Arms Control
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During the strategic modernization program that the Soviet Union undertook in the 1970s, it deployed a large number of multiple-warhead ballistic missiles. This deployment raised concerns in the United States about vulnerability of its land-based missile force and was one of the factors that contributed to the military buildup that the United States undertook in the late 1970s-early 1980s. The newly available documents that contain evidence of the Soviet missile programs demonstrate that the "window of vulnerability" did not exist and provide some insight into the Soviet modernization program.

Pavel Podvig joined CISAC as a research associate in 2004. Before that he was a researcher at the Center for Arms Control, Energy and Environmental Studies at the Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology (MIPT). He worked as a visiting researcher with the Security Studies Program at MIT and with the Program on Science and Global Security at Princeton University, and he taught physics in MIPT's General Physics Department for more than ten years.

Podvig graduated with honors from the Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology in 1988, with a degree in physics. In 2004 he received a PhD in political science from the Moscow Institute of World Economy and International Relations.

His research has focused on technical and political issues of missile defense, space security, U.S.-Russian relations, structure and capabilities of the Russian strategic forces, and nuclear nonproliferation. He was the head of the Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces research project and the editor of a book of the same title, which is considered a definitive source of information on Russian strategic forces.

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Pavel Podvig is an independent analyst based in Geneva, where he runs his research project, "Russian Nuclear Forces." He is also a Senior Research Fellow at the UN Institute for Disarmament Research and a researcher with the Program on Science and Global Security at Princeton University. Pavel Podvig started his work on arms control at the Center for Arms Control Studies at the Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology (MIPT), which was the first independent research organization in Russia dedicated to analysis of technical issues of disarmament and nonproliferation. Pavel Podvig led the Center for Arms Control Studies project that produced the book, Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces (MIT Press, 2001). In recognition of his work in Russia, the American Physical Society awarded Podvig the Leo Szilard Lectureship Award of 2008 (with Anatoli Diakov). Podvig worked with the Program on Science and Global Security at Princeton University, the Security Studies Program at MIT, and the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University. His current research focuses on the Russian strategic forces and nuclear weapons complex, as well as technical and political aspects of nuclear nonproliferation, disarmament, missile defense, and U.S.-Russian arms control process. Pavel Podvig is a member of the International Panel on Fissile Materials. He has a  physics degree from MIPT and PhD in political science from the Moscow Institute of World Economy and International Relations.

For a list of publications, please visit http://russianforces.org/podvig/.

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Pavel Podvig Speaker
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On 8 February 2007, at the Kellogg Conference Center at the Columbia University School of International and Public Affairs (SIPA), the Journal of International Affairs and the Middle East Institute hosted a live debate between Scott Sagan and Kenneth Waltz. The two political scientists revisited their classic debate on nuclear weapons, addressing recent developments in Iran and possible global responses. Richard K. Betts moderated the event. Dean Lisa Anderson delivered opening remarks. This article is a transcript of the discussion.

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Journal of International Affairs
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Scott D. Sagan
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Leonard Weiss is a senior science fellow at CISAC and a consultant to the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. He began his professional career as a researcher in mathematical system theory at the Research Institute for Advanced Studies in Baltimore. This was followed by tenured professorships in applied mathematics and electrical engineering at Brown University and the University of Maryland. During this period he published widely in the applied mathematics literature. In 1976 he received a Congressional Science Fellowship that resulted in a career change. For more than two decades he worked for Senator John Glenn as the staff director of both the Senate Subcommittee on Energy and Nuclear Proliferation and the Committee on Governmental Affairs. He was the chief architect of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978 and other legislation sponsored by Senator Glenn. Since retiring from the Senate staff in 1999, he has published numerous articles on nonproliferation issues for the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, Arms Control Today, and other journals. In 2003-4 he chaired the Federation of American Scientists' Advisory Committee on Weapons in Space which produced the FAS report entitled "Ensuring America's Space Security." His research at CISAC includes an assessment of the impact on the nonproliferation regime of nuclear trade with non-signers of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.

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Leonard Weiss is a visiting scholar at Stanford University’s Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC). He is also a national advisory board member of the Center for Arms control and Non-Proliferation in Washington, DC. He began his professional career as a PhD researcher in mathematical system theory at the Research Institute for Advanced Studies in Baltimore. This was followed by tenured professorships in applied mathematics and electrical engineering at Brown University and the University of Maryland. During this period he published widely in the applied mathematics literature. In 1976 he received a Congressional Science Fellowship that resulted in a career change. For more than two decades he worked for Senator John Glenn as the staff director of both the Senate Subcommittee on Energy and Nuclear Proliferation and the Committee on Governmental Affairs. He was the chief architect of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978 and legislation that created the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board. In addition, he led notable investigations of the nuclear programs of India and Pakistan. Since retiring from the Senate staff in 1999, he has published numerous articles on nonproliferation issues for the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, Arms Control Today, and the Nonproliferation Review. His current research interests include an assessment of the impact on the nonproliferation regime of nuclear trade with non-signers of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, and more generally the relationship of energy security concerns with nonproliferation.

For a comprehensive list of Dr. Weiss's publications, click here.

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Pavel Podvig (speaker) joined CISAC as a research associate in 2004. Before that he was a researcher at the Center for Arms Control, Energy and Environmental Studies at the Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology (MIPT). He worked as a visiting researcher with the Security Studies Program at MIT and with the Program on Science and Global Security at Princeton University, and he taught physics in MIPT's General Physics Department for more than ten years.

Podvig graduated with honors from the Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology in 1988, with a degree in physics. In 2004 he received a PhD in political science from the Moscow Institute of World Economy and International Relations.

His research has focused on technical and political issues of missile defense, space security, U.S.-Russian relations, structure and capabilities of the Russian strategic forces, and nuclear nonproliferation. He was the head of the Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces research project and the editor of a book of the same title, which is considered a definitive source of information on Russian strategic forces.

Theodore Postol (discussant) is a professor of science, technology and national security policy in the Program in Science, Technology, and Society at MIT. He did his undergraduate work in physics and his graduate work in nuclear engineering at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. After receiving his Ph.D., Postol joined the staff of Argonne National Laboratory, where he studied the microscopic dynamics and structure of liquids and disordered solids using neutron, x-ray and light scattering, along with computer molecular dynamics techniques. Subsequently he went to the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment to study methods of basing the MX Missile, and later worked as a scientific adviser to the Chief of Naval Operations. After leaving the Pentagon, Postol helped to build a program at Stanford University to train mid-career scientists to study developments in weapons technology of relevance to defense and arms control policy. In 1990 Postol was awarded the Leo Szilard Prize from the American Physical Society. In 1995 he received the Hilliard Roderick Prize from the American Association for the Advancement of Science and in 2001 he received the Norbert Wiener Award from Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility for uncovering numerous and important false claims about missile defenses.

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Pavel Podvig is an independent analyst based in Geneva, where he runs his research project, "Russian Nuclear Forces." He is also a Senior Research Fellow at the UN Institute for Disarmament Research and a researcher with the Program on Science and Global Security at Princeton University. Pavel Podvig started his work on arms control at the Center for Arms Control Studies at the Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology (MIPT), which was the first independent research organization in Russia dedicated to analysis of technical issues of disarmament and nonproliferation. Pavel Podvig led the Center for Arms Control Studies project that produced the book, Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces (MIT Press, 2001). In recognition of his work in Russia, the American Physical Society awarded Podvig the Leo Szilard Lectureship Award of 2008 (with Anatoli Diakov). Podvig worked with the Program on Science and Global Security at Princeton University, the Security Studies Program at MIT, and the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University. His current research focuses on the Russian strategic forces and nuclear weapons complex, as well as technical and political aspects of nuclear nonproliferation, disarmament, missile defense, and U.S.-Russian arms control process. Pavel Podvig is a member of the International Panel on Fissile Materials. He has a  physics degree from MIPT and PhD in political science from the Moscow Institute of World Economy and International Relations.

For a list of publications, please visit http://russianforces.org/podvig/.

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Pavel Podvig Speaker
Theodore Postol Professor of Science, Technology and National Security Policy Speaker Massachusetts Institute of Technology
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Plutonium (Pu) and highly enriched uranium (HEU), the fissile material that is the sine qua non of nuclear weapons, manifest fingerprints that are unique to the manufacturing processes employed in their creation. Such fingerprints are not as clear as those made famous by the FBI for decades, or as DNA is today, but they are fingerprints, nonetheless. The technical challenge is to develop the processes that will link, beyond reasonable doubt, the fissile material to its manufacturer. If the technical challenges can be met, political challenges lay beyond and must be resolved before the civilized world can be assured that the fissile material that generates a nuclear explosion can be traced to its source, but if it can, many benefits to society will result. Among these are deterrence of potential suppliers, credible delay in reacting to nuclear terrorism, and international cooperation of the highest sort.

Harold Smith holds the appointment of distinguished visiting scholar and professor with the Goldman School of Public Policy at the University of California, Berkeley (UCB), where he focuses on the impact of technology on foreign and defense policy. In 1993, Smith served as assistant to the scretary of defense for nuclear, chemical, and biological defense programs during the Clinton administration. In 1960 he joined the faculty of UCB where he retired as professor and chairman of the Department of Applied Science in 1976. Smith was awarded a White House Fellowship in 1966 and was assigned as a special assistant to the secretary of defense. Since that time, he has served as an advisor to numerous governmental boards on national security policy. Of particular note are his chairmanship of the Vulnerability Task Force of the Defense Science Board and a special study for (then) Secretary of Defense Schlesinger on the Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS); i.e. the Smith Report. He has published in the New York Times, the Christian Science Monitor, the Wall Street Journal, U.S. News and World Report, and Arms Control Today. He received his PhD in nuclear engineering from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Bill Dunlop is currently a senior scientist at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) and has held numerous positions during his career there, including serving as the project manager for strategic missile and defensive weapons systems, the program manager for the development of the W87 warhead for the MX missile, and the program manager for earth penetrator weapons. From 1985 until 1990 he was the division leader overseeing work on thermonuclear weapons development. From January 1994 until December 1995, he served as the technical advisor to the U.S. ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament. The principal activity during this period in the Conference on Disarmament was the negotiation of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. After his return from Geneva, Dunlop resumed the leadership of the Arms Control and Treaty Verification Program, which later was renamed the Proliferation Prevention and Arms Control (PPAC) Program. He continues to work part-time at LLNL where he is involved cargo security issues and defense activities. Dunlop received his BA in physics from the University of Pennsylvania. He received his MS in physics and his PhD in nuclear physics from the Univesity of California, Los Angeles.

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Harold Smith Distinguished Visiting Scholar and Professor, Goldman School of Public Policy Speaker University of California, Berkeley
Bill Dunlop Senior Scientist Speaker Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
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For a long time, how nuclear facilities were protected from terrorists and thieves has been largely the prerogative of the facilities themselves or individual governments. But the September 11 terrorist attacks and statements by Osama bin Laden have raised new concerns about preventing terrorists from stealing or attacking nuclear material that is often not well protected. As a result, new international standards have been adopted, calling on states to provide stronger protection for nuclear material.

So far, however, these standards are very general and lack effective enforcement. To remedy these shortcomings, the UN Security Council should consider such measures as providing a greater role for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

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Arms Control Today
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At their meeting in India in July of 2005, President George W. Bush and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh agreed that the United States and India should resume cooperation in peaceful nuclear energy matters. Their cooperation had ended in 1974 after the Indians conducted a nuclear explosion which the United States concluded was a nuclear weapon test. After achieving a tentative agreement with Prime Minister Singh, Bush called upon Congress to amend the Atomic Energy Act's prohibition on U.S. nuclear assistance to India so that he could carry out the agreement. Before the end of its 2006 session, Congress did so. It approved a bill authorizing the negotiation of a new U.S.-India nuclear cooperation agreement. The authorization was not a "blank check." In this new statute, Congress insisted upon having an opportunity for reviewing whatever final agreement the administration negotiates with India. It demanded that, before it considers whether to give approval to that agreement, the agreement be submitted for approval to both the IAEA and to the international Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG).

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Lawyer's Alliance for World Security
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What role should nuclear weapons play in today's world? How can the United States promote international security while safeguarding its own interests? U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy informs this debate with an analysis of current nuclear weapons policies and strategies, including those for deterring, preventing, or preempting nuclear attack; preventing further proliferation, to nations and terrorists; modifying weapons designs; and revising the U.S. nuclear posture.

Presidents Bush and Clinton made major changes in U.S. policy after the cold war, and George W. Bush's administration made further, more radical changes after 9/11. Leaked portions of 2001's Nuclear Posture Review, for example, described more aggressive possible uses for nuclear weapons. This important volume examines the significance of such changes and suggests a way forward for U.S. policy, emphasizing stronger security of nuclear weapons and materials, international compliance with nonproliferation obligations, attention to the demand side of proliferation, and reduced reliance on nuclear weapons in U.S. foreign policy.

With a foreword by William J. Perry. Contributors: Chaim Braun (CISAC), George Bunn (CISAC), Christopher F. Chyba (formerly CISAC Co-Director), David Holloway (CISAC), Michael May (CISAC, formerly Director of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory), W.K.H. Panofsky (formerly Director of Stanford Linear Accelerator Center), Karthika Sasikumar (University of British Columbia, former CISAC fellow), Roger Speed (formerly with the Livermore Laboratory), and Dean A. Wilkening (Science Program Director, CISAC).

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Brookings Institution Press and CISAC
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David Holloway
Michael M. May
Karthika Sasikumar
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To reduce the risk of nuclear terrorism, we must prevent terrorists from obtaining nuclear weapons or materials. This will require, among other things, a sustained effort to keep dangerous nations from going nuclear--in particular North Korea. This article reviews the efforts the United States has undertaken through the years to keep North Korea from building a nuclear arsenal, arguing that the history of proliferation on the Korean Peninsula is marked by five nuclear crises. A sixth could be on the horizon, further compromising American efforts to lessen the likelihood of a nuclear attack on U.S. soil.

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Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science
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William J. Perry
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