This report comprises a description, summary, and analysis of an entrepreneurial training workshop for Russian nuclear scientists held at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), May 9-20, 1994. This is the third in a series of such workshops. The first workshop was held in Boston, July, 1992. The second was held in Moscow, June, 1993. The workshop was cosponsored by the U.s. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), and the Ministry of the Russian Federation for Atomic Energy (Minatom).

The goals of the workshop were to provide the Russian scientists with academic and practical background in several basic business areas, and then to assist them, in conjunction with American industry representatives, in the preparation of business plans for possible cooperative projects.

In this book, distinguished U.S. and Russian scholars analyze the great challenges confronting post-Communist Russia and examine the Yeltsin government's attempts to deal with them. Focusing on problems of state- and nation-building, economic reform, demilitarization, and the definition of Russia's national interests in its relations with the outside world, the authors trace the complex interplay between the communist legacy and efforts to chart new directions in both domestic and foreign policy in the years ahead.

Chapter 3 in The New Russia: Troubled Transformation, edited by Gail W. Lapidus.

The papers in this volume are revised versions of presentations made by the authors at a conference on economic reform in Russia, which was held at Stanford University on November 22 and 23, 1993. Professor Kenneth Arrow from Stanford chaired the confer­ence, which was sponsored by the university's Center for International Security and Arms Control ( CISAC), under the auspices of its project on Russian defense conversion, and by the Moscow-based Institute for the Economy in Transition. Speakers included all the authors in this volume, as well as other representatives of the Institute for the Economy in Transition, the World Bank, and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development ( EBRD).

With the ending of the Cold War, regional conflicts have come increasingly to the fore.  U.S. foreign policy goals in such areas continue to involve a mix of U.S. self-interest (as perceived by governing elites, Congress, and sometimes the electorate directly) and a desire to see conflicts in the world resolved more peacefully.  Both of these factors have led and will probably continue to lead to U.S. military interventions in some of these conflicts.

This paper addresses the issue of what role--if any--U.S. nuclear weapons should play in these interventions.  We focus on the following questions: given a military regional confrontation between the United States and a regional power, under what circumstances if any should nuclear weapons be used?  What arguments militate for and against their use? Can one come to an overall policy recommendation in this regard?

We are well aware that the best way to deal with military confrontations is to prevent them. To some degree, military confrontations represent a failure of policy.  Nevertheless, these confrontations do occur, and on occasion, the use of nuclear weapons has been and may again be contemplated.  The paper reviews some such possible occasions.

The dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991 and the emergence of 15 independent states on its territory mark the end not only of the Soviet system itself but also of a centuries-long process of state-building that created the Russian empire. In the process of serving and extending this empire, the Soviet state unwittingly stimulated a process of nation-building among its constituent peoples. which ultimately contributed to its collapse. The papers presented in this volume are an attempt to analyze and comment on the origins, evolution, and demise of protracted experiment.

In August 1991, the people of Moscow and Leningrad demonstrated to the world that democracy is an idea whose time had come for the Soviet Union. As a result, the Soviet
government received a mandate for political reform. This reform, if successful, will result in a political system that will be very different from any that the people in the Soviet Union have ever known-a government of the people, by the people, and for the people.

Hand in hand with political reform, the Union and its republics will be attempting sweeping economic reforms. While recognizing how difficult it will be for the Soviet Union to achieve economic reform, it is also important to observe that it is at least conceivable now. A critically important component of economic reform in the Soviet Union is the conversion of their defense industry from a centrally managed monolith to a collection of independent, privately owned enterprises, producing civil products.

The world is facing truly breathtaking changes, in particular from the socialist countries. The traditional rigidity of communist regimes and the preeminence of the communist parties in these countries are breaking down. Strong voices of nationalism within the Soviet Union are challenging the very integrity of the union itself. Thus, a bipolar world--where the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), led by the United States, and the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO), led by the Soviet Union, represent both .an ideological schism and a superpower confrontation--is no longer the basis or even a dominant force for threatened conflict.

The recognition is growing that such factors as economic strength, abundance of basic resources, productivity, and the health and morale of the population are in many respects stronger bases of national security than are military forces. This recognition conflicts sharply with the concept of national security as defined in the Dictionary of Military Terms (issued by the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff) as "a military or defense advantage over any foreign nation or group of nations."

In view of all these developments, the realization that military power and national security are not synonymous is becoming more prevalent in the United States.  More attention is focusing on internal threats from deficiencies such as those in education, from erosion of the country's infrastructure, drugs, and problems of the environment. This attention, in turn, has deflected public concern and attention from military issues. The decreased concern not only has diminished the priority given to military preparedness but also, unfortunately, has lessened the concern with arms control.

This paper addresses the steps that the United States should take to insure the continuation of its position of influence and involvement in world commerce and geopolitics in light of the developments in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.  The developments are both positive--prodemocracy movements, lessened tensions--and negative, the latter suggesting that there may well be a period in which pent-up ethnic, ideological, and nationalistic pressures could give rise to local conflicts and regional disputes throughout the world, not just in Eastern Europe.

The national security strategy of the United States since World War II has changed frequently during the course of eight administrations and two wars. But it has also had an underlying consistency, driven by three major factors: the Cold War, the United States' position as leader of the Western world, and the economic strength of the United States. In the 1990s, however, U.S. national security strategy is likely to be very different as the Cold War abates, the United States' role with allies evolves from one of dominance to one of senior partnership, and the U.S. economy is stressed by actions to reduce the budget and trade deficits.