FSI researchers work to understand continuity and change in societies as they confront their problems and opportunities. This includes the implications of migration and human trafficking. What happens to a society when young girls exit the sex trade? How do groups moving between locations impact societies, economies, self-identity and citizenship? What are the ethnic challenges faced by an increasingly diverse European Union? From a policy perspective, scholars also work to investigate the consequences of security-related measures for society and its values.
The Europe Center reflects much of FSI’s agenda of investigating societies, serving as a forum for experts to research the cultures, religions and people of Europe. The Center sponsors several seminars and lectures, as well as visiting scholars.
Societal research also addresses issues of demography and aging, such as the social and economic challenges of providing health care for an aging population. How do older adults make decisions, and what societal tools need to be in place to ensure the resulting decisions are well-informed? FSI regularly brings in international scholars to look at these issues. They discuss how adults care for their older parents in rural China as well as the economic aspects of aging populations in China and India.
Analysis of the New North Korean Missile Launch Complex
In 2006, public reports began to circulate that North Korea was constructing a large new rocket testing and launching center in a rural North-western coastal valley. A Jane's article by Bermudez nicknamed the complex Pongdong-ni and reported on some of the individual facilities. Coming in the aftermath of the 2006 Taepo-dong II launch failure from the existing Musadun-ri launch center on North Korea's East coast, there has been world-wide speculation and ‘expert' analysis, much of it based on Google Earth images which have not been updated since 2003 (Musadun-ri) and 2006 (Pongdong-ni). A recent government report that a rocket engine test occured during the summer of 2008 ratcheted up the media rhetoric: meanwhile little has been admitted by North Korea. In our presentation, we will examine the growth of the DPRK's rocket programs using commercial tools and satellite visible and multispectral data previously available only the government intelligence and military analysts. In our presentation:
- We will assess and compare the capabilities and completion schedules of Pongdong- ni and Musadun-ri,
- Present important new policy issues that are presented by these major facility investments,
- Show examples of how Open Source Technical Intelligence can provide an improved public understanding of foreign WMD activities independently of government and partisan policy centers.
- Comment on last weeks Iranian satellite launch using North Korean developed rockets.
Lew Franklin is a long-time CISAC Affiliate, joining CISAC in 1992 as a Visiting Scholar after retiring as a TRW vice president, and previously vice president and co-founder of ESL, a defense intelligence company. Upon retirement he was awarded the CIA's Gold Medal for career-long contributions to foreign weapons assessment and national technical means capabilities. At CISAC his work focused on technical intelligence related problems, including wmd proliferation, export controls, defense conversion, and especially conversion of retired ICBMs for low-cost space launches. In 1993, he headed the launch campaign that mated the Stanford Quakesat satellite onto a retired Russian SS-19 Rokot launcher for a successful launch to orbit. His current research into Open Source Technical Intelligence is in support of the upcoming visit to North Korea led by Lewis and Hecker.
Nick Hansen graduated with a BA in Geography from Syracuse University in 1964. His career in national intelligence spans 43 years first as an Army imagery analyst, and then in industry with GTE-EDL, ESL/TRW, Tera Research as a cofounder Vice Pres. and then again at ESL (now TRW/Northrop-Grumman) as a Director. Currently he is in an SES position at the Navy's NIOC-Suitland, MD, as an image technology expert associated with Pennsylvania State University. He has been twice nominated for the NRO's Pioneer award for innovative imagery uses and techniques development and is an expert in foreign weapons systems and test ranges. Currently Nick is supporting John Lewis' North Korea project.
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Future Directions for Pakistan-U.S. Security Cooperation
Syed Ibne Abbas joined the Consulate General of Pakistan, Los Angeles on August 3, 2006. Prior to his present assignment, he served in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Islamabad as Director General (2004-2006).
He joined the Foreign Service of Pakistan in 1983 and held various diplomatic assignments at the Pakistan Missions abroad: Berne (1989-1992), Geneva (1992-1994), Canberra (1998-2001) and New Delhi (2001-2004). He also worked at the Headquarters as Director and Desk Officer, and served as Deputy Secretary, Prime Minister's Secretariat (1995-1997).
He has represented Pakistan and led delegations on several occasions on bilateral and multilateral fora. He attended the 1997 and 2006 UN General Assembly sessions as a Pakistan delegate. He represented Pakistan at the Conference on Disarmament and attended meetings of the South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation (SAARC) and Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC).
He has delivered talks at the Pakistan's premier civil and military training institutions. He holds masters degrees in Political Science and International Relations.
CISAC Conference Room
Former deputy director of national intelligence joins FSI
Thomas Fingar, a prominent intelligence expert and China scholar who served as the first Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Analysis and as chairman of the National Intelligence Council, has joined FSI Stanford effective January 2009. Fingar served on the Stanford staff for a decade after completing his PhD in political science here in 1977 and now returns as the 2008-2009 Payne Distinguished Lecturer. At the expiration of that appointment in December of 2009, he will become the inaugural Oksenberg Rohlen Distinguished Fellow at FSI.
"We are thrilled to welcome Tom Fingar back to Stanford," said FSI Director Coit D. Blacker, the Olivier Nomellini Professor in International Studies. "His experience and commanding knowledge of international security and intelligence issues - from contemporary China and Iran to the risks of nuclear proliferation and terrorism using weapons of mass destruction - will be of enormous benefit to our faculty, the students who will be our next generation of leaders, and the wider Stanford community."
FSI's Payne Distinguished Lectureship, named for Frank and Arthur Payne, annually presents to the larger Stanford community prominent speakers chosen for their international reputation as leaders, with an emphasis on visionary thinking, a broad grasp of a given field, and the capacity to articulate an important perspective on the global community and its challenges. Previous Payne lecturers have included Alejandro Toledo, Peter Piot, David Heymann, Joschka Fischer, Sir David Manning, Mohamed ElBaradei, Jorge Castaneda, Sadaka Ogata, Josef Joffe, and Bill Bradley.
While serving as the Payne Lecturer, Fingar will deliver three public lectures to the Stanford community. He will reside in FSI's Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC), co-directed by nuclear scientist Siegfried Hecker, director emeritus of the Los Alamos National Laboratory, and political scientist Scott D. Sagan, with Lynn Eden serving as acting co-director while Sagan is on sabbatical this year. "Stanford is fortunate to have a scholar-practitioner of Tom Fingar's stature engaging in our multidisciplinary efforts to address the complex security issues currently facing the international community," Hecker said.
A prominent China scholar who has published dozens of books and articles on Chinese politics and policymaking, Fingar will become the inaugural Oksenberg Rohlen Distinguished Fellow at FSI in 2010, based at the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (Shorenstein APARC). The Shorenstein center is world renowned for its work on contemporary political, economic, and security issues in Northeast Asia and houses the Asia-Pacific Scholars Program, which supports graduate students engaged in Asia-related studies.
Fingar has had a distinguished career in public service. He was assistant secretary of the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) and principal advisor to the secretary on intelligence issues from July 2004 until May 2005, when he was named Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Analysis and chairman of the National Intelligence Council. While at the State Department, he also served as Acting Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Research (2003-04 and 2000-01), Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary (2001-03), Deputy Assistant Secretary for Analysis (1994-2000), director of the Office of Analysis for East Asia and the Pacific (1989-94), and chief of the China Division (1986-89).
Between 1975 and 1986, Fingar held a number of positions at Stanford, including senior research associate at CISAC and director of the university's U.S.-China Relations program, which ultimately, with other units, became Shorenstein APARC. He has also served as a consultant to many U.S. government agencies and private sector organizations.
Fingar holds a BA in government and history from Cornell and an MA and PhD from Stanford in political science. He will offer his first 2009 Payne distinguished lecture on March 11, 2009 from 4:30 - 6:00 pm in FSI's Bechtel Conference Center, 616 Serra Street. The address is free and open to the public.
Targeting Civilians in War
Accidental harm to civilians in warfare often becomes an occasion for public outrage, from citizens of both the victimized and the victimizing nation. In this vitally important book on a topic of acute concern for anyone interested in military strategy, international security, or human rights, Alexander B. Downes reminds readers that democratic and authoritarian governments alike will sometimes deliberately kill large numbers of civilians as a matter of military strategy. What leads governments to make such a choice?
Downes
examines several historical cases: British counterinsurgency tactics
during the Boer War, the starvation blockade used by the Allies against
Germany in World War I, Axis and Allied bombing campaigns in World War
II, and ethnic cleansing in the Palestine War. He concludes that
governments decide to target civilian populations for two main
reasons?desperation to reduce their own military casualties or avert
defeat, or a desire to seize and annex enemy territory. When a state's
military fortunes take a turn for the worse, he finds, civilians are
more likely to be declared legitimate targets to coerce the enemy state
to give up. When territorial conquest and annexation are the aims of
warfare, the population of the disputed land is viewed as a threat and
the aggressor state may target those civilians to remove them.
Democracies historically have proven especially likely to target
civilians in desperate circumstances.
In Targeting Civilians in
War, Downes explores several major recent conflicts, including the 1991
Persian Gulf War and the American-led invasion of Iraq in 2003.
Civilian casualties occurred in each campaign, but they were not the
aim of military action. In these cases, Downes maintains, the
achievement of quick and decisive victories against overmatched foes
allowed democracies to win without abandoning their normative beliefs
by intentionally targeting civilians. Whether such ?restraint? can be
guaranteed in future conflicts against more powerful adversaries is,
however, uncertain.
During times of war, democratic societies
suffer tension between norms of humane conduct and pressures to win at
the lowest possible costs. The painful lesson of Targeting Civilians in
War is that when these two concerns clash, the latter usually prevails.
Global Politics of Defense Reform
This volume analyzes the impact of key global trends on civil-military relations by examining defense reform processes since the end of the Cold War. Civil-military relations are reconceptualized to emphasize three dimensions: civilian control of the armed forces, effectiveness in carrying out roles and missions, and efficiency in use of resources. The key global trends that affect these dimensions are the globalization of new norms and ideas, the democratization of governance, technological innovation, and economic liberalization. By focusing on defense reform processes, this book examines cases where civil-military relations can potentially alter quite rapidly under the impact of global trends. By comparing cases across Europe, Asia, North and South America, this book argues that democratization and globalization have had an outsized role in determining the timing and sequence of defense reform and the consequent impact on civil-military relations.
Nuclear Warfare
Technology has always had a profound influence on the character of war. In the past century alone the industrial revolution, culminating in the development of modern aircraft, tanks, artillery, and naval vessels increased the lethality of war manifold. However, the advent of nuclear weapons in 1945 represented a quantum jump in the lethality of war. Looking ahead, one wonders how emerging information technologies and bio-technologies might revolutionize warfare in the future.
The history of the Cold War can be attributed to the confluence of two factors: the development of nuclear weapons and the rise of the former Soviet Union and the United States as the two dominant military powers after World War II. It may seem paradoxical that the development of the most destructive form of warfare, nuclear warfare, led to a period of relative peace, the Cold War. In fact, nuclear weapons have been used only twice in war-the U.S. bombing of Hiroshima on August 6, 1945 and Nagasaki on August 9, 1945. This is not to say that wars on the periphery of U.S. and Soviet interests did not occur, but simply that war between the major powers was absent. This article discusses the development of nuclear weapons, their effects, and the impact they have had on the character of war and military strategy. The ascendance of deterrence as the central strategic concept for nuclear warfare helps explain the apparent paradox mentioned above.
The Cost of Counterterrorism: Power, Politics, and Liberty
In the aftermath of a terrorist attack political stakes are high: legislators fear being seen as lenient or indifferent and often grant the executive broader authorities without thorough debate. The judiciary's role, too, is restricted: constitutional structure and cultural norms narrow the courts' ability to check the executive at all but the margins. The dominant "Security or Freedom" framework for evaluating counterterrorist law thus fails to capture an important characteristic: increased executive power that shifts the balance between branches of government. This book re-calculates the cost of counterterrorist law to the United Kingdom and the United States, arguing that the damage caused is significantly greater than first appears. Donohue warns that the proliferation of biological and nuclear materials, together with willingness on the part of extremists to sacrifice themselves, may drive each country to take increasingly drastic measures with a resultant shift in the basic structure of both states.
“Laura Donohue’s sophisticated and complex analysis of counterterrorism law in Britain and the United States warns of the risks to fundamental individual rights when democracies establish counterterrorist regimes. Although governments frame their initiatives in terms of a choice between security and freedom, Donohue challenges this logic. Loss of liberty is not necessarily balanced by gain in safety. Compromises intended to be temporary turn out to be permanent. Leaders and citizens of democracies would be well advised to heed this pointed and timely warning.”
- Martha Crenshaw, Senior Fellow, Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC), Stanford University
An ambitious argument against the "Security or Freedom" framework, which is the dominant paradigm for thinking about counterterrorist law. The first book to compare the history of both British and American counterterrorist law. Argues that counterterrorist law is a danger to the rights central to liberal democracy: life, liberty, property, privacy and free speech.
Russian and Chinese Responses to U.S. Military Plans in Space
In recent years, Russia and China have urged the negotiation of an international treaty to prevent an arms race in outer space. The United States has responded by insisting that existing treaties and rules governing the use of space are sufficient. The standoff has produced a six-year deadlock in Geneva at the United Nations Conference on Disarmament, but the parties have not been inactive. Russia and China have much to lose if the United States were to pursue the space weapons programs laid out in its military planning documents. This makes probable the eventual formulation of responses that are adverse to a broad range of U.S. interests in space. The Chinese anti-satellite test in January 2007 was prelude to an unfolding drama in which the main act is still subject to revision. If the United States continues to pursue the weaponization of space, how will China and Russia respond, and what will the broader implications for international security be?
The American Academy called upon two scholars to further elucidate answers to these questions and to discuss the consequences of U.S. military plans for space. Pavel Podvig, a research associate at the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University and former researcher at the Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology, discusses possible Russian responses, given their current capabilities and strategic outlook. Hui Zhang, a research associate at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, considers Chinese responses.
Each scholar suggests that introducing weapons into space will have negative consequences for nuclear proliferation and international security. As Podvig points out, Russia's main concern is likely to be maintaining strategic parity with the United States. This parity will be destroyed by the deployment of weapons in space, making a response from Russia likely. Podvig suggests that Russia does not have many options for the development of its own weapon systems in space but is likely to react to U.S. development of space weapons through other countermeasures, such as extending the life of its ballistic missiles. Podvig describes such measures as "the most significant and dangerous global effects of new military developments, whether missile defense or space-based weapons."
Zhang arrives at similar conclusions. He describes how U.S. military plans for space will negatively affect peaceful uses of outer space, disrupting civilian and commercial initiatives, but he focuses his discussion on a much greater concern among Chinese officials — that actions by the United States in space will result in a loss of strategic nuclear parity. China's options for response, as detailed by Zhang, include building more ICBMs, adopting countermeasures against missile defense, developing ASAT weapons, and reconsidering China's commitments on arms control. Thus, a U.S. decision to introduce weapons into space would destabilize the already vulnerable international nonproliferation regime. Zhang concludes, "U.S. space weaponization plans would have potentially disastrous effects on international security and the peaceful use of outer space. This would not benefit any country's security interests."
The Science and Politics of Testing in India: What to Expect After the Nuclear Deal?
Abstract: Nuclear testing has a special place in the Indian nuclear discourse. India's activism on disarmament issues can be traced back to Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru's 1954 call for a test ban. In recent times, at three critical junctures: CTBT negotiations (1994-96), the dialogue with the U.S. after the nuclear tests of May 1998 (1998-2000) and the negotiations on the civil nuclear agreement with the U.S. (2005-2008), the testing issue has made a demand for answers on fundamental questions. Gill and Gopalaswamy believe that the debate on the politics and science of nuclear testing in India reflects two larger questions: firstly, in the manner in which India should relate to the wider nonproliferation regime pending nuclear disarmament and secondly what should be the nature and extent of the Indian nuclear deterrent in a world with nuclear weapons? Neither of these questions has been satisfactorily answered and thus it is still an open debate.
There are significant international dimensions to this debate. The first aspect is the fate of the CTBT, which India refused to sign after two and half years of engagement. The second aspect is the perceptions of the credibility of India's deterrent in a fluid strategic landscape. Gill and Gopalaswamy argue that while India has begun to be relatively more engaging with the nonproliferation regime, it is unlikely that New Delhi will ratify the CTBT anytime soon. Rather, engagement with India on fissile material/fuel cycle control and delegitimization of nuclear weapons may turn out to be a more productive use of scarce political capital in New Delhi and elsewhere in the short run. As this engagement develops, the CTBT would be seen less as a step child of the regime from which India was kept apart but more as one among a number of regimes that involve India in a network of mutual restraints, thus improving the prospects for India's participation in a formal, global ban on testing.
On the scientific aspects, Gill and Gopalaswamy argue that a ‘perceptual set' induced by U.S. nuclear history is at the heart of the controversy over the two-stage device tested on May 11, 1998. They believe that in the light of new data made available by Indian scientists, the option of renewed explosive testing should be considered by India only as a demonstration of intent to maintain the credibility of India's deterrent if certain redlines were to be crossed. The fact that India has such redlines in mind would act to induce more responsibility on part of the other nuclear weapon states relevant to India's decisions, thus reducing the probability of renewed testing by India.
Amandeep Singh Gill is a visiting fellow at CISAC. He is a member of the Indian Foreign Service and has served in the Indian Mission to the United Nations in Geneva, the Indian Embassy in Tehran and the High Commission of India in Colombo. At headquarters in New Delhi, he has served twice in the Disarmament and International Security Affairs Division of the Ministry of External Affairs from 1998 to 2001 and again from 2006 to 2008 at critical junctures in India’s nuclear diplomacy. He was a member of the Indian delegation to the Conference on Disarmament during the negotiations on the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. He has also served as an expert on the UN Secretary General’s panels of experts on Small Arms and Light Weapons and on Missiles.
His research priorities include disarmament, arms control and non proliferation, Asian regional security and human security issues. He is currently working on the interaction of nuclear policies of major states, particularly in Asia.
Before joining the Indian Foreign Service, Amandeep Gill worked as a telecommunications engineer. He retains an abiding interest in the interaction of science, security and politics. He is founder of a non-profit called Farmers First Foundation that seeks to reclaim agriculture for the farmers and demonstrate the viability of integrated agriculture in harmony with nature.
Bharath Gopalaswamy is a postdoctoral associate at Cornell University's Peace Studies Program. He has a PhD in Mechanical Engineering with a specialization in Numerical Acoustics. He has previously worked at the Indian Space Research Organization's High Altitude Test Facilities and the European Aeronautics Defense and Space Company's Astrium GmbH division in Germany.
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