0098a.jpg Class of 2016

Ben Mittelberger is a senior in computer science concentrating in information systems design and implementation. He is a current student in the CISAC Honors Program. His thesis is titled: "In Data We Trust?: The Big Data Capabilities of the National Counterterrorism Center." It focuses on the increasing size and complexity of intelligence datasets and whether or not the center is structured properly to leverage them. He is advised by Dr. Martha Crenshaw. 

Honors Student CISAC Honors Program in International Security Studies
Honors Student CISAC Honors Program in International Security Studies
Seminars
Directors' Seminar Series

The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty at 20: Prospects for Ratification and the Enduring Risks of Nuclear Testing

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- Please note special start time: 2:55 rather than 3:30 PM; please RSVP above - 

 

The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty at 20:
Prospects for Ratification and the Enduring Risks of Nuclear Testing

 

Twenty years after the signing of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and creation of its accompanying organization, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO), the CTBT remains extremely relevant in the context of nuclear proliferation, deterrence, testing, and more. Yet challenges also remain that impede the ratification of the treaty and its entry into force.

On Thursday, May 19, 2016, the American Academy invites you to participate in a discussion on nuclear testing and the prospects of the ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, in partnership with Stanford University’s CISAC Social Science Research Seminar.

Participants at Stanford will watch a livestream of a panel discussion held at the American Academy’s headquarters in Cambridge, MA, featuring the speakers listed below, who will share new insights on the prospects for ratifying the CTBT and the challenges presented by nuclear testing. There will be an opportunity to submit questions to the panelists in Cambridge. Following the livestream, Professor Scott Sagan will moderate a discussion at Stanford.

Featuring

Lassina Zerbo 

Executive Secretary, Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization 

Rose E. Gottemoeller

Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security, U.S. Department of State

Siegfried Hecker

Senior Fellow, Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies; Research Professor of Management Science and Engineering, Stanford University

Robert Rosner

William E. Wrather Distinguished Service Professor in the Departments of Astronomy & Astrophysics and Physics, and the Enrico Fermi Institute and the Harris School of Public Policy Studies, University of Chicago; Co-Chair, Global Nuclear Future Initiative, American Academy of Arts and Sciences

Arun Rath

Correspondent, NPR and WGBH

♦♦♦

Scott Sagan

Caroline S.G. Munro Professor of Political Science, the Mimi and Peter Haas University Fellow in Undergraduate Education, and Senior Fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation and the Freeman Spogli Institute at Stanford University; Project Chair, New Dilemmas in Ethics, Technology and War; and Senior Advisor to the Global Nuclear Future Initiative, American Academy of Arts and Sciences

Lassina Zerbo Executive Secretary Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization
Rose Goettemoeller Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security U.S. Department of State

Siegfried S. Hecker

CISAC
Stanford University
Encina Hall, C220
Stanford, CA 94305-6165

(650) 725-6468 (650) 723-0089
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Senior Fellow, Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, Emeritus
Research Professor, Management Science and Engineering, Emeritus
hecker2.jpg PhD

Siegfried S. Hecker is a professor emeritus (research) in the Department of Management Science and Engineering and a senior fellow emeritus at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI). He was co-director of CISAC from 2007-2012. From 1986 to 1997, Dr. Hecker served as the fifth Director of the Los Alamos National Laboratory. Dr. Hecker is an internationally recognized expert in plutonium science, global threat reduction, and nuclear security.

Dr. Hecker’s current research interests include nuclear nonproliferation and arms control, nuclear weapons policy, nuclear security, the safe and secure expansion of nuclear energy, and plutonium science. At the end of the Cold War, he has fostered cooperation with the Russian nuclear laboratories to secure and safeguard the vast stockpile of ex-Soviet fissile materials. In June 2016, the Los Alamos Historical Society published two volumes edited by Dr. Hecker. The works, titled Doomed to Cooperate, document the history of Russian-U.S. laboratory-to-laboratory cooperation since 1992.

Dr. Hecker’s research projects at CISAC focus on cooperation with young and senior nuclear professionals in Russia and China to reduce the risks of nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism worldwide, to avoid a return to a nuclear arms race, and to promote the safe and secure global expansion of nuclear power. He also continues to assess the technical and political challenges of nuclear North Korea and the nuclear aspirations of Iran.

Dr. Hecker joined Los Alamos National Laboratory as graduate research assistant and postdoctoral fellow before returning as technical staff member following a tenure at General Motors Research. He led the laboratory's Materials Science and Technology Division and Center for Materials Science before serving as laboratory director from 1986 through 1997, and senior fellow until July 2005.

Among his professional distinctions, Dr. Hecker is a member of the National Academy of Engineering; foreign member of the Russian Academy of Sciences; fellow of the TMS, or Minerals, Metallurgy and Materials Society; fellow of the American Society for Metals; fellow of the American Physical Society, honorary member of the American Ceramics Society; and fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.

His achievements have been recognized with the Presidential Enrico Fermi Award, the 2020 Building Bridges Award from the Pacific Century Institute, the 2018 National Engineering Award from the American Association of Engineering Societies, the 2017 American Nuclear Society Eisenhower Medal, the American Physical Society’s Leo Szilard Prize, the American Nuclear Society's Seaborg Medal, the Department of Energy's E.O. Lawrence Award, the Los Alamos National Laboratory Medal, among other awards including the Alumni Association Gold Medal and the Undergraduate Distinguished Alumni Award from Case Western Reserve University, where he earned his bachelor's, master's, and doctoral degrees in metallurgy.

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Research Professor of Management Science and Engineering CISAC at Stanford University
Robert Rosner University of Chicago; American Academy of Arts and Sciences
Arun Rath Correspondent National Public Radio and WGBH

Scott D. Sagan

CISAC
Stanford University
Encina Hall, E202
Stanford, CA 94305-6165

(650) 725-2715 (650) 723-0089
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The Caroline S.G. Munro Professor of Political Science
The Bass University Fellow in Undergraduate Education  
Senior Fellow, Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies
rsd25_073_1160a_1.jpg PhD

Scott D. Sagan is Co-Director and Senior Fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation, the Caroline S.G. Munro Professor of Political Science, and the Bass University Fellow in Undergraduate Education at Stanford University. He also serves as Co-Chair of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences’ Committee on International Security Studies. Before joining the Stanford faculty, Sagan was a lecturer in the Department of Government at Harvard University and served as special assistant to the director of the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the Pentagon.

Sagan is the author of Moving Targets: Nuclear Strategy and National Security (Princeton University Press, 1989); The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons (Princeton University Press, 1993); and, with co-author Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: An Enduring Debate (W.W. Norton, 2012). He is the co-editor of Insider Threats (Cornell University Press, 2017) with Matthew Bunn; and co-editor of The Fragile Balance of Terror (Cornell University Press, 2022) with Vipin Narang. Sagan was also the guest editor of a two-volume special issue of Daedalus: Ethics, Technology, and War (Fall 2016) and The Changing Rules of War (Winter 2017).

Recent publications include “Creeds and Contestation: How US Nuclear and Legal Doctrine Influence Each Other,” with Janina Dill, in a special issue of Security Studies (December 2025); “Kettles of Hawks: Public Opinion on the Nuclear Taboo and Noncombatant Immunity in the United States, United Kingdom, France, and Israel”, with Janina Dill and Benjamin A. Valentino in Security Studies (February 2022); “The Rule of Law and the Role of Strategy in U.S. Nuclear Doctrine” with Allen S. Weiner in International Security (Spring 2021); “Does the Noncombatant Immunity Norm Have Stopping Power?” with Benjamin A. Valentino in International Security (Fall 2020); and “Just War and Unjust Soldiers: American Public Opinion on the Moral Equality of Combatants” and “On Reciprocity, Revenge, and Replication: A Rejoinder to Walzer, McMahan, and Keohane” with Benjamin A. Valentino in Ethics & International Affairs (Winter 2019).

In 2022, Sagan was awarded Thérèse Delpech Memorial Award from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace at their International Nuclear Policy Conference. In 2017, he received the International Studies Association’s Susan Strange Award which recognizes the scholar whose “singular intellect, assertiveness, and insight most challenge conventional wisdom and intellectual and organizational complacency" in the international studies community. Sagan was also the recipient of the National Academy of Sciences William and Katherine Estes Award in 2015, for his work addressing the risks of nuclear weapons and the causes of nuclear proliferation. The award, which is granted triennially, recognizes “research in any field of cognitive or behavioral science that advances understanding of issues relating to the risk of nuclear war.” In 2013, Sagan received the International Studies Association's International Security Studies Section Distinguished Scholar Award. He has also won four teaching awards: Stanford’s 1998-99 Dean’s Award for Distinguished Teaching; Stanford's 1996 Hoagland Prize for Undergraduate Teaching; the International Studies Association’s 2008 Innovative Teaching Award; and the Monterey Institute for International Studies’ Nonproliferation Education Award in 2009.     

Co-director of the Center for International Security and Cooperation
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Panel Discussions

Knowledge Infrastructures for a Changing Planet: the past, present, and future of relations between climate science and nuclear weapons research

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Abstract: Nuclear war and climate change present the two most serious threats to global security since World War II. This talk shows that nuclear weapons research and climate science were historically connected in deep, sometimes intimate ways. Each developed its own knowledge infrastructure, including people, technical systems, and organizations, with surprising parallels and frequent exchanges across the classified/civilian divide. From the 1940s on, nuclear weapons research and climate science both relied heavily on computer models, used related physics and numerical methods, and shared human as well as technical resources. Radiocarbon from nuclear weapons tests contributed to understanding of the global carbon cycle, while fallout monitoring networks produced critical knowledge about the stratosphere. In the 1980s, the potential for “nuclear winter” — a war-induced climatic catastrophe — became a major political issue, but the groundwork for this concern had been laid long before.

This interplay not only continued, but became even more significant after the Cold War’s end, when the weapons labs’ expertise, equipment, and observing systems were partially repurposed. Several US national laboratories now play essential roles in climate and Earth system science. Among these roles are the Program on Climate Model Diagnosis and Intercomparison, based at Livermore and responsible for the important Coupled Model Intercomparison Project (CMIP), a major unifying force in climate modeling for the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change assessments. The cyberinfrastructure underlying CMIP and similar projects must address mounting challenges related to data access controls, software support, and the security of huge data collections, while their institutional and human bases depend on ongoing national support. Crafting effective climate policy, I argue, will require understanding and rethinking the dynamics of these knowledge infrastructures for the present, rapidly evolving context.

About the Speaker: Paul Edwards is a Professor in the School of Information (SI) and the Dept. of History at the University of Michigan. SI is an interdisciplinary professional school focused on bringing people, information, and technology together in more valuable ways.

His research explores the history, politics, and cultural aspects of computers, information infrastructures, and global climate science. His current research focuses on knowledge infrastructures for the Anthropocene.

Dr. Edwards is co-editor (with Geoffrey C. Bowker) of the Infrastructures book series (MIT Press), and he serves on the editorial boards of Big Data & Society: Critical Interdisciplinary Inquiries and Information & Culture: A Journal of History. His most recent book is A Vast Machine: Computer Models, Climate Data, and the Politics of Global Warming (MIT Press, 2010).

 

 

Paul Edwards Professor of Information and History University of Michigan
Seminars

The Soviet Union and the Creation of the International Atomic Energy Agency

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The Soviet Union responded sceptically to Eisenhower’s ‘Atoms for Peace’ speech in December 1953 but eventually entered negotiations on the creation of the International Atomic Energy Agency. It believed the IAEA would provide opportunities for political influence and scientific collaboration. It did not want the peaceful uses of atomic energy around the world to be dominated by the United States. It pressed for close ties between the new agency and the United Nations and supported India and other developing countries in their opposition to safeguards. The new Agency was to be a forum for competition as well as cooperation.

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Cold War History
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David Holloway
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Reset of U.S. Nuclear Waste Management Strategy and Policy Meeting #4: Integration of Storage, Transportation and Disposal of Commercial Spent Nuclear Fuel

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Reset of U.S. Nuclear Waste Management Strategy and Policy

Meeting #4:  Integration of Storage, Transportation and Disposal of

Commercial Spent Nuclear Fuel

May 17-18, 2016, George Washington University, Washington, DC

 

Spent nuclear fuel must be managed from the time it is removed from the reactor to its eventual reprocessing or permanent disposal in a geologic repository.  The present management strategy for commercial spent fuel in the United States is not what was originally envisioned, even as recently as a decade ago.

The inventory of commercial spent nuclear fuel in in the U.S. is growing at a rate of ~2,000 metric tons per year, and is projected to be ~140,000 metric tons by mid-century, which is the earliest time that current Administration policy projects the availability of a permanent geologic repository.  Without options for off-site storage or disposal and with no prospects for reprocessing, utilities have expanded their capacity to store the growing spent fuel inventory at existing reactor sites, choosing without exception to rely on large dry-storage casks.  These casks are characterized as “dual purpose” systems, in that the sealed canisters are designed for both extended on-site storage and, with appropriate over-packs, subsequent transportation.  The dual-purpose canisters are not, however, designed for disposal, and they are significantly larger than the disposal canisters planned for all repository concepts currently proposed world-wide. 

Current Practice and Technical, Operational, and Institutional Concerns

The current practice of loading commercial spent fuel into dry storage systems carries with it an unavoidable commitment to one of three future alternatives:

a)     all spent fuel placed in large dual-purpose canisters will eventually need to be repackaged into purpose-built casks for disposal,

b)     the nation will need to construct one or more repositories that can directly accommodate large dual-purpose canisters for disposal, or

c)      spent fuel will remain indefinitely at interim storage facilities and be repackaged as needed, perhaps every century.

 

Suboptimal alternatives will lead to increased uncertainties. 

All of these options are technically feasible, but none are what was originally planned, and all introduce major new uncertainties regarding the design and operation of future storage and disposal facilities.  These uncertainties will impact already large and uncertain future costs:  for example, as part of its 2013 assessment of the adequacy of the Nuclear Waste Fee to meet total disposal costs, the DOE estimated a range for $24 billion to $81 billion (2012 dollars) for future repository costs, not including costs associated with repackaging spent fuel.   

 

Industry continues to load larger and heavier canisters, which pose logistical challenges. 

The dual purpose storage canisters themselves are large:  up to 2 meters in diameter and 5 meters in length, and the largest currently in use accommodate up to 37 intact fuel assemblies from pressurized water reactors, which account for about two thirds of the U.S. reactor fleet. A loaded canister may weigh on the order of 70 metric tons, and transportation shielding may increase the weight to 150 metric tons. Because it is economically advantageous for nuclear power plants to load larger canisters, the canister size exceeds sizes and weights that may be optimal for transportation and subsequent disposal.  Engineering solutions for hoist, ramp, and transporter operations appear to be feasible, but need to be accounted for in planning.

 

Larger canisters will be hotter for longer and therefore may require a longer time to cool before transportation and subsequent disposal. 

Although dual purpose canisters are certified by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission for both storage and subsequent transportation, the certificates of compliance set different temperature limits for storage versus transportation. This results in a situation where some canisters may need to cool before they can be transported. This delay may be on the order of decades for some canister designs, and in particular for higher-burnup fuels that generate more heat.

 

With respect to disposal, different geologies impose different temperature constraints on the underground environment. For example, some repository designs have assumed that the maximum temperature in clay backfill must remain below 100˚C, while salt may accommodate temperatures up to 200 to 250˚C. High thermal loads may be accommodated by cooling canisters above ground for many years, ventilating the repository for many years after waste emplacement, or increasing the spacing between canisters.  These choices will affect repository costs.

 

Consolidated Interim Storage is an option. 

Constructing consolidated interim storage facilities has the potential to alleviate storage concerns at reactor sites and may provide a path to resolution of legal issues associated with federal responsibility for spent fuel management.  Consolidated storage facilities could also be used to provide flexibility in repackaging options for ultimate disposal.  Consolidated storage facilities will introduce additional cost and siting concerns, and technical issues associated with the mechanical effects of repeated transportation and storage will need to be addressed.

 

Legislative and regulatory issues must be addressed. 

All options for the management and disposal of commercial spent nuclear fuel currently under consideration in the U.S. will require legislative and regulatory actions.

 

 

Questions to be addressed:

  1. What might a better-integrated spent fuel management system for the United States look like?
  2. What metrics (e.g., cost, safety, and security) should be used to judge the optimization of the spent fuel management system?
  3. What are the barriers to achieving the integration of the spent fuel management system?
  4. What are the potential benefits of an integrated spent fuel management system?
  5. What actions could be taken now that would have an impact on future spent nuclear fuel management practice? 
  6. What are the implications of taking no action?

Reset Conference Documents for meeting no. 4 can be accessed through this link. 

 

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For information related to the first meeting in this series, and relevant materials, please click here.

For information related to the second meeting in this series, and relevant materials, please click here.

For information related to the third meeting in this series, and relevant materials, please click here.

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George Washington University, Washington, DC

Steering committee members
Sponsors: Precourt Institute for Energy, MacArthur Foundation, George Washington University, Center for International Security and Cooperation

Learning from a Disaster: Improving Nuclear Safety and Security After Fukushima (edited volume)

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This book—the culmination of a truly collaborative international and highly interdisciplinary effort—brings together Japanese and American political scientists, nuclear engineers, historians, and physicists to examine the Fukushima accident from a new and broad perspective.
  
It explains the complex interactions between nuclear safety risks (the causes and consequences of accidents) and nuclear security risks (the causes and consequences of sabotage or terrorist attacks), exposing the possible vulnerabilities all countries may have if they fail to learn from this accident.
  
The book further analyzes the lessons of Fukushima in comparative perspective, focusing on the politics of safety and emergency preparedness. It first compares the different policies and procedures adopted by various nuclear facilities in Japan and then discusses the lessons learned—and not learned—after major nuclear accidents and incidents in other countries in the past. The book's editors conclude that learning lessons across nations has proven to be very difficult, and they propose new policies to improve global learning after nuclear accidents or attacks.

Contributors to this volume include Nobumasa Akiyama, Edward D. Blandford, Toshihiro Higuchi, Trevor Incerti (formerly a researcher at the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center at Stanford University), Kenji E. Kushida, Phillip Y. Lipscy, Michael May, Kaoru Naito (former President of the Nuclear Material Control Center), Scott D. Sagan, Kazuto Suzuki, and Gregory D. Wyss, Distinguished Member of Technical Staff in the Security Systems Analysis Department at Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, NM.

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Scott D. Sagan
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Additive Manufacturing & High-Performance Computing: Disruptive Latent Technologies Impacting Our National Security

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Abstract: Dr. Goodwin’s presentation will discuss some of the rapid developments in additive manufacturing technology (3-D printing with metals and other materials) and their relationship to high performance computing. His will then address issues concerning the potential impacts of these technologies to include the US nuclear enterprise, nuclear proliferation and nonproliferation, and terrorism.
 
About the Speaker: Dr. Bruce Goodwin, Associate Director-at-Large for National Security Policy and Research at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), is responsible for policy research and liaison with the US military, US government, and non-governmental organizations. He previously was the Principal Associate Director in charge of the nuclear weapons program at LLNL for twelve years.
Bruce Goodwin Associate Director-at-Large for National Security Policy and Research Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
Seminars

Rival Hierarchies: Lessons from the Cold War for Today’s Geopolitics

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Abstract: To what extent will multipolar institution building undermine the US-led international order? Recent Chinese initiatives like the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and similar efforts by Russia and even Venezuela, might be seen as attempts to build alternatives to American hegemony. We suggest that we can learn from past rival hierarchies to understand contemporary politics. Some scholars highlight international hierarchy, in which a dominant state exerts a limited degree of political control over one or more subordinate states. We contend that certain patterns of international cooperation and conflict between dominant states cannot be fully understood without reference to their rival hierarchies. We identify three distinct mechanisms through which one hierarchy can influence the internal workings of a second hierarchy: competitive shaming, outbidding, and inter-hierarchy cooperation.

We illustrate the plausibility of our argument by exploring the politics of nuclear technology sharing by the United States and the Soviet Union in the Cold War. We show that Soviet competitive shaming of the United States was a major motivation for the U.S. Atoms for Peace program. In response, the Soviet Union attempted to outbid the United States with its own technology sharing program. Ultimately, Moscow and Washington cooperated in founding the International Atomic Energy Agency.

The paper is co-authored with Nicholas Miller, Frank Stanton Assistant Professor of Nuclear Security and Policy at Brown University.

About the Speaker: Jeff D. Colgan is the Richard Holbrooke Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science and Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs at Brown University.  His research focuses on two main areas: (1) the causes of war and (2) global energy politics. His book, Petro-Aggression: When Oil Causes War, was published in 2013 by Cambridge University Press. An article that previews the book's argument won the Robert O. Keohane award for the best article published in International Organization (Oct 2010) by an untenured scholar. He has published other articles in International Organization, World Politics, International Security and elsewhere.

Professor Colgan previously taught at the School of International Service of American University 2010-2014, and was a Fellow at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington DC in 2012-13. He completed his PhD at Princeton University, and was a Canada-US Fulbright Scholar at UC Berkeley, where he earned a Master’s in Public Policy. Dr. Colgan has worked with the World Bank, McKinsey & Company, and The Brattle Group.

 

Jeff D. Colgan Richard Holbrooke Assistant Professor of Political Science and International and Public Affairs Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs, Brown University
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European Nuclear Nationalism: the UK and France (book chapter)

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France and the UK have had different approaches to the possibility of nuclear disarmament; these derive from the different post- Second World War national narratives in which the development of nuclear weapons has been embedded. This started from two different attitudes toward the NATO Alliance and its nuclear component, two different sets of lessons learned from the 1956 Suez crisis, and it culminated in two different reactions to the increase in nuclear disarmament advocacy worldwide, which is the focus of this chapter.

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Nik Hynek and Michal Smetana, (eds.), Global Nuclear Disarmament. Strategic, Political and Regional Perspectives. London: Routledge: 225-250
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Benoît Pelopidas
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