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Co-Sponsored by The Center for Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law;

the Stanford Project on Human Rights Diplomacy, the Project on Peace and Cooperation in the Asian-Pacific Region, and the Center for International Security and Cooperation

Dr. Dan Wei will give an overview of the present state of legal reform in China, and will cover such topics as the death penalty and other criminal procedure reforms, and measures to insure the rights of detainees and prisoners.

He is a professor at the Institute for Procuratorial Theory of the Supreme People's Procuratorate of China, one of the four principal branches of the Chinese judicial system. He was a Fellow of the Danish Institute of Human Rights in 2002, and he travels and speaks widely in China and overseas on topics related to the development of Chinese law and practice.

Since receiving a PhD from Wuhan University in 1999, he has published 5 books and more than 40 articles in the field of criminal justice. His book, Comparative Studies on the Crimes of Trafficking in Persons, published by The Law Press of China in June 2004, is the first specialized Chinese publication on the topic of human trafficking.

As the deputy editor in chief of Chinese Criminal Science, he has transformed the journal into the most authoritative publication in the field of criminology in China. The journal now boasts more than 20,000 readers. The State Council granted him a Special Award for Distinguished Service in 2004.

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Dan Wei Professor Speaker Institute for Procuratorial Theory of the Supreme People's Procuratorate of China
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Recently, post-explosion nuclear forensics, or nuclear attribution, has gained a new spotlight within the scientific and policymaking community working on nuclear weapons. Academics are beginning to ask whether post-explosion forensics might create a replacement for an international nonproliferation regime or at least offer a fallback option to deter states and individuals from selling nuclear materials. This paper examines current attribution technology from unclassified literature and finds the technology to be well developed but not foolproof, such that nuclear attribution currently provides little deterrent value. If current capabilities were publicized more thoroughly, and if the post-explosion process of assessing the evidence were internationalized, states and intermediate actors might be deterred more effectively. This paper also discusses the development of a nuclear fingerprint database; while useful, its impact on deterrence would be minimal.

This article is based on the author's undergraduate honors thesis, completed during 2005-2006 in CISAC's Interschool Honors Program in International Security.

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Nonproliferation Review
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We have learned little from the cataclysms of September 11 and Hurricane Katrina. When it comes to catastrophe, America is living on borrowed time--and squandering it.

The truth is, acts of terror cannot always be prevented, and nature continues to show its fury in frighteningly unpredictable ways. Resiliency, argues Flynn, must now become our national motto. With chilling frankness and clarity, Flynn paints an all-too-real scenario of the threats we face within our own borders. A terrorist attack on a tanker carrying liquefied natural gas into Boston Harbor could kill thousands and leave millions more of New Englanders without power or heat. The destruction of a ship with a cargo of oil in Long Beach, California, could bring the West Coast economy to its knees and endanger the surrounding population. But even these alarmingly plausible terrorist scenarios pale in comparison to the potential destruction wrought by a major earthquake or hurricane.

Our growing exposure to man-made and natural perils is largely rooted in our own negligence, as we take for granted the infrastructure handed down to us by earlier generations. Once the envy of the world, this infrastructure is now crumbling. After decades of neglect, our public health system leaves us at the mercy of microbes that could kill millions in the next flu pandemic. Flash flooding could wipe out a fifty-year-old dam north of Phoenix, placing thousands of homes and lives at risk. The next San Francisco earthquake could destroy century-old levees, contaminating the freshwater supply that most of California relies on for survival.

It doesn't have to be this way. The Edge of Disaster tells us what we can do about it, as individuals and as a society. We can--and, Flynn argues, we must--construct a more resilient nation. With the wounds of recent national tragedies still unhealed, the time to act is now. By tackling head-on, eyes open the perils that lie before us, we can remain true to our most important and endearing national trait: our sense of optimism about the future and our conviction that we can change it for the better for ourselves--and our children.

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Council on Foreign Relations and Random House
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Testimony before the Homeland Security Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee on "Five- and Ten-Year Homeland Security Goals." In the afternoon session on 30 January 2007, the subcommittee heard from Brian Michael Jenkins, of RAND Corporation; Paul Stockton, of CISAC at Stanford University; James Carafano, of the Heritage Foundation; and Randall Yim, former director of the Homeland Security Institute.

Congress and the Administration have made great progress in securing the Nation since 9/11. Major challenges remain, however, both for responding to the flaws revealed by Hurricane Katrina and--at least as important--anticipating and preparing for the threats to come. We cannot meet those challenges by following the path we are on today.

Four changes will get us on a better path. First, we need to rethink the meaning of homeland security and the priorities within it. Second, we need to recast the division of labor in homeland security, and go much further to capitalize on the advantages that states and localities have over the federal government in securing the Nation. Third, we should build deeper integration within the Department of Homeland Security--through means I will propose today that would produce benefits far beyond the Department. Finally, we need to consider more comprehensive ways to bring risk-based analysis to bear on homeland security decisions, and thereby gain the greatest possible impact from the resources you invest in this constrained fiscal environment.

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U.S. House of Representatives, Appropriations Committee, Homeland Security Subcommittee
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Ambassador Sen was born on 9 April 1944. After graduating from college he joined the Indian Foreign Service in July 1966. From May 1968 to July 1984, Sen served in Indian missions and posts in Moscow, San Francisco, Dhaka and in the Ministry of External Affairs. He also served as secretary to the Atomic Energy Commission of India.

From July 1984 to December 1985, Sen served as the joint secretary in the Ministry of External Affairs. He was thereafter joint secretary to the prime minister of India from January 1986 to July 1991 where he was responsible for foreign affairs, defense, and science and technology.

Mr. Sen was ambassador to Mexico from September 1991 to August 1992; ambassador to the Russian Federation from October 1992 to October 1998; ambassador to Germany from October 1998 to May 2002; and high commissioner to the United Kingdom from May 2002 to April 2004. He assumed charge as ambassador of India to the United States of America in August 2004.

The Ambassador participated in summit meetings in the United Nations, Commonwealth, Non-Aligned Movement, Six Nation Five Continent Peace Initiative, South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, IAEA, G-15 and other forums and also in over 160 bilateral summit meetings. He had several assignments as special envoy of the prime minister of India for meetings with foreign government representatives and heads of state.

The Ambassador's visit is co-sponsored by the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Freeman Spogli Institute and the Stanford Center for International Development at Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.

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Ronen Sen Ambassador of India to the United States of America Speaker
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Drell Lecture Recording: NA

 

Drell Lecture Transcript:

 

Speaker's Biography: Thom Shanker is the national security and foreign policy correspondent for the New York Times. He joined the Times in 1997 and began covering the Pentagon in May 2001, four months before the terrorist attacks. Previously, Shanker was foreign editor of the Chicago Tribune. From 1992 to 1995, as the Tribune's senior European correspondent, based in Berlin, he covered the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina; the departure of American, British, French, and Russian forces from Berlin; and emerging cases of nuclear smuggling in Central Europe.

Shanker spent two years in the master's degree program at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, specializing in strategic studies and international law. He has written on foreign policy, military affairs, and the intelligence community for The New York Review of Books, The New Republic, and American Journalism Review.

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Thom Shanker National Security and Foreign Policy Correspondent Speaker The New York Times
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The Bush administration should set aside its "anything-but-Clinton" policy toward North Korea and move to end a dangerous stalemate with that country, write Professor Robert C. Bordone and law student Albert Chang of the Harvard Law School. Their op-ed, "Real superpowers negotiate," appeared in PostGlobal, a moderated forum among journalists and other contributors on washingtonpost.com. Chang graduated from Stanford in June 2006 with an honors certificate in international security studies from CISAC's undergraduate honors program.

The Administration's North Korea policy of "ABC"--Anything But Clinton--needs revision. When North Korea withdrew from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 2003, President Bush responded by refusing to talk to Pyongyang for fear of rewarding bad behavior. As an initial gut reaction to abhorrent North Korean behavior in 2003, this response may have been understandable. But from a perspective of accomplishing the goal of denuclearizing North Korea, this policy continues to be a demonstrable failure.

The decision to play chicken with the North Koreans in 2003 gave them precisely what they wanted--plenty of time to develop their own nuclear capabilities. Finally after nearly a year had elapsed, the Administration belatedly embarked upon substantive multilateral talks spearheaded by Secretary Rice. Now, three years later, North Korea has finally demonstrated its nuclear capability. Nonetheless, the Administration continues to reject calls for direct, bilateral talks with the North Koreans, a condition North Korea has said would be a precursor to implementing the denuclearization agreement of September 2005.

Ideally the current UN sanctions will force North Korea to understand that it must denuclearize. But what if sanctions fail to persuade Kim Jong Il? Does the Administration have a second order strategy to deal with a nuclear North Korea?

With bilateral talks the Administration would be taking the first confidence building step to break the stalemate in what has been over a year without dialogue. This gesture would send a clear signal: the U.S. is not trying to topple the regime and it is serious about stabilizing relations between the two countries.

So what are the risks of initiating such direct talks?

First, the Administration has argued that multilateral talks are necessary because the U.S. needs the influence of China and South Korea. But there is no reason that bilateral and multilateral talks cannot co-exist. The Administration should continue to encourage coordinated Six Party Talks but also engage with North Korea on a one-on-one basis at the track-II diplomatic level. This way, the U.S. leverages Chinese and South Korean support on North Korea while still engaging with Pyongyang in a direct dialogue. Bilateral talks would also show our partners in China and South Korea that we are responsive to their preferences for a more diplomatic approach. Such an approach might give Kim Jong Il a face-saving way to say "yes" to reasonable incentives. At the same time, such a move would help rehabilitate the Administration's poor reputation for diplomacy in the international community.

Second, there are hard-liners who fear that the U.S. might look weak by acceding to a precondition of talks that President Bush has refused since the beginning of his presidency. If this Administration had a track record of being bullied, a world reputation for timidity, we might worry about the second-order effects of such a move. However, the concern of the world is not that the Bush Administration is soft, but rather that it does not listen.

This presidency's foreign policy is at a crossroads. A mid-term correction, animated by a unilateral openness to bilateral talks, however it may seem to the unsophisticated observer, is not weak. After all, our strongest asset during bilateral talks is our power to say "no"--to refuse demands that fail to meet American economic and security interests. Sitting down to listen and talk knowing that we reserve the full right and ability to say "no" at any moment, gives up nothing. It is a sign of our power, not our weakness; our maturity as the world's strongest democracy, not our churlishness as a schoolboy on the playground of world politics.

Negotiating is not about refusing to blink first. The best outcomes occur when there are candid exchanges and confidence building measures that tip the balance toward peace. Bilateral talks should not be regarded as rewards for bad behavior, but as another powerful tool--along with sanctions and continuing Six-Party Talks--by which we may secure our policy aims.

Some may question the advisability of bilateral negotiations if we believe that North Korea will not denuclearize. The truth is the stakes are too high to make such assumptions. Until we sit down and talk directly with Pyongyang, we cannot be certain of its true intentions. It is possible that North Korea will flout our direct gestures, signaling to the world its unwillingness to renounce nuclear weapons. If that happens, the Administration's hand will be strengthened in its diplomatic efforts with its allies to adopt a harder stance toward Pyongyang. But it is also possible that the Administration will have traded the insignificant "concession" of listening to the North Koreans in a bilateral forum for the end result of a nuclear-free Korean peninsula, the avoidance of an Asian arms race, and the reduced threat of nuclear proliferation to terrorist groups.

There are times when the hard line is necessary. We should never fear to take that path. But we should not confuse toughness on the real-life issues with stubbornness on pre-conditions for dialogue. It's high-time that the Administration understand that listening and talking--at bilateral, multilateral, and second-track levels--are tools that may yield better results than playing a silly game of chicken.

Robert C. Bordone is the Thaddeus R. Beal Assistant Clinical Professor of Law at Harvard Law School and the Director of the Harvard Negotiation and Mediation Clinical Program.

Albert Chang is a first-year student at Harvard Law School with expertise in U.S. foreign policy toward East Asia. A Harry S. Truman Scholar and Paul & Daisy Soros Fellow, Albert graduated Phi Beta Kappa from Stanford University in Political Science and International Security Studies.

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How has the threat of catastrophic terrorism reshaped the strategic environment? This chapter argues that in fact the threat is not dramatically new; what is new is the salience of this threat to the public in some states, particularly the United States. However, the secretive nature of counter-terrorism actions necessarily means that the public is ill-informed about the potential efficacy of government's activities and so cannot assess if their rhetoric matches their actions. Thus public statements can easily be tailored to what decision-makers think the public wants to hear, rather than to what decision-makers genuinely believe. We consequently rely on an examination of how the United States budgets and exercises for the war on terrorism to illuminate what American decision-makers believe to be the links between domestic counter-terror operations and strategy. Along the way we look at the tools states have to prepare for counter-terrorism, and the challenges of doing so.We find strong evidence that the United States remains strategically focused on relationships between states, and argue this is probably an appropriate focus.

The second edition of this successful textbook has been completely revised and updated in light of 9/11. In the aftermath of the attacks, there has been an increased need to address issues of war and peace, particularly terrorism, irregular warfare, the spread of weapons of mass destruction and the revolution in military affairs.

The new edition contains a mature set of reflections on the role of military power in the contemporary world. It analyzes recent conflicts from Afghanistan to the Iraq War and looks at the ongoing debates about the lessons that can be learned from these wars. Particular attention is given to the debates about whether there has been a revolution in military affairs given the phenomenal pace of innovation in electronics and computer systems.

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Oxford University Press in "Strategy in the Contemporary World", 2nd ed., edited by John Baylis, James J. Wirtz, Colin S. Gray, and Eliot Cohen
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Paul Stockton joined CISAC this fall as a senior research scholar, bringing academic and political experience in homeland security policy issues. His research and teaching focus on how U.S. institutions respond to changing threats--especially the rise of terrorism.

As the first researcher CISAC has hired who specializes in homeland security, Stockton will help build the center's research in this area, which is gaining scholarly and public interest.

"Stockton's return to CISAC," where he held a postdoctoral fellowship in 1989-1990, "adds both new depth and breadth to the Center's research on terrorism and homeland security," said Scott Sagan, CISAC director. "He has great practical experience with Congress and national security policy making and in-depth knowledge about how government, military, and private industry forces interact in the homeland security arena."

A former advisor on defense, intelligence, counter-narcotics and foreign affairs to Sen. Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Stockton also studies interactions between Congress and the president in creating budgets and institutions to address security threats. He is writing an article that explores the congressional response to hurricane Katrina and examines the unresolved challenges that Katrina-scale catastrophes pose to the U.S. disaster response system. He is editing a graduate textbook, Homeland Security, to be published by Oxford in 2007. Stockton will also write a book manuscript analyzing the domestic political constraints that shape homeland security budget and policy decisions, in a work tentatively titled The Politics of Homeland Security.

Stockton came to CISAC from the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, Calif., where he served as associate provost and directed the school's Center for Homeland Defense and Security. Besides shaping CISAC's research program in homeland security, Stockton, who has PhD in government from Harvard, is co-teaching the center's undergraduate honors program with senior fellow Stephen Stedman.

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Ambassador James E. Goodby is a nonresident senior fellow at the Brookings Institution and a research affiliate at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He has held several senior government positions dedicated to arms control and nonproliferation, including deputy to the special adviser to the president and secretary of state on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), 2000-2001; special representative of President Clinton for the security and dismantlement of nuclear weapons, 1995-1996; chief negotiator for nuclear threat reduction agreements, 1993-1994, and vice chair of the U.S. delegation to the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty talks, 1982-1983. He served as U.S. ambassador to Finland in 1980-1981.

Bart Bernstein is a Professor of American history at Stanford University. He has written very widely on post-World War II American history, including the surrender of Japan at the end of World War II, economic policy, diplomacy, nuclear history, and scientific discovery.

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James Goodby Former U.S. Ambassador; Nonresident Senior Fellow Speaker Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies, Brookings Institute
Bart Bernstein Professor of American History Speaker Stanford University
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