Military
Paragraphs

Abstract: There is a growing interest in the use of offensive cyber capabilities (OCC) among states. Despite the growing interest in these capabilities, little is still known about the nature of OCC as a tool of the state. This research therefore aims to understand if (and how) offensive cyber capabilities have the potential to change the role of military power. Drawing on a wide range of cases, we argue that these capabilities can alter the manner in which states use their military power strategically in at least four ways. OCC are not particularly effective in deterring adversary military action, except when threatened to be used by states with a credible reputation. However, they do have value in compellence. Unlike conventional capabilities, the effects of offensive cyber operations do not necessarily have to be exposed publicly, which means the compelled party can back down post-action without losing face thus deescalating conflict. The potential to control the reversibility of effect of an OCC by the attacker may also encourage compliance. OCC also contribute to the use of force for defensive purposes, as it could provide both a preemptive as well as preventive strike option. Finally, its symbolic value as a ‘prestige weapon’ to enhance ‘swaggering’ remains unclear, due to its largely non-material ontology and transitory nature.

All Publications button
1
Publication Type
Annual Reports
Publication Date
Journal Publisher
NATO CCD COE Publications: Tallinn
Authors
Max Smeets
Herbert S. Lin
Authors
Siegfried S. Hecker
News Type
News
Date
Paragraphs

In this session from DARPA’s 60th anniversary symposium, D60, Dr. Valerie Browning, director of the agency’s Defense Sciences Office (DSO); keynote speaker Dr. Vincent Tang, program manager for DSO; and a panel of notable experts, including CISAC's Siegfried Hecker, explore the challenges and opportunities for combatting WMD use and preventing proliferation in the emerging global landscape.

Moderator Dr. Valerie Browning – DARPA, DSO
Keynote Dr. Vincent Tang – DARPA, DSO
Panelists Mr. Peter Bergen – Journalist, Dr. Siegfried Hecker – Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University The Honorable Andrew “Andy” Weber – Former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs

 

All News button
1
News Type
Blogs
Date
Paragraphs

On May 23, Stanford students enrolled in Technology and Security (MS&E 193/293) met with General James M. Holmes. General Holmes delivered delivered gave a talk, "Applying Technology--the Military Perspective," and engaged students in a Q&A session afterwards. The interisciplinary course explores the relation between technology, war, and national security policy from early history to modern day, focusing on current U.S. national security challenges and the role that technology plays in shaping our understanding and response to these challenges.

 

img 4445 General James M. Holmes

[[{"fid":"231402","view_mode":"crop_870xauto","fields":{"format":"crop_870xauto","field_file_image_description[und][0][value]":"General James M. Holmes","field_file_image_alt_text[und][0][value]":"General James M. Holmes","field_file_image_title_text[und][0][value]":"General James M. Holmes","field_credit[und][0][value]":"Margaret Williams","field_caption[und][0][value]":"","thumbnails":"crop_870xauto"},"link_text":null,"type":"media","field_deltas":{"2":{"format":"crop_870xauto","field_file_image_description[und][0][value]":"General James M. Holmes","field_file_image_alt_text[und][0][value]":"General James M. Holmes","field_file_image_title_text[und][0][value]":"General James M. Holmes","field_credit[und][0][value]":"Margaret Williams","field_caption[und][0][value]":"","thumbnails":"crop_870xauto"}},"attributes":{"alt":"General James M. Holmes","title":"General James M. Holmes","class":"media-element file-crop-870xauto","data-delta":"2"}}]]

[[{"fid":"231403","view_mode":"crop_870xauto","fields":{"format":"crop_870xauto","field_file_image_description[und][0][value]":"General James M. Holmes","field_file_image_alt_text[und][0][value]":"General James M. Holmes","field_file_image_title_text[und][0][value]":"General James M. Holmes","field_credit[und][0][value]":"Margaret Williams","field_caption[und][0][value]":"","thumbnails":"crop_870xauto"},"link_text":null,"type":"media","field_deltas":{"3":{"format":"crop_870xauto","field_file_image_description[und][0][value]":"General James M. Holmes","field_file_image_alt_text[und][0][value]":"General James M. Holmes","field_file_image_title_text[und][0][value]":"General James M. Holmes","field_credit[und][0][value]":"Margaret Williams","field_caption[und][0][value]":"","thumbnails":"crop_870xauto"}},"attributes":{"alt":"General James M. Holmes","title":"General James M. Holmes","class":"media-element file-crop-870xauto","data-delta":"3"}}]]

Hero Image
All News button
1
Authors
News Type
News
Date
Paragraphs

Evolving drone technology will enable countries to make low-cost but highly credible threats against states and groups that do not possess drones, Stanford political scientist Amy Zegart found in new research.

Could the mere threat of using an armed drone ever coerce an enemy to change their behavior – without attacking them?

Yes, says Stanford political scientist Amy Zegart, who argues in a new research paper that countries that simply possess deadly, armed drones could change an adversary’s behavior without even striking them. Zegart is the Davies Family Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution and co-director of Stanford’s Center for International Security and Cooperation.

“Armed drones are likely to offer coercion ‘windows of opportunity’ in at least one important circumstance: states that have armed drones confronting states that do not,” she said. “As wars grow longer and less conclusive, armed drones enable states to sustain combat operations, making threats to ‘stay the course’ more believable.”

Zegart believes that drone technology is becoming a more effective instrument to change a state’s behavior than yesteryear’s more costly option of using ground troops or large-scale military movements in war or conflict.

“Drones may be turning deterrence theory on its head,” said Zegart, referring to the cost-benefit calculation a potential aggressor makes when assessing an attack.

Zegart’s focus is on next-generation drones, which are essentially unmanned fighter jets and are currently in development. She is not examining the use of existing drones like quadcopters and Reaper and Predator unmanned aerial vehicles.

 

Foreign military officers surveyed

Zegart’s research is based on surveys of 259 foreign military officers conducted between 2015 and 2017. Participants were highly experienced foreign military officers who were attending classes at the National Defense University and Naval War College.

A drone is an unmanned aircraft that can be piloted remotely to deliver a lethal payload to a specific target.

Today, Zegart said, many scholars are studying whether drone proliferation across the world could change the future of warfare.

“But even here the focus has been the implications for the use of force, not the threat of force,” she said.

 

New drones are more lethal than ever, offering greater speeds, ranges, stealth and agility, according to Zegart. The U.S. is ahead, but not alone, in using drones. Nine countries have already used armed drones in combat, and at least 20 more are developing lethal drone programs – including Russia and China.

“It is time for a rethink” about drones, Zegart said. Technological advances will soon enable drones to function in hostile environments better than ever before.

“Drones offer three unique coercion advantages that theorists did not foresee: sustainability in long duration conflicts; certainty of precision punishment, which can change the psychology of adversaries; and changes in the relative costs of war,” she said.

Threats involving a high cost may be actually less credible than assumed, said Zegart. Her findings challenge the belief of “cost signals,” a military strategy where a country threatens another with a high-cost option, such as ground troops, which is intended to show resolve.

Drones may actually signal a nation’s resolve more effectively because – as a low-cost option – they can be part of an enduring offensive campaign against an enemy.

“The advent of armed drones suggests that costly signals may no longer be the best or only path to threat credibility,” she said. As wars grow longer and less conclusive, a particular country’s test of resolve becomes “more about sustaining than initiating action.”

“In situations where a coercing state has armed drones but a target state does not, drones make it possible to implement threats in ways that impose vanishingly low costs on the coercer but disproportionately high costs on the target,” Zegart said.

 

Combat, coercion

Zegart said that throughout history, whenever a new military technology emerges, adversaries have basically faced two choices – either concede or innovate to overcome the other side’s advantage.

 

“There is no reason to expect drones will be any different. The more that drones are used for combat and coercion, the more likely it will be that others will develop drone countermeasures,” she said.

New weapons often evolve technologically before “game-changing ideas” occur about how to use them, Zegart added. This was true of submarines before World War I, tanks after World War I, airplanes (which originally replaced surveillance balloons and were not used to drop bombs until 1911), and nuclear weapons during the Cold War.

“While physicists in the Manhattan Project developed the first atom bomb in just three years, it took much longer to develop the conceptual underpinnings of deterrence that kept the Cold War cold,” she said.

Drones raise important questions about the role of machines in decision-making during conflict, Zegart said. For example, much has been debated and written about the ethical and legal issues raised by U.S. drone strikes, the usefulness of drone operations against terrorist groups and whether the Pentagon or CIA should control and operate the drones.

Such questions are likely to grow more “numerous and knotty” as drones and other technologies evolve, she said.

 

Media Contacts

Amy Zegart, Hoover Institution and Center for International Security and Cooperation: zegart@stanford.edu

Clifton B. Parker, Hoover Institution: (650) 498-5205, cbparker@stanford.edu

 

 

All News button
1
-

Abstract: This research investigates why and how regional nuclear powers come to develop specific kind of nuclear delivery systems, especially a submarine-based ballistic missile (SSBN) force. In the second nuclear age, as new nuclear states develop sophisticated delivery systems including SSBNs, understanding the logic and process of their nuclear force development is essential for both regional and international security. The origins and development process of India’s nuclear submarine program suggests that nuclear force development is a historically contingent process. This data-driven research, based on newly declassified archival documents from the Indian archives and extensive oral history interviews, refutes teleological narratives that either argue for technological determinism or the need for projecting nuclear deterrence as the primary causal variables. By situating India’s nuclear submarine program in the organizational routines of its nuclear scientific bureaucracy, bureaucratic politics of its military-scientific complex and the military socialization of the Indian Navy, this research explains India’s most secretive military-scientific programs. This comprehensive empirical research, currently based on a single case study, also addresses an important theoretical question in the field of international security studies: why states develop specific kinds of weapon systems, including those for nuclear weapons delivery?  

Speaker bio: Prior to joining CISAC as a Nuclear Security Postdoctoral Fellow, Yogesh Joshi was an Associate Fellow in the Strategic Studies Program at the Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi. He recently received his PhD from Jawaharlal Nehru University specializing in Indian foreign and security policy. 

At CISAC, Yogesh is finishing a book manuscript on the history of India's nuclear submarine program. His research traces the origins, process and development of India's nuclear submarine program using multi-archival sources and extensive oral history interviews. Yogesh’s data-driven research posits that India’s nuclear submarine program was riddled with shifting motivations, ambivalent rationales and halting progress. Rather than being driven by a single coherent strategic plan, India stumbled upon a submarine-based nuclear deterrent. By situating the nuclear submarine program in India’s Cold War security policy, its nuclear policy, its naval strategy in the Indian Ocean, the bureaucratic politics of its military-scientific complex and its quest for technological prestige, this research is an attempt to understand path-dependency in one of India’s most secretive military-scientific programs. It not only has implications for explaining India's nuclear program and policy but also provides an avenue to explain the process of decision-making behind state's pursuance of specific kinds of nuclear delivery systems. This research is supported by the MacArthur foundation. 

He has held fellowships at George Washington University, King’s College London and Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington DC. His research has appeared or is under review in Asian Security, International History Review, International Affairs, Survival, US Naval War College Review, Comparative Strategy, Harvard Asia Quarterly, India Review, Asia Policy, Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs, War on the Rocks, World Politics Review and The Diplomat. He has co-authored two books: The US ‘Pivot’ and Indian Foreign Policy: Asia's Emerging Balance of Power (Palgrave Macmillan, 2015) and India in Nuclear Asia: Regional Forces, Perceptions and Policies (Orient Blackswan (South Asia), forthcoming 2018; also forthcoming in fall 2018 by Georgetown University Press for the rest of the world). A short introduction on India’s Nuclear Policy was recently commissioned by Oxford University Press and has been accepted for publication in 2018. A monograph titled 'India’s Evolving Nuclear Force and Implications for U.S. Strategy in the Asia-Pacific' was published by the Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College in 2016. 

Not in residence
0
yogesh_joshi.jpg
PhD

Prior to joining CISAC as a Nuclear Security Postdoctoral Fellow, Yogesh Joshi was an Associate Fellow in the Strategic Studies Program at the Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi. He recently received his PhD from Jawaharlal Nehru University specializing in Indian foreign and security policy. 

At CISAC, Yogesh is finishing a book manuscript on the history of India's nuclear submarine program. His research traces the origins, process, and development of India's nuclear submarine program using multi-archival sources and extensive oral history interviews. Yogesh’s data-driven research posits that India’s nuclear submarine program was riddled with shifting motivations, ambivalent rationales and halting progress. Rather than being driven by a single coherent strategic plan, India stumbled upon a submarine-based nuclear deterrent. By situating the nuclear submarine program in India’s Cold War security policy, its nuclear policy, its naval strategy in the Indian Ocean, the bureaucratic politics of its military-scientific complex and its quest for technological prestige, this research is an attempt to understand path-dependency in one of India’s most secretive military-scientific programs. It not only has implications for explaining India's nuclear program and policy but also provides an avenue to explain the process of decision-making behind state's pursuance of specific kinds of nuclear delivery systems. This research is supported by the Stanton Foundation. 

He has held fellowships at George Washington University, King’s College London and Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington DC. His research has appeared or is forthcoming in Diplomacy and Statecraft, Asian Security, International History Review, International Affairs, Survival, US Naval War College Review, Comparative Strategy, Harvard Asia Quarterly, India Review, Asia Policy, Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs, War on the Rocks, World Politics Review and The Diplomat. He has co-authored two books: The US ‘Pivot’ and Indian Foreign Policy: Asia's Emerging Balance of Power (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015) and India and Nuclear Asia: Forces, Doctrines and Dangers (Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2018).  A short introduction to India’s Nuclear Policy was recently published by Oxford University Press.  

 

Affiliates
CV
Yogesh Joshi Nuclear Security Postdoctoral Fellow CISAC
Seminars
-

- This event is offered as a joint sponsorship with the Hoover Institution - 

Registration is at capacity. Thank you for your understanding!

Abstract:  Since the days of Samuel Huntington and Morris Janowitz, one fundamental question has been whether civilian and soldier are doomed to clash — Huntington thought yes, Janowitz no, but for different reasons. In recent years civil-military tension has been a constant, from the confrontations between Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and Generals Gregory Newbold and Eric Shinseki, to the dismissal of General Stanley McChrystal by President Obama. And tension at staff levels have been worse. Professor Cohen will offer thoughts on why civil-military tension is not only inevitable but even, at some level, desirable.

Speaker bio: Eliot Cohen is the Robert E. Osgood Professor of Strategic Studies at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS).  After receiving his BA and PhD degrees from Harvard he taught there and later at the Naval War College, before coming to SAIS in 1990. His books include, most recently, The Big Stick: The Limits of Soft Power and the Necessity of Military Force as well as Conquered into Liberty: Two Centuries of Battle Along the Great Warpath that Made the American Way of War and Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime among others. He served in the US Army Reserve, was a director in the Defense Department’s policy planning staff, led the US Air Force’s multivolume study of the first Gulf War and has served in various official advisory positions. In 2007-2009 he was Counselor of the Department of State, serving as Secretary Condoleezza Rice’s senior adviser, focusing chiefly on issues of war and peace, including Iraq and Afghanistan. His public commentary appears in The Washington Post, The Wall Street Journal, The New York Times and on major television networks, and he is a contributing editor at The Atlantic.

Eliot Cohen School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), Johns Hopkins University
Seminars
-

Abstract: What are the causes of change in Russian declaratory nuclear strategy? Three cases of Russian declaratory nuclear strategy, the military doctrines from 1993, 2000 and 2010, demonstrate significant variation in the role nuclear weapons play in Russian national security.

Structural theories of international relations explain this variation as a function of the balance of military power. Perceived nuclear or conventional inferiority vis-a-vis potential adversaries certainly inspires Russian behavior, but Russia chooses to balance in different ways than balance of power theory predicts, depending on available resources and capabilities.
 
A more compelling explanation for strategy variation lies in the politics of strategy formulation in Russia. Russian military actors effectively influence nuclear strategy due to both intellectual and institutional dominance. Civilian actors are less unified in their strategy preferences and less institutionally dominant in strategy formulation over time. Despite increased political control over the military, civilian influence on nuclear strategy outcomes does not seem to increase in Russia.
 
These findings have implications for how we understand the Russian security policy-making environment as well as for the content and context of Russian nuclear strategy and posture.
 
Speaker bio: Kristin Ven Bruusgaard is a Stanton Nuclear Security Predoctoral Fellow at CISAC, and a doctoral candidate at King’s College London. Her research focuses on Russian nuclear strategy and deterrence policy in the post-cold war era. Kristin is currently on leave from the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies (IFS). She has previously been a senior security policy analyst in the Norwegian Armed Forces, a junior researcher at the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI), and an intern at the Congressional Research Service (CRS) in Washington, D.C., and at NATO HQ. She holds an MA in Security Studies from Georgetown University, and a BA from Warwick University. Her work has been published in Security Dialogue, U.S. Army War College Quarterly Parameters, Survival and War on the Rocks
0
kristinvenbruusgaard_rsd17_076_0268a.jpg

Dr. Kristin Ven Bruusgaard is Director of the Norwegian Intelligence School. She served as the Deputy Leader of the 2021 Norwegian Government Defense Commission, providing advice on future Norwegian defense policy for the next 10-20 years. Previously she was a Postdoctoral Fellow (Assistant Professor) of Political Science at the University of Oslo, a Nuclear Security Postdoctoral Fellow and a Stanton Nuclear Security Predoctoral Fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC), Stanford University, a Research Fellow at the Norwegian Institute for Defense Studies (IFS), and a senior security policy analyst in the Norwegian Armed Forces.

Her academic research focuses on Soviet and Russian nuclear strategy, nuclear and non-nuclear deterrence, crisis and deterrence dynamics in Europe and the Arctic/High North. She holds a Ph.D. in Defence Studies from King's College London and an MA in Security Studies from Georgetown University. She is a certified language officer in the Norwegian Army. Her work has been published in Foreign Affairs, Security Dialogue, Journal of Strategic Studies, Survival, War on the Rocks, Texas National Security Review, Parameters and Bulletin of Atomic Scientists and by Cambridge University Press. She was awarded the 2020 Amos Perlmutter Prize from the Journal of Strategic Studies for her article Russian Nuclear Strategy and Conventional Inferiority

Affiliate
CV
Date Label
Kristin Ven Bruusgaard CISAC
Seminars
-

Abstract: In this talk, I present three findings from an in-depth investigation of the US Drone War in Pakistan from 2004 to 2014. First, I use a panel estimation strategy to show a negative statistical association between the drone war period from 2008 onward and insurgent violence in Pakistan. Second, I use a process tracing approach, drawing on data collected through fieldwork in Pakistan including interviews with members of Al-Qaeda and Pakistan Taliban, to show the drone war period from 2008 to 2014 led to dramatic reduction in the targeted organizations’ operational capabilities, folding of and displacement from bases, managerial challenges like desertions, and political breakdown like splintering and feuds. Third, I use interview-based data to show that the popularly held notion of “drone blowback” – that drone strikes energize recruitment of targeted armed groups - doesn’t find empirical support. I explain these findings by introducing a new concept of Legibility and Speed-of-exploitation System, or L&S in short. L&S varies in the degree of legibility of the population where armed groups are based (legibility, in short) and the speed of exploitation of legibility gains (speed, in short). I argue that the period of the US Drone War which attained high levels of L&S (2008 to 2014) was very disruptive for the targeted groups. The theoretical position and empirical findings challenge the wisdom on importance of winning “hearts-and-minds” of civilians in counterterrorism/counterinsurgency. The findings also have important policy implications for how US policymakers are likely to approach the challenge of managing threats by Al-Qaeda and ISIS from weak states.

Speaker bio: Asfandyar Mir is a Social Science Predoctoral fellow at CISAC and a PhD Candidate in Political Science at the University of Chicago. His research focuses on effectiveness of counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations. His research draws on quantitative and qualitative microdata collected through field work and archival sources. Some of his research is forthcoming in Security Studies. His commentary has been featured in the Washington Post’s Monkey Cage. 

0
rsd19_072_0386a.jpg

Asfandyar Mir is an affiliate with the Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University. Previously he has held predoctoral and postdoctoral fellowships at the center. His research interests are in the international relations of South Asia, US counterterrorism policy, and political violence, with a regional focus on Afghanistan and Pakistan. His research has appeared in peer-reviewed journals of International Relations, such as International Security, International Studies Quarterly and Security Studies, and his commentary has appeared in Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, H-Diplo, Lawfare, Modern War Institute, Political Violence at a Glance, Politico, and the Washington Post.

Asfandyar received his PhD in political science from the University of Chicago and a masters and bachelors from Stanford University.

Affiliate
Asfandyar Mir CISAC
Seminars
-
This event is restricted to current Stanford students, faculty, staff and visiting scholars. 
The event is at capacity and RSVPs are now closed. Thank you for your understanding.
 
Abstract: Machines are increasingly helping us with cognitive tasks in addition to physical labor. Like the industrial revolution, this transition in how we use machines will have major impacts on the security of states and the character of armed conflict. How should we think about this transition? What issues should we prepare for? I will parse several broad areas where AI applications may affect elements of national power, and highlight issues we can already see emerging for national security leaders.
 
Speaker Bio: Dr. Matthew Daniels works for the Office of the Secretary of Defense and NASA. His principal areas of focus include U.S. space programs, deep space exploration, and artificial intelligence. Previously he was an engineer at NASA, where he worked on spacecraft designs and special projects for the director of NASA Ames in Mountain View, CA. Matt received his Ph.D. and M.S. degrees in engineering from Stanford and a B.A. in physics from Cornell, was a fellow at Stanford's Center for International Security and Cooperation, and is an adjunct professor at Georgetown.
 

William J. Perry Conference Room

Encina Hall, 2nd floor

616 Serra Street

Stanford, CA 94305

0
Affiliate
1-RSD13_085_0211a.jpg

Dr. Matthew Daniels is currently serving at the White House. His work focuses on U.S. space programs and technology strategy.

Previously he was the DoD's inaugural Technical Director for AI in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research & Engineering, overseeing the DoD's broad artificial intelligence R&D portfolio. He has also served as Advisor to the Director of Net Assessment in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, focusing on strategy for U.S. space programs, and a member of the strategy and plans team for the NASA Administrator, focusing on deep space exploration and development. He is the only person to have served simultaneously at Net Assessment and NASA. Outside of the U.S. Government, Matt has been a research affiliate at MIT and Stanford, space technology advisor to MIT’s Lincoln Laboratory, a senior fellow at Georgetown's Center for Security and Emerging Technology, and continues to teach on space security and exploration at Georgetown.

Earlier Matt was a research engineer at NASA, with work in spacecraft design, stochastic control, and new science missions. He has served as part of NASA Ames delegations to build new technology projects with U.S. allies and partners in Europe, the Middle East, and South America. Matt received his Ph.D. and M.S. degrees in engineering from Stanford, a B.A. in physics from Cornell, was a Fellow at Stanford's Center for International Security and Cooperation, and is a recipient of the Department of Defense Medal for Distinguished Public Service.

 

Advisor Department of Defense and NASA
Seminars
Paragraphs

In the next decade and a half, China and India will become two of the world’s indispensable powers—whether they rise peacefully or not. During that time, Asia will surpass the combined strength of North America and Europe in economic might, population size, and military spending.

All Publications button
1
Publication Type
Books
Publication Date
Authors
Anja Manuel
Subscribe to Military