The history of the October 1969 alert demonstrates that even in this high-politics arena of nuclear diplomacy, presidential orders were actively fought against, sometimes manipulated or ignored, and often honored only in part. Other orders were interpreted and implemented in a more vigorous manner that best suited the organizational interests of the military commanders doing the interpretation. The result was that many important details of the military activities undertaken in October 1969 reflected the operational interests of the military commanders and the goals of lower-level bureaucratic actors as much as the strategic objectives of the president. In this important sense, the nuclear alert was loosely coupled to the president´s orders.

Proponents of a new generation of low-yield nuclear earth-penetrating weapons (EPWs), such as modified versions of the B61-11 currently in the US stockpile, claim that such weapons could be used against deeply buried and hardened underground bunkers with "minimal collateral damage." Even a very low-yield nuclear EPW exploded in or near an urban environment will, however, cause radioactive dirt and debris and other radioactive material to fall out over several square kilometers. A nuclear EPW with a yield less than one-tenth of that of the nuclear weapon used on Hiroshima or Nagasaki could result in fatal doses of radiation to tens of thousands of victims. Biological and chemical agents stored in targeted bunkers may be dispersed into the atmosphere without being destroyed by an EPW, potentially injuring or killing unprotected civilians. The number of casualties from a nuclear EPW attack would depend on the location of the target, the density of the surrounding population, the extent of debris dispersal, and the possibility of escape or evacuation. In addition to the acute and long-term medical consequences, use of nuclear weapons would weaken existing restraints against further proliferation or use of nuclear weapons and would cross a threshold that has been maintained since 1945, when the United States detonated the first nuclear weapons over Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

What is the impact of the events of September 11 and the subsequent "war on terrorism" on nuclear issues? The "war on terrorism" is a handy political moniker for what the United States must learn to do in response to changes that have actually been taking place over several years. Some of the US responses to date have been wise. Some need a new look. Perhaps most important, in some areas, the United States and other countries have not responded and may be at a loss to respond, given the constraints on their policies. Some of these lacking responses provide the most important items on the post September 11 security agenda. In what follows, I will give one view of what these are and what to do about them.

I begin with nuclear terrorism, particularly the possibility of using nuclear weapons for terrorist purposes. The next section addresses the related issue of nuclear proliferation to state and non-state actors. The events of September 11 have given a new twist to that issue. There is a relationship between the possibility of nuclear weapons getting into terrorists' hands and the problems in Iraq, South and Central Asia, and North Korea. The following sections deals with an item that is no longer high on the US political agenda but which is tied to proliferation and terrorism and has a greater long-range potential for causing trouble, the incipient nuclear rivalries around the world. In closing, I suggest some elements of a desirable nuclear posture to deal with some of the problems outlined.

Since the Bush administration took office, and especially since excerpts of the Nuclear Posture Review were released, there have appeared in America some heated arguments about the Bush administration's changes to the Clinton administration's nuclear strategy, what consequences these changes would produce, and what influences they would exert on international and regional security. Different people have different views. The purpose of this working paper is to find solutions to these key issues. The effects of the Bush administration's nuclear strategy on China's security are also discussed.

The main viewpoint of the working paper is that the Bush administration has made the most fundamental adjustments to America's nuclear strategy since the end of the Cold War. These adjustments greatly modify U.S. nuclear deterrent strategy, the country's policy on using nuclear weapons, the triad of deterrent forces structure, and nuclear arms control policy. The new nuclear strategy would upset a balance of forces and stability regionally and around the globe. Moreover, the United States is shifting the focus of military strategy from Europe to Asia. This would exert significant influences on Asian-Pacific regional security and China's security.

This report presents the highlights of a workshop entitled "Communicating Nuclear Risk: Informing the Public about the Risks and Realities of Nuclear Terrorism" held at the Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC) of the Institute of International Studies at Stanford University on May 20, 2002.

This workshop produced several publications for use in communicating with the public: a backgrounder titled "Understanding the Risks and Realities of Nuclear Terrorism," and related fact sheets on "Dirty Bombs," "Nuclear Explosions," "Attacks on Nuclear Facilities," and "Radiation."

This encyclopedic book edited by Pavel Podvig provides comprehensive data about Soviet and Russian strategic weapons, payloads, and delivery systems and on the nuclear complex that supports them. The data are drawn from open, primarily Russian sources. Information is presented chronologically, arranged by individual systems and facilities, and is not available elsewhere in a single volume.

Following an overview of the history of Soviet strategic forces, the book discusses the structure of the political and military leadership in the Soviet Union and Russia, the structure of the Russian military and military industry, nuclear planning procedures, and the structure of the command and control system. It describes the nuclear warhead production complex and the Soviet nuclear weapon development program. It then focuses on the individual services that constitute the so-called strategic triad--land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles, the strategic submarine fleet, and strategic aviation. It presents an overview of Soviet strategic defense, including air defense systems, the Moscow missile defense system, the radar and space-based early warning networks, and the space surveillance system. The book also includes a description of the Soviet nuclear testing program, including information on test sites and on all Soviet nuclear tests and peaceful nuclear explosions. It concludes with a look at the future of strategic nuclear weapons in Russia.

The horrifying events of 11 September 2001 serve notice that civilization will confront severe challenges in the twenty-first century. As national security budgets expand in response, we should recognize that only a broad conception of security will be adequate to meet some of the threats that we may face. Biological security provides a powerful example. It must address both the challenge of biological weapons and that of infectious disease. The right approach should benefit public health even if major acts of biological terrorism never occur. Our thinking about biological security must transcend old misplaced analogies to nuclear and chemical security.

Nuclear security has been based on nonproliferation, deterrence, and defense, with intelligence woven throughout. Nonproliferation seeks to prevent the diversion of materials from civilian programs to military or terrorist weapons. Should nonproliferation fail, the United States relies on deterrence through the threat of retaliation. Defense, active or civil, has so far been less central.

Effective biological security requires a different mix. For all its challenges, nuclear nonproliferation is comparatively robust, in part because the production of weapons-usable uranium or plutonium provides a conspicuous bottleneck through which any nuclear program must pass, unless those materials are stolen. This is why preventing nuclear theft is such a high priority in the post-Cold War world. Biological agents

are easier to acquire. Most can be found in naturally occurring outbreaks. Weaponizing these agents has proved challenging for terrorist groups, but the Aum Shinrikyo's unsuccessful efforts to spray the anthrax organism throughout Tokyo in 1993 warned that attempted mass urban attacks were no longer in the realm of the fantastic.

The transfer of dangerous biological agents should be controlled where possible, and the spread of the technologies and personnel to weaponize them should be impeded. But any biological nonproliferation regime will necessarily be less robust than its nuclear counterpart, because the relevant materials, technologies, and knowledge are far more widespread.

Biological terrorism also challenges requirements for successful deterrence. Because some diseases incubate for a week or more, identifying the perpetrators of an attack may prove difficult. A terrorist group might even hope that its attack would go unrecognized; when followers of the Bhagwan Shree Rajneesh infected 750 Oregonians with salmonella in 1984, it took over a year before the infection was determined to have been intentional. Finally, as with any form of terrorism, some groups may simply be unconcerned about retaliation.

In the face of these difficulties, good intelligence is all the more important. Warning and prevention are preferable to coping with the consequences of an attack, but we must also be ready should an attack occur. This requires that greater emphasis be placed on improving public health, a kind of homeland defense that is applicable to both unintentional and intentional disease outbreaks.

Because of disease incubation times, the first responders to a biological attack may well be health-care workers at hospitals and clinics rather than specialized units. The speed and effectiveness of a response will depend on disease surveillance: the recognition by health-care workers that certain illnesses appear unusual and the rapid notification of the proper authorities. Because incubation times often exceed international travel times, both domestic and international components are required. But the domestic component of disease surveillance in most nations, including the United States, is too weak, and international networks are inadequate. Donor nations need to increase support for these efforts. And there are many other needs, such as developing and stockpiling sufficient vaccines, antibiotics, or antivirals and otherwise preparing to meet the enormous challenges that would be posed by a major outbreak. It is time to quicken the pace of these efforts, to which departments of health are as central as departments of defense.

Disease surveillance and response are not nonproliferation measures, so cannot substitute for an effective verification regime under the Biological Weapons Convention. But biological security requires the developed world, especially the United States, to see that its ongoing self-interest is closely allied with sustainable public-health improvements in the developing world. And the explosion of biotechnology, with the weapons implications that follow from it, requires the scientific community to discuss its responsibilities in earnest.