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[[{"fid":"221894","view_mode":"crop_870xauto","fields":{"format":"crop_870xauto","field_file_image_description[und][0][value]":"Herbert Abrams","field_file_image_alt_text[und][0][value]":"Herbert Abrams","field_file_image_title_text[und][0][value]":"Herbert Abrams","field_credit[und][0][value]":"","field_caption[und][0][value]":"Herbert Abrams","field_related_image_aspect[und][0][value]":"","thumbnails":"crop_870xauto"},"type":"media","attributes":{"alt":"Herbert Abrams","title":"Herbert Abrams","width":"870","style":"width: 400px; height: 500px; float: right; margin-left: 15px","class":"media-element file-crop-870xauto"}}]]Renowned radiologist Herbert Leroy Abrams, who co-founded the Nobel Prize-winning organization International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, died Jan. 20 at his Palo Alto home. He was 95.

Abrams was a professor emeritus of radiology at Stanford University, a senior fellow at Stanford's Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, and an affiliated faculty member at the Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC).

Abrams' illustrious, multi-faceted career embraced what he called the "four dimensions of bio-medicine" – patient care, research, teaching and advocacy.

"For as long as I have known him, I could only describe Herb Abrams as a class act," said Sanjiv "Sam" Gambhir, professor and chair of radiology at Stanford. "It is upon the shoulders of giants such as Herb that we ourselves stand today at the cutting edge of radiology."

Former U.S. Secretary of Defense and CISAC colleague William J. Perry praised Abrams for his "wisdom and carefully chosen words" in his advocacy for better control of nuclear weapons.

"The forces maintaining nuclear weapons and creating the danger that we might use them are very powerful and very hard to stop, and Herb and the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War were an early voice of sanity in this field, " Perry said.

Visionary pioneer in radiology

Born in 1920 in New York to immigrant parents, Abrams declined to go into the family hardware business. He graduated from Cornell University in 1941 and earned his medical degree from Long Island College of Medicine in 1946.

According to his family, Abrams had planned to become a psychiatrist until he was captivated by radiological imaging, which provided the road map for virtually all surgical and many medical therapies.

Abrams, his wife, Marilyn, and daughter, Nancy, moved to the West Coast in 1948.  Their son, John, was born a year later. Abrams completed his residency in radiology at Stanford in 1952 and joined the faculty as an assistant professor in the department in 1954.

While Abrams rose to become director of diagnostic radiology at Stanford, he and Marilyn raised their children in the Bay Area during what his children say he often called "The Golden Years" – rich with deep friendships, youthful exuberance, guitar-playing, family adventures, and professional success.

Abrams was an internationally known authority on cardiovascular radiology and wrote more than 190 articles and seven books on cardiovascular disease and health policy.

For many years he served as editor-in-chief of Postgraduate Radiology, and he was founding editor-in-chief of the journal Cardiovascular and Interventional Radiology.

In 1961 he published Angiography, the first comprehensive volume on the subject, which now is in its fourth edition (edited by Stanley Baum) under the title Abrams' Angiography: Vascular and Interventional Radiology.

"Under his guidance, Stanford pioneered in the fields of coronary artery imaging and the diagnosis of adult and congenital heart diseases, as well as vascular diseases, such as renal artery narrowing as a cause of hypertension," said Lewis Wexler, professor emeritus of radiology at Stanford, who was a resident under Abrams.   

"For many years, I referred to him as 'Dr. Abrams,' even though he requested a less formal address," Wexler added.  "I think I waited until I was a full professor before I called him 'Herb.' His wife and a number of his old friends from San Francisco called him 'Hoppy,' an endearment that aptly describes his energy, excitement and ability to jump effortlessly from discussing radiology [to discussing] health policy, politics, religion, art and music."

The Boston years

In 1967, with their children pursuing their own paths, Abrams and his wife moved to Boston, where he became the Philip H. Cook Professor of Radiology at Harvard Medical School and radiologist-in-chief at Brigham and Women's Hospital and at the Dana Farber Cancer Center.  The intellectual environment of Boston invigorated him and he devoted himself to building a great radiology department, a new research institute, and an outstanding teaching center.  During their time in Boston he and Marilyn also began a long love affair with Martha's Vineyard, where they built a house in 1975.

Steven Seltzer, chair of the Department of Radiology at Brigham and Women's Hospital, who holds the Philip Cook professorship at Harvard Medical School, which Abrams previously held, remembers his longtime mentor as a visionary who helped broaden the scope of radiology as a discipline.

When Seltzer arrived at Brigham and Women's in 1976 to do his radiology residency in what was then a very small department, he recalled being "incredibly impressed with the professional growth opportunities and the values and quality of the program that Abrams was building." He added that radiology was "still growing up" at that time and that Abrams had a vision that began during his years at Stanford and developed during his years in Boston.

"He was a very determined man. I fully bought into that vision. I thought this is a good person to have as a mentor and a role model, because I also aspired to live in a world that had similar characteristics that Herb had dreamed of," Seltzer said.

As a mentor and teacher, Seltzer remembered, Abrams pursued and demanded excellence and sometimes exhibited impatience.  During the time that Seltzer held the post of chief resident in radiology at Brigham and Women's, the hospital scored one of the first CT scanners in the city. The device operated 18 hours a day, seven days a week, and was staffed by residents after hours and on weekends. This was in addition to the residents' regular on-call duties. When the residents balked, Seltzer approached his boss and questioned the fairness of the arrangement and suggested that the residents be compensated with a stipend. "He just looked at me and said, 'Steve, you're doing this. This is your responsibility, and you need to get the residents comfortable with it.'"

During their 40-year relationship, Seltzer got to know another side of Abrams, whose approach to being a grandfather and great-grandfather was far different from the "tough love" he doled out to his students.

Anti-nuclear advocacy

Toward the end of the Boston years, in the early eighties, Abrams developed a keen interest in the effects of ionizing radiation and nuclear weapons and the problems of accidental or inadvertent nuclear war, which led to the next phase of his career as an anti-nuclear activist.

"He leveraged his training in radiology to become one of the leading experts on the health effects of low-dose radiation," said David Relman, professor of medicine at Stanford and current co-director of CISAC.

"It's a problem that doesn't get as much attention as the catastrophic effects of a nuclear blast, but the long-term consequences of low-dose radiation was something that Herb … helped promote as a serious issue, worthy of attention and study," Relman added.

Abrams discussed the threats posed by radiation in a story published in the Spring 1986 issue of Stanford Medicine magazine. He said that, for physicians, nuclear weapons and nuclear war were "the central health issue of the 20th century."

"We need to educate not only our colleagues and our students, but our constituents – the patients  – and ultimately policymakers about the consequences of nuclear war," Abrams said in the article. "Medical students are seldom taught about the effects of radiation. It's important because there have been radiation disasters unrelated to nuclear weapons, and there will be more in the future."

He was founding vice president of International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW), which won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1985, just five years after the organization was established. He also served for many years on the national board of directors and as national co-chair of Physicians for Social Responsibility (PSR), a U.S. affiliate of IPPNW.

"His contributions were huge," said Scott Sagan, Caroline S.G. Munro professor of political science at Stanford. Sagan added that under Abrams' leadership the IPPNW "did yeoman's work to try to educate the public and world leaders about the consequences of nuclear war at a time when many, including some in the Reagan administration, were minimizing the consequences of nuclear weapons use."

Abrams returned to Stanford in 1985 as a professor of radiology, but spent most of his time in research at CISAC, working to link various disciplines and philosophies in the political, international and academic arenas to create a better understanding of international security during the nuclear age.

Presidential disability

In the 1990s Abrams began to focus on presidential disability and its potential impact on decision-making.

In 1992 he published The President Has Been Shot: Disability, Confusion and the 25th Amendment, which brought together important issues at the intersection of medicine, politics and humanism.

"[H]is contributions to our intellectual life and to our knowledge of the presidency and so much more were significant and lasting," said CISAC co-founder John Lewis, who invited Abrams to join CISAC after he returned to Stanford.

Near the end of his long life, Abrams wrote about the effects of aging, not only on leaders but also on himself.

Sagan said Abrams "continued to make both scholarly and policy contributions" even toward the end of his long career.

"Herb lectured every year at Stanford on how the physical and psychological health of leaders influenced their decision-making about war and peace," Sagan said.

CISAC co-director Amy Zegart said Abrams "was vibrant to the end," attending seminars and "asking hard-hitting questions."

"He had an incredible mind and an incredible heart, and I think everybody saw both of those things in him, which is why he was such a bedrock of our community for such a long time," Zegart said.

A vibrant family life

Always at the core of Abrams' life was bringing together his family to travel, to ski, to play tennis, and to celebrate birthdays and holidays. 

On his 95th birthday Abrams played four-generation tennis with his son, grandson, and great-grandson on Martha's Vineyard, where his family spent summers for 45 years. Until the last month of his life, he played doubles three times a week.

In addition to Marilyn, to whom he was married for 73 years, daughter Nancy (Richard Eilbert), of Lincoln, Mass. and son John (Christine) of West Tisbury, Mass. ,Abrams is survived by three grandchildren (Pinto and Sophie Abrams, and Natasha Eilbert) and three great-grandchildren (Kalib, Silas, and Axel Abrams).

Memorial donations in memory of Abrams may be made to Physicians for Social Responsibility 1111 14th St. NW, Suite 700, Washington, DC, 20005, or by visiting that organization's website at www.PSR.org.

A service to celebrate his life will be held on the Stanford campus on March 19; details will be announced.

 

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My Journey at the Nuclear Brink is a continuation of William J. Perry's efforts to keep the world safe from a nuclear catastrophe. It tells the story of his coming of age in the nuclear era, his role in trying to shape and contain it, and how his thinking has changed about the threat these weapons pose.
  
In a remarkable career, Perry has dealt firsthand with the changing nuclear threat. Decades of experience and special access to top-secret knowledge of strategic nuclear options have given Perry a unique, and chilling, vantage point from which to conclude that nuclear weapons endanger our security rather than securing it.

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Why did Iran agree to send the bulk of its low-enriched uranium out of the country and remove the core of its Arak reactor? Those actions significantly lengthen the time it would take to build up a nuclear weapon program.

Siegfried Hecker, CISAC senior fellow and former Los Alamost National Laboratory director, shares his personal view in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists: http://thebulletin.org/iran-nuclear-option-more-trouble-it-was-worth9064

 

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Iranian nuclear negotiators meet with international representatives at the International Atomic Energy Agency headquarters in Vienna, Austria on January 16, 2016.
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Can the U.S. find the right balance between cooperation and containment, so it can realize the long-term benefits of the nuclear deal with Iran? CISAC visiting fellow Nicholas Burns, who helped to negotiate sanctions against Iran for the Bush administration a decade ago, offers his opinion in this piece for The New York Times.

 

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U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry takes his seat across from Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif on January 16, 2016, at the Palais Coburg Hotel in Vienna, Austria, before a meeting about the implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action outlining the shape of Iran's nuclear program.
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Reset of U.S. Nuclear Waste Management Strategy and Policy

Meeting 3: Consent-Based Siting

The Reset Project’s third meeting, March 9-10, 2016, will focus on another key issue: consent-based siting. In 2012, the Blue Ribbon Commission on America’s Nuclear Future recommended a new, consent-based approach to siting future nuclear waste-management facilities. As a near-term action, the Commission recommended that future siting efforts be informed by past experience, drawing on experience gained in siting nuclear waste facilities in the U.S. and abroad. In 2013, the Secretary of Energy released the Administration’s Strategy for the Management and Disposal of Used Nuclear Fuel and High-level Radioactive Waste, which endorsed the principles underlying the BRC recommendations (adaptive, phased implementation).  Recently, the Department of Energy has invited public comment on the design of a consent-based siting process.

Critical to the success of any consent-based approach in the U.S. is that the implementer sustain public trust and confidence over decades and that there be a resolution of how power is distributed between the federal government on the one-hand and state/local governments on the other.

The Reset Project’s third meeting seeks to advance the understanding of how a consent-based siting process might be designed in the U.S.:

  1. What insights are provided from the U.S. experience for building local, Tribe and State confidence, and for initiating and sustaining consent-based siting?
  2. How can consent-based siting be informed by the experience by other nuclear projects in the U.S or internationally? 
  3. How is “consent” sought, demonstrated and sustained?
  4. What are priority areas for preparing the policy and regulatory foundations for consent-based siting?

These topics will be addressed over a two-day meeting, through presentations and panel discussions. Invited speakers will share their experience, drawing on their first-hand experience with consent-based siting – from those with direct experience at the levels of local government, Tribe and State governments, to implementers and regulatory authorities involved. Scholars and other experts will be invited to address some important ethical and legal dimensions of consent-based siting. Considerable time will be set aside for discussion and audience participation.  

Reset Conference Documents for meeting no. 3 can be accessed through this link. 

 

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For information related to the first meeting in this series, and relevant materials, please click here.

For information related to the second meeting in this series, and relevant materials, please click here.

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Sponsors: Precourt Institute for Energy, Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, Center for International Security & Cooperation
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Stanford nuclear experts said they were skeptical of North Korea’s claim that it had detonated a hydrogen bomb this week.

However, they said the test was an important step forward for North Korea’s nuclear program and would have a destabilizing effect on the entire region.

“I don’t believe it was a real hydrogen bomb, but my greatest concern is not so much whether or not they actually tested a hydrogen bomb, but rather that they tested at all,” said Siegfried Hecker, former director of Los Alamos National Laboratory and senior fellow at Stanford’s Center for International Security and Cooperation.

North Korean dictator Kim Jong-un has “a track record of exaggerated statements, hyperbole and outright lies,” according to Scott Sagan, Caroline S.G. Munro professor of Political Science.

“The propaganda machine in North Korea has made all sorts of claims about Kim Jong-un’s personal prowess and his history, and it is totally unsurprising that he might make exaggerated claims about North Korea’s military prowess,” Sagan said.

Former U.S. Secretary of Defense William J. Perry said he also doubted that North Korea had detonated a two-stage hydrogen bomb.

“Whether it’s a hydrogen bomb or not, it’s very dangerous, destabilizing development,” said Perry.

“It’s obvious they’re working to increase the capability and size of their nuclear arsenal and that represents a huge danger to the region and creates major instability and major concerns on the part of South Korea and Japan.”

Many North Korea watchers had been anticipating another nuclear test.

“We’ve thought that the North Koreans could test at any time – that the tunnels were ready, that they could do this at any time – so it would be a political decision, not a technical decision,” said Thomas Fingar, senior fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies.

Hecker said North Korea’s latest nuclear test would move the country closer to being able to miniaturize a nuclear warhead and mount it on a missile, extending the reach of their nuclear weapons.

“They will have achieved greater sophistication in their bomb design – that is the most worrisome aspect,” Hecker said.

“At this point, what makes their nuclear arsenal more dangerous is not so much explosive power of the bomb, but its size, weight and the ability to deliver it with missiles.”

On the diplomatic agenda, the U.S. and its allies will likely push for stronger sanctions in the wake of the tests, according to Kathleen Stephens, a former U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Korea and William J. Perry fellow at Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC).

“In the UN the U.S., Japan and South Korea will likely look for another, and stronger, UN Security Council resolution, presumably with some efforts to attach to it some teeth and strengthen sanctions,” Stephens said.

The U.S. Congress is currently considering financial sanctions that would cut of all access to U.S. banks for any banks dealing with the North Koreans.

But financial sanctions would likely be less effective in dealing with North Korea than they had been with Iran, according to Fingar.

“It’s like hitting a masochist,” said Fingar.

“North Korea is relatively insulated from the external economy, where Iran wasn’t. Iran had a middle class, you could make sanctions hurt, they could have a real effect. You could make it hard for the North Koreans to buy luxury goods, but at the end of the day, is that going to bring down the regime?”

Financial sanctions against North Korea could have the unintended consequence of also hurting China, said David Straub, associate director of the Korea program at APARC.

“This could be problematic for China because many of the transactions that North Korea conducts would be going thorough Chinese banks, and the Chinese, understandably might not be happy about the US financial sanctions on them, in effect,” Straub said.

Perry recommended that the U.S. reinvigorate diplomatic talks with North Korea in collaboration with China, South Korea, Japan and Russia.

“I would not give up on negotiations with North Korea yet,” Perry said.

“What could have been done many years ago was following through on negotiations with North Korea at the turn of the Century, which were proceeding robustly in the last years of Clinton’s second term, but were abandoned by the Bush Administration...That was a geo-strategic error.”

But Hecker said those negotiations would be harder now.

“I have previously argued that we should focus on three “No’s” for three “Yes’s” – that is no more bombs, no better bombs (meaning no testing) and no export – in return for addressing the North’s security concerns, its energy shortage and its economic woes,” said Hecker.

“This could have worked when I first proposed it 2008 after one of my seven visits to North Korea. It will be more difficult now."

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A protester burns banners depicting North Korean leader Kim Jong-un during an anti-North Korea rally in central Seoul, South Korea, January 7, 2016.
A protester burns banners depicting North Korean leader Kim Jong-un during an anti-North Korea rally in central Seoul, South Korea, January 7, 2016.
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The Department of Energy's long-term plan for dealing with material contaminated with plutonium and heavier elements from the U.S. weapons program is to bury it underground at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant in southeastern New Mexico.

The Energy Department's plan aims to safeguard nuclear material for the next 10,000 years. But three Stanford nuclear scientists point out in a new commentary article in the journal Nature that the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) was not designed to hold as much plutonium as is now being considered for disposal there. And, in fact, the site has seen two accidents in recent years.

"These accidents during the first 15 years of operation really illustrate the challenge of predicting the behavior of the repository over 10,000 years," said Rod Ewing, the Frank Stanton Professor in Nuclear Security at Stanford and a senior fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation.

What's more, there's more plutonium proposed for disposal at WIPP in the future, a result of treaties with the former Soviet Union and now Russia to decrease the number of nuclear weapons by dismantling them.

A recent assessment of what to do with the plutonium from dismantled weapons has proposed that the material be diluted and disposed of at WIPP. But this analysis does not include a revision of the safety analysis for the site, wrote Ewing and his two Stanford co-authors in the Department of Geological Sciences, postdoctoral scholar Cameron Tracy and graduate student Megan Dustin.

They call on the U.S. Department of Energy, which operates WIPP, to take another look at the safety assessment of the site. Particular emphasis should be on the estimates of drilling activity in the oil-rich Permian Basin, where WIPP is located, and on the effects of such a huge increase in the plutonium inventory for the pilot plant.

"The current regulatory period of 10,000 years is short relative to the 24,100-year half-life of plutonium-239, let alone that of its decay product, uranium-235, which has a half-life of 700 million years," the researchers wrote.

"We cannot be certain that future inhabitants of the area will even know WIPP is there," they added. As a result, it is important to understand the impact of future drilling in the area.

The waste is stored 2,150 feet below the surface in hundreds of thousands of plastic-lined steel drums in rooms carved out of a 250-million-year-old salt bed. The repository is at about half of its planned capacity and slated to be sealed in 2033.

The researchers question some of the assumptions used in the safety studies. For example, to determine the odds of oil drilling in the future, the study uses a 100-year historical average drill rate, even though drilling has intensified in recent decades, throwing this assumption into question.

The Stanford experts also suggest more attention to how the buried materials may interact with each other, particularly with salty brine, over centuries. A single storage drum may contain a variety of materials, such as lab coats, gloves and laboratory instruments; thus, the chemistry is complex.

Ewing said that the complacency that led to the accidents at WIPP can also occur in the safety analysis. Therefore, he advises, it is important to carefully review the safety analysis as new strategies for more plutonium disposal are considered.

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A recovery worker obtains samples from a damaged drum after a radioactive leak at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant in Carlsbad, New Mexico in May, 2014.
A recovery worker obtains samples from a damaged drum after a radioactive leak at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant in Carlsbad, New Mexico in May, 2014.
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Former Los Alamos National Laboratory director Siegfried Hecker assesses North Korea’s claim to have detonated a hydrogen bomb in an underground nuclear test this week. Hecker is one of the world’s top experts on the North Korean nuclear program. He has visited North Korea seven times since 2004, and is the only Western scientist known to have ever been inside a North Korean uranium enrichment facility. He is currently a senior fellow at Stanford’s Center for International Security and Cooperation, and a research professor of Management Science and Engineering.

Do you believe that North Korea actually detonated a hydrogen bomb in its latest nuclear test?

I don’t believe it was a real hydrogen bomb, but my greatest concern is not so much whether or not they actually tested a hydrogen bomb, but rather that they tested at all. Since this test worked, they will have achieved greater sophistication in their bomb design – that is the most worrisome aspect. This is their fourth test – with each test they can learn a lot.

What makes a hydrogen bomb a more threatening weapon than a conventional atomic bomb?

A hydrogen bomb can be a hundred or a thousand-fold more powerful than a fission bomb. Certainly a blast of a megaton will be much more destructive than the Hiroshima bomb, but the more important part is the ability to deliver at long range and to do it accurately. That is what would threaten the United States and its allies most; even with the size of nuclear blasts they have already demonstrated.

White House officials say that initial data from nearby monitoring stations are not consistent with a hydrogen bomb test. How will we know for sure whether it was a hydrogen bomb or not?

The short answer is that we may never know. The telltale signs of a hydrogen bomb are very difficult to pick up in a deeply buried test. Typically hydrogen bombs have greater explosive power or yield. This test is currently believed to have resulted in a seismic tremor of 5.1 on the Richter earthquake scale. That would make it roughly equivalent to the third nuclear test in February 2013. At that time, North Korea claimed it tested a miniaturized atomic bomb – there was no mention of a hydrogen bomb. My estimate of the yield for the 2013 test is roughly 7 to 16 kilotons – which is in the range of the 13-kiloton Hiroshima blast. As far as destructiveness, a Hiroshima-scale explosion is bad enough. Detonated in Manhattan, it may kill as many as a quarter million people. The power of the 2013 and the current explosion is more consistent with fission bombs than hydrogen bombs.

Can you rule out the possibility that it was a hydrogen bomb?

I find it highly unlikely that the North tested a real hydrogen fusion bomb, but we know so little about North Korea’s nuclear weapons design and test results that we cannot completely rule it out. A modern hydrogen bomb is a two-stage device that uses a fission bomb to drive the second stage fusion device. A two-stage device is very difficult to design and construct, and is likely still beyond the reach of North Korea today. However, by comparison, China’s early nuclear weapon program progressed rapidly. It tested its first fission bomb in 1964 and less than three years later demonstrated a hydrogen bomb – and that was 50 years ago. North Korea has now been in the nuclear testing business for almost 10 years, so we can’t rule anything out for certain.

If it wasn’t a hydrogen bomb, what kind of bomb might it have been?

What may be more likely than a two-stage hydrogen bomb is that they took an intermediate step that utilizes hydrogen (actually hydrogen isotopes) fuel to boost the explosive yield of the fission bomb, a sort of turbocharging. Such a device has a fusion or “hydrogen” component, but is not a real hydrogen bomb. It allows miniaturization – that is making the bomb smaller and lighter. Moreover, it would be the first step toward eventually mastering a two-stage hydrogen bomb.

The most important aspect then is to miniaturize, whether it is a fission bomb, a boosted fission bomb, or a hydrogen bomb. The Nagasaki bomb weighed 5,000 kilograms. It was delivered in a specially equipped B-29 bomber. North Korea wants to demonstrate it has a deterrent. To do so, it needs to be able to credibly threaten the U.S. mainland or our overseas assets. For that, you have to make the bomb (more correctly, the warhead) small enough to mount on a missile. The smaller and lighter, the greater the reach. At this point, what makes their nuclear arsenal more dangerous is not so much explosive power of the bomb, but its size, weight and the ability to deliver it with missiles.

How close is North Korea to being able to credibly threaten a nuclear strike against the mainland United States?

North Korea is still a long way off from being able to strike the US mainland. It has only had one successful space launch. It needs a lot more, but it has a large effort in that direction.

Do you think North Korea conducted this test for political or technical reasons?

North Korea had very strong technical and military drivers for this test, as well as follow-on tests. The political environment is mostly what has constrained it from testing earlier and more often. However, this test demonstrates that Pyongyang is willing to weather the political storm this test will bring. It has done so for all previous tests.

What are your current estimates on the size of North Korea's stockpile of nuclear weapons and materials?

Much like in the area of sophistication of the bomb, we have little information of what North Korea actually possesses. The best we can do is to estimate how much bomb fuel, plutonium and highly enriched uranium, they may have produced and estimate how many bombs they can produce from that stockpile. My best estimate at this time is that they may have enough bomb fuel for 18 bombs with a capacity to make 6 to 7 more annually. That, combined with the increased sophistication they surely achieved with this test, paints a troublesome picture.

How should the U.S. respond?

I am concerned about we haven’t done to date. Washington has lost many opportunities we have had since North Korea began its nuclear weapon production in earnest in 2003. One thing that’s clear is that doing what we and the rest of the world have done so far – half-hearted diplomacy, ultimatums, and sanctions – have failed, so these are not the answer. I have previously argued that we should focus on three “No’s” for three “Yes’s” – that is no more bombs, no better bombs (meaning no testing) and no export – in return for addressing the North’s security concerns, its energy shortage and its economic woes. This could have worked when I first proposed it 2008 after one of my seven visits to North Korea. It will be more difficult now.

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CISAC senior fellow Siegfried Hecker on a tour of North Korea's Yongbyon nuclear facility in 2008.
CISAC senior fellow Siegfried Hecker on a tour of North Korea's Yongbyon nuclear facility in 2008.
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Brad Roberts's book is a counter to the conventional wisdom that the United States can and should do more to reduce both the role of nuclear weapons in its security strategies and the number of nuclear weapons in its arsenal.  

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