This paper describes the technologies needed for producing nuclear weapons, giving particular attention to those used in electromagnetic separation and laser uranium-235 enrichment.  The complexity of the technologies makes it clear that developing countries, to various degrees, need assistance from the developed world in order to build nuclear weapons.  Complete restriction of assistance could prevent the spread of these weapons.  Unfortunately, knowledge of the technology is already so widespread that preventing further spread is virtually impossible in the long run.  In practice, imposing rigorous control over the availability of key components of all of the possible technologies may delay access to nuclear weapons by the less-developed world for many years.  All of the recommendations in this discussion may be overtaken by the chaotic situation in the former Soviet Union--rumors abound that its nuclear engineers, technology, weapons material, and the weapons themselves are potentially for sale.  A better method of preventing proliferation is needed, and some of the proposals for achieving improvements are discussed in this paper.

Under Article VI of the NPT, all parties agree "to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control." The purpose of this paper is to consider the meaning of this language.

Although may problems face international efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to additional countries in the years ahead, none is more important than gaining a lengthy extension of the non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Action on extension will be taken by majority vote of the over 160 parties at a conference called to consider this question in 1995. This paper will consider why a lengthy extension of the NPT is important; what options for, and obstacles to, extension exist and what the NPT's strongest supporters can offer the NPT members who are skeptical about a long extension in order to win their votes.

The prevention of nuclear proliferation is intimately related to stringent restraints on the supply of fissionable material available for weapons. We review the practices of the United States in providing security and control of bomb-grade material and the problems that have been encountered. We then consider the challenges to security and control of nuclear weapons material posed by the dismantlement of nuclear weapons in the Former Soviet Union (FSU).

"The 35-year goal of achieving a comprehensive test ban can best be attained, without compromising the integrity of the regime, by not defining precisely what constitutes a nuclear explosion."

This paper examines technical and institutional possibilities for improving the ability of the international safeguards regime to prevent or slow the spread of nuclear weapons. It relies strongly on the experience of the recently uncovered Iraqi nuclear-weapons program and the role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the United Nations in the discovery of the program's extent and scope.

The Iraqi program and its exposure following the Gulf War surprised and disturbed much of the international community. However, the shock generated by the extent and the size of an effort that had been suspected but remained grossly underestimated and misunderstood has given a strong political impetus to the will of the international community for strengthening the non-proliferation regime.

This paper makes a number of suggestions based on a review of the Iraqi effort and on an assessment of possible future attempts by other nations to acquire nuclear weapons.

What guidance does international law provide in determining who succeeds to the treaty obligations of a large nation-state when it splits up? This Article will consider, first, the general rules of inheritance in such a case and, second, what has happened so far in four concrete areas.

The dissolution of the Soviet Union has brought new nuclear non-proliferation dangers and opportunities. Both revolve around the approximately thirty thousand nuclear weapons and the fissile materials for perhaps ninety thousand nuclear bombs in the former Soviet Union. The weapons are now deployed in only four of the newly independents states - most in Russia, but some still in Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine. "Loose Nukes" is the colloquial description of one aspect of the new threats.

New positive and negative assurances from all five permanent members of the UN Security Council are now vitally important, not only to provide support to Ukraine and every other non-nuclear-weapons state's legitimate concerns, but to advance the vital goals of nuclear non-proliferation prior to the critical 1995 NPT review and extension conference.