The wars of the 1990s confirm a basic finding from the study of civil war termination: "peacemaking is a risky business." The greatest source of risk comes from spoilers - leaders and parties who believe that peace emerging from negotiations threatens their power, worldview, and interests, and use violence to undermine attempts to achieve it. When spoilers succeed, the results are catastrophic. But not all spoilers do succeed.

The crucial difference between the success and failure of spoilers is the role played by international actors as custodians of peace. This study begins to develop a typological theory of spoiler management, providing a first step toward understanding the spoiler problem in peace processes and evaluating the appropriateness and effectiveness of different strategies of spoiler mangement.

"Claim-Making and Large-Scale Historical Processes in the Late Twentieth Century," held March 7-9, 1997, at Stanford University, was an experimental workshop to preview the dimensions on the eve of the twenty-first century that the MacArthur Foundation Consortiumon Challenges to the Study of International Peace and Cooperation, will explore over the next three years: war and institutions of violence; globalization; society and the ecosphere; and identity and social power. The idea was to examine these dimensions as large structural macro-historical processes and also to look at how these processes are immanent in the political and cultural claims made by contending actors. All of the workshop panels brought out issues of several dimensions. The first panel, on Globalization and Social Claims, looked at processes of globalization and also at society and the ecosphere. The second panel, State Formation and Claim-Making, focused on the dimensions of war and institutions of violence and also identity and social power. The third panel, Identities and Social Power, was on that dimension, largely in the context of globalization. The fourth panel, a roundtable on Claims to Sovereignty in the Former Soviet Union, was most related to the dimension of war and institutions of violence.

Those studying international peace and security tend to look for the origins of violence in differences, whether among economic interests, ethno-cultural groups, or clashing ideologies. Arguing from the Girardian perspective (described in an appendix to this essay), Bland argues that it is the similarity of the warring camps in Northern Ireland that underlies cycles of violence and retribution. Over the past two centuries, periods of relative calm and socioeconomic equalization in the region have been followed by outbreaks of inter-group violence and rapid social polarization.

Bland shows that symbolic displays of "marching and rising"--in which Protestant and Catholic extremists reassert their respective roles as triumphant masters and defiant rebels--are generative rather than merely symptomatic of differences and violence between the two sides. Acts of terror beget more than retaliation: they permeate the entire fabric of society and become self-perpetuating, as each person becomes a potential victim and a potential killer in the eyes of the other side. The only protection and "justice" in Northern Ireland was that offered by the very perpetrators of violence. Whereas social scientists have argued for security guarantees and constitutional engineering as solutions to internal wars, Bland shows that a "hurting stalemate" of violence and retribution can persist indefinitely as long as making peace with the enemy is unacceptable.

Bland argues that protacted inter-group conflicts are best resolved in ethical and interpersonal terms. Combatants on each side must transcend their conflict by recognizing and affirming publicly their common humanity, and by unilaterally renouncing the principle of retributive justice. To paraphrase Anwar Sadat, whom Bland cites as such a "transcender," peace is won not by signing agreements but by embracing enemies.

Given that organized violence within states is currently more widespread and destructive than war among states, many advocate expanding the concept of security to include elements of political and personal security at the domestic level. Since individuals generally look to governments to provide this security, deadly violence--whether by insurgents, polite forces, or criminal networks--can undermine the stability and legitimacy of state authorities. Unfortunately, democratization has accompanied increases in such violence in many parts of the world.

In a case study of contemporary Benin that has much broader implications, Bruce Magnusson argues that democratizing states must solve simultaneous and interrelated threats to public security in order to survive. At the level of the state, leaderships must safeguard democratic institutions from violent overthrow, particularly by disaffected militaries. At the level of society, democratic legitimacy rests on protection from criminality and from the arbitrary exercise of public and police authority. These challenges must be met jointly within a democratic constitutional framework: domestic order is key to averting military takeover, and likewise constitutionality provides the central guarantee for individual rights and civil liberties.

During the Cold War, the United States carried out a number of covert actions against elected governments in the Third World. Critics of the "democratic peace" suggest these covert operations are potential invalidations of, or at least exceptions to, the proposition that liberal democracies rarely or never wage war on one another. Democratic peace theorists, however, argue that the targets of these covert actions were not long-term, stable democracies, that covert action falls short of interstate war by Correlates of War (CoW) criteria, and that the covert nature of these operations meant that liberal norms and institutions in the United States did not have an opportunity to function. Even so, by forcing the executive to use covert means, democratic institutions may have prevented the higher level of international violence known as war, although they were not robust enough to prevent covert action. Liberal interventionist and anti-communist ideology provided policymakers with a justificatory frame for intervention which, however, did not amount to war between democracies.

In April 1994, black and white South Africans for the first time will vote for a nonracial government. This watershed election is one of many recent profound changes in Southern Africa, including independence in Namibia, democratic elections in Zambia, a peace agreement in Mozambique, and renewed civil war in Angola.

The authors explore the sources and dynamics of the political, economic, and diplomatic transformations taking place in Southern Africa. They recount how Southern Africa has long endured costly, violent domestic and interstate conflicts, often complicated and intensified by external interventions and interests. They also analyze the various attempts to resolve Southern Africa's conflicts. They suggest that the democratic transition in South Africa opens the possibility to create a secure Southern Africa, but they also note that past conflict legacies and new unanticipated conflicts could stand in the way. The challenge ahead will be to create new institutions at the national and regional levels that can help political players resolve conflict without resorting to violence.

ABOUT THE BOOK

We have seen in recent hijackings and other hostage-takings that the mightiest military machine in the world can be tied down like Gulliver. What would happen if tomorrow's Lilliputians had an atomic bomb, or used other means to cause nuclear violence? Preventing Nuclear Terrorism is an insightful and provocative book that provides early warning of a threat that must be stopped from materializing at all costs. It points the way to avoiding a situation in which the world order, not just our nation, would be placed at risk. It warrants close scrutiny.
- Representative Richard Gephardt
Chairman, House Democratic Caucus

The old adage about an ounce of prevention being worth a pound of cure aptly describes the basic thrust of this valuable book. The book begins with a distinguished and balanced International Task Force of experts concluding that 'the probability of nuclear terrorism is increasing' and warning that 'the fact that so far there has been no serious act of nuclear terrorism is no reason for complacency.' The Task Force report is followed by 26 studies that provide valuable insight and perspective into all aspects of a world-threatening problem. This is a unique body of work that offers a realistic and urgently needed roadmap for steering clear of nuclear terrorism.
- Senator Sam Nunn
Chairman, Senate Armed Services Committee

There is no greater challenge to the entire world than the prevention of a detonation, accidental or otherwise, of even a single nuclear weapon. Preventing Nuclear Terrorism makes a unique and valued contribution toward that end. It should be widely read, discussed, and acted upon.
- Senator John W. Warner
Secretary of the Navy, 1972-74