Arms Control
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Russia has had a long history of opposing US missile defense activities. Most recently, Russian concern focused on the alleged capability of the "third site" to intercept Russian ICBMs. The "third site" was a plan to place 10 ground-based interceptors in Poland and a large X-band radar in the Czech Republic proposed by the Bush Administration prior to its cancellation in 2009 by the Obama Administration. Now this same Russian concern has arisen regarding phases III and IV of the Phased Adaptive Approach to European missile defense proposed by the Obama Administration. This talk will assess the extent to which Russian concerns are valid in military/technical terms.


Speaker Biography:

Dean Wilkening is a Senior Research Scientist at the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University. He holds a Ph.D. in physics from Harvard University and worked at the RAND Corporation prior to coming to Stanford. His major research interests include nuclear strategy and policy, arms control, the proliferation of nuclear and biological weapons, bioterrorism, ballistic missile defense, and energy and security. His most recent research focuses on the broad strategic and political implications of ballistic missile defense deployments in Northeast Asia, South Asia and Europe. Prior work focused on the technical feasibility of boost-phase ballistic missile defense interceptors. His recent work on bioterrorism focuses on understanding the scientific and technical uncertainties associated with predicting the outcome of hypothetical airborne biological attacks and the human effects of inhalation anthrax, with the aim of devising more effective civil defenses. He has participated in, and briefed, several US National Academy of Science committees on biological terrorism and consults for several US national laboratories and government agencies.

Reuben W. Hills Conference Room

Dean Wilkening Senior Research Scientist Speaker CISAC
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CISAC Co-director Siegfried Hecker discusses energy, proliferation issues and his trips to North Korea. 

CISAC
Stanford University
Encina Hall, C220
Stanford, CA 94305-6165

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Senior Fellow, Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, Emeritus
Research Professor, Management Science and Engineering, Emeritus
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Siegfried S. Hecker is a professor emeritus (research) in the Department of Management Science and Engineering and a senior fellow emeritus at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI). He was co-director of CISAC from 2007-2012. From 1986 to 1997, Dr. Hecker served as the fifth Director of the Los Alamos National Laboratory. Dr. Hecker is an internationally recognized expert in plutonium science, global threat reduction, and nuclear security.

Dr. Hecker’s current research interests include nuclear nonproliferation and arms control, nuclear weapons policy, nuclear security, the safe and secure expansion of nuclear energy, and plutonium science. At the end of the Cold War, he has fostered cooperation with the Russian nuclear laboratories to secure and safeguard the vast stockpile of ex-Soviet fissile materials. In June 2016, the Los Alamos Historical Society published two volumes edited by Dr. Hecker. The works, titled Doomed to Cooperate, document the history of Russian-U.S. laboratory-to-laboratory cooperation since 1992.

Dr. Hecker’s research projects at CISAC focus on cooperation with young and senior nuclear professionals in Russia and China to reduce the risks of nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism worldwide, to avoid a return to a nuclear arms race, and to promote the safe and secure global expansion of nuclear power. He also continues to assess the technical and political challenges of nuclear North Korea and the nuclear aspirations of Iran.

Dr. Hecker joined Los Alamos National Laboratory as graduate research assistant and postdoctoral fellow before returning as technical staff member following a tenure at General Motors Research. He led the laboratory's Materials Science and Technology Division and Center for Materials Science before serving as laboratory director from 1986 through 1997, and senior fellow until July 2005.

Among his professional distinctions, Dr. Hecker is a member of the National Academy of Engineering; foreign member of the Russian Academy of Sciences; fellow of the TMS, or Minerals, Metallurgy and Materials Society; fellow of the American Society for Metals; fellow of the American Physical Society, honorary member of the American Ceramics Society; and fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.

His achievements have been recognized with the Presidential Enrico Fermi Award, the 2020 Building Bridges Award from the Pacific Century Institute, the 2018 National Engineering Award from the American Association of Engineering Societies, the 2017 American Nuclear Society Eisenhower Medal, the American Physical Society’s Leo Szilard Prize, the American Nuclear Society's Seaborg Medal, the Department of Energy's E.O. Lawrence Award, the Los Alamos National Laboratory Medal, among other awards including the Alumni Association Gold Medal and the Undergraduate Distinguished Alumni Award from Case Western Reserve University, where he earned his bachelor's, master's, and doctoral degrees in metallurgy.

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Source: Wall Street Journal

The world would not be safer if the U.S. had no nuclear weapons.

The international Global Zero movement has captured the imagination of people around the world. Proponents argue that by cutting its nuclear arsenal dramatically, the U.S. can lead the way to a "world free of nuclear weapons."

In response, many of the world's leading strategic thinkers-both those skeptical of, and hopeful for, eventual global nuclear disarmament-have invested great time and energy imagining the possible advantages and disadvantages of living in a world with zero nuclear weapons.

To reframe the debate, I propose an alternate number as a possible size for the U.S. nuclear arsenal: infinity.

Imagining a world in which America possesses infinite nuclear weapons -- just as advocates of nuclear zero imagine the opposite -- it's hard not to conclude that having infinite weapons is preferable to having none.

The primary purpose of the U.S. nuclear arsenal is to deter our enemies and assure our friends. No adversary would be restrained by the fear of attack from a nonexistent nuclear arsenal. But the prospect of fighting an adversary with unlimited nuclear firepower would induce much more caution even in our most reckless enemies.

Many of our allies today worry that if we continue to cut the size of our arsenal, we won't have enough nuclear forces to extend the nuclear umbrella to them and retain a large enough reserve capacity to simultaneously deter challenges against ourselves. Drawing down to zero would greatly exacerbate those fears. Building to infinity would put them to rest.

Some claim that the primary reason to reduce our nuclear weapons is to convince leaders in other capitals that if we don't need nuclear weapons, they don't either. But building to infinity could also dissuade proliferation by convincing countries that they have no hope of ever achieving nuclear parity with the U.S.

Of course, building to infinity would strain the national budget, and maintaining the arsenal could present real security problems, especially regarding command and control. Nevertheless, if forced to choose, the United States would be more secure with infinite nuclear weapons than with none.

Let me be clear. I'm not advocating that the United States build an infinite number of nuclear weapons. That is an absurd and arbitrary goal. But so is zero.

Having dispensed with the extremes of the debate, it is time for serious strategists to get back to the hard work of deciding what roles and missions nuclear weapons ought to have in U.S. defense policy, and what nuclear force structure is appropriate for achieving them.

 

 

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Siegfried Hecker offers a first-person perspective on the important contributions scientists can make toward improving the safety and security of nuclear materials and reducing the global nuclear dangers in an evolving world.

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Physics Today
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Sixty-six years ago, a small group of scientists, policy makers and military leaders embarked upon a highly secretive project to build a nuclear bomb. It would change the world forever. Today, the tightly-controlled knowledge and technologies of the Manhattan Project have given way to the open culture of the internet and the Information Age.

The revolution in technology and information dissemination that has transpired since the dawn of the nuclear age has had far-reaching effects on the entire national security apparatus. It has presented dangers, but also opportunities. In the arms control arena, new communication tools allow treaties to be negotiated with greater speed, and computing models help sustain nuclear stockpiles without testing. Verification techniques and technologies are developing in new and innovative directions. However, the traditional tools of arms control policy are limited in how they apply to cyber-weapons and warfare; new ones will be needed.

Identifying the challenges associated with the Information Age, as well as solutions and opportunities, will drive the arms control agenda for the next century.

 

Drell Lecture Recording: NA

 

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Speaker's Biography: Rose Gottemoeller was sworn in as the Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance, on April 6, 2009. She was the chief negotiator of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) with the Russian Federation. Since 2000, she had been with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. She most recently was a senior associate in the Carnegie Russia & Eurasia Program in Washington, D.C., where she worked on U.S.–Russian relations and nuclear security and stability. She also served as the director of the Carnegie Moscow Center from January 2006 – December 2008.

Formerly Deputy Undersecretary of Energy for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation and before that, Assistant Secretary for Nonproliferation and National Security, also at the Department of Energy, she was responsible for all nonproliferation cooperation with Russia and the Newly Independent States. She first joined the Department of Energy in November 1997 as director of the Office of Nonproliferation and National Security.

Prior to her work at the Department of Energy, Ms. Gottemoeller served for 3 years as Deputy Director of the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London. From 1993 to 1994, she served on the National Security Council in the White House as director for Russia, Ukraine, and Eurasia Affairs, with responsibility for denuclearization in Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus. Previously, she was a social scientist at RAND and a Council on Foreign Relations International Affairs Fellow. She has taught on Soviet military policy and Russian security at Georgetown University.

Ms. Gottemoeller received a B.S. from Georgetown University and a M.A. from George Washington University. She is fluent in Russian.

Oak Lounge

Rose Gottemoeller Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance Speaker
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Congratulations to the 10 members of the Class of 2011 CISAC Honors Program in International Security Studies. The students were honored at a June 10 ceremony for their successful participation in the interdisciplinary program and for their contributions to the field of international security research.

The Stanford seniors join 114 others who have graduated from the program since its inception in 2000. This year's program was co-directed by Coit D. Blacker and Martha Crenshaw, with assistance from teaching assistant Michael Sulmeyer.

In alphabetical order, the students, their majors, and their thesis titles are:

Devin Banerjee

Management Science and Engineering

India's Red Stain: Explaining the Indian Government's Ineffective Response to the Maoist-Naxalite Insurgency Since 1967.

Peter Davis

International Relations

The Non-Aligned Movement: A Struggle for Global Relevance

Anand Habib

Biology

The Demise and Rise of Governance in Health Systems: A Path Forward

RJ Halperin

Political Science

The U.S. and the Origins of the Pakistani Nuclear Weapons Program: National Interests, Proliferation Pessimism, and Executive-Legislative Politics

Akhil Iyer

International Relations, Minor in Arabic

The Establishment of the U.S. Africa Command: Form, Function, and the Process of Agency Formation

Astasia Myers

Political Science and International Relations, Minor in Economics

IAEA Enforcement of Nuclear Nonproliferation Violators: Are Some Animals More Equal than Others?

Jimmy Ruck

History

Crouching Tiger Hidden Dragon? Evolving Civil Military-Relations in China

Varun Sivaram

Engineering Physics and International Relations

Sunny Side Up: Characterizing the U.S. Military's Approach to Solar Energy Policy

* Recipient of the William J. Perry Award

Jaclyn Tandler

International Relations

Let Them Eat Yellow Cake: Understanding the History of France's Sensitive Nuclear Export Policy

*Recipient of the Firestone Medal

Shine Zaw-Aung

International Relations, Minor in Energy Engineering

The Third Horseman: On Famines and Governments

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Please join us on April 25 and 26 for two evenings devoted to an examination of and conversation about the March 11, 2011 Tohoku earthquake in northern Honshu, Japan, and the subsequent tsunami and nuclear accident. In talks and panel discussions, experts from the School of Earth Sciences and the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies will focus on what happened, the impacts of the events, and what the future holds for Japan and other earthquake- and tsunami-zone regions of the world.


APRIL 25 PARTICIPANTS

Moderator:

Pamela A. Matson is the Chester Naramore Dean of the Stanford University School of Earth Sciences, Richard and Rhoda Goldman Professor of Environmental Studies at Stanford, and senior fellow at the Woods Institute for the Environment.

Panelists:

Gregory Beroza is the Wayne Loel Professor in the Stanford University School of Earth Sciences and chair of the Department of Geophysics. He works to develop and apply techniques for analyzing seismograms—recordings of seismic waves—in order to understand how earthquakes work and the hazard they pose to engineered structures.

Gregory G. Deierlein is the John A. Blume Professor in the Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering and director of the Blume Earthquake Engineering Center at Stanford. His research focuses on improving limit states design of constructed facilities through the development and application of nonlinear structural analysis methods and performance-based design criteria.

Katherine Marvel is the Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC) Perry Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI) at Stanford. Her research interests include energy security and nuclear nonproliferation, renewable energy technologies, energy security, nuclear power and nonproliferation, sustainable development, and public understanding of science.

For more information, please visit the symposium website.

William R. Hewlett Teaching Center
Auditorium 200
370 Serra Mall
Stanford Campus

Pamela A. Matson Dean of the School of Earth Sciences, Goldman Professor of Geological and Environmental Sciences and FSI Senior Fellow Moderator Stanford University
Gregory Beroza Chair Panelist Department of Geophysics, Stanford University
Gregory G. Deierlein Director Panelist Blume Earthquake Engineering Center, Stanford University
Katherine D. Marvel Perry Fellow Panelist Center of International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University
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As Russia and the United States reduce their nuclear arsenals, their relationship has undergone a complex transformation toward cooperation and partnership mixed with suspicion and rivalry, writes Pavel Podvig in a new paper. "The focus of Russia’s nuclear policy, however, has remained essentially unchanged."

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