In recent years, world attention has been drawn to the acquisition by developing countries of delivery systems for nuclear weapons as distinct from the nuclear warheads themselves. In particular, concerns have been raised about the spread of ballistic-missile systems and technologies to areas such as theMiddle East, in which there are strong regional tensions.  The extensive use of ballistic missiles in the "war of the cities" in 1988 during the Iran-Iraq War and the use of Scud missiles by Iraq against Israel and Saudi Arabia during Desert Storm highlighted the rapid proliferation of these weapons, and served as a premonition of worse things to come if and when developing states deploy ballistic missiles armed with weapons of mass destruction.  The ballistic missiles of concern have ranges of a hundred to a few thousand kilometers (km) and can carry payloads of up to one or two thousand kilograms (kg). These systems are becoming increasingly prominent in Third World arsenals, and are perceived as threatening stability and regional military balances.

This study examines the impact of ballistic-missile proliferation, focusing on sixteen regional states which have or soon could have ballistic-missile capabilities.  Specifically, the study: (1) evaluates the military effectlveness of ballistic missiles in comparison with advanced strike aircraft, (2) identifies trends in the supply of and demand for ballistic missiles, (3) identifies key technologies and systems whose control is essential to a successful missile non-proliferation regime, (4) reviews the relevancy and effectiveness of present control mechanisms including the MlssiIe Technology Control Regime (MTCR), and (5) offers policy options for strengthening controls on the acquisition by developing states of longer-range ground strike delivery systems, including ballistic missiles and advanced combat aircraft.

After eight years of marathon negotiations, the United States and the Soviet Union are finally close to concluding a strategic-arms-reduction treaty (START). At the 1990 Washington summit, U.S. president George Bush and Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev signed a communique concerning the reduction of strategic nuclear arms. Although the agreement is not the long-awaited START, the two presidents reaffirmed their determination to have the treaty completed and ready for signature by the end of 1990. The marked progress toward nuclear disarmament by the two superpowers has once again caused vast repercussions. While hailing progress, many people show more concern for the implications of the treaty for the future of arms control.

Robert Axelrod's The Evolution of Cooperation has been widely acclaimed in the few years since its publication. Given its promise for promoting cooperation in ‘prisoner's dilemma games' (PDGs), such praise is unsurprising. The purpose of this paper is to consider whether the tit-for-tat (TFT) strategy Axelrod recommends for achieving an evolution of cooperation in PD situations has application to the negotiation of arms control treaties.

The expected degree of compliance with agreements or treaties under negotiation must be inferred from the record of the past as well as from the expectations that are raised by the willingness of the parties to dedicate increased resources to verification, to accept more-intrusive inspections, to exhibit greater openness, and to provide for cooperative verification measures.  Yet such expectations for compliance must be tempered by the recognition of fundamental factors, which are discussed.

ABOUT THE BOOK

We have seen in recent hijackings and other hostage-takings that the mightiest military machine in the world can be tied down like Gulliver. What would happen if tomorrow's Lilliputians had an atomic bomb, or used other means to cause nuclear violence? Preventing Nuclear Terrorism is an insightful and provocative book that provides early warning of a threat that must be stopped from materializing at all costs. It points the way to avoiding a situation in which the world order, not just our nation, would be placed at risk. It warrants close scrutiny.
- Representative Richard Gephardt
Chairman, House Democratic Caucus

The old adage about an ounce of prevention being worth a pound of cure aptly describes the basic thrust of this valuable book. The book begins with a distinguished and balanced International Task Force of experts concluding that 'the probability of nuclear terrorism is increasing' and warning that 'the fact that so far there has been no serious act of nuclear terrorism is no reason for complacency.' The Task Force report is followed by 26 studies that provide valuable insight and perspective into all aspects of a world-threatening problem. This is a unique body of work that offers a realistic and urgently needed roadmap for steering clear of nuclear terrorism.
- Senator Sam Nunn
Chairman, Senate Armed Services Committee

There is no greater challenge to the entire world than the prevention of a detonation, accidental or otherwise, of even a single nuclear weapon. Preventing Nuclear Terrorism makes a unique and valued contribution toward that end. It should be widely read, discussed, and acted upon.
- Senator John W. Warner
Secretary of the Navy, 1972-74

In early 1983, members of Stanford University's Center for International Security and Arms Control met to discuss ideas on the establishment of a joint U.S.-U.S.S.R. center to support cooperative efforts to prevent accidental nuclear war. William Perry (former Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering) began the discussion by outlining several measures he felt could help to reduce the risk of nuclear war by accident or miscalculation. Calling attention to the earlier proposals of Senators Gary Hart, Sam Nunn, and Henry Jackson, he endorsed the concept of a joint accidental nuclear war prevention center as a mechanism to support efforts of the two superpowers to prevent or reduce the likelihood of the outbreak of nuclear war. Most notable in this regard was his personal experience of an erroneous warning of a large-scale Soviet missile attack on the U.S., which resulted from a NORAD computer malfunction. Information exchanges and consultation to clarify circumstances surrounding an accident - or the misperceptions that might result from one - could be facilitated by a number of different types of centers that have been suggested. Perry described one possible configuration for such a center, consisting of two stations, jointly staffed and located in Washington and Moscow.

Members of the Stanford Center met again in June 1983 to examine in more detail the issues raised by this idea and similar ones, and possible next steps involved in implementation. This paper reports on research in progress on this subject. In addition to the Perry contribution, much of the conceptual analysis of the missions of a joint center derives from the work of Alexander George on crisis prevention and crisis management.' Those elements of the research covering the technical and 'mechanization' requirements are contributed by Elliott Levinthal and Ted Ralston. Lastly, the suggested negotiating approach derives from the experiences and thinking of Sidney Graybeal, former U.S. Commissioner of the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC).