On 8 February 2007, at the Kellogg Conference Center at the Columbia University School of International and Public Affairs (SIPA), the Journal of International Affairs and the Middle East Institute hosted a live debate between Scott Sagan and Kenneth Waltz. The two political scientists revisited their classic debate on nuclear weapons, addressing recent developments in Iran and possible global responses. Richard K. Betts moderated the event. Dean Lisa Anderson delivered opening remarks. This article is a transcript of the discussion.

A look at experience in Iran and North Korea--and the origins of the NPT and safeguards in the 1960s--offers insights into the authority of IAEA nuclear inspectors.

Recently, post-explosion nuclear forensics, or nuclear attribution, has gained a new spotlight within the scientific and policymaking community working on nuclear weapons. Academics are beginning to ask whether post-explosion forensics might create a replacement for an international nonproliferation regime or at least offer a fallback option to deter states and individuals from selling nuclear materials. This paper examines current attribution technology from unclassified literature and finds the technology to be well developed but not foolproof, such that nuclear attribution currently provides little deterrent value. If current capabilities were publicized more thoroughly, and if the post-explosion process of assessing the evidence were internationalized, states and intermediate actors might be deterred more effectively. This paper also discusses the development of a nuclear fingerprint database; while useful, its impact on deterrence would be minimal.

This article is based on the author's undergraduate honors thesis, completed during 2005-2006 in CISAC's Interschool Honors Program in International Security.

On Oct. 9, 2006, North Korea conducted a nuclear test and proclaimed itself a world nuclear power. The explosion yield was less than one kiloton, much less than the first nuclear test of other states and even less than the expected yield of four kilotons that North Korean officials forecast to their Chinese counterparts.

Nonetheless, the test demonstrated Pyongyang's mastery of the nuclear fuel cycle and at least rudimentary nuclear-weapon design and manufacturing capabilities.

On Feb. 13, North Korea signed a six-party agreement to take initial actions to implement a Sept. 19, 2005 Joint Statement for the eventual abandonment of its nuclear weapons program. While this is welcome news, the road to the abandonment of North Korean nuclear weapons and capabilities will be long and arduous, and success is far from guaranteed. Its nuclear program still poses significant risks to international security, the most serious of which is the export of nuclear materials, expertise or technologies to states such as Iran and the potential for subsequent proliferation to terrorists.

Does the proliferation of nuclear weapons cause ongoing conflicts to diminish or to intensify? The spread of nuclear weapons to South Asia offers an opportunity to investigate this crucial question. Optimistic scholars argue that by threatening to raise the cost of war astronomically, nuclear weapons make armed conflict in South Asia extremely unlikely. Pessimistic scholars maintain that nuclear weapons make the subcontinent war-prone, because of technological, political, and organizational problems. This book argues that nuclear weapons have destabilized the subcontinent, principally because of their interaction with India and Pakistan's territorial preferences and relative military capabilities. These findings challenge both optimistic and pessimistic conventional wisdom and have implications beyond South Asia.

This analysis questions President George W. Bush's reasons for refusing to follow a number of provisions of the U.S.-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act.

In his oral bill-signing statement to reporters and members of the public, President Bush praised the bill he was signing. He did not mention his disagreements with Congress on several of the provisions of the bill. However, in a separate written signing statement, he made clear that he, not Congress, conducts foreign policy and therefore has the greater say on what that policy should be. He declared: "Given the Constitution's commitment to the presidency of the authority to conduct the Nation's foreign affairs, the executive branch shall construe such policy statements as advisory." Thus, he concluded, he will not follow some of the provisions of the new statute: "My approval of the Act [by signing it] does not constitute my adoption of the statements of foreign policy in the Act as U.S. foreign policy."

For a long time, how nuclear facilities were protected from terrorists and thieves has been largely the prerogative of the facilities themselves or individual governments. But the September 11 terrorist attacks and statements by Osama bin Laden have raised new concerns about preventing terrorists from stealing or attacking nuclear material that is often not well protected. As a result, new international standards have been adopted, calling on states to provide stronger protection for nuclear material.

So far, however, these standards are very general and lack effective enforcement. To remedy these shortcomings, the UN Security Council should consider such measures as providing a greater role for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

At their meeting in India in July of 2005, President George W. Bush and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh agreed that the United States and India should resume cooperation in peaceful nuclear energy matters. Their cooperation had ended in 1974 after the Indians conducted a nuclear explosion which the United States concluded was a nuclear weapon test. After achieving a tentative agreement with Prime Minister Singh, Bush called upon Congress to amend the Atomic Energy Act's prohibition on U.S. nuclear assistance to India so that he could carry out the agreement. Before the end of its 2006 session, Congress did so. It approved a bill authorizing the negotiation of a new U.S.-India nuclear cooperation agreement. The authorization was not a "blank check." In this new statute, Congress insisted upon having an opportunity for reviewing whatever final agreement the administration negotiates with India. It demanded that, before it considers whether to give approval to that agreement, the agreement be submitted for approval to both the IAEA and to the international Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG).