The second nuclear nonproliferation conference sponsored by the Nuclear Threat Initiative and the Russian Academy of Sciences was held in Moscow, March 18-20, 2009. The first was held Oct. 23-25, 2002, a year after the 9/11 attacks. Much of the global security focus at that time was, understandably, on terrorism. In fact, the tragic Dubrovka Theater siege took place during the conference. A principal message of the first conference was not to forget the dangers of nuclear proliferation while the world responded to the growing potential of nuclear terrorism. The proceedings of the first conference are available on request from aedawson@stanford.edu.

Since 2002, the Libyan nuclear program and the AQ Khan network have been exposed; the Iranian covert uranium enrichment program has been discovered and found to have made significant technical progress; North Korea has withdrawn from the NPT and tested a nuclear device; and Syria has built a plutonium-producing reactor.

March 2009 was a propitious time to hold the second conference. US-Russian relations have deteriorated in recent years, reaching their nadir in August of 2008 with the invasion of Georgia. Now a new American administration is determined to "reset" relations between the two former superpowers. There are some reasons for cautious optimism leading toward a possible turning point in US-Russian relations. Cooperation on nuclear matters is crucial in this context and the events of the past seven years have demonstrated that such partnerships are necessary to make the world a safer place.

CISAC's Lew Franklin and his coauthor, Nick Hansen, contributed the latter half of a two-part article discussing the Korean peninsula's space programme competition. The beginning of their section of the article is highlighted in the attached document.

(Excerpt) South Korea's space programme has not developed in isolation. As Seoul has moved through guided missile development, satellite production and soon an SLV launch, North Korea has pursued a similar path towards the prestigious goal of the first indigenous Korean satellite launch.

Although more rapid, North Korea's programme has been less successful. Three SLV launches have failed to place a satellite into orbit, despite official claims to the contrary. The most recent launch, of the Unha-2 SLV on 5 April, failed in the third stage and fell into the Pacific Ocean, failing to place the Kwangmyongsong-2 satellite into orbit.

Much media attention surrounding these launches has concentrated on the possibility of such technology being used for intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). The Unha-2, with its relatively large first stage draws suspicion of a long-predicted ICBM, but the absence of a militarized launcher or re-entry vehicle/warhead testing programme suggests that this vehicle and both launch pads are primarily for satellite launches at this time, with the added benefit of dual-use military rocket technology spin-off. Analysis of commercial high-resolution satellite imagery, North Korean-released video of two of its three launches and public announcements on space activities suggests that North Korea is currently focused on SLV and satellite development; Pyongyang remains eager to pursue a space programme for the nationalistic, commercial and military benefits, probably including military space.

A confluence of events has presented the Russian Federation and the United States with an unusual opportunity to transform their relationship.

The unfortunate reality is that trust is at an exceedingly low level between the elites and publics of both nations. Building that trust requires a leap of faith that they can work together on the most difficult issues. The determination to drive such trust-building on a vexing issue was behind the decision of senior Americans and Russians brought together by the EastWest Institute in 2007 to explore if collaboration was possible on the issue of Iran's ballistic missile and nuclear program. Following a tough yet civil private debate in Moscow, the participants - including on the American side General (ret.) James L. Jones, Ambassador Henry Crumpton, and General (ret.) Lance Lord, and a senior Russian delegation led by Presidential Representative Ambassador Anatoly Safonov - agreed that EWI should convene leading scientists from both states to take up the Iran issue and make it the subject of the fi rst JTA - Joint Threat Assessment. It would be an attempt to see if the top scientists and experts of the two states could agree on the nature of the threat posed by Iran's nuclear and ballistic missile program. Our debate in Moscow demonstrated that there was no easy agreement on Iran's intentions. A great cloud of ‘smoke' hung over the policy communities of both nations - a mixing of emotions and unsubstantiated reports with facts and policies. There was no dialogue. Instead the issue generated independent monologues fraught with suspicion and distrust. The decision to move forward with a JTA was a risky one. There was no assurance that it could be done.

Indeed, most outside experts told us that the task was impossible. Relations between Russia and the United States had deteriorated to a nadir not seen in decades. Among the major causes for the severe decline were the rushed ballistic missile defense agreements between the United States and Poland and between the United States and the Czech Republic to deploy assets in these European countries to counter a potential Iranian nuclear and missile threat. The United States government viewed this as a defensive move. Was Iran developing a capacity to hit Europe? How long would it take? The Russian government countered that the ballistic missile defense deployment near its borders was surely directed against Russia - an offensive move. Russian leaders and experts dismissed the idea that Iran currently possessed an offensive ballistic missile program capable of striking Europe. The sixteen Americans and Russians who sat around that Track 2 table back in 2007 in Moscow could have stopped at that impasse - but they did not. They agreed that the heart of the issue did not start with either the United States or with Russia but rather with the need to decipher the threat - what were Iran's technical capabilities? Could the two sides analyze and come to an agreement on the nature of the threat through a joint threat assessment?

Russia and the United States have been in dispute over the timeframe involved for Iran to acquire nuclear warheads and delivery vehicles, on the means needed to prevent that from happening, and - in the worst case that it cannot be prevented - the military operational responses available to both sides to defend against Iran's potential use of nuclear armed missiles. It was agreed that only after capabilities are ascertained can productive political conversations about motives and policy responses follow. Therein lay the mandate for the two teams of scientists, who worked independently and in a series of joint meetings that more often than not lasted well into the night.

Though the Iranian nuclear program has been the subject of detailed forensic public analyses, much less detailed attention has been paid, in public at least, to the Iranian missile program. Claims and counterclaims abound and defy easy understanding by the non-specialist. This report aims to fi ll that gap by providing a detailed examination of Iranian nuclear and missile capabilities. When might Iran be capable of deploying nuclear warheads? Assuming that Iran can develop that capability, would the proposed missile defenses be able intercept Iranian missiles? What are the possibilities of U.S.-Russian cooperation in this area? These are the vital questions that this report examines and makes its assessments.

Introduction
The next decade will bring increased demands for improving the security and accountability of nuclear weapons and material, for reducing nuclear weapons stockpiles, and for strengthening the global nuclear nonproliferation regime. As states consider options for addressing these challenges they will need to consider how technology can help in the implementation of new approaches. Nuclear arms reduction treaties are likely to involve only the U.S. and Russia in the immediate future.

However, as nuclear stockpiles are reduced to low numbers, all states with nuclear weapons will likely be brought into the process. In the context of Article VI of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, states without nuclear weapons will require a high level of confidence that nuclear reductions are taking place. Therefore all states have a stake in understanding and developing options for verification and transparency.

In the 1990's there were significant efforts to develop technical approaches to the next generation of nuclear arms control. Many of these efforts involved collaboration between U.S. and Russian nuclear laboratories. In addition there have been numerous academic studies of monitoring nuclear weapons and nuclear materials. Although much work remains, these past accomplishments provide a strong basis for moving forward.

This workshop brought together a small group of technical experts from Russia, France, the United Kingdom and the United States to review past and ongoing work, to exchange information about technical approaches to verification of nuclear arms reductions, and to consider areas for international technical cooperation. Technical experts from China also planned to participate, but last-minute administrative difficulties prevented their attendance.

This Summary provides a flavor of the discussions during the workshop, including key observations and ideas for next steps. It does not follow the order of the workshop agenda, nor does it represent a consensus view of participants. More information about the workshop and copies of presentations are available.

This paper describes a "base camp" on the path to the "summit" of nuclear elimination in which the current tradition of nuclear non-use has been strengthened significantly, so that nuclear use and nuclear threats are delegitimized as instruments of national power. Before describing this future world and the steps that could lead up to or beyond it, the paper presents some essential background information on nuclear delegitimization.