Terrorism
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William J. Perry
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Reprinted with permission from Washingtonpost.Newsweek Interactive Company and The Washington Post

North Korea's declared nuclear bomb test program will increase the incentives for other nations to go nuclear, will endanger security in the region and could ultimately result in nuclear terrorism. While this test is the culmination of North Korea's long-held aspiration to become a nuclear power, it also demonstrates the total failure of the Bush administration's policy toward that country. For almost six years this policy has been a strange combination of harsh rhetoric and inaction.

President Bush, early in his first term, dubbed North Korea a member of the "axis of evil" and made disparaging remarks about Kim Jong Il. He said he would not tolerate a North Korean nuclear weapons program, but he set no bounds on North Korean actions.

The most important such limit would have been on reprocessing spent fuel from North Korea's reactor to make plutonium. The Clinton administration declared in 1994 that if North Korea reprocessed, it would be crossing a "red line," and it threatened military action if that line was crossed. The North Koreans responded to that pressure and began negotiations that led to the Agreed Framework. The Agreed Framework did not end North Korea's aspirations for nuclear weapons, but it did result in a major delay. For more than eight years, under the Agreed Framework, the spent fuel was kept in a storage pond under international supervision.

Then in 2002, the Bush administration discovered the existence of a covert program in uranium, evidently an attempt to evade the Agreed Framework. This program, while potentially serious, would have led to a bomb at a very slow rate, compared with the more mature plutonium program. Nevertheless, the administration unwisely stopped compliance with the Agreed Framework. In response the North Koreans sent the inspectors home and announced their intention to reprocess. The administration deplored the action but set no "red line." North Korea made the plutonium.

The administration also said early this summer that a North Korean test of long-range missiles was unacceptable. North Korea conducted a multiple-launch test of missiles on July 4. Most recently, the administration said a North Korean test of a nuclear bomb would be unacceptable. A week later North Korea conducted its first test.

It appears that the administration is deeply divided on how to deal with North Korea, with some favoring negotiation and others economic and political pressure to force a regime change. As a result, while the administration was willing to send a representative to the six-party talks organized by the Chinese in 2003, it had no apparent strategy for dealing with North Korea there or for providing leadership to the other parties. In the meantime, it increased economic pressure on Pyongyang. Certainly an argument can be made for such pressure, but it would be naive to think it could succeed without the support of the Chinese and South Korean governments, neither of which backs such action. North Korea, sensing the administration's paralysis, has moved ahead with an aggressive and dangerous nuclear program.

So what can be done now that might have a constructive influence on North Korea's behavior? The attractive alternatives are behind us. There should and will be a U.N. resolution condemning the test. The United Nations may respond to calls from the United States and Japan for strong sanctions to isolate North Korea and cut off trade with it. But North Korea is already the most isolated nation in the world, and its government uses this isolation to its advantage. Stronger sanctions on materials that might be of use to the nuclear program are reasonable, but the horse is already out of the barn. Economic sanctions to squeeze North Korea would increase the suffering of its people but would have little effect on the elite. In any event, they would be effective only if China and South Korea fully participated, and they have shown no inclination to do so.

There will be calls to accelerate our national missile defense program. But the greatest danger to the United States from this program is not that North Korea would be willing to commit suicide by firing a missile at the United States, even if it did develop one of sufficient range. Rather, it is the possibility that the North Koreans will sell one of the bombs or some of their plutonium to a terrorist group. The president has warned North Korea not to transfer any materials from its nuclear program. But the warnings we have sent to North Korea these past six years have gone unheeded and its acts unpunished. It is not clear that this latest one will have any greater effect. If a warning is to have a chance of influencing North Korea's behavior it has to be much more specific. It would have to promise retaliation against North Korea if a terrorist detonated a nuclear bomb in one of our cities. It must be backed by a meaningful forensics program that can identify the source of a nuclear bomb.

This test will certainly send an undesirable message to Iran, and that damage has already been done. But it is important to try to keep this action from precipitating a nuclear arms race in the Asia-Pacific region. Both Japan and South Korea have the capability to move quickly to full nuclear-weapon status but have not done so because they have had confidence in our nuclear umbrella. They may now reevaluate their decision. We should consult closely with Japan and South Korea to reassure them that they are still under our umbrella and that we have the will and the capability to regard an attack on them as an attack on the United States. This may be necessary to discourage them from moving forward with nuclear deterrence of their own.

Our government's inattention has allowed North Korea to establish a new and dangerous threat to the Asia-Pacific region. It is probably too late to reverse that damage, but serious attention to this problem can still limit the extent of the damage.

The writer was secretary of defense from 1994 to 1997.

Copyright 2006, Washingtonpost.Newsweek Interactive and The Washington

Post. All rights Reserved.

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Paul Stockton joined CISAC this fall as a senior research scholar, bringing academic and political experience in homeland security policy issues. His research and teaching focus on how U.S. institutions respond to changing threats--especially the rise of terrorism.

As the first researcher CISAC has hired who specializes in homeland security, Stockton will help build the center's research in this area, which is gaining scholarly and public interest.

"Stockton's return to CISAC," where he held a postdoctoral fellowship in 1989-1990, "adds both new depth and breadth to the Center's research on terrorism and homeland security," said Scott Sagan, CISAC director. "He has great practical experience with Congress and national security policy making and in-depth knowledge about how government, military, and private industry forces interact in the homeland security arena."

A former advisor on defense, intelligence, counter-narcotics and foreign affairs to Sen. Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Stockton also studies interactions between Congress and the president in creating budgets and institutions to address security threats. He is writing an article that explores the congressional response to hurricane Katrina and examines the unresolved challenges that Katrina-scale catastrophes pose to the U.S. disaster response system. He is editing a graduate textbook, Homeland Security, to be published by Oxford in 2007. Stockton will also write a book manuscript analyzing the domestic political constraints that shape homeland security budget and policy decisions, in a work tentatively titled The Politics of Homeland Security.

Stockton came to CISAC from the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, Calif., where he served as associate provost and directed the school's Center for Homeland Defense and Security. Besides shaping CISAC's research program in homeland security, Stockton, who has PhD in government from Harvard, is co-teaching the center's undergraduate honors program with senior fellow Stephen Stedman.

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If the ultimate terror attack were to happen--a nuclear explosion in a city--the resulting death and destruction would be almost unimaginable. But we can imagine the geopolitical consequences. Can we do anything now that would help matters? Michael May, Jay Davis and Raymond Jeanloz argue that we can, by establishing a databank of known nuclear explosive materials. Using this resource it would be possible to establish where the materials came from and who was responsible for the terrorist act. Not just for purposes of retribution, but in order to assess the chances of further nuclear detonations.

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Michael M. May
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This event will be opened first by a talk on Terrorism and Motivation by Arie Kruglanski and then followed by a Roundtable conversation on Terrorism, Leadership and Motivation with Eva Meyersson Milgrom, SIEPR, Stanford University, Robert Powell, Department of Sociology, UC Berkeley, Paul Milgrom, Department of Economics, Stanford University

David Laitin, Department of Political Science, Stanford University, and Lee Ross, Department of Psychology, Stanford University.

Professor Kruglanski has been a pioneer in fields such as intrinsic motivation, open and close mindedness and goals and motivation. He is a frequent keynote speaker around the world, and a recipient of the Donald T. Campbell Award for Distinguished Scientific Contribution to Social Psychology, as well as the Humboldt Forschungspreis. Professor Kruglanski is a fellow of the American Psychology Association and the National Academy of Sciences. He is on the editorial boards of Psychological Review, New Review of Social Psychology and American Psychologist

Daniel and Nancy Okimoto Conference Room

Arie Kruglanski Co-Director Speaker The National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), University of Maryland
Paul Milgrom Professor Speaker Dept. of Economics, Stanford University

Department of Political Science
Stanford University
Encina Hall, W423
Stanford, CA 94305-6044

(650) 725-9556 (650) 723-1808
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James T. Watkins IV and Elise V. Watkins Professor of Political Science
laitin.jpg PhD

David Laitin is the James T. Watkins IV and Elise V. Watkins Professor of Political Science and a co-director of the Immigration Policy Lab at Stanford. He has conducted field research in Somalia, Nigeria, Spain, Estonia and France. His principal research interest is on how culture – specifically, language and religion – guides political behavior. He is the author of “Why Muslim Integration Fails in Christian-heritage Societies” and a series of articles on immigrant integration, civil war and terrorism. Laitin received his BA from Swarthmore College and his PhD from the University of California, Berkeley.

Affiliated faculty at the Center for International Security and Cooperation
Affiliated faculty at The Europe Center
David Laitin Professor Speaker Department of Political Science, Stanford University
Eva Meyersson Milgrom Senior Researcher Speaker Stanford Institute for Economics and Policy Research
Robert Powell Department of Sociology Speaker UC Berkeley
Lee Ross Department of Psychology Speaker Stanford University
Panel Discussions
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Dara Kay Cohen is a PhD candidate in political science at Stanford University and was a fellow and research assistant at CISAC in 2004-2005 and 2005-2006. Her research at CISAC involved studying the politics of national security; she examined the creation of the Department of Homeland Security, how security issues have affected congressional elections and co-wrote a paper with Jacob N. Shapiro on the failure of the homeland security alert system. Her current dissertation research focuses on the use of sexual violence during civil wars, and she spend last summer in Sierra Leone conducting initial field work. She previously worked at the Department of Justice as a paralegal in the Outstanding Scholars Program in the Counterterrorism Section and at the u.S. Embassy in London on terrorist financing issues. She received her a.B. in political science and philosophy with honors from Brown University in 2001.

Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, with a PhD in political science from Stanford as well as a law degree from Yale, focuses his scholarship on how organizations cope with the legal responsibility for managing complex criminal justice, regulatory, and international security problems. He has published the leading academic paper on the operation of federal money laundering laws, and one of the most exhaustive empirical case studies of public participation in regulatory rulemaking proceedings. Recent projects address the role of criminal enforcement in managing transnational threats, the physical safety of refugee communities in the developing world, legislative and budgetary dynamics affecting the federal Department of Homeland Security, and the impact of bureaucratic structure on how institutions implement legal mandates. Professor Cuéllar is an affiliated faculty member at the Stanford Center for International Security and Cooperation, and a member of the Executive committee for the Stanford International Initiative. Before joining the Stanford Law School faculty in 2001, he served as senior advisor to the u.S. Treasury Department's Undersecretary for Enforcement and clerked for Chief Judge Mary M. Schroeder of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

Bary R. Weingast is a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution as well as the Ward C. Krebs Family Professor in the Department of Political Science at Stanford University; he served as chair of that department from 1996 to 2001. He is also a professor of economics, by courtesy, at the university. He was a fellow at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences from 1993 to 1994. Weingast is an expert in political economy and public policy, the political foundation of markets and economic reform, U.S. politics, and regulation. His current research focuses on the political determinants of public policymaking and the political foundations of markets and democracy. Weingast is a fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. He is the 2006 recipient of the William H. Riker Prize in Political Science. He received the Heinz Eulau Award for Best paper from the American Political Science Review in 1987. With Charles Stewart, he received the Award for Best Paper n Political History b the American Political Science Association in 1994 and again in 1998. He is also the recipient, along with Kenneth Schultz, of the Franklin L. Burdette Award for Best paper Presented at the 1994 Political Science Association Meeting.

Paul Stockton is a senior research scholar at CISAC. He was formerly the associate provost at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California, and was the former director of its Center for Homeland Defense and Security. His teaching and research focus son how U.S. security institutions respond to changes in the threat (including the rise of terrorism), and the interaction of Congress and the Executive branch in restructuring national security budgets, policies and institutional arrangement.s Stockton joined the faculty of the Naval Postgraduate School in August 1990. From 1995 until 2000, he served as director of NPS's Center for Civil-Military Relations. From 2000-2001, he founded and served as the acting dean of NPS's School of International Graduate Studies. He was appointed associate provost in 2001.

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Dara K. Cohen PhD Candidate Speaker Department of Political Science, Stanford University
Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar Speaker
Barry R. Weingast Senior Fellow, Hoover Institution and Ward C. Krebs Family Professor Speaker Department of Political Science, Stanford University
Paul Stockton Commentator
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Matthew Kroenig is a doctoral candidate in the Charles and Louise Travers Department of Political Science at the University of California, Berkeley, the Herbert York Fellow at the Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation at the University of California, and a predoctoral fellow at CISAC. His dissertation explains the strategic incentives that drive states to provide nuclear weapons technology to nonnuclear-weapon states. His other research focuses on international security, nuclear weapons proliferation, homeland security, terrorism, and civil war. His writings have appeared in such publications as Democratization, Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, Newsday, and Security Studies.

Kroenig has also served as a strategist in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, where he was a principal author of key national security strategy and defense review documents and where he led the development of a U.S. government-wide strategy for deterring terrorist networks. For his work, Kroenig received the Department of Defense's Award for Outstanding Achievement.

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Matthew Kroenig Predoctoral Fellow Speaker CISAC
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The prospect of civil nuclear cooperation between the United States and India has stirred controversy for its potential impact on nuclear proliferation. I will discuss the origins or the U.S.-India nuclear deal, its current political prospects in the United States and India, and evaluate its impact on the nonproliferation regime. My talk will be based on part on the report U.S.-India Nuclear Cooperation: A Strategy for Moving Forward.

Michael Levi is a fellow for science and technology at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York. He was previously a science and technology fellow at the Brookings Institution. Levi is the author of two books, The Future of Arms Control (Brookings, 2005, with Michael O'Hanlon), and Rethinking Nuclear Terrorism (Harvard University Press, forthcoming).

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Michael Levi Fellow for Science and Technology Speaker Council on Foreign Relations
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Bioterrorism is a growing threat. While the U.S. government has spent considerable sums on programs designed to protect the United States from a biological attack, no clear strategy has been articulated to guide planning and expenditures. This talk will present the outlines of a coherent strategy for coping with bioterrorism that includes diplomacy, deterrence and defense, with the emphasis on defense.

Dean Wilkening directs the Science Program at CISAC. He holds a Ph.D. in physics from Harvard University and spent 13 years at the RAND Corporation prior to coming to Stanford in 1996. His major research interests have been nuclear strategy and policy, arms control, the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, ballistic missile defense, and conventional force modernization. His most recent research focuses on ballistic missile defense and biological terrorism. His work on missile defense focuses on the broad strategic and political implications of deploying national and theater missile defenses, in particular, the impact of theater missile defense in Northeast Asia, and the technical feasibility of boost-phase interceptors for national and theater missile defense. His work on biological weapons focuses on understanding the scientific and technical uncertainties associated with predicting the outcome of hypothetical airborne biological weapon attacks, with the aim of devising more effective civil defenses, and a reanalysis of the accidental anthrax release in 1979 from a Russian military compound in Sverdlovsk with the aim of improving our understanding of the human effects of inhalation anthrax.

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Dean Wilkening Speaker
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This study analyzes the political plights of twenty-eight terrorist groups- the complete list of foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs) as designated by the U.S. Department of State since 2001.7 The data yield two unexpected findings. First, the groups accomplished their forty-two policy objectives only 7 percent of the time. Second, although the groups achieved certain types of policy objectives more than others, the key variable for terrorist success was a tactical one: target selection. Groups whose attacks on civilian targets outnumbered attacks on military targets systematically failed to achieve their policy objectives, regardless of their nature. These findings suggest that (1) terrorist groups rarely achieve their policy objectives, and (2) the poor success rate is inherent to the tactic of terrorism itself. Together, the data challenge the dominant scholarly opinion that terrorism is strategically rational behavior.8 The bulk of the article develops a theory to explain why terrorist groups are unable to achieve their policy objectives by targeting civilians.

This article has five main sections. The first section summarizes the conventional wisdom that terrorism is an effective coercive strategy and highlights the deficit of empirical research sustaining this position. The second section explicates the methods used to assess the outcomes of the forty-two terrorist objectives included in this study and finds that terrorist success rates are actually extremely low. The third section examines the antecedent conditions for terrorism to work. It demonstrates that although terrorist groups are more likely to succeed in coercing target countries into making territorial concessions than ideological concessions, groups that primarily attack civilian targets do not achieve their policy objectives, regardless of their nature. The fourth section develops a theory derived from the social psychology literature for why terrorist groups that target civilians are unable to compel policy change. Its external validity is then tested against three case studies: the September 1999 Russian apartment bombings, the September 11, 2001, attacks on the United States, and Palestinian terrorism in the first intifada. The article concludes with four policy implications for the war on terrorism and suggestions for future research.

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We develop a mathematical model to find the optimal inspection strategy for detecting a nuclear weapon (or nuclear material to make a weapon) from being smuggled into the United States in a shipping container, subject to constraints of port congestion and an overall budget. We consider an 11-layer security system consisting of shipper certification, container seals, and a targeting software system, followed by passive (neutron and gamma), active (gamma radiography), and manual testing at overseas and domestic ports. Currently implemented policies achieve a low detection probability, and improved security requires passive and active testing of trusted containers and manually opening containers that cannot be penetrated by radiography. The annual cost of achieving a high detection probability of a plutonium weapon using existing equipment in traditional ways is roughly several billion dollars if testing is done domestically, and is approximately five times higher if testing is performed overseas. Our results suggest that employing high-energy x-ray radiography and elongating the passive neutron tests at overseas ports may provide significant cost savings, and several developing technologies, radiation sensors inside containers and tamper-resistant electronic seals, should be pursued aggressively. Further effort is critically needed to develop a practical neutron interrogation scheme that reliably detects moderately shielded, highly enriched uranium.

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Lawrence M. Wein
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