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Kelly Moore is Associate Professor of Sociology and Affiliate of Women's Studies at the University of Cincinnati.  She is the author of Disrupting Science: Social Movements, American Scientists, and the Politics of the Military, 1945-1975 (Princeton University Press, 2008), and the co-editor of The New Political Sociology of Science: Institutions, Networks, and Power (University of Wisconsin Press, 2006).   Her articles have appeared in Research in Organizational Sociology, American Journal of Sociology and other journals.  She currently serves as Chair of the American Sociological Association section on Science, Knowledge and Technology, and is writing a book about neoliberalism, food, and nutrition in U.S. from 1980 to 2005. 

Rebecca Slayton is a lecturer in the Science, Technology and Society Program at Stanford University and a CISAC affiliate. In 2004-2005 she was a CISAC science fellow. Her research examines how technical judgments are generated, taken up, and given significance in international security contexts. She is currently working on a book which uses the history of the U.S. ballistic missile defense program to study the relationships between and among technology, expertise, and the media. Portions of this work have been published in journals such as History and Technology and have been presented at academic conferences. As a postdoctoral fellow in the Science, Technology, and Society Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, in 2004 she completed an NSF-funded project entitled Public Science: Discourse about the Strategic Defense Initiative, 1983-1988.

As a physical chemist, she developed ultrafast laser experiments in condensed matter systems and published several articles in physics journals. She also received the AAAS Mass Media Science and Engineering Fellowship in 2000, and has worked as a science journalist for a daily paper and for Physical Review Focus. She earned her doctorate in chemistry from Harvard University in 2002.

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Kelly Moore Associate Professor of Sociology, University of Cincinnati Speaker
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Slayton’s research and teaching examine the relationships between and among risk, governance, and expertise, with a focus on international security and cooperation since World War II. Slayton’s current book project, Shadowing Cybersecurity, examines the historical emergence of cybersecurity expertise. Shadowing Cybersecurity shows how efforts to establish credible expertise in corporate, governmental, and non-governmental contexts have produced varying and sometimes conflicting expert practices. Nonetheless, all cybersecurity experts wrestle with the irreducible uncertainties that characterize intelligent adversaries, and the fundamental inability to prove that systems are secure. The book shows how cybersecurity experts have paradoxically gained credibility by making threats and vulnerabilities visible, while acknowledging that more always remain in the shadows.

Slayton’s first book, Arguments that Count: Physics, Computing, and Missile Defense, 1949-2012 (MIT Press, 2013), shows how the rise of a new field of expertise in computing reshaped public policies and perceptions about the risks of missile defense in the United States. In 2015, Arguments that Count won the Computer History Museum Prize. In 2016, Slayton was awarded a National Science Foundation CAREER grant for her project “Enacting Cybersecurity Expertise.” In 2019, Slayton was also a recipient of the United States Presidential Early Career Award for Scientists and Engineers, for her NSF CAREER project.

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Rebecca Slayton CISAC Affiliated Faculty; Lecturer, Science, Technology, and Society Program, Stanford University Commentator
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Max Abrahms is a PhD candidate at UCLA focusing on the interface of terrorism and international relations theory. Abrahms has published in International Security, Security Studies, Terrorism and Political Violence, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, and Middle East Policy. Prior to coming to Stanford, Abrahms was a research associate at Harvard University's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs; a fellow at Tel Aviv University; a fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy; and a commissioned op-ed writer on Palestinian terrorism for the Los Angeles Times. He has appeared as a terrorism analyst on ABC News, Al-Arabiyya, Al-Hurra, Al-Jazeera, BBC, CBS, CNN, CNN Financial, Fox News, National Public Radio, and PBS. Abrahms is a graduate of the University of Pennsylvania (summa cum laude) and Oxford University, where he read his MPhil in International Relations.

Paul Stockton is a senior research scholar at Stanford University's Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC). He was formerly the associate provost at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California, and was the founding director of its Center for Homeland Defense and Security. His research focuses on how U.S. security institutions respond to changes in the threat (including the rise of terrorism), and the interaction of Congress and the Executive branch in restructuring national security budgets, policies and institutional arrangements. Stockton also serves as co-teacher of the CISAC Honors Program, which assists Stanford seniors in writing theses on international security.

Stockton joined the faculty of the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) in August 1990. From 1995 until 2000, he served as director of NPS' Center for Civil-Military Relations. From 2000-2001, he founded and served as the acting dean of NPS' School of International Graduate Studies. He was appointed associate provost in 2001.

Stockton is the editor of Homeland Security, a graduate text to be published by Oxford University Press in 2009. Stockton serves on the editorial review board of Homeland Security Affairs, the quarterly journal he helped establish in 2005. His research has appeared in Political Science Quarterly, International Security, and Strategic Survey. He is co-editor of Reconstituting America's Defense: America's New National Security Strategy (1992). He has also published an Adelphi Paper and has contributed chapters to a number of books, including James Lindsay and Randall Ripley, eds., U.S. Foreign Policy After the Cold War (1997).

From 1986-1989 Stockton served as legislative assistant to U.S. Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan. Stockton was Senator Moynihan's personal representative on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and was principal advisor to the senator on defense, intelligence, counter narcotics policy and foreign affairs. Stockton was awarded a Postdoctoral Fellowship for 1989-1990 by CISAC. During his graduate studies at Harvard, he served as a research associate at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London.

Stockton received a bachelor's degree from Dartmouth College in 1976 and a doctorate in government from Harvard in 1986.

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Max Abrahms Speaker
Paul Stockton CISAC Senior Research Scholar Commentator
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The purpose of this article is to contribute to a better understanding of the contemporary
importance for democracy of the relationship between elected leaders and the security
forces. It attempts to present a conceptualization and framework to help comprehend what
security forces actually do and how they interface with democratic governments. The article
aims to extend the conceptual breadth of the literature on civil–military relations beyond
control to include two further dimensions – effectiveness and efficiency. The research is
based on the authors’ experience in conducting programmes for officers and civilians throughout the world in line with at least six different roles and missions of security forces. The conceptualization draws on literature in comparative politics, organization theory, and defence economics, as well as civil–military relations, and security sector reform.

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Abstract: In this age of increasing "Global Transparency," commercial satellite imagery has now made it possible for anyone to remotely peer "over the fence" and view what heretofore had been otherwise impossible...clandestine nuclear facilities (most significantly, those capable of producing fissile material suitable for use in nuclear weapons). The synergistic combination of readily available tools: personal computers, the internet, three-dimensional virtual globe visualization applications such as Google Earth, and high resolution commercial satellite imagery has gone beyond what anyone could have imaged just a few years ago. The downside of all this is that those who want to keep their clandestine nuclear facilities and associated activities from being either detected, identified, and/or monitored, are becoming more adept in their use of camouflage, concealment, and deception.

Iran is one such case where it has followed a steep learning curve of adapting to the threat that overhead observation can pose. After repeated dissident group revelations about Iran's clandestine nuclear facilities, together with confirming media broadcast of commercial satellite images of those facilities followed by verification inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA); the government of Iran has become increasingly aware of this threat and gone to greater and greater lengths to try and defeat it. Iran's cover-up tactics have improved with time...from concealed infrastructure and false cover stories (Natanz)...to refurbishment and sanitization of facilities following removal of incriminating equipment (Kalaye Electric and Lashkar Abad), to the wholesale razing of facilities together with the removal of dirt and vegetation to defeat IAEA forensic environmental sampling (Lavizan).

While the international community continues to debate the issue of whether or not Iran's nuclear program is purely peaceful in nature (helping it to stay an "open case"), Iran is defiantly pursuing its goal of fissile material production. Syria, on the other hand (evidently together with North Korea), was also quite aware of the overhead observation threat, taking great pains to conceal its plutonium production reactor at Al-Kibar. Syria disguised the true function of the facility by employing minimal site security (no fences or guard towers), having minimal support infrastructure (with non visible powerlines and only buried water lines), not installing a telltale reactor ventilation stack or cooling tower, hiding the reactor building in a ravine (terrain masking), and finally camouflaging the facility with a false façade to make it appear as a byzantine fortress. Nonetheless, despite all those steps, a leak of ground-level reactor construction and interior photographs, which formed the basis for the subsequent bombing of the facility by Israel, successfully thwarted that effort (the "closed case?"). Rather than confessing the truth about al-Kibar, the Syrian government rushed to remove all traces of the destroyed reactor and supplant it with a new larger footprint building for as yet unknown purposes while continuing to claim it was previously only a disused military warehouse. The IAEA asked d Syria for permission to inspect not only the Al-Kibar site, but reportedly up to three other sites thought to be associated with it. The Syrians refused access to all but the now heavily sanitized Al-Kibar location. We must now all await the IAEA report on the findings of that singular onsite inspection.

Frank Pabian is a Senior Nonproliferation Infrastructure Analyst at Los Alamos National Laboratory who has over 35 years experience in the nuclear nonproliferation field including six years with the Office of Imagery Analysis and 18 years with Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory's "Z" Division.  Frank also served as a Chief Inspector for the IAEA during UN inspections in Iraq from 1996-1998 focusing on "Capable Sites." In December 2002, Frank served as one of the first US nuclear inspectors back in Iraq with UN/IAEA. While at Los Alamos, Frank has developed and presented commercial satellite imagery based briefings on foreign clandestine nuclear facilities to the International Nuclear Suppliers Group, the IAEA, NATO, and the Foreign Ministries of China and India on behalf of the NNSA and STATE.

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Frank Pabian International Research, Analysis, and Development Work Force, LANL Speaker
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Iran has a robust program to exert influence in Iraq in order to limit American power‐projection capability in the Middle East, ensure the Iraqi government does not pose a threat to Iran, and build a reliable platform for projecting influence further abroad. Iran has two primary modes of influence. First, and most importantly, it projects political influence by leveraging close historical relationships with several Shi'a organizations in Iraq: the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI), the Badr organization, and the Dawah political party. Second, Iran uses the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and Qods Force (QF) to provide aid in the form of paramilitary training, weapons, and equipment to various Iraqi militant groups, including Moqtada al‐Sadr's Jaysh al‐Mahdi (JAM) and the Special Group Criminals (SGCs). Iran also projects influence through economic initiatives and various religious programs. Iranian influence in Iraq is inevitable, and some of it is legal and constructive. Nonetheless, Iranian policy in Iraq is also duplicitous. Iran publicly calls for stability while subverting Iraq's government and illegally sponsoring anti‐government militias.

Although Iran publicly protested the U.S.‐led invasion of Iraq in 2003, its agents and allies initially cooperated with U.S. forces. Iraqi refugee groups with deep ties to Iran participated in U.S.‐sponsored pre‐invasion conferences, and Iran urged its surrogates to assist U.S. forces and position themselves to seize power through the electoral process. Yet even as its political allies came to power in Baghdad with U.S. backing, Iran began supporting anti‐government, anti‐coalition militia movements typified by JAM and, later, the SGCs. The two‐tracked strategy offered Iran unique levers to increase violence in Iraq and then to benefit when violence subsided. Another advantage has been that, intentionally or not, Iran's two‐pronged approach obscured the importance of Iran's political influence in Iraq by focusing the international media and U.S. policymakers on Iran's lethal aid to militia groups.

Iran has achieved three major accomplishments in Iraq. First, the unstable security situation and political opposition means the U.S. is not in a position to use Iraq as a platform for targeting Iran. Second, Iran's political allies have secured high‐ranking positions in the Iraqi government. Third, the Iraqi constitution calls for a highly federalized state. Iran values a decentralized Iraq because it will be less capable of projecting power, and because Iran is primarily concerned with Iraq's southern, oil‐rich, Shi'a‐dominated provinces. Iran believes that increased southern autonomy will leave those provinces more open to Iranian influence. Iran's successes in Iraq are not all a function of its own efforts. For example, a democratic Iraq will almost certainly be highly federalized because of the power of Iraqi Kurds to distance themselves from the Iraqi government, and because of increasingly heated sectarian divisions that can be mitigated by devolving power to regional governments.

Iran's effort to manipulate Iraqi surrogates predates the 2003 U.S. military operations. During the 1980s and 1990s, Iran helped organize and finance ISCI's predecessor, the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), and its Badr Corps Militia. It also worked closely with elements of the Islamic Dawah Party and helped train and fund its militant wing. Before 2003, the Badr Corps served as Iran's most important action arm inside Iraq, and was considered an official component of the IRGC‐QF. Badr received training and weapons from the IRGC‐QF and Lebanese Hizballah to attack both the Iraqi regime and the Mujahidin‐e Khalq Organization (MKO), an Iranian terrorist group. Numerous senior individuals in the Badr Corps during the 1990s play critical logistical roles funneling weapons to militants in Iraq today, including Abu Mustafa al‐Sheibani-the first major Explosively Formed Penetrator (EFP) smuggler-and Abu Mahdi al‐Muhandis, the terrorist and former Badr Corps commander who was elected to the Iraqi parliament before fleeing to Iran. In some cases, these people had direct ties to current Iraqi politicians, including Hadi al‐Ameri, who was al‐Muhandis' Chief of Staff.

Iran's support for Iraqi refugee groups in the 1980s and 1990s has important consequences today. The refugee groups often disagreed over how closely to associate with the Iranian regime. SCIRI was most closely linked to Iran's clerical regime, going so far as to recognize Ayatollah Khomeini's doctrine of guardianship of the jurist-velayate faqih-which implied Ayatollah Khomeini was their Supreme Leader. The Dawah party, however, was bitterly split over velayate faqih. Meanwhile, many Shi'a that remained in Iraq grew resentful of the Iraqi refugees that pontificated about Saddam's regime without facing its brutality firsthand. Most supported Iran's religious government but rejected velayate faqih. The political and doctrinal disagreements were often reflected in debates about which religious figures to follow. SCIRI was led by Ayatollah Baqir al‐Hakim, while many Dawah supporters and Iraqis still in Iraq supported Ayatollahs from the al‐Sadr family. These divisions laid the groundwork for contemporary divisions between the establishment ISCI and Dawah parties in Baghdad and the anti‐establishment Sadrist movement.

Despite its successes, Iran faces numerous hurdles projecting influence in Iraq. Many Iraqis-including Shi'a-despise ISCI, Iran's primary political ally, precisely because of its close relationship with Iran. In 2007, ISCI took its current name and abandoned the title Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq, which had implied a closer relationship with Tehran. ISCI also publicly stated that Grand Ayatollah Ali al‐Sistani is its most important religious influence-thereby distancing the organization from Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei, whom it had previously considered supreme. Meanwhile, Iran's militia allies in Iraq tend to oppose Iranian political influence there. Moqtada al‐Sadr and others are willing to accept Iranian training and weapons to pursue their political, religious, and criminal aims, but they remain hostile to Iranian political influence and thus are unreliable allies.

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The tenth anniversary of India’s and Pakistan’s 1998 nuclear tests enables scholars to revisit the issue of South Asian proliferation with a decade of hindsight. What lessons do the intervening years hold regarding nuclear weapons’ impact on South Asian security? Some scholars claim that nuclear weapons had a beneficial effect during this period, helping to stabilize historically volatile Indo-Pakistani relations. Such optimistic analyses of proliferation’s regional security impact are mistaken, however. Nuclear weapons have had two destabilizing effects on the South Asian security environment. First, nuclear weapons’ ability to shield Pakistan against all-out Indian retaliation, and to attract international attention to Pakistan’s dispute with India, encouraged aggressive Pakistani behavior. This, in turn, provoked forceful Indian responses, ranging from large-scale mobilization to limited war. Although the resulting Indo-Pakistani crises did not lead to nuclear or full-scale conventional conflict, such fortunate outcomes were not guaranteed and did not result primarily from nuclear deterrence. Second, these Indo-Pakistani crises led India to adopt a more aggressive conventional military posture toward Pakistan. This development could exacerbate regional security-dilemma dynamics and increase the likelihood of Indo-Pakistani conflict in years to come. Thus nuclear weapons not only destabilized South Asia in the first decade after the nuclear tests; they may damage the regional security environment well into the future.

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Jacob N. Shapiro is Assistant Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University. His primary research interests are the organizational aspects of terrorism, insurgency, and security policy. Shapiro's ongoing projects study the balance between secrecy and openness in counterterrorism, the causes of militant recruitment in Islamic countries, and the relationship between public goods provision and insurgent violence in Iraq and Afghanistan. His research has been published in International Security, International Studies Quarterly, Foreign Policy, Military Operations Research, and a number of edited volumes. Shapiro is a Harmony Fellow at the Combating Terrorism Center at the United States Military Academy. Professor Shapiro served as a Naval Reserve officer with the Office of Naval Intelligence and the Naval Warfare Development Command. On active duty he served at Special Boat Team 20 and onboard the USS Arthur W. Radford (DD-968). Ph.D. Political Science, M.A. Economics, Stanford University. B.A. Political Science, University of Michigan.

Lieutenant Colonel David Ottignon is a national security affairs fellow for 2008-2009 at the Hoover Institution. LTCOL Ottignon represents the U.S. Marine Corps. Ottignon graduated from Ithaca College and was commissioned in the Marine Corps in 1987 as a combat engineer. He participated in Operation Restore Hope in Somalia, Operation Enduring Freedom in the Philippines, and most recently, in Operation Iraqi Freedom from 2007 to 2008. Other previous assignments include service in the U.S. Pacific Command, Assistant Professor of Military Science at the University of Rochester and Commanding Officer, 2d Combat Engineer Battalion, 2d Marine Division. He has earned his MBA from the Simon School, University of Rochester and a Masters in National Security and Strategic Studies from the Naval War College. His research at Hoover will focus on current and future national security issues. Ottignon is on the select list for promotion to Colonel. 

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Jacob Shapiro Assistant Professor of Politics and International Affairs, Princeton University Speaker
Lieutenant Colonel David Ottignon National Security Affairs Fellow, Hoover Institution Commentator
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Dara Kay Cohen, the 2008-09 Zukerman Fellow, is a Ph.D. candidate in Stanford's Department of Political Science, the Teaching Assistant for CISAC's Honors Program and a 2008-09 Peace Scholar Dissertation Fellow at the United States Institute for Peace. Her dissertation, "Explaining Sexual Violence During Civil War," studies how rape was used during civil wars between 1980-99. She has completed seven months of fieldwork in Sierra Leone and East Timor, where she interviewed more than 200 ex-combatants and noncombatants. She is a 2007-2008 recipient of the National Science Foundation Doctoral Dissertation Improvement Grant.  

Dara's previous research focused on the politics of homeland security, and the escalation of international military crises. Her research has appeared in the Stanford Law Review and International Security. Dara graduated with honors with an A.B. in Political Science and Philosophy from Brown University in 2001, and served as a paralegal in the Outstanding Scholars Program in the Counterterrorism Section of the U.S. Department of Justice from 2001-2003. 

Benedetta Faedi is a Graduate Fellow at the Michelle Clayman Institute for Gender Research, Stanford University, and a doctoral candidate at Stanford Law School. Her work focuses on sexual violence against women in Haiti and their active involvement in armed violence. She earned her LL.B. from the University of Rome "La Sapienza," (Summa Cum Laude), a M.A. in Political Science from the University of Florence, and an LL.M. from the London School of Economics and Political Science. 

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Dara K. Cohen Predoctoral Fellow, CISAC; Peace Scholar, United States Institute of Peace; PhD Candidate, Political Science, Stanford University Speaker
Benedetta Faedi Graduate Fellow, Michelle Clayman Institute for Gender Research, Stanford University; Ph.D. Candidate, Stanford Law School Commentator
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The Soviet strategic modernization program of the 1970s was one of the most consequential developments of the Cold War. Deployment of new intercontinental ballistic missiles and the dramatic increase in the number of strategic warheads in the Soviet arsenal created a sense of vulnerability in the United States that was, to a large degree, responsible for the U.S. military buildup of the late 1970s and early 1980s and the escalation of Cold War tensions during that period. U.S. assessments concluded that the Soviet Union was seeking to achieve a capability to fight and win a nuclear war. Estimates of missile accuracy and silo hardness provided by the U.S. intelligence community led many in the United States to conclude that the Soviet Union was building a strategic missile force capable of destroying most U.S. missiles in a counterforce strike and of surviving a subsequent nuclear exchange. Soviet archival documents that have recently become available demonstrate that this conclusion was wrong. The U.S. estimates substantially overestimated the accuracy of the Soviet Union’s missiles and the degree of silo reinforcement. As the data demonstrate, the Soviet missile force did not have the capability to launch a successful first strike. Moreover, the data strongly suggest that the Soviet Union never attempted to acquire a first-strike capability, concentrating instead on strategies based on retaliation.

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Pavel Podvig
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The IISS Strategic Dossier on nuclear programmes in the Middle East provides a comprehensive overview of the history of nuclear programmes in the region, an evaluation of national nuclear capabilities and policies, and an analysis of future aspirations. The fact-rich country profiles, which include Israel and Turkey, also assess how each state may react to an Iranian nuclear weapons capability. In addition to analyzing the proliferation risks inherent in the nuclear fuel cycle, the dossier assesses policy options, including possible regional arms control measures, that can help allow atomic energy to be harnessed for peaceful uses without engendering a ‘proliferation cascade’.

Nuclear power plants alone are not a proliferation risk. Without enrichment or reprocessing capabilities, power-reactor fuel, whether fresh or spent, cannot be used for the production of nuclear weapons. There are various ways, however, in which reactor projects and related nuclear fuel-cycle facilities could be used to further a nuclear-weapons development programme. This chapter describes these various possible proliferation pathways. It should be stressed that no successful nuclear weapons programme has ever relied on commercial reactors. Most of the states that have pursued weapons programmes went on to construct nuclear power plants, but only after their dedicated military programmes were successful, nearing success or had been abandoned. The scenarios for proliferation activities related to nuclear power plants described here are, therefore, only hypothetical, but they cannot be ruled out, especially in light of the increasing availability of nuclear-weapons-related technologies spread by black-market networks.

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International Institute for Strategic Studies in "Nuclear Programmes in the Middle East: In the Shadow of Iran"
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