Abstract: In the 2008 presidential campaign, Barack Obama had a very specific agenda to revise and update the U.S. nuclear posture. However, there were many elements in his program which later disappeared, or which were modified by the time his Nuclear Posture Review came out in April 2010. Over the course of the 18-month review process, the option to implement a no-first use policy and the idea of an unconditional negative security assurance were both examined. A no-first use policy would mean that the U.S. would never use nuclear weapons first, only in response to a nuclear attack by its opponents; an unconditional negative security assurance would mean that the U.S. would not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states. Both of these policies could have significantly reduced the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. posture, and they could have also limited the number of adversaries and contingencies that nuclear weapons need to cover. Although these goals were in line with President Obama’s nuclear agenda, the administration decided to adopt a careful alternative in both cases. My paper investigates why President Obama agreed to these alternatives, and the strategic implications of these policies.

About the Speaker: Dr. Anna Péczeli is a Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC) at Stanford University. She is also a research fellow at the Centre for Strategic and Defence Studies (National University of Public Service – Budapest, Hungary), where she is currently on sabbatical leave. Previously she was an assistant lecturer at Corvinus University of Budapest, an adjunct fellow at the Hungarian Institute of International Affairs, a visiting research fellow at the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt, and a visiting Fulbright fellow at the Nuclear Information Project of the Federation of American Scientists in Washington, DC. Dr. Péczeli earned a Ph.D. degree in International Relations from Corvinus University of Budapest, her research focused on the Obama administration’s nuclear strategy – the review of nuclear guidance, and the extent to which the legacies of the Cold War still define U.S. nuclear planning.

Dr. Péczeli is a member of the G7 Berlin Group – International Coalition for CBRN Security Culture; the European Defence and Security Network (sponsored by the European Parliament); the CSIS Project on Nuclear Issues (PONI); the EU Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Consortium; and chair of the Executive Board of the International Student/Young Pugwash (ISYP) group.

Abstract: Deterrence is one of the most central concepts in international relations scholarship. Countries can dissuade changes to the status quo, according to the logic of deterrence, by threatening an opponent with pain (deterrence by punishment) or by reducing the probability that an opponent will achieve its aims (deterrence by denial). In the realm of international security, most deterrence theorists assume that states need military capabilities to deter by punishment or denial. Deterrence works, based on this line of thinking, because states can use military power to destroy cities, bomb critical military targets, or blunt land invasions. It is also possible, however, to punish an adversary without invoking destruction militarily. Yet deterrence through non-military means remains poorly understood in international relations. This project develops a theory to identify the conditions under which countries can deter opponents without using threats of military force. I explore the implications of this theory in one particular context: the development of dual-use nuclear technology. Having the capability to build nuclear weapons — a condition known as “nuclear latency” — may provide countries with deterrence benefits that we normally associate with having a nuclear arsenal. When states achieve nuclear latency, they (implicitly) threaten to develop nuclear weapons at some point in the future. The threat here is to pursue a policy that others would find undesirable, not to physically destroy things of value on another state’s territory, as in traditional deterrence theory. Does this kind of threat discourage others from meddling in a country’s affairs? This study presents the results of an analysis designed to identify the effects of nuclear latency (and nuclear arsenals) on the onset of international conflict from 1945 to 2000, drawing on a new dataset of sensitive dual-use nuclear plants in 32 countries.

About the Speaker: Matthew Fuhrmann is an associate professor of political science and Ray A. Rothrock `77 Fellow at Texas A&M University. He was named an Andrew Carnegie Fellow in 2016 by the Carnegie Corporation of New York. He is the author of Atomic Assistance: How “Atoms for Peace” Programs Cause Nuclear Insecurity (Cornell University Press, 2012) and the coauthor of Nuclear Weapons and Coercive Diplomacy (Cambridge University Press, 2016). His work has been published or is forthcoming in peer-reviewed journals such as American Journal of Political Science, British Journal of Political Science, International Organization, International Security, International Studies Quarterly, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Journal of Peace Research, and Journal of Politics. He has also written opinion pieces for The Atlantic (online), The Christian Science Monitor, Slate, and USA Today. He is a term member of the Council on Foreign Relations. You can follow him on Twitter @mcfuhrmann.

Abstract: All nations that have selected a strategy for the long-term management of high-level radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel have opted for disposal in a deep-mined, geologic repository.  Choosing a site for such a facility has been problematic.  Of the two dozen efforts that have been undertaken in the United States and abroad over the last half decade, only six remain on track, and only three have reached what appears to be a stable outcome.  Typically, a country organizes its waste management program to compare at least two sites before making a final choice.  All those sites must be shown to be technically suitable based on predetermined criteria.  For countries like the United States, which can site a repository in a variety of host geologic formations, these criteria are generic in nature.  Basing a siting decision on generic criteria especially requires the exercise of discretion.  This circumstance produces tough dilemmas that may be quite difficult to overcome credibly.

About the Speaker: Dr. Metlay is a member of the Senior Professional Staff of the U.S. Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board (NWTRB).  He received his Bachelor of Science degrees from Caltech in molecular biology and medieval history and his Masters and Doctoral degrees in public policy from the University of California, Berkeley.  He taught political science at Indiana University and MIT.  Dr. Metlay has authored numerous publications dealing with technology policy, regulation, organization behavior, and radioactive waste.  He has worked in the Carter White House and with the Secretary of Energy on radioactive waste issues.  Dr. Metlay has testified before Congress and several state legislative committees.