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Steven A. Cook and Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall argue that Turkey is of enormous strategic importance to the United States and Europe, especially at a time when the widening chasm between the West and the Islamic world looms as the greatest foreign policy challenge. Yet Ankara's relations with Washington are strained - over Iraq, Cyprus, Syria, Iran and Hamas - and Turkey's prospects for joining the European Union remain uncertain.

As a model of a democratizing and secular Muslim state that has been a stalwart ally for more than 50 years, Turkey is of enormous strategic importance to the United States and Europe, especially at a time when the widening chasm between the West and the Islamic world looms as the greatest foreign policy challenge. Yet Ankara's relations with Washington are strained - over Iraq, Cyprus, Syria, Iran and Hamas - and Turkey's prospects for joining the European Union remain uncertain.

As Washington prepares for a visit Wednesday by Turkey's foreign minister, Abdullah Gul, the United States and Turkey should explore three initiatives to repair and revitalize their relationship.

First, although the United States and Turkey share broad goals in Iraq, the situation there threatens a potential breach in relations. The Turks feel the war in Iraq has undermined their security by stirring Kurdish nationalism. It also coincided with renewed terrorist attacks mounted by the Kurdistan Worker's Party from inside Iraq. To address this challenge, the United States should initiate a trilateral dialogue on the future of Iraq with Turkey and representatives of the Iraqi government, including Kurdish leaders.

If the effort to build a functioning Iraqi government is successful, this trilateral consultative process will support the common goal of a unified and sovereign Iraq; should the Iraqi government fail, the dialogue will provide a mechanism for managing some of the worst potential consequences.

Second, Washington must make it a diplomatic priority to persuade skeptics in Europe to take a more positive approach toward Turkey. Peering into the future and considering the strategic implications of a Turkey unmoored - or, more darkly, a Turkey that turns against its traditional partners, aligning itself more closely with Damascus, Moscow or Tehran - should be instructive.

Washington needs to make the case to its European allies that delaying Turkey's accession to the EU could harm their security. The longer accession takes, the more likely it is that Turks will become disenchanted with the EU and look elsewhere for opportunities; it is also more likely that Turkey's impressive political reform process, which began in 2002, will stall.

Further, Washington should take a leadership role in working to resolve the Cyprus conflict, which threatens to create further obstacles to Turkish EU membership. Rather than waiting for a new UN or EU initiative on the future of the island, America should catalyze a renewed negotiation process. A special Cyprus coordinator would work with the UN and EU to develop a new plan for reuniting the island, encourage European leaders to use their collective clout to require more constructive behavior from the Cypriot government, and coordinate Washington's political, diplomatic and economic steps to break Turkish Cypriots from their international isolation.

Third, the United States and Turkey should establish a high-level commission that meets twice a year and provides a structured mechanism for interaction across agencies of government, nongovernmental organizations and the private sector. At the outset, three working groups should be launched, focusing on security, economic and commercial ties, and educational and cultural exchanges.

A U.S.-Turkey cooperation commission could facilitate the re-establishment of the sustained interaction that characterizes America's strongest partnerships, and provide a foundation for keeping Turkey aligned with the West should Ankara's bid for EU membership ultimately fail.

As tensions over the outcome in Iraq mount, the prospects for generating positive momentum in U.S.- Turkey relations are diminishing. The consequences of a disoriented Turkey would be even greater than a failure in Iraq. America and Europe must do everything they can to ensure that Turkey remains firmly anchored in the West.

Steven A. Cook and Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall are fellows at the Council on Foreign Relations.

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As a model of a democratizing and secular Muslim state that has been a stalwart ally for more than 50 years, Turkey is of enormous strategic importance to the United States and Europe, especially at a time when the widening chasm between the West and the Islamic world looms as the greatest foreign policy challenge. Yet Ankara's relations with Washington are strained - over Iraq, Cyprus, Syria, Iran and Hamas - and Turkey's prospects for joining the European Union remain uncertain.

As Washington prepares for a visit Wednesday by Turkey's foreign minister, Abdullah Gul, the United States and Turkey should explore three initiatives to repair and revitalize their relationship.

First, although the United States and Turkey share broad goals in Iraq, the situation there threatens a potential breach in relations. The Turks feel the war in Iraq has undermined their security by stirring Kurdish nationalism. It also coincided with renewed terrorist attacks mounted by the Kurdistan Worker's Party from inside Iraq. To address this challenge, the United States should initiate a trilateral dialogue on the future of Iraq with Turkey and representatives of the Iraqi government, including Kurdish leaders.

If the effort to build a functioning Iraqi government is successful, this trilateral consultative process will support the common goal of a unified and sovereign Iraq; should the Iraqi government fail, the dialogue will provide a mechanism for managing some of the worst potential consequences.

Second, Washington must make it a diplomatic priority to persuade skeptics in Europe to take a more positive approach toward Turkey. Peering into the future and considering the strategic implications of a Turkey unmoored - or, more darkly, a Turkey that turns against its traditional partners, aligning itself more closely with Damascus, Moscow or Tehran - should be instructive.

Washington needs to make the case to its European allies that delaying Turkey's accession to the EU could harm their security. The longer accession takes, the more likely it is that Turks will become disenchanted with the EU and look elsewhere for opportunities; it is also more likely that Turkey's impressive political reform process, which began in 2002, will stall.

Further, Washington should take a leadership role in working to resolve the Cyprus conflict, which threatens to create further obstacles to Turkish EU membership. Rather than waiting for a new UN or EU initiative on the future of the island, America should catalyze a renewed negotiation process. A special Cyprus coordinator would work with the UN and EU to develop a new plan for reuniting the island, encourage European leaders to use their collective clout to require more constructive behavior from the Cypriot government, and coordinate Washington's political, diplomatic and economic steps to break Turkish Cypriots from their international isolation.

Third, the United States and Turkey should establish a high-level commission that meets twice a year and provides a structured mechanism for interaction across agencies of government, nongovernmental organizations and the private sector. At the outset, three working groups should be launched, focusing on security, economic and commercial ties, and educational and cultural exchanges.

A U.S.-Turkey cooperation commission could facilitate the re-establishment of the sustained interaction that characterizes America's strongest partnerships, and provide a foundation for keeping Turkey aligned with the West should Ankara's bid for EU membership ultimately fail.

As tensions over the outcome in Iraq mount, the prospects for generating positive momentum in U.S.- Turkey relations are diminishing. The consequences of a disoriented Turkey would be even greater than a failure in Iraq. America and Europe must do everything they can to ensure that Turkey remains firmly anchored in the West.

Steven A. Cook and Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall are fellows at the Council on Foreign Relations.

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The emerging schism between the West and the Islamic world makes America's relationship with Turkey--a Western-oriented, democratizing Muslim country--more important than ever. Unfortunately, despite the long history of close collaboration, U.S.-Turkish relations have deteriorated markedly over the last three years. The U.S. invasion of Iraq--and the potential consequences for Turkey with its large Kurdish population--is the primary issue that divides Washington and Ankara, but there are also differences regarding Cyprus, Syria, Iran, Israel, and Hamas, as well as a rising tide of anti-Americanism in Turkey. To repair this important alliance relationship, Washington should establish a regular trilateral dialogue involving the United States, Turkey, and Iraqi Kurds; play a leading role in seeking a settlement to the long-standing dispute over Cyprus; be more active in supporting Ankara's bid for EU membership; and work to create a U.S.-Turkey Cooperation Commission that would meet on a biannual basis to provide a structured forum for government agencies, NGOs, and private sector leaders from both countries to discuss matters of mutual concern.

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Lyman and Morrison will discuss the Council on Foreign Relations-sponsored Independent Task Force Report on the US and Africa. The Report argues that Africa is becoming steadily more central to the United States and to the rest of the world in ways that transcend humanitarian interests. Africa now plays an increasingly significant role in supplying energy, preventing the spread of terrorism, and halting the devastation of HIV/AIDS. Africa's growing importance is reflected in the intensifying competition with China and other countries for both access to African resources and influence in this region. A more comprehensive U.S. policy toward Africa is needed, the report states, and it lays out recommendations for policymakers to craft that policy. The report is available at www.cfr.org.

Princeton N. Lyman is the Ralph Bunche Senior Fellow and Director for Africa Policy Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. He is also an Adjunct Professor at Georgetown University. Ambassador Lyman served for over three decades at the U.S. Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), completing his government service as Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs. He was previously Ambassador to South Africa, Ambassador to Nigeria, Director of Refugee Programs and Director of the USAID Mission to Ethiopia.

From 1999 to 2000, he was Senior Fellow at the United States Institute of Peace. Ambassador Lyman held the position of Executive Director of the Global Interdependence Initiative of the Aspen Institute (1999 to 2003) and has received the President's Distinguished Service Award and the Department of State Distinguished Honor Award. Ambassador Lyman has published on foreign policy, African affairs, economic development, HIV/AIDS, UN reform, and peacekeeping. He coauthored the Council on Foreign Relations Special Report entitled Giving Meaning to "Never Again": Seeking an Effective Response to the Crisis in Darfur and Beyond. His book, Partner to History: The U.S. Role in South Africa's Transition to Democracy, was published in 2002. He earned his B.A. from the University of California at Berkeley and his Ph.D. in Political Science from Harvard University. He serves as the Co-Director of the Council on Foreign Relations-sponsored Independent Task Force on Africa.

J. Stephen Morrison is Director of the Africa Program and the Task Force on HIV/AIDS at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). He joined CSIS in January 2000 and in late 2001, launched the CSIS Task Force on HIV/AIDS. The task force is a multiyear project co-chaired by Senators Bill Frist (R-TN) and John Kerry (D-MA) and funded by the Gates Foundation and the Catherine Marron Foundation. Dr. Morrison co-chaired the reassessment of the U.S. approach to Sudan that laid the basis for the Bush administration push for a negotiated peace settlement, and in the summer of 2002 he organized an energy expert mission to the Sudan peace negotiations in Kenya.

From 1996 through early 2000, Dr. Morrison served on the Secretary of State's Policy Planning Staff, where he was responsible for African affairs and global foreign assistance issues. In that position, he led the State Department's initiative on illicit diamonds and chaired an interagency review of the U.S. government's crisis humanitarian programs. From 1993 to 1995, Dr. Morrison conceptualized and launched USAID's Office of Transition Initiatives; he served as the office's first Deputy Director and created post-conflict programs in Angola and Bosnia. From 1992 until mid-1993, Dr. Morrison was the Democracy and Governance Adviser to the U.S. embassies and USAID missions in Ethiopia and Eritrea. He serves as the Co-Director of the Council on Foreign Relations-sponsored Independent Task Force on Africa.

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Princeton Lyman Ralph Bunche Senior Fellow and Director for Africa Policy Studies Keynote Speaker Council on Foreign Relations
J. Stephen Morrison Director of the Africa Program and Task Force on HIV/AIDS Keynote Speaker Center for Strategic and International Studies
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John Harvey has served since March 2001 as director of the Policy Planning Staff of the National Nuclear Security Administration. In this role he advises the NNSA Administrator on major policy and program decisions. He is responsible for analysis of program and policy options relating to NSC-directed policy reviews, the work of the Nuclear Weapons Council, external advisory boards, and interagency working groups. He has the lead in developing NNSA's long-range planning guidance--the so-called "front end" of the Program, Planning Budgeting and Execution process currently being implemented in NNSA. Of note, Harvey has been "point" for NNSA on the President's NSPD-4 Strategic Review, the Nuclear Posture Review and its associated implementation, the interagency review of nuclear testing issues, and on the drafting and implementation of National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD)-28 on Nuclear Weapons Command, Control, Safety, and Security. From March 1995 to January 2001, Harvey served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Forces and Missile Defense Policy where he developed and oversaw implementation of U.S. defense policy governing strategic and theater nuclear forces and ballistic missile defense.

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John Harvey Senior Technical Advisor Speaker the National Nuclear Security Administration
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The assumption that states can and ought to stop the flow of funds to terrorist organizations deserves greater scrutiny. Potential benefits obtained by disrupting financial networks may not decrease the intensity of attacks, even as they weaken terrorist organizations. The anti-money laundering model currently applied by the UK and US has proven counter-productive, undermining the states' counterterrorism efforts. The erosion of individual rights incorporated in the regime risks leaking into criminal law, thereby altering basic constitutional entitlements. Efforts to prevent extremists from obtaining funds may have a devastating affect on social services in poor regions and impede the development of civil society and "state building." What is intriguing about ATF is that it evokes many of the same issues that arise in other areas of counterterrorism. Whether and how to surmount them remains less than clear.

This event is a collaborative effort between CISAC and European Forum.

Encina Hall Central,
Second Floor, C231

Jacob Shapiro Speaker
Laura Donohue Speaker
Khalid Medani Speaker
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Chapter 6 in Reappraising Openheimer: Centennial Studies and Reflections, edited by Cathryn Carson and David A. Hollinger (Office for History and Science of Technology, University of California, Berkeley, 2005).

The editors write: "From the beginning all the way up to the present, the Soviet nuclear weapons project has served as foil for the American effort. It preoccupied Robert Oppenheimer's minders in the Manhattan Project, fixated by the possibility of espionage; it drove his postwar attempts to achieve international control of atomic weapons just as surely as it lit up his opponents' mistrust of his stance on the hydrogen bomb. Throughout the arms race, Soviet progress vis-a-vis American weapons production helped drive the dynamic of the Cold War. More recently, Soviet and post-Soviet sources have inspired careful reanalysis of the dual courses of the two nations' nuclear projects. That effort has shed new light on the conditions under which Oppenheimer's wartime labors could find the conclusion they did. . . .

"David Holloway explores parallels between Robert Oppenheimer and his Soviet counterpart, Iulii Khariton. Similarities in background and differences in role make Holloway's contrast instructive."

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University of California, Berkeley in "Reappraising Oppenheimer: Centennial Studies and Reflections"
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Paul Stockton is the associate provost at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California, and is director of its Center for Homeland Defense and Security. Stockton is the editor of Homeland Security (forthcoming from Oxford University Press in 2005). His research has appeared in Political Science Quarterly, International Security and Strategic Survey. He is co-editor of Reconstituting America's Defense: America's New National Security Strategy (1992). Stockton has also published an Adelphi Paper and has contributed chapters to a number of books, including James Lindsay and Randall Ripley, eds., U.S. Foreign Policy After the Cold War (1997). Stockton received a BA summa cum laude from Dartmouth College in 1976 and a PhD in government from Harvard University in 1986. He served from 1986-1989 as legislative assistant to U.S. Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan. Stockton was awarded a postdoctoral fellowship for 1989-1990 by CISAC. In August 1990, he joined the faculty of the Naval Postgraduate School. From 1995 until 2000, he served as director of the NPS Center for Civil-Military Relations. From 2000-2001, he founded and served as the acting dean of the NPS School of International Graduate Studies. He was appointed associate provost in 2001.

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Paul Stockton Associate Provost, Director, Center for Homeland Security Speaker Naval Postgraduate School
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Robert McNamara is worried. He knows how close we've come. His counsel helped the Kennedy administration avert nuclear catastrophe during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Today, he believes the United States must no longer rely on nuclear weapons as a foreign-policy tool. To do so is immoral, illegal, and dreadfully dangerous.

This article, the cover story for the May/June 2005 issue of Foreign Policy, began as a talk McNamara delivered at Stanford to CISAC researchers, staff, and friends on Oct. 18, 2004.

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Foreign Policy
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Has the Bush administration used the War on Terror to consolidate power in the executive branch? Is the United States in danger of undermining civil liberties and laying the foundation for an American police state? Arguing against conventional wisdom the authors answer these questions with an emphatic No. Drawing on evidence from the USA Patriot Act, the creation of the Department of Homeland Security, the Transportation Security Administration, intelligence reform, and the detention of enemy combatants, the authors argue that what is most striking about US homeland security policy in the wake of 9-11 is just how weak the response of the American state has been. This outcome is contrary to both conventional wisdom and theoretical expectation. The authors argue that this puzzle is best explained by focusing on the institutional structure of US domestic politics.

Jay Stowsky is an adjunct professor at the University of California, Berkeley's School of Information Management and Systems (SIMS) and is the executive drector of UC Berkeley's Services Science Program. Previously, he directed UC Berkeley's program on Information Technology and Homeland Security at the Goldman School of Public Policy and served in the Clinton administration as senior economist for science and technology policy on the staff of the White House Council of Economic Advisers. Stowsky has also served as associate dean at UC Berkeley's Haas School of Business and as director of research policy for the University of California system. He has authored several studies of U.S. technology policy, including "Secrets to Share or Shield: New Dilemmas for Military R&D in the Digital Age," in Research Policy (Vol. 33, No. 2, March 2004) and "The Dual-Use Dilemma," in Issues in Science and Technology (Winter 1996). He is co-author, with Wayne Sandholtz, et al., of The Highest Stakes: The Economic Foundations of the Next Security System (Cambridge Oxford University Press, 1992).

Matthew Kroenig is a PhD candidate in the Department of Political Science at UC Berkeley and a Public Policy and Nuclear Threats Fellow at the Institute of Global Conflict and Cooperation. Kroenig's dissertation research explains the conditions under which states provide sensitive nuclear assistance to nonnuclear weapons states. Previously, he was a research associate with the Information Technology and Homeland Security Project and has also served in government as an intelligence analyst.

Reuben W. Hills Conference Room, East 207, Encina Hall

Matt Kroenig PhD Candidate Speaker Department of Political Science, UC Berkeley
Jay Stowsky Adjunct Professor Speaker School of Information Management and Systems, UC Berkeley
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