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Steven Pifer
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President Trump’s newly named envoy for arms control, Marshall Billingslea, gave a lengthy interview last week on the administration’s approach to nuclear arms negotiations. He stressed bringing in China, struck a pessimistic note about the sole treaty constraining Russian and U.S. nuclear forces, and offered no ideas for getting Moscow to discuss non-strategic nuclear arms.

Unfortunately, the interview reinforces the view that the Trump administration is unlikely to achieve a nuclear deal…or even develop a serious proposal.

Read full article at Defense One

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Officials in Moscow and Beijing will read Mr. Billingslea’s interview and see nothing to give them reason to negotiate.

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Steven Pifer
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The Trump administration’s proposal for trilateral arms control negotiations appears to be gaining little traction in Moscow and Beijing, and the era of traditional nuclear arms control may be coming to an end just as new challenges emerge. This is not to say that arms control should be an end in it itself. It provides a tool that, along with the right combination of deterrence and defense forces and proper doctrine, can enhance U.S. and allied security and promote stability.

Applying that tool will require overcoming a variety of challenges, not just regarding nuclear weapons but related issues, such as missile defense and conventional strike systems. Policymakers face some hard choices.

NUCLEAR ARMS

In August 2019, the United States withdrew from the 1987 Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty following Russia’s violation. (More broadly, Moscow’s selective compliance with arms control agreements poses a problem.) The 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) remains as the sole agreement constraining U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons. New START expires in February 2021, but can be extended for up to five years.

For the United States, New START extension should be a no-brainer. Russia is in compliance with the treaty. Extension would continue limits on Russian strategic forces, as well as the flow of information on those forces provided by the treaty’s verification measures, until 2026. Extension would not require that the Pentagon change its strategic modernization plans, as those plans were designed to fit within New START’s limits.

Moscow has offered to extend New START, but the Trump administration has been reluctant. In 2017, U.S. officials said that, before considering the extension issue, they wanted to: 1) see if Russia met the New START limits, which took full effect in February 2018, and 2) complete the nuclear posture review, which was released the same month. Two years later, however, the administration still lacks a position on extension.

Instead, President Trump has set an unachievable objective — a trilateral negotiation with China and Russia covering all their nuclear arms. As I recently wrote in more detail, Chinese officials have repeatedly said no to such a negotiation, citing the large difference in nuclear weapons levels. The Trump administration thus far has offered nothing to entice Beijing to change its position.

Moreover, almost a year after the president set his goal, his administration has yet to offer a proposal — or even an outline — for what such a negotiation would seek to achieve. Neither Washington nor Moscow is ready to agree to have the same number of nuclear weapons as China, but it is unrealistic to think that Beijing would accept unequal limits.

Setting aside China, Russia is not ready to discuss all nuclear arms unless certain conditions are met (more on that below). The Obama administration sought a new negotiation after New START’s conclusion with the goal of including all U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons. That idea never gained traction in Moscow.

If New START expires in 2021, the United States and Russia likely would not launch major new build-ups, as both face real defense budget constraints. But their deployed strategic warhead levels could “creep up” above the number allowed by New START if the sides add warheads to intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and/or submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) that currently carry fewer warheads than their capacity. With the demise of New START’s verification regime, the sides would have little visibility into the other’s actions regarding adding warheads or total warhead numbers.

Some appear to believe that holding back on agreeing to the extension of New START and/or starting from scratch in a new negotiation might increase U.S. leverage to include all nuclear arms, including non-strategic nuclear weapons. That does not appear to be the case. It is more likely that the end of New START’s constraints on deployed strategic weapons would make bringing non-strategic or non-deployed nuclear weapons under control more difficult.

MISSILE DEFENSE

Russian conditions for discussing a broader agreement focus first on missile defense. Differences over missile defense pose a challenge for arms control.

Current U.S. missile defenses hardly constitute a threat to Russian ICBM and SLBM warhead numbers. Moscow, however, has long seemed to fear the potential of U.S. technology and prospective missile defenses. The United States and Russia came close in spring 2011 to an arrangement on a cooperative missile defense for Europe, but they failed to reach agreement, after which the Russian position on limiting missile defenses hardened. Moscow showed no interest in a 2013 U.S. proposal for an executive agreement on missile defense transparency, under which the sides would have exchanged information each year on their current missile defense numbers and prospective numbers looking out each year for 10 years.

Moscow appears to want legally-binding limits on missile defenses. However, the Trump administration’s 2019 missile defense posture review stressed that there should be no negotiated limits on missile defense. Missile defense has a strong constituency in the U.S. Senate, impeding the chance that a treaty limiting missile defenses would get the necessary two-thirds approval.

The missile defense issue will become more complex in coming years. As part of its ground-based mid-course defense, the U.S. military maintains 44 ground-based interceptors in Alaska and California capable of intercepting strategic ballistic missile warheads, with another 20 interceptors planned. In a separate program, the Pentagon is now developing a new variant of the SM-3 missile interceptor. Whereas current variants (the SM-3 IA and SM-3 IB) can engage intermediate-range ballistic missile warheads, the Pentagon intends to test the new SM-3 IIA variant against an ICBM warhead.

If the SM-3 IIA proves capable of intercepting strategic ballistic missile warheads, that will raise concern in Moscow (and Beijing) about the proliferation of those interceptors on U.S. warships, at Aegis Ashore sites in Romania and Poland, and elsewhere. Russia’s interest in limits on missile defenses would only intensify as would Moscow’s linkage of future nuclear arms reduction negotiations to a negotiation on missile defense.

LONG-RANGE PRECISION-GUIDED CONVENTIONAL STRIKE

Sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs) and air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) carrying conventional warheads have never been constrained by arms control agreements. As their precision has increased, Russian officials and experts have expressed concern that they could destroy targets that previously would have required a nuclear weapon and that the United States might consider a “conventional strategic” attack on Russia. It is unclear how realistic this concern is; would, for example, a conventionally-armed U.S. SLCM warhead be powerful enough to disable a hardened Russian ICBM silo?

Russian officials in 2011 began linking long-range precision-guided conventional strike systems to the issue of further nuclear arms cuts. The Pentagon has shown little enthusiasm for limits on these conventional systems, which are a key component of U.S. power projection capabilities. Russia may be starting to catch up, having demonstrated conventionally-armed ALCMs and SLCMs in Syria, but the U.S. military holds a significant numerical advantage.

As with missile defense, the situation with conventional strike may become even more complex. With the demise of the INF Treaty, the Pentagon is now developing or planning several conventionally-armed ground-launched missiles that would have been prohibited by the treaty. Two missiles — the Precision Strike Missile with a possible range of 700 kilometers and a ground-launched cruise missile with a range of 1,000 kilometers — almost certainly are being developed with European contingencies in mind. The Pentagon’s planned ballistic missile with a range of 3,000-4,000 kilometers is intended for the Asia-Pacific region, primarily as a counter to the large number of Chinese intermediate-range missiles (most of which are believed to be conventionally-armed).

Developing and deploying these U.S. missiles — along with Russia’s continued deployment of the 9M729 intermediate-range ground-launched cruise missile plus other missiles that Russia may develop and deploy as “counters” to new U.S. missiles — would further complicate the long-range precision-guide conventional strike picture. That, if in turn linked to nuclear arms control, would impede negotiation of a new agreement reducing and limiting nuclear weapons.

HYPERSONIC, CYBER, AND SPACE

Hypersonic weapons pose another complex factor for arms controllers. Both the United States and Russia (as well as China) are developing hypersonic weapons, including hypersonic glide vehicles to mount on ballistic missiles and hypersonic cruise missiles. Russia has deployed a small number of Avangard hypersonic glide vehicles atop ICBMs to enhance their ability to overcome U.S. missile defenses. Those fall under New START’s limits, but future hypersonic weapons, such as Russia’s Kinzhal air-launched ballistic missile, do not.

A negotiation to limit nuclear arms or long-range precision-guided conventional strike systems would have to take account of hypersonic weapons. That could be difficult, as the United States, Russia, and China appear to be focusing on different types of hypersonic systems.

Cyber and space domains can also have important effects on the nuclear arms relationship. Cyber raises concern about the possibility that a side’s nuclear command, control, and communication systems might be compromised in ways that would allow an intruder either to disrupt communications, including an authorized launch order, or to spoof the system with an unauthorized instruction. The cyber domain does not lend itself readily to traditional arms control-type arrangements.

As for space, Moscow has long advanced proposals to ban the weaponization or militarization of space. Washington has resisted those proposals, in part out of concern that they might affect the ability of the U.S. military to operate space-based assets for command and control, early warning, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance purposes. It is unclear whether more limited proposals, such as a ban on anti-satellite tests that generate orbital debris or a ban on deploying strike weapons in space, might be negotiable.

DIFFICULT TRADE-OFFS

Traditional nuclear arms control is in trouble. If the United States and Russia — and perhaps other countries in the future — wish to continue to use it as a tool to promote a more stable, secure, and transparent nuclear relationship, they will have to deal with challenges that did not arise or that they could agree to set aside during past negotiations.

Washington faces a fundamental choice: Is it prepared to countenance some constraints on missile defense and possibly long-range precision-guided conventional strike systems in order to get Russia to agree to further reduce and limit nuclear arms, including non-strategic nuclear weapons? Moscow faces something of the reverse choice: Will it hold to its insistence on limiting missile defenses and conventional strike systems even if that blocks a future nuclear arms agreement with the United States?

There remains the question of China, and Russia almost certainly would seek to include Britain and France. Would those third countries be willing to consider an approach other than a full negotiation with the United States and Russia, perhaps by offering a degree of transparency regarding their nuclear forces and committing unilaterally not to increase their nuclear weapons numbers so long as U.S. and Russian nuclear forces were reducing?

It would make sense for U.S. and Russian officials to conduct regular, intense bilateral strategic stability talks on the full range of issues — nuclear arms, missile defense, conventional strike systems, hypersonic weapons, third-country nuclear forces, cyber, and space — and their various interactions. Such discussions, if they go beyond mere recital of talking points, might allay some concerns the sides hold about the other while helping U.S. and Russian officials to decide whether specific negotiations might make sense.

None of these questions will be easy, and sorting them out will take time. That bolsters the already strong argument for extending New START. Doing so would give Washington and Moscow five more years to figure out what role, if any, arms control should play in managing their nuclear relationship with one another and, perhaps, with third countries.

 

Originally for Brookings

 

 

 

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Asfandyar Mir
Ramzy Mardini
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On Wednesday night, U.S.-led coalition forces based out of Camp Taji north of Baghdad came under intense rocket fire. The attack killed three coalition personnel, two American and one British. It also injured nearly a dozen more personnel.

While rocket fire on U.S. military bases in Iraq is not new, this attack is the first time U.S. personnel have been killed by suspected Iranian-backed Iraqi groups since the United States killed Iranian Gen. Qasem Soleimani in early January. The attack is likely to anger the Trump administration, which has pursued an aggressive strategy against Iran. It also catches the White House in the middle of another ballooning international crisis — the coronavirus pandemic.

Why did this attack happen now? And will this incident spark more hostilities in the Middle East?
 

 

Read the rest at The Washington Post

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The United States must at some point depart from Afghanistan and bring this costly “forever war” to a conclusion. With over 2,400 U.S. servicemembers killed, many more wounded, and nearly a trillion dollars spent to date, America’s leaders are under an obligation to design and execute a plan that stops a decades-long hemorrhaging of American blood and treasure.

 

Read the Rest at War on the Rocks

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Seminar Recording: https://youtu.be/liv27EFoFWA

 

About this Event: The phenomenon of “fake news” has become a highly political issue not only in the United States but also in other parts of the world. In this talk, we focus on the politics of fighting disinformation in post-communist Central Europe, specifically in the Czech Republic. In the Czech public debate, the problem of disinformation started to be treated by many politicians, journalists, and analysts as an existential threat, as they see the spread of “fake news” as a part of Russia-led hybrid warfare waged against the West, aiming at undermining the trust in the current political system and its elites. We explain the emergence and wide-spread popularity of this military narrative around disinformation and suggest that using the language of war in this context is a highly political move, which changes our way of thinking about the problem of disinformation, gives room for repressive solutions rather than civilian ones, and by itself threatens the fundamental values of a democratic society more than paid Russian “trolls”. We argue instead for understanding the problem of disinformation as a part of a broader condition of “information chaos”, characterized by sociotechnical transformations of news production and consumption, occasional malign interference by state- as well as non-state actors, all this taking place in the context of growing inequalities and cultural backlash against traditional elites in Western societies.

 

About the Speaker:

Dagmar Rychnovská is Marie Sklodowska-Curie Fellow at the Techno-science and societal transformation group at the Institute for Advanced Studies in Vienna. She holds a PhD in International Relations (Charles University in Prague), an MA in Comparative and International Studies (ETH Zurich and University of Zurich), and an LLM in Law and Politics of International Security (VU University Amsterdam). Her research interests lie at the intersection of international relations, security studies, and science and technology studies. Her current research explores security controversies in research and innovation governance, with a focus on bioweapons, biotechnologies, and biobanks.

 

Michal Smetana is currently a Visiting Scholar at the Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC), Stanford University, as well as Research Associate and Assistant Professor at the Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University, and Coordinator of the newly established Peace Research Center Prague. He holds a PhD in International Relations from Charles University in Prague, and he was previously a Visiting Research Fellow at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF). His main research interests lie at the intersection of security studies, international relations, and political psychology, with a specific focus on issues related to nuclear weapons in world politics, arms control and disarmament, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, deterrence theory, and norms and deviance in international affairs. His most recent articles have been published in International Affairs, The Washington Quarterly, Journal of International Relations and Development, International Relations, Asia Europe Journal, Bulletin of the Atomic ScientistsCambridge Review of International Affairs, The Nonproliferation Review, and other academic and policy journals. He is the author of Nuclear Deviance: Stigma Politics and the Rules of the Nonproliferation Game (Palgrave Macmillan) and co-editor of Global Nuclear Disarmament: Strategic, Political, and Regional Perspectives (Routledge) and Indirect Coercion: Triangular Strategies and International Conflict (Charles University Press). 

Dagmar Rychnovská & Michal Smetana
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Panel discussion with Stanford international affairs experts on escalating U.S.-Iran tensions.

 

Register: Click here to RSVP

 

Livestream: Please click here to join the livestream.

 

About this Event: U.S.-Iran tensions are at a new high following the U.S. drone strike that killed Iranian Major General Qassem Soleimani. Both sides continue to exchange threats of violence, and the implications for Iran’s nuclear ambitions, the fight against ISIS, and the U.S. presence in Iraq are expected to be profound. Join us for a panel discussion with Lisa Blaydes, Colin Kahl, Brett McGurk and Abbas Milani, moderated by Michael McFaul, on how recent developments may reshape the geopolitical landscape in one of the most volatile regions of the world.

 

This event is co-sponsored with Hamid and Christina Moghadam Program in Iranian Studies, Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, and the Middle East Initiative at the Center for International Security and Cooperation.

 

Speaker's Biographies:

Lisa Blaydes is a Professor of Political Science at Stanford University and a Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies. She is the author of Elections and Distributive Politics in Mubarak’s Egypt (Cambridge University Press, 2011). Her articles have appeared in the American Political Science ReviewInternational Studies QuarterlyInternational OrganizationJournal of Theoretical PoliticsMiddle East Journal, and World Politics. She holds degrees in Political Science (PhD) from the University of California, Los Angeles and International Relations (BA, MA) from Johns Hopkins University.

 

Colin Kahl is co-director of the Center for International Security and Cooperation, the inaugural Steven C. Házy Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, and a Professor, by courtesy, in the Department of Political Science at Stanford University. He is also a Strategic Consultant to the Penn Biden Center for Diplomacy and Global Engagement.

From October 2014 to January 2017, he was Deputy Assistant to the President and National Security Advisor to the Vice President. In that position, he served as a senior advisor to President Obama and Vice President Biden on all matters related to U.S. foreign policy and national security affairs, and represented the Office of the Vice President as a standing member of the National Security Council Deputies’ Committee. From February 2009 to December 2011, Dr. Kahl was the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for the Middle East at the Pentagon. In this capacity, he served as the senior policy advisor to the Secretary of Defense for Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel and the Palestinian territories, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Yemen, and six other countries in the Levant and Persian Gulf region. In June 2011, he was awarded the Secretary of Defense Medal for Outstanding Public Service by Secretary Robert Gates. 

From 2007 to 2017 (when not serving in the U.S. government), Dr. Kahl was an assistant and associate professor in the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University's Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service. From 2007 to 2009 and 2012 to 2014, he was also a Senior Fellow at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS), a nonpartisan Washington, DC-based think tank. From 2000 to 2007, he was an assistant professor of political science at the University of Minnesota. In 2005-2006, Dr. Kahl took leave from the University of Minnesota to serve as a Council on Foreign Relations International Affairs Fellow in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, where he worked on issues related to counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, and responses to failed states. In 1997-1998, he was a National Security Fellow at the John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies at Harvard University.

Current research projects include a book analyzing American grand strategy in the Middle East in the post-9/11 era. A second research project focuses on the implications of emerging technologies on strategic stability.

He has published numerous articles on international security and U.S. foreign and defense policy in Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, International Security, the Los Angeles Times, Middle East Policy, the National Interest, the New Republic, the New York Times, Politico, the Washington Post, and the Washington Quarterly, as well as several reports for CNAS.

His previous research analyzed the causes and consequences of violent civil and ethnic conflict in developing countries, focusing particular attention on the demographic and natural resource dimensions of these conflicts. His book on the subject, States, Scarcity, and Civil Strife in the Developing World, was published by Princeton University Press in 2006, and related articles and chapters have appeared in International Security, the Journal of International Affairs, and various edited volumes.

Dr. Kahl received his B.A. in political science from the University of Michigan (1993) and his Ph.D. in political science from Columbia University (2000).

 

Brett McGurk is the Frank E. and Arthur W. Payne Distinguished Lecturer at the Freeman Spogli Institute and Center for Security and Cooperation at Stanford University.

McGurk’s research interests center on national security strategy, diplomacy, and decision-making in wartime.  He is particularly interested in the lessons learned over the presidencies of George W. Bush, Barack Obama, and Donald Trump regarding the importance of process in informing presidential decisions and the alignment of ends and means in national security doctrine and strategy.  At Stanford, he will be working on a book project incorporating these themes and teaching a graduate level seminar on presidential decision-making beginning in the fall of 2019.  He is also a frequent commentator on national security events in leading publications and as an NBC News Senior Foreign Affairs Analyst. 

Before coming to Stanford, McGurk served as Special Presidential Envoy for the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS at the U.S. Department of State, helping to build and then lead the coalition of seventy-five countries and four international organizations in the global campaign against the ISIS terrorist network.  McGurk was also responsible for coordinating all aspects of U.S. policy in the campaign against ISIS in Iraq, Syria, and globally.

McGurk previously served in senior positions in the George W. Bush and Barack Obama administrations, including as Special Assistant to President Bush and Senior Director for Iraq and Afghanistan, and then as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Iraq and Iran and Special Presidential Envoy for the U.S. campaign against the Islamic State under Obama.

McGurk has led some of the most sensitive diplomatic missions in the Middle East over the last decade. His most recent assignment established one of the largest coalitions in history to prosecute the counter-ISIS campaign. He was a frequent visitor to the battlefields in both Iraq and Syria to help integrate military and civilian components of the war plan. He also led talks with Russia over the Syria conflict under both the Trump and Obama administrations, initiated back-channel diplomacy to reopen ties between Iraq and Saudi Arabia, and facilitated the formation of the last two Iraqi governments following contested elections in 2014 and 2018.

In 2015 and 2016, McGurk led fourteen months of secret negotiations with Iran to secure the release of Washington Post reporter Jason Rezain, U.S. Marine Amir Hekmati, and Pastor Saad Abadini, as well as three other American citizens.

During his time at the State Department, McGurk received multiple awards, including the Distinguished Honor Award and the Distinguished Service Award, the highest department awards for exceptional service in Washington and overseas assignments.

McGurk is also a nonresident senior fellow in the Middle East Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

McGurk received his JD from Columbia University and his BA from the University of Connecticut Honors Program.  He served as a law clerk to Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist on the U.S. Supreme Court, Judge Denis Jacobs on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 2d Circuit, and Judge Gerard E. Lynch on the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York.

 

Abbas Milani is the Hamid & Christina Moghadam Director of Iranian Studies at Stanford University and a Professor (by courtesy) in the Stanford Global Studies Division. He is also one of the founding co-directors of the Iran Democracy Project and a research fellow at the Hoover Institution. His expertise include U.S.-Iran relations as well as Iranian cultural, political, and security issues. Until 1986, he taught at Tehran University’s Faculty of Law and Political Science, where he was also a member of the Board of Directors of the university’s Center for International Relations. After moving to the United States, he was for fourteen years the Chair of the Political Science Department at the Notre Dame de Namur University. For eight years, he was a visiting Research Fellow in University of California, Berkeley’s Middle East Center.

Professor Milani came to Stanford ten years ago, when he became the founding director of the Iranian Studies Program. He also worked with two colleagues to launch the Iran Democracy Project at the Hoover Institution. He has published more than twenty books and two hundred articles and book reviews in scholarly magazines, journals, and newspapers. His latest book is a collection he co-edited with Larry Diamond, Politics & Culture in Contemporary Iran: Challenging the Status Quo  (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2015).

 

Michael McFaul is the Ken Olivier and Angela Nomellini Professor of International Studies in Political Science, Director and Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, and the Peter and Helen Bing Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, all at Stanford University. He was also the Distinguished Mingde Faculty Fellow at the Stanford Center at Peking University from June to August of 2015. He joined the Stanford faculty in 1995. He is also an analyst for NBC News and a contributing columnist to The Washington Post. McFaul served for five years in the Obama administration, first as Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Russian and Eurasian Affairs at the National Security Council at the White House (2009-2012), and then as U.S. Ambassador to the Russian Federation (2012-2014).

He has authored several books, most recently the New York Times bestseller,  “From Cold War to Hot Peace: An American Ambassador in Putin’s Russia.”  Earlier books include Advancing Democracy Abroad: Why We Should, How We Can; Transitions To Democracy: A Comparative Perspective  (eds. with Kathryn Stoner); Power and Purpose: American Policy toward Russia after the Cold War (with James Goldgeier); and Russia’s Unfinished Revolution: Political Change from Gorbachev to Putin. His current research interests include American foreign policy, great power relations between China, Russia, and the United States, and the relationship between democracy and development. 

Prof. McFaul was born and raised in Montana. He received his B.A. in International Relations and Slavic Languages and his M.A. in Soviet and East European Studies from Stanford University in 1986. As a Rhodes Scholar, he completed his D. Phil. in International Relations at Oxford University in 1991.

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Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies
Professor of Political Science
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Lisa Blaydes is a Professor of Political Science at Stanford University. She is the author of State of Repression: Iraq under Saddam Hussein (Princeton University Press, 2018) and Elections and Distributive Politics in Mubarak’s Egypt (Cambridge University Press, 2011). Professor Blaydes received the 2009 Gabriel Almond Award for best dissertation in the field of comparative politics from the American Political Science Association for this project.  Her articles have appeared in the American Political Science Review, International Studies Quarterly, International Organization, Journal of Theoretical Politics, Middle East Journal, and World Politics. During the 2008-2009 and 2009-2010 academic years, Professor Blaydes was an Academy Scholar at the Harvard Academy for International and Area Studies. She holds degrees in Political Science (PhD) from the University of California, Los Angeles, and International Relations (BA, MA) from Johns Hopkins University.

 

Affiliated faculty at the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law
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Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies
Steven C. Házy Senior Fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation
Professor, by courtesy, of Political Science
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Colin Kahl is the Steven C. Házy Senior Fellow at Stanford University’s Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC), an interdisciplinary research hub in the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies. He is also the faculty director of CISAC’s Program on Geopolitics, Technology, and Governance, and a professor of political science (by courtesy). 

Current research projects include: an examination of the role of emerging technologies (including cyber, space, and artificial intelligence and autonomy) in “integrated deterrence” vis-à-vis the People’s Republic of China (PRC); an assessment of the role of U.S.-Russia nuclear deterrence and Russian nuclear coercion in the Ukraine war; and an analysis of the utility of the concept of the “Free World” for U.S. foreign policy.

From April 2021-July 2023, Dr. Kahl served as the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy at the U.S. Department of Defense. In that role, he was the principal adviser to the Secretary of Defense for all matters related to national security and defense policy and represented the Department as a standing member of the National Security Council Deputies’ Committee. He oversaw the writing of the 2022 National Defense Strategy, which focused the Pentagon’s efforts on the “pacing challenge” posed by the PRC, and he led the Department’s response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and numerous other international crises. He also led several other major defense diplomacy initiatives, including: an unprecedented strengthening of the NATO alliance; the negotiation of the AUKUS agreement with Australia and the United Kingdom; historic defense force posture enhancements in Australia, Japan, and the Philippines; and deepening defense and strategic ties with India. In June 2023, Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin III awarded Dr. Kahl the Department of Defense Distinguished Public Service Medal, the highest civilian award presented by the Secretary of Defense.

During the Obama Administration, Dr. Kahl served as Deputy Assistant to President Obama and National Security Advisor to the Vice President Biden from October 2014 to January 2017. He also served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for the Middle East from February 2009 to December 2011, for which he received the Outstanding Public Service Medal in July 2011.

Dr. Kahl is the co-author (along with Thomas Wright) of Aftershocks: Pandemic Politics and the End of the Old International Order (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2021) and the author States, Scarcity, and Civil Strife in the Developing World (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006). He has also published numerous article on U.S. national security and defense policy in Foreign AffairsForeign PolicyInternational Security, the Los Angeles TimesMiddle East Policy, the National Interest, the New Republic, the New York TimesPolitico, the Washington Post, and the Washington Quarterly, as well as several reports for the Center for a New American Security (CNAS), a non-partisan think tank in Washington, DC.

Dr. Kahl previously taught at Georgetown University and the University of Minnesota, and he has held fellowship positions at Harvard University, the Council on Foreign Relations, CNAS, and the Penn Biden Center for Diplomacy and International Engagement. 

He received his B.A. in political science from the University of Michigan (1993) and his Ph.D. in political science from Columbia University (2000).

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Abbas Milani

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616 Jane Stanford Way
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Director, Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies
Ken Olivier and Angela Nomellini Professor of International Studies, Department of Political Science
Peter and Helen Bing Senior Fellow, Hoover Institution
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PhD

Michael McFaul is Director at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, the Ken Olivier and Angela Nomellini Professor of International Studies in the Department of Political Science, and the Peter and Helen Bing Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution. He joined the Stanford faculty in 1995. Dr. McFaul also is as an International Affairs Analyst for NBC News and a columnist for The Washington Post. He served for five years in the Obama administration, first as Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Russian and Eurasian Affairs at the National Security Council at the White House (2009-2012), and then as U.S. Ambassador to the Russian Federation (2012-2014).

He has authored several books, most recently the New York Times bestseller From Cold War to Hot Peace: An American Ambassador in Putin’s Russia. Earlier books include Advancing Democracy Abroad: Why We Should, How We Can; Transitions To Democracy: A Comparative Perspective (eds. with Kathryn Stoner); Power and Purpose: American Policy toward Russia after the Cold War (with James Goldgeier); and Russia’s Unfinished Revolution: Political Change from Gorbachev to Putin. He is currently writing a book called Autocrats versus Democrats: Lessons from the Cold War for Competing with China and Russia Today.

He teaches courses on great power relations, democratization, comparative foreign policy decision-making, and revolutions.

Dr. McFaul was born and raised in Montana. He received his B.A. in International Relations and Slavic Languages and his M.A. in Soviet and East European Studies from Stanford University in 1986. As a Rhodes Scholar, he completed his D. Phil. In International Relations at Oxford University in 1991. His DPhil thesis was Southern African Liberation and Great Power Intervention: Towards a Theory of Revolution in an International Context.

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Scott D. Sagan
Benjamin Valentino
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Americans show much less tolerance for war crimes than they did during the war in Vietnam.

Read the Rest at Washington Post

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This event is co-sponsored by the Program in History and Philosophy of Science; Program in Science, Technology, and Society; and Stanford Center for Law and History.

 

Livestream: This event will not be live-streamed or recorded

 

Abstract: How have national practices of nuclear security produced local conditions of insecurity? After World War II, the United States’ nuclear testing program transformed the Marshall Islands into an experimental site for testing both new weapons and forms of territorial governance. During the same period, the Hunters Point Shipyard in southeast San Francisco became the launching point and return site for ships, scientists, and military personnel circulating between the mainland and the Pacific tests. These activities not only incorporated the Marshall Islands and Hunters Point into networks of militarization and scientific knowledge production, but also resulted in widespread radiological contamination. Professors Mary Mitchell and Helen Kang will discuss the entangled legal, environmental, and social legacies of radiological contamination at these two sites, shedding light on the consequential damages of the Cold War and ongoing efforts to demand accountability from the United States government.

 

Helen Kang Biography: Helen H. Kang is Professor of Law at Golden Gate University School of Law and Director of the school’s Environmental Law and Justice Clinic, which has received recognition for its work from the American Bar Association and the Clinical Legal Education Association, among others. She has devoted most of her legal career to environmental protection, first as Trial Attorney with the Environmental Enforcement Section of the U.S. Department of Justice. Since joining the clinic in 2000, she and her students have successfully represented community and environmental groups, prevailing against agencies such as U.S. EPA and large sources of pollution, including power plants. The clinic’s work has contributed to developments in environmental law, reducing pollution in communities most affected by pollution in California and beyond, and improving public participation and regulatory accountability. Helen’s achievements include successfully arguing in the California Supreme Court to defend the California Environmental Quality Act from federal preemption and compelling California, after decades of abdication, to meaningfully regulate agricultural pollution. She graduated from Berkeley Law, University of California at Berkeley, and Yale University.

 

Mary Mitchell Biography: Mary X. Mitchell is an Assistant Professor of History at Purdue University where she works on issues at the intersection of environmental inequality and law. During the spring of 2020, Mitchell will be a faculty fellow at Princeton University's Shelby Cullom Davis Center. She earned her PhD in History and Sociology of Science from the University of Pennsylvania in 2016 and was an Atkinson Fellow in Sustainability at Cornell University from 2016-2018. Previously, she practiced law in Pennsylvania and served as a law clerk to Judge Anthony J. Scirica of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.

 

Helen Kang Professor of Law Golden Gate University School of Law
Mary Mitchell Assistant Professor of History Purdue University
Seminars
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For U.S. intelligence agencies, the twenty-first century began with a shock, when 19 al Qaeda operatives hijacked four planes and perpetrated the deadliest attack ever on U.S. soil. In the wake of the attack, the intelligence community mobilized with one overriding goal: preventing another 9/11. The CIA, the National Security Agency, and the 15 other components of the U.S. intelligence community restructured, reformed, and retooled. Congress appropriated billions of dollars to support the transformation.

That effort paid off. In the nearly two decades that U.S. intelligence agencies have been focused on fighting terrorists, they have foiled numerous plots to attack the U.S. homeland, tracked down Osama bin Laden, helped eliminate the Islamic State’s caliphate, and found terrorists hiding everywhere from Afghan caves to Brussels apartment complexes. This has arguably been one of the most successful periods in the history of American intelligence.

But today, confronted with new threats that go well beyond terrorism, U.S. intelligence agencies face another moment of reckoning. From biotechnology and nanotechnology to quantum computing and artificial intelligence (AI), rapid technological change is giving U.S. adversaries new capabilities and eroding traditional U.S. intelligence advantages. The U.S. intelligence community must adapt to these shifts or risk failure as the nation’s first line of defense.

 

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Publication Type
Commentary
Publication Date
Journal Publisher
Foreign Affairs
Authors
Amy Zegart
Michael Morell
Michael Morell
Number
May/June 2019
Authors
Amy Zegart
News Type
Commentary
Date
Paragraphs

Thirty years ago this week, I watched the news from Beijing and started shredding my bedding. It was the night before my college graduation, I had been studying Chinese politics, and news had broken that college students just like us had been gunned down in Tiananmen Square after weeks of peaceful and exhilarating democracy protests—carried on international TV. In the iconic square where Mao Zedong had proclaimed the People’s Republic decades before, bespectacled students from China’s best universities had camped out, putting up posters with slogans of freedom in Chinese and English. A “goddess of democracy” figure modeled after the Statue of Liberty embodied their hopes—and ours—for political liberation in China.

On my campus back then were just a handful of students majoring in East Asian studies. Learning of the brutal crackdown in Beijing, we somehow found one another, gathered our friends, and stayed up making hundreds of white armbands for classmates to wear at commencement the next day. Grappling with the cold realities of the “real world” we were about to enter, we didn’t know what else to do. So we tore sheets and cried for what might have been.

The June 4, 1989, massacre was a horrifying spectacle that the Chinese government has sought to erase from national memory ever since. But, 30 years later, contemplating what might have been is more important than ever. In hindsight, Tiananmen Square serves as a continuing reminder about just how much China has defied, and continues to defy, the odds and predictions of experts. The fact is that generations of American policy makers, political scientists, and economists have gotten China wrong more often than they’ve gotten China right. In domestic politics, economic development, and foreign policy, China has charted a surprising path that flies in the face of professional prognostications, general theories about anything, and the experience of other nations.

Read the rest at The Atlantic

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