Karl Eikenberry has spent the better part of the last 40 years in uniform, and much of it in combat zones. Then as U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan, he continued a mission of service to his country.
Now he's offering his thoughts on the future of the military, and even turning a critical eye on the institution he has long served.
But, he told an audience during his second Payne Lecture, hosted by Stanford's Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, "We must not confuse dissent for disloyalty."
Eikenberry, who left the Army in 2009 when he became ambassador, said he has been disturbed in recent years by how political leaders have been using the military and by what he characterized as the military's outsized role in determining national security and foreign policy.
"These are problems that have to be acknowledged and debated publicly for the good of the nation and, I believe, our Armed Forces," he said during the May 3 lecture.
He said the dissolution of the draft after the Vietnam War led to the creation of an incredibly competent and capable military, but one that elected officials are more willing to deploy.
"Question No. 1," Eikenberry asked the audience, "If we had a conscript Armed Forces in 2003 and that conscript Armed Forces then are the sons and daughters, drafted, of constituents of our members of Congress, I want you to raise your hand if you think in 2003 we would have invaded Iraq."
Eikenberry questioned, as well, whether Congress would have held hearings – which it hasn't done – into the killings of Americans and allied servicemen by Afghan soldiers and police if the victims had been draftees rather than enlistees.
After only a few hands went up, Eikenberry said, "When you see those results, is there something wrong with the system?"
The former lieutenant general, who did not endorse a draft, urged a debate on ownership of the military: Does it belong to the American people or politicians?
He warned that the separation between soldiers and civilians – in daily life on bases, for example – also leads to ignorance of how the other lives. The separation can mean less judiciousness by lawmakers when determining whether to send service members into war, he said.
He also criticized the lack of oversight of the military by Congress and the media.
"I witnessed this up close and personal in Afghanistan when I transitioned from general to the top diplomat," he said. "Formerly treated with great deference by members of Congress, both I and my embassy team were now constantly on the witness stand."
He said lawmakers were right to challenge them: "We're spending a good deal of taxpayers' money."
He said as a member of the military, he never experienced that kind of scrutiny, as lawmakers are reluctant to be seen as less than fully supportive of troops.
"But by not subjecting the military to the same rigorous standards of scrutiny, they were applying a double standard and I don't think they were doing their complete jobs," he said.
He also said the media have failed to provide critical analysis of military engagements because of relentless pressure to file stories and fear they'll lose authoritative sources if they question actions.
Eikenberry spoke about responsibility and accountability within the military itself, as well.
Regarding the second Iraq war, he said the failure to anticipate the post-invasion environment was a massive failure of military command and planning, not just civilian.
"The costs of this failure have been enormous," he said. "And yet, there has been no accounting."
He also talked about the "strategic corporal," a term coined by then-Marine Corps Commandant General Charles Krulak in 1999. The strategic corporal refers to the serviceman whose missteps, wittingly or unwittingly, can have a strategic impact on the outcome of a military campaign.
He said in World War II there were no strategic corporals, only strategic commanders. A corporal's missteps would likely not affect military advancement in a battle.
"In the 21st century, however, in an era of instantaneous global communications and decentralized combat fought across very complex political, ethnic and religious mosaics, the strategic corporal does decidedly exist," he said, mentioning Abu Ghraib, the recent Koran burnings and the suspected murder of 17 Afghan civilians by an Army soldier.
"When the president of the United States has to apologize frequently for the misdeeds of members of our Armed Forces on the global stage as he's had to do in recent months, I have to say, I don't think that he or the American people are being well served," Eikenberry said.
He said in those cases of misdeeds, the mission may be too risky or the strategy not well planned out, and policy should possibly be reconsidered.
As the war in Afghanistan winds down and the military's mission is refocused, Eikenberry said the biggest security threat to the U.S. is a faltering economy. He echoed the sentiments of former Joint Chiefs of Staff Adm. Mike Mullen, who said in 2010 that he considered the country's growing debt to be its No. 1 security threat.
"With a broken economy, our country cannot make the foundational investments in education, research and development, and infrastructure that are absolutely essential to sustaining a strong defense," Eikenberry said.
Eikenberry said retirement and health care costs in the Defense Department also are ballooning.
Eikenberry said it is important to keep our research and development lead, invest in education, ensure we have systems in place to defend U.S. borders against terrorism and invest more in alliances and partnerships as the world becomes more multi-polar.
He also said the military needs to know what it's after.
"With the end of the Afghan and Iraq conflicts, and our current fiscal crisis, our military leaders and our civilian leaders, they need to better define threats and they must be ready to address today and tomorrow these threats," he said.
Karl Eikenberry is the Payne Distinguished Lecturer at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies. Within FSI he is an affiliated faculty member with the Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law (CDDRL) and the Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC), and an affiliated researcher with the Europe Center. Before coming to Stanford, he served as U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan from May 2009 to July 2011, where he led the civilian side of the surge directed by President Obama to reverse Taliban momentum and help set the conditions for transition to full Afghan sovereignty.
Prior to his appointment as Chief of Mission in Kabul, Ambassador Eikenberry had a 35-year career with the U.S. Army, retiring with the rank of Lieutenant General in 2009. His operational posts include service in the continental U.S., Hawaii, Korea, Italy, and Afghanistan, where he served as Commander of the American-led Coalition Forces from 2005-2007.
Ambassador Eikenberry also served in various political-military positions, including service as Deputy Chairman of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Military Committee in Brussels.
His military awards include the Defense Distinguished and Superior Service Medals, Legion of Merit, Bronze Star, Ranger Tab, Combat and Expert Infantryman badges, and master parachutist wings. He has received numerous civilian awards as well.
Amb. Eikenberry is a graduate of the U.S. Military Academy, holds master's degrees from Harvard University in East Asian Studies and Stanford University in Political Science, and was a National Security Fellow at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard.
He is a trustee of the International Institute for Strategic Studies and a member of the Council on Foreign Relations and the Council of American Ambassadors. He recently received the George F. Kennan Award for Distinguished Public Service from the National Committee on American Foreign Policy. He has published numerous articles on U.S. military training, tactics, and strategy and on Chinese military history and Asia-Pacific security issues.
Koret Taube Conference Center
Gunn SIEPR Building
366 Galvez Street
Abstract:
This article elaborates the notion of ‘nuclear idiosyncrasy’ as a specific understanding of what nuclear weapons and energy are, what they stand for and what they can do. It then assesses the persistence of nuclear idiosyncrasy over time and its effects on French nuclear policies in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Iran. Based on interviews in France, Geneva and the UAE, this article contributes to three debates within foreign policy analysis and nuclear history. Is a regional approach necessary to understand the framing of foreign policies in the twenty-first century? Does a change in leadership fundamentally affect the orientations of nuclear policies? Are the risks of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East and the measures to prevent it similarly understood by all the players in the international community? First, it shows that French nuclear policies in the Middle East are not shaped by dynamics specific to the region as the often invoked notion of an ‘Arab policy of France’ would suggest. Secondly, in-depth analysis leads one to reject the idea of a major change between the nuclear policies of Presidents Chirac and Sarkozy. Thirdly, persistent French nuclear idiosyncrasy leads also to rejection of the idea of convergence towards a shared understanding of the proliferation threat in the Middle East.
On May 18-19, the Program on Poverty and Governance will host a two-day conference on the provision of public goods and good governance throughout the world. This conference, co-sponsored by the Center for Latin American Studies, will bring together an interdisciplinary group of economists, political scientists, policymakers, and public health researchers examining these questions. Public goods—goods and services such as education, healthcare, sanitation, potable water, and other benefits provided by the government—are intrinsically tied to issues of governance, which we broadly define as the exercise of political authority and the use of institutional resources to manage society’s problems and affairs. More specifically, factors such how political leaders get elected, the way in which government projects get funded, whether the community participates in decision-making, and the extent to which the distribution of government benefits is done through clientelistic networks, among others, play an important role in the quality and coverage of public goods that governments provide. Additionally, a critical question in large parts of the developing world relates to the role of international players and foreign aid in the provision of public goods –does external provision of public goods enable or hinder governmental capacity to deliver public services in poor communities? Through two days of presentations and panel discussions, the conference will explore how various facets of governance affect the provision of public goods and services throughout the world.
The conference will be held in Encina Hall at Stanford University May 18th and 19th, 2012. Guests are encouraged to RSVP by May 16th. Any questions may be addressed to the Program on Poverty and Governance program associate Elena Cryst.
CISAC Conference Room
Dept. of Political Science
Encina Hall, Room 436
Stanford University,
Stanford, CA
Beatriz Magaloni Magaloni is the Graham Stuart Professor of International Relations at the Department of Political Science. Magaloni is also a Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute, where she holds affiliations with the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law (CDDRL) and the Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC). She is also a Stanford’s King Center for Global Development faculty affiliate. Magaloni has taught at Stanford University for over two decades.
She leads the Poverty, Violence, and Governance Lab (Povgov). Founded by Magaloni in 2010, Povgov is one of Stanford University’s leading impact-driven knowledge production laboratories in the social sciences. Under her leadership, Povgov has innovated and advanced a host of cutting-edge research agendas to reduce violence and poverty and promote peace, security, and human rights.
Magaloni’s work has contributed to the study of authoritarian politics, poverty alleviation, indigenous governance, and, more recently, violence, crime, security institutions, and human rights. Her first book, Voting for Autocracy: Hegemonic Party Survival and its Demise in Mexico (Cambridge University Press, 2006) is widely recognized as a seminal study in the field of comparative politics. It received the 2007 Leon Epstein Award for the Best Book published in the previous two years in the area of political parties and organizations, as well as the Best Book Award from the American Political Science Association’s Comparative Democratization Section. Her second book The Politics of Poverty Relief: Strategies of Vote Buying and Social Policies in Mexico (with Alberto Diaz-Cayeros and Federico Estevez) (Cambridge University Press, 2016) explores how politics shapes poverty alleviation.
Magaloni’s work was published in leading journals, including the American Political Science Review, American Journal of Political Science, Criminology & Public Policy, World Development, Comparative Political Studies, Annual Review of Political Science, Cambridge Journal of Evidence-Based Policing, Latin American Research Review, and others.
Magaloni received wide international acclaim for identifying innovative solutions for salient societal problems through impact-driven research. In 2023, she was named winner of the world-renowned Stockholm Prize in Criminology, considered an equivalent of the Nobel Prize in the field of criminology. The award recognized her extensive research on crime, policing, and human rights in Mexico and Brazil. Magaloni’s research production in this area was also recognized by the American Political Science Association, which named her recipient of the 2021 Heinz I. Eulau Award for the best article published in the American Political Science Review, the leading journal in the discipline.
She received her Ph.D. in political science from Duke University and holds a law degree from the Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México.
Chinese Vice President Xi Jinping recently visited the United States to meet with top officials and tour various cities. China experts followed the trip closely because Xi is anticipated to become China’s next president. Thomas Fingar spoke with the Shanghai Oriental Morning Post about the visit, and about the Obama administration’s Asia policy.
How will the Obama administration’s strategic adjustments towards the Asia-Pacific shape or influence Xi’s visit? Given the fast-changing environment and shift of power towards Asia, will there be any changes or differences in the United States’s treatment of China’s anticipated future leader?
The primary impact is likely to be on the discussions between Xi and his American interlocutors. I assume that U.S. officials will want to explain the announced strategic adjustments and that Xi will seek authoritative answers to questions that he and other Chinese leaders have about the objectives and implications of the adjustments.
Contrary to your question, I do not believe the environment is changing rapidly—shifts in the global system and the shift in dynamism and wealth toward Asia have been under way for decades. The United States has been and will remain a part of that transition. The U.S. goal is to ensure that the changes result in increased security and prosperity for all—a win-win situation not unlike what happened when first Japan and then the other “Asian tigers” preceded China on the path toward greater wealth and power.
What interests Washington most about Vice President Xi? What expectations does the United States have for his visit?
Washington expects Xi to succeed Hu Jintao and understands that he will be first among equals in a collective leadership that constrains Xi’s ability to act independently. But U.S. officials also understand that Xi, like all leaders, brings personal preferences and agendas to the job and that dealing with him will be influenced by his personality, understanding of American culture, and goals for the relationship. Simply stated, the Americans Xi meets will want to get to know him and what he is like.
U.S. officials understand that he is here as China’s vice president and therefore is unlikely to be bringing new initiatives. They do expect him to have questions about U.S. and Obama administration positions on a wide range of global issues and to have questions about U.S. intentions in Asia.
Is the U.S. “pivot to Asia” strategy aimed at containing or encircling China? Almost all U.S. official statements try to clarify that the United States is not trying to contain China, but its policy focus and military deployments in the Asia-Pacific have made many Chinese scholars doubtful of U.S. intentions. What are your observations? Is U.S. rhetoric consistent with its actions?
I do not like the term “pivot to Asia” and am pleased that U.S. officials seem to have stopped using that term. The United States is not returning to Asia; we never left. I think the basic point of recent statements is that with the end of the U.S. role in the conflict in Iraq and plans to draw down in Afghanistan, the United States will be able to focus more attention on other parts of the world. Asia is, and has been, the most dynamic, fastest changing, and in many ways most-challenging region of the world for many years. The region is also very important to the United States and deserves more attention than it has received. The Asia-Pacific is a region of superlatives—biggest economies, largest militaries, most nuclear powers, largest military budgets, largest foreign exchange reserves, etc. It would be unwise and impossible not to pay attention to developments in and affecting the region and its relations with other parts of the global system.
I have been working on China for more than 45 years and working with Chinese counterparts for 40 years. I must say that I have just about abandoned efforts to persuade important groups in China that the United States is not attempting to surround, contain, or thwart China’s rise. They seem determined to believe that it is the case no matter what we say or do. It is impossible for me to look at the policies and actions of the last eight administrations and come to any conclusion except that the United States means what its leaders have said: that it is in the interest of the United States for China to be strong, secure, and prosperous. The record shows quite clearly that the United States has assisted China’s rise. It also shows that China’s rise has been beneficial to the United States. We are not poorer or weaker or more insecure because China’s people live better and China plays an increasingly important role on the world stage.
Do you think the Obama administration has changed the direction of U.S. strategy toward China or Asia compared with the Bush administration?
The short answer is, “no. ” The Bush administration was preoccupied by terrorism, Iraq, and Afghanistan and devoted less time and attention to Asia. Obama is redressing the balance and better aligning attention with current interests. Arguably what has changed is the perception of China held by others in the region. A series of foreign policy blunders in 2010 undercut the success of China’s diplomacy and increased regional concern about China’s intentions. That prompted requests for reassurance that the United States would remain engaged in the region and that the Bush administration’s “neglect” of certain regional meetings was not a harbinger of a retreat from Asia. The Obama administration seeks to provide that assurance and to make clear that we are engaged in Asia because we are a Pacific power with great interests in the region. We are not there to contain or block anybody.
The United States is struggling with its economy and also cutting its defense budget. Do you think this strategy comes at the right time?
Downturns in the economy never come at a good time. The great recession has taken a heavy toll but we are recovering and will recover. We have been spending too much for too long and need to cut back. In my opinion, we also need to tax ourselves more to pay for modernization of infrastructure, better schools, and other requisites of continued prosperity. We are winding down two long and expensive wars and should reduce our defense budget. It will take time to replace worn out equipment and to reduce the large role that defense expenditures played in the U.S. economy during the Cold War, but we will get there eventually. More importantly, now is a good time to reduce defense expenditures and reorganize our military because we do not have any enemies and are not bent on conquering other nations.
Is the “pivot to Asia” strategy concrete or more of a “paper tiger” given the fact that other challenges, including Iran, are still occupying the United States?
As previously noted, the term “pivot to Asia” exaggerates the amount of change. The United States never left or lost interest in Asia, but is now able to devote more attention to the most dynamic, and in some respects most dangerous place in the world. Building a new security architecture that is inclusive—including China—and addresses concerns in and about North Korea is and should be a priority. Forging institutions to ensure continued stability and prosperity in the region despite paralysis at the global level and adjusting to changes in production and supply chains are among the long list of specific issues that need attention. The United States has a stake in the way these issues are addressed and must be engaged in the search for solutions.
