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 In Unclear Physics, Malfrid Braut-Hegghammer tells the story of the Iraqi and Libyan programs from their origins in the late 1950s and 1960s until their dismantling.

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Målfrid Braut-Hegghammer
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Abstract: Deterrence is one of the most central concepts in international relations scholarship. Countries can dissuade changes to the status quo, according to the logic of deterrence, by threatening an opponent with pain (deterrence by punishment) or by reducing the probability that an opponent will achieve its aims (deterrence by denial). In the realm of international security, most deterrence theorists assume that states need military capabilities to deter by punishment or denial. Deterrence works, based on this line of thinking, because states can use military power to destroy cities, bomb critical military targets, or blunt land invasions. It is also possible, however, to punish an adversary without invoking destruction militarily. Yet deterrence through non-military means remains poorly understood in international relations. This project develops a theory to identify the conditions under which countries can deter opponents without using threats of military force. I explore the implications of this theory in one particular context: the development of dual-use nuclear technology. Having the capability to build nuclear weapons — a condition known as “nuclear latency” — may provide countries with deterrence benefits that we normally associate with having a nuclear arsenal. When states achieve nuclear latency, they (implicitly) threaten to develop nuclear weapons at some point in the future. The threat here is to pursue a policy that others would find undesirable, not to physically destroy things of value on another state’s territory, as in traditional deterrence theory. Does this kind of threat discourage others from meddling in a country’s affairs? This study presents the results of an analysis designed to identify the effects of nuclear latency (and nuclear arsenals) on the onset of international conflict from 1945 to 2000, drawing on a new dataset of sensitive dual-use nuclear plants in 32 countries.

About the Speaker: Matthew Fuhrmann is an associate professor of political science and Ray A. Rothrock `77 Fellow at Texas A&M University. He was named an Andrew Carnegie Fellow in 2016 by the Carnegie Corporation of New York. He is the author of Atomic Assistance: How “Atoms for Peace” Programs Cause Nuclear Insecurity (Cornell University Press, 2012) and the coauthor of Nuclear Weapons and Coercive Diplomacy (Cambridge University Press, 2016). His work has been published or is forthcoming in peer-reviewed journals such as American Journal of Political ScienceBritish Journal of Political ScienceInternational OrganizationInternational SecurityInternational Studies QuarterlyJournal of Conflict ResolutionJournal of Peace Research, and Journal of Politics. He has also written opinion pieces for The Atlantic (online), The Christian Science MonitorSlate, and USA Today. He is a term member of the Council on Foreign Relations. You can follow him on Twitter @mcfuhrmann.

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Matthew Fuhrmann is the Cullen-McFadden Professor of Political Science at Texas A&M University. ​He has been a Visiting Professor at Yale University (2023-24), Visiting Associate Professor at Stanford University (2016-17), Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations (2010-11), and Research Fellow at Harvard University's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs (2007-08). He was named an Andrew Carnegie Fellow in 2016 by the Carnegie Corporation of New York. ​His research and teaching focus on international security issues with an emphasis on nuclear weapons, diplomacy and bargaining, and alliance politics. He is the author of three books, including Influence Without Arms: The New Logic of Nuclear Deterrence (Cambridge University Press, 2024) and Nuclear Weapons and Coercive Diplomacy (Cambridge University Press, 2017, with Todd S. Sechser). His articles are published in journals such as ​American Journal of Political Science, Journal of Politics, British Journal of Political Science, International Organization, International Security, and International Studies Quarterly. His research has been mentioned in media outlets such as CNNThe New York TimesThe New Yorker, and NPR

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Stanford expert Siegfried Hecker proposes a series of nuclear weapons and energy questions that journalists and citizens should consider asking the 2016 presidential candidates.

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Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
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Siegfried S. Hecker
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With nuclear policy an increasingly serious issue in the world today, a Stanford scholar suggests in a newly published paper that the U.S. presidential candidates explain their viewpoints on these topics to the American people.

The journal article in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists includes six questions on nuclear terrorism, proliferation, weapons policy and energy developed by Siegfried Hecker, a nuclear scientist and senior fellow at Stanford’s Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC) and the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies.

Hecker served as a director of the Los Alamos National Laboratory before coming to Stanford. He is a world-renowned expert in plutonium science, global threat reduction and nuclear security. Hecker suggests that journalists and the public ask the candidates for the U.S. presidency the following questions:

• "Do you believe that nuclear terrorism is one of the greatest threats facing the United States, and, if so, what will you do to invigorate international cooperation to prevent it?

• How will you attempt to roll back North Korea’s increasingly threatening and destabilizing nuclear weapon program?

• Will you continue to support the (Iranian nuclear) deal and, if so, how will you work with Iran, quell dissent among our allies in the region, and answer criticism here at home?

• Do you plan to continue building a strategic partnership with India, and, if so, how will you reassure Pakistan that the U.S. insistence on nuclear restraint in South Asia includes not just Pakistan, but India as well?

• Will you continue to push for a reduced role for nuclear weapons in U.S. defense policy? If so, will you promote further nuclear arms reductions and ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty? And if Russia and China stay their current course, how will you deal with US nuclear modernization, and how will you reassure America’s allies?

• What are your plans for the domestic nuclear power industry and for the role the United States will play in this sector internationally?"

In his article, Hecker describes the context surrounding many of these questions. For example, he noted that the alarming acceleration of North Korea’s nuclear arsenal in the last six years indicates that the current U.S. policy approach to that country needs to be revisited.

Also, Hecker points out the complexity of the current nuclear arms situation worldwide. Both Russia and China have expanded their nuclear systems and are pursuing a more aggressive foreign policy. On the other hand, every president of the post-Cold War era has reduced U.S. reliance on nuclear weapons for its national security.

 

 

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A Chinese-made Hongqi-2 missile on display at the Military Museum in Beijing in 2011. China then announced a double-digit increase in its secretive military budget.
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Stanford nuclear scientist and CISAC senior fellow Siegfried S. Hecker explains in this article in 38 North why North Korea's recent nuclear test is "deeply alarming" and what Washington's possible policy options are going forward. An excerpted passage is below:

 

On September 9, 2016, seismic stations around the world picked up the unmistakable signals of another North Korean underground nuclear test in the vicinity of Punggye-ri. The technical details about the test will be sorted out over the next few weeks, but the political message is already loud and clear: North Korea will continue to expand its dangerous nuclear arsenal so long as Washington stays on its current path.

 

Preliminary indications are that the test registered at 5.2 to 5.3 on the Richter scale, which translates to an explosion yield of approximately 15 to 20 kilotons, possibly twice the magnitude of the largest previous test. It appears to have been conducted in the same network of tunnels as the last three tests, just buried deeper into the mountain. This was the fifth known North Korean nuclear explosion; the second this year, and the third since Kim Jong Un took over the country’s leadership in December 2011. Continue reading

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People watch a news report on North Korea's first hydrogen bomb test at a railroad station in Seoul on January 6, 2016.
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Abstract: All nations that have selected a strategy for the long-term management of high-level radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel have opted for disposal in a deep-mined, geologic repository.  Choosing a site for such a facility has been problematic.  Of the two dozen efforts that have been undertaken in the United States and abroad over the last half decade, only six remain on track, and only three have reached what appears to be a stable outcome.  Typically, a country organizes its waste management program to compare at least two sites before making a final choice.  All those sites must be shown to be technically suitable based on predetermined criteria.  For countries like the United States, which can site a repository in a variety of host geologic formations, these criteria are generic in nature.  Basing a siting decision on generic criteria especially requires the exercise of discretion.  This circumstance produces tough dilemmas that may be quite difficult to overcome credibly.

About the Speaker: Dr. Metlay is a member of the Senior Professional Staff of the U.S. Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board (NWTRB).  He received his Bachelor of Science degrees from Caltech in molecular biology and medieval history and his Masters and Doctoral degrees in public policy from the University of California, Berkeley.  He taught political science at Indiana University and MIT.  Dr. Metlay has authored numerous publications dealing with technology policy, regulation, organization behavior, and radioactive waste.  He has worked in the Carter White House and with the Secretary of Energy on radioactive waste issues.  Dr. Metlay has testified before Congress and several state legislative committees.

The dilemma of multiple choices: Comparing the technical suitability of sites for a deep-mined, geologic repository for high-activity radioactive waste
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Daniel Metlay Senior staff member U.S. Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board
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Scott D. Sagan
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Jeffrey Lewis and Scott Sagan discuss President Obama’s consideration of adopting a policy of No-First-Use of nuclear weapons, stating that “While we think that such a pledge would ultimately strengthen U.S. security, we believe it should be adopted only after detailed military planning and after close consultation with key allies, tasks that will fall to the next administration.”
 
The authors argue that the U.S. should instead apply a "nuclear necessity principle" derived from just war doctrine.  Sagan and Lewis propose that the Obama Administration declare that “the United States will not use nuclear weapons against any target that could be reliably destroyed by conventional means.”
 
To read the op-ed, published in The Washington Post, click here.
 
To view a video by The Wall Street Journal, featuring Scott Sagan, about the pros and cons of a U.S. nuclear No-First-Use policy, click here.
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President Obama Participates In The Nuclear Security Summit
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In January 2004, a delegation from Stanford University led by Prof. John W. Lewis and joined by one of the authors, Siegfried S. Hecker, at the time senior fellow at the Los Alamos National Laboratory and former director, was invited to visit the Yongbyon Nuclear Center. This visit by Hecker and follow-on visits during each of the next six consecutive years contributed substantially to our knowledge of North Korean nuclear activities. In this report, we utilize information obtained during the Stanford delegation visits, along with other open-source information, to provide a holistic assessment of North Korean nuclear developments from the demise of the Agreed Framework through November 2015. To read the full article, click here.

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When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, the worry in the West was what would happen to that country’s thousands of nuclear weapons. Would “loose” nukes fall into the hands of terrorists, rogue states, criminals – and plunge the world into a nuclear nightmare?

Fortunately, scientists and technical experts in both the U.S. and the former Soviet Union rolled up their sleeves to manage and contain the nuclear problem in the dissolving Communist country.

One of the leaders in this relationship was Stanford engineering professor Siegfried Hecker, who served as a director of the Los Alamos National Laboratory before coming to Stanford as a senior fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation. He is a world-renowned expert in plutonium science, global threat reduction and nuclear security.

Hecker cited one 1992 meeting with Russian scientists in Moscow who were clearly concerned about the risks. In his new book, Doomed to Cooperate: How American and Russian scientists joined forces to avert some of the greatest post-Cold War nuclear dangers, Hecker quoted one Russian expert as saying, “We now need to be concerned about terrorism.”

Earning both scientific and political trust was a key, said Hecker, also a senior fellow at Stanford’s Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies. The Russians were proud of their scientific accomplishments and highly competent in the nuclear business – and they sought to show this to the Americans scientists, who became very confident in their Russian counterparts’ technical capabilities as they learned more about their nuclear complex and toured the labs.

Economic collapse, political turmoil

But the nuclear experts faced an immense problem. The Soviets had about 39,000 nuclear weapons in their country and in Eastern Europe and about 1.5 million kilograms of plutonium and highly enriched uranium (the fuel for nuclear bombs), Hecker said. Consider that the bomb that the U.S. dropped on the Japanese city of Nagasaki in 1945 was only six kilograms of plutonium, he added. Meanwhile, the U.S. had about 25,000 nuclear weapons in the early 1990s.

Hecker and the rest of the Americans were deeply concerned about the one million-plus Russians who worked in nuclear facilities. Many faced severe financial pressure in an imploding society and thus constituted a huge potential security risk.

“The challenge that Russia faced with its economy collapsing was enormous,” he said in an interview.

The Russian scientists, Hecker said, were motivated to act responsibly because they realized the awful destruction that a single nuclear bomb could wreak. Hecker noted that one Russian scientist told him, “We arrived in the nuclear century all in one boat, and a movement by anyone will affect everyone.” Hecker noted, “Therefore, you know, we were doomed to work together to cooperate.”

All of this depended on the two governments involved easing nuclear tensions while allowing the scientists to collaborate. In short order, the scientists developed mutual respect and trust to address the loose nukes scenario.

The George H.W. Bush administration launched nuclear initiatives to put the Russian government at ease. For example, it took the nuclear weapons off U.S. Navy surface ships and some of its nuclear weapons off alert to allow the Russians to do the same. The U.S. Congress passed the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction legislation, which helped fund some of the loose nuke containment efforts.

While those were positive measures, Hecker said, it was ultimately the cooperation among scientists, what they called lab-to-lab-cooperation, that allowed the two former superpower enemies to “get past the sensitivity barriers” and make “the world a safer place.”

Since the end of the Cold War, no significant nuclear event has occurred as a result of the dissolution of the Soviet Union and its nuclear complex, Hecker noted.

Lesson: cooperation counts

One lesson from it all, Hecker said, is that government policymakers need to understand that scientists and engineers can work together and make progress toward solving difficult, dangerous problems.

“We don’t want to lose the next generation from understanding what can actually be done by working together,” he said.  “So, we want to demonstrate to them, Look, this is what was done when the scientists were interested and enthusiastic and when the government gave us enough room to be able to do that.”

Hecker said this scientific cooperation extended to several thousand scientists and engineers at the Russian sites and at U.S. nuclear labs – primarily the three defense labs: Lawrence Livermore, Los Alamos, and Sandia national laboratories. Many technical exchanges and visits between scientists in Russia and the United States took place.

He recalled visiting some of the nuclear sites in Russian cities shrouded by mystery. “These cities were so secret, they didn’t even appear on Soviet maps.”

Change of threat

When the Soviet Union collapsed, the nature of the nuclear threat changed, Hecker said. The threat before was one of mutual annihilation, but now the threat changed to what would happen if nuclear assets were lost, stolen or somehow evaded the control of the government.

“From an American perspective we referred to these as the ‘four loose nuclear dangers,'” he said.

This included securing the loose nukes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe; preventing nuclear materials or bomb fuel from getting into the wrong hands; the human element involving the people who worked in the Soviet nuclear complex; and finally, the “loose exports” problem of someone trying to sell nuclear materials or technical components to overseas groups like terrorists or rogue nations.

For Hecker, this is not just an American story. It is about a selfless reconciliation with a longtime enemy for the greater global good, a relationship not corrupted by ideological or nationalistic differences, but one reflective of mutual interests of the highest order.

“The primary reason,” he said, “why we didn’t have a nuclear catastrophe was the Russian nuclear workers and the Russian nuclear officials. Their dedication, their professionalism, their patriotism for their country was so strong that it carried them through these times in the 1990s when they often didn’t get paid for six months at a time … The nuclear complex did its job through the most trying times. And it was a time when the U.S. government took crucial conciliatory measures with the new Russian Federation and gave us scientists the support to help make the world a safer place.”

 

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Siegfried Hecker (second from left) takes a tour of a secret Russian nuclear facility in the city of Sarov in February, 1992. Hecker was serving as director of the Los Alamos National Laboratory during his visit.
Siegfried Hecker (second from left) takes a tour of a secret Russian nuclear facility in the city of Sarov in February, 1992. Hecker was serving as director of the Los Alamos National Laboratory during his visit.
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RESET of U.S. Nuclear Waste Managements Strategy and Policy

Meeting #5: Regulations, Risk and Safety

October 26-27, 2016, Stanford University

 

One of the unique challenges of the safe storage and disposal of nuclear waste is the very long time frame over which the safety of different strategies is evaluated.  These evaluations typically involve models that capture atomic-scale processes, such as diffusion and corrosion, to global-scale processes, such as climate change and tectonic events.  At each scale, the models are often highly coupled, the outcome of one modeled process becoming the input for the next.  The safety analysis becomes the basis for determining risk to the public and environment and is used to determine whether a specific, nuclear waste repository or storage facility will meet regulatory requirements.  Thus, there is an inter-play among the determination of risk, regulatory compliance and safety.  Finally, these analysis become part of the discussion of safety and acceptability by political institutions and the public.

In this fifth meeting of the series of RESET meetings, the speakers will explore a number of these issues from a technical, as well as social science, perspective.

Topics and questions that we expect to discuss during the meeting include:

  • Comparison of different international approaches to the analysis of risk.
  • Comparison of the regulatory structures of different countries.
  • What is a “safety case” and how is this approach related to a quantitative probabilistic risk analysis?
  • What is the relation between regulatory compliance and safety?
  • What time periods can be evaluated? Why one million years? Is this necessary or credible?
  • How does one maintain the credibility of the regulations and the regulator?
  • Once a facility or repository is determined to be in regulatory compliance, how can subsequent, new knowledge be applied to the safety analysis?
  • What is the role of public engagement? What role should communities near nuclear facilities play in the regulatory process?

Reset Conference Document for meeting no. 5 can be accessed through this link.

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For information related to the first meeting in this series, and relevant materials, please click here.

For information related to the second meeting in this series, and relevant materials, please click here.

For information related to the third meeting in this series, and relevant materials, please click here.

For information related to the fourth meeting in this series, and relevant materials, please click here.


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