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UPDATE: This event will be live streamed on our Facebook page. Follow us there to make sure you don't miss the start.

This event is open to the Stanford community and the public, but a Stanford or government-issued ID must be presented for admission.

The event is on-the-record but off-camera. No photography or video recording will be permitted. Cameras will not be permitted inside the venue.

Members of the media: registration is required; please follow the directions below.


Join the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center for a discussion on the DPRK with the U.S. Special Representative for North Korea Stephen Biegun.
 
Mr. Biegun will deliver opening remarks followed by a conversation with Robert Carlin, an expert on U.S.-North Korea relations and a visiting scholar at Stanford’s Center for International Security and Cooperation. The event will conclude with a question-and-answer session.
 
Members of the media interested in covering the event should register with Shorenstein APARC by 12:00 p.m., Wednesday, January 30. A press credential must be presented for admission.

Speaker bio

Stephen E. Biegun was appointed by Secretary of State Mike Pompeo as the U.S. Special Representative for North Korea in August 2018. As Special Representative, on behalf of the Secretary of State he directs all U.S. policy on North Korea, leads negotiations, and spearheads U.S. diplomatic efforts with allies and partners.
 
Biegun has three decades of experience in the Executive and Legislative Branches in government as well as the private sector. Most recently, Biegun was vice president of International Governmental Relations for Ford Motor Company, where—as a third generation Ford employee—he oversaw all aspects of Ford’s international governmental interactions including throughout the Indo-Pacific Region.
 
Previously, as national security advisor to Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist, he provided analysis and strategic planning for the U.S. Senate’s consideration of foreign policy, defense and intelligence matters, and international trade agreements. Prior to that, Biegun worked in the White House from 2001-2003 as Executive Secretary of the National Security Council. He served as a senior staff member to the National Security Advisor, Condoleezza Rice, and performed the function of chief operating officer for the National Security Council.
 
Before joining the White House staff, Biegun served for 14 years as a foreign policy advisor to members of both the House of Representatives and the U.S. Senate. During this time, he held the position of Chief of Staff of the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations from 1999-2000. In addition, he served as a senior staff member of the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs for six years.
 
From 1992 to 1994, Biegun served in Moscow, Russia as the Resident Director in the Russian Federation for the International Republican Institute, a democracy-building organization established under the National Endowment for Democracy.
 
He is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations and the Aspen Strategy Group, and has served on the boards of the National Bureau of Asian Research, the US-ASEAN Business Council, the US-Russia Foundation for Economic Development and the Rule of Law, and Freedom House.
 

 

Koret-Taube Conference CenterJohn A. and Cynthia Fry Gunn SIEPR Building366 Galvez Street 
Stephen Biegun, U.S. Special Representative for North Korea
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Amy Zegart
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In a world complicated by terrorism, cyber threats and political instability, the private sector has to prepare for the unexpected. Amy Zegart, CISAC co-director, the Hoover Institution’s Davies Family Senior Fellow, and co-author (along with Condoleezza Rice) of Political Risk: How Businesses And Organizations Can Anticipate Global Insecurity, explains lessons learned in keeping cargo planes moving, hotel guests protected – and possibly coffee customers better served.  

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Clifton B. Parker
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John W. Lewis, a Stanford political scientist who pioneered new ways of thinking about U.S.-China relations and launched some of the first Asian study programs in higher education, died Monday at his home on the Stanford campus. He was 86.

John W. Lewis

 

 

Lewis was a prolific scholar and one of the preeminent China specialists of his generation. His deep commitment to using insights from academic research to inform policy deliberations and solve important problems related to international relations and security led him to establish several centers and institutes at Stanford. These institutions supported collective undertakings involving scholars and officials from all over the globe and inspired dozens of graduate students to follow Lewis’ lead to make a tangible difference toward a more peaceful world.

He founded and directed the Center for East Asian Studies from 1969 to 1970, the Northeast Asia-United States Forum on International Policy (now the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center), from 1983 to 1990, and, along with theoretical physicist Sidney Drell, co-founded Stanford’s Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC) in 1983, serving as a co-director until 1991. Stanford’s Center for International Security and Arms Control, CISAC’s precursor, was founded by Lewis and Drell in 1970. Lewis also led CISAC’s Project on Peace and Cooperation in the Asian-Pacific Region.

Expert on Asia

Lewis, the William Haas Professor of Chinese Politics, Emeritus, and a senior fellow at CISAC and the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI), joined the Stanford faculty in 1968 after teaching for seven years at Cornell University, coming to campus as an expert on China at the apex of public unrest regarding the Vietnam War. As a teacher, he helped lead an interdisciplinary course on nuclear arms and disarmament and engaged in simulated arms control talks with students.

In addition to his work on China, Lewis was a pioneer in dealing with North Korea. He visited the North in 1986 and numerous times thereafter, always with the deep conviction that it was vitally important to listen and learn.  He opened doors long closed by inviting North Korean, South Korean and U.S. officials to meet at Stanford in the early 1990s, and afterwards hosted official North Korean delegations.

He was invited to visit the North Korean nuclear center at Yongbyon after the collapse of the U.S.-North Korea Agreed Framework in 2002.  This and subsequent visits with Stanford colleagues provided virtually the only direct information on developments at the site, said Thomas Fingar, a Shorenstein APARC Fellow at FSI.

Sig Hecker, a CISAC senior fellow and the former director of the Los Alamos National Laboratory, recalls traveling to North Korea with Lewis in January 2004, a significant time in the country’s nuclear program.

“I would never have gone to North Korea without John,” Hecker said. “He had developed a relationship that allowed us to establish an effective means of communication during the times our governments were not talking. I had worked closely with John on North Korea ever since. He was incredibly knowledgeable and had an intensity that motivated everyone around him.”

Passion for peace

Lewis was extremely active in his retirement, visiting his CISAC office in Encina Hall daily, writing books, giving lectures and archiving his materials. While recovering from a recent fall, Lewis was constantly on the phone with colleagues and continued to collaborate until he lost his ability to speak, said his daughter, Amy Tich, BA ’85.

Above all, he was an advocate of peace, education and talking with – and learning about – the nature of one’s perceived rivals, such as China and North Korea, instead of allowing misinformation and misunderstandings to spread. The word “cooperation” in the title of CISAC emanates from this belief.

How ironic, said Tich, that her father’s death came at a time when relations between the U.S. and North Korea over the North’s nuclear tests are filled with tension.

“He had amazing relationships all across Asia,” Tich said. “He believed in what he was doing to the core of his being. He wanted world peace, to save the world from nuclear war.”

John’s son, Stephen Lewis, AB ’80, MS ’80, MBA ’84, said, “He lived a remarkable life. He made enormous strides in Korean relations and Chinese relations. And he did it with a sense of humor and humility that earned him the right to push because only from pushing through issues do you get answers.”

A Renaissance scholar

Lewis was the Renaissance scholar who bridged the gap between the academic and policy worlds. In the 1970s, he was a major player in the restoration of academic exchanges with China and established ties between U.S. and Chinese academic and governmental institutions that continue today.

In the 1980s, he built enduring ties with the Institute for Far Eastern Studies in Moscow that enhanced understanding and collaboration among Americans, Russians, and Chinese.  He launched a project to gather medical expertise at Stanford to deal with North Korea’s severe drug-resistant tuberculosis problem, a project that took him twice to Mongolia to explore the possibility of a regional effort against TB.

Lewis was never satisfied with simply having a problem discussed, said Fingar. He ended every meeting with assembled experts on North Korean issues with a prodding, “A useful discussion. Now, what can we do?”

Lewis helped American business executives, academics, government officials and military officers establish contacts and networks in China. He also led two congressional delegations to Asia. In recognition of his impact, Lewis was invited to serve on the Committee on International Security and Arms Control of the National Academy of Sciences; the Joint Committee on Contemporary China of the Social Science Research Council; and the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations.

The Stanford scholar also did consulting work for the Los Alamos National Laboratory, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, the U.S. Department of Defense, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, and the Office of Technology Assessment of the U.S. Congress.

Born in King County, Washington, in 1930, Lewis gained his first exposure to international issues and institutions as a teenage page at the San Francisco meeting that established the United Nations. His interest in China was inspired by the stories and achievements of missionary relatives who built schools for Chinese girls. After graduating from Deep Springs College (California) in 1949, Lewis earned  his bachelor’s degree (1953), master’s degree (1958) and doctorate (1962) at UCLA. His service as a gunnery officer in the U.S. Navy (1954-1957) kindled his interest in security issues and Korea.

Publications, research

Lewis wrote and co-authored numerous influential books on Asia and international security, including Leadership in Communist China (1963); and  The United States in Vietnam (1967) (with George Kahin); and China Builds the Bomb (1988).

“John’s numerous books about Chinese decision-making regarding nuclear weapons and the Korean War were path-breaking,” said Scott Sagan, a professor of political science and senior fellow at CISAC and FSI. “His work permitted us to see behind ‘the bamboo curtain’ and understand Mao [Zedong] and his successors with more clarity than was possible before.”

Lewis received numerous letters from colleagues and former students in his final days and Tich read all of them to him. Among the praise bestowed on Lewis was his “ability to inspire in me and others profound curiosity and dedication to scholarship,” that he provided “a model of how to bring values to bear on scholarship and global citizenship,” and “[He] represented the perfect mix of academic research and real-time involvement with the world.”

CISAC co-director and FSI Senior Fellow Amy Zegart remembers Lewis’ generosity and enthusiasm.

“I can still remember knocking on John’s door as a young grad student 20 years ago and sheepishly asking if he might be willing to conduct a directed reading course with me about China’s foreign policy,” Zegart said. “He said ‘yes’ immediately. His generosity of spirit and commitment to teaching still infuse CISAC today, and will shape Stanford students for generations to come. It is a true honor to co-direct the center that John and Sid Drell created.”

Lewis is survived by Jacquelyn Lewis, his wife of 63 years; his children Stephen Lewis, Amy Tich and Cynthia Westby; and five grandchildren, Brian, BA ’15, Taryn, Kylie, Katie and Rhys.

In keeping with his life-long commitment to teaching students and training successors, the family requests that anyone wishing to honor Professor Lewis do so by contributing to the John and Jackie Lewis Fund at Stanford University, which supports funding for Stanford graduate students and postdoctoral fellows  doing research on matters related to Asia. Donations to the fund should be made out to Stanford University and sent to the John and Jackie Lewis Fund, in care of Scott Nelson, Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, 616 Serra Street, Stanford, California, 94305.

In an oral history interview with the Stanford Historical Society, Lewis recounts his earlier days on campus and the impact of his career. Videos of an 80th birthday celebration for Lewis can be found here.

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Uneasy Partnerships presents the analysis and insights of practitioners and scholars who have shaped and examined China's interactions with key Northeast Asian partners. Using the same empirical approach employed in the companion volume, The New Great Game (Stanford University Press, 2016), this new text analyzes the perceptions, priorities, and policies of China and its partners to explain why dyadic relationships evolved as they have during China's "rise."

Synthesizing insights from an array of research, Uneasy Partnerships traces how the relationships that formed between China and its partner states—Japan, the Koreas, and Russia—resulted from the interplay of competing and compatible objectives, as well as from the influence of third-country ties. These findings are used to identify patterns and trends and to develop a framework that can be used to illuminate and explain Beijing's engagement with the rest of the world.

This book is part of the Studies of the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center series at Stanford University Press.

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Thomas Fingar
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Are nuclear weapons useful for coercive diplomacy? Since 1945, most strategic thinking about nuclear weapons has focused on deterrence - using nuclear threats to prevent attacks against the nation's territory and interests. But an often overlooked question is whether nuclear threats can also coerce adversaries to relinquish possessions or change their behavior. Can nuclear weapons be used to blackmail other countries? The prevailing wisdom is that nuclear weapons are useful for coercion, but this book shows that this view is badly misguided. Nuclear weapons are useful mainly for deterrence and self-defense, not for coercion. The authors evaluate the role of nuclear weapons in several foreign policy contexts and present a trove of new quantitative and historical evidence that nuclear weapons do not help countries achieve better results in coercive diplomacy. The evidence is clear: the benefits of possessing nuclear weapons are almost exclusively defensive, not offensive.

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Matthew Fuhrmann
Todd S. Sechser
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Abstract: What role do negotiations play in the midst of interstate wars? Extant scholarship has largely treated negotiations as being irrelevant to understanding a conflict's trajectory, or as being a direct reflection of hostilities on the battlefield. Neither view is supported by historical readings or empirical patterns of intra-war diplomacy. I present an alternative view of negotiations as being instrumental. Diplomatic bargaining not only occurs in response to battlefield outcomes, but is also used deceptively by disadvantaged belligerents to stall for time, manage political pressures, and regroup militarily. Using two new daily-level datasets of battles and diplomatic activity, I show that negotiations in post-1945 wars extend conflict when the war initiator has an advantage in fighting, occur in response to lop-sided battle outcomes, dampen the intensity of combat, and are associated with subsequent improvements in the war target's success on the battlefield. This framework of instrumental negotiations shows that the effect of intra-war diplomacy is conditional on the state of hostilities, and has substantial implications on our understanding of war termination and conflict resolution.

About the Speaker: Eric Min is a CISAC Predoctoral Fellow for 2016-2017 and a Ph.D. candidate in political science at Stanford University. His research is focused on interstate diplomacy, information gathering and sharing during crises, and applications of machine learning and text analysis techniques to declassified documents related to conflict and foreign policy. 

His dissertation develops a theory regarding the strategic use of negotiations as a tool of war. Utilizing two new daily-level datasets of battles and diplomatic activity across all interstate wars since 1816, digitized versions of military operations reports and negotiation transcripts from the Korean War, and a series of case studies, he shows that states dynamically weigh costs and benefits with respect to “instrumental” negotiations. His findings demonstrate when, why, and how diplomacy is not only used to settle wars, but also to help win them. These conclusions have substantial implications on academic and policy-making approaches to conflict resolution.  
Eric is a National Science Foundation Graduate Research Fellow. He has also received support from Stanford's Institute for Research in the Social Sciences (IRiSS) and the Center for International Cooperation and Negotiation (SCICN). Eric received his undergraduate degree in International Relations and Spanish/Linguistics at New York University, where he was valedictorian of the College of Arts and Science.

Encina Hall, 2nd floor

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Eric Min is Assistant Professor of Political Science at UCLA. He is received his Ph.D. in Political Science from Stanford University, where he was the Zukerman Postdoctoral Fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation for the 2017-2018 academic year. From 2011-2013 he held the Sakurako and William Fisher Family Graduate Fellowship at Stanford, and from 2013-2017 he held a National Science Foundation Graduate Research Fellowship. His dissertation, entitled “Negotiation in War,” was the recipient of the 2018 Kenneth Waltz Dissertation Prize from American Political Science Association’s International Security Section. His work has won the Midwest Political Science Association’s 2017 Robert H. Durr Award (for best paper applying quantitative methods to a substantive problem), Stanford University’s 2016 Goldsmith Writing Prize, and he won the New York University Roland P. Beattie Award as the 2010 university valedictorian. He is an expert on the application of machine learning, text, and statistical methods to the analysis of interstate war, diplomacy, and conflict management.

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Eric Min Predoctoral Fellow CISAC
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John Lewis & Xue Litai
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In 2013, China’s president, Xi Jinping, launched a massive reclamation and construction campaign on seven reefs in the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea. Beijing insisted that its actions were responsible and in accord with international law, but foreign critics questioned Xi’s real intentions. Recently available internal documents involving China’s leader reveal his views about war, the importance of oceans in protecting and rejuvenating the nation, and the motives underlying his moves in the South China Sea. Central to those motives is China’s rivalry with the United States and the grand strategy needed to determine its outcome. To this end, Xi created five externally oriented and proactive military theater commands, one of which would protect newly built assets in the South China Sea and the sea lanes – sometimes referred to as the Maritime Silk Road – that pass through this sea to Eurasia and beyond. Simultaneously, China’s actions in the Spratlys complicated and worsened the US-China rivalry, and security communities in both countries recognized that these actions could erupt into armed crises – despite decades of engagement to prevent them. A permanent problem-solving mechanism may allow the two countries to move toward a positive shared future.

You can read the full article from CISAC co-founder John Lewis and Xue Litai on the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists Web site.

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China's rise has elicited envy, admiration, and fear among its neighbors. Although much has been written about this, previous coverage portrays events as determined almost entirely by Beijing. Such accounts minimize or ignore the other side of the equation: namely, what individuals, corporate actors, and governments in other countries do to attract, shape, exploit, or deflect Chinese involvement. The New Great Game analyzes and explains how Chinese policies and priorities interact with the goals and actions of other countries in the region.
 
To explore the reciprocal nature of relations between China and countries in South and Central Asia, The New Great Game employs numerous policy-relevant lenses: geography, culture, history, resource endowments, and levels of development. This volume seeks to discover what has happened during the three decades of China's rise and why it happened as it did, with the goal of deeper understanding of Chinese and other national priorities and policies and of discerning patterns among countries and issues.
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Thomas Fingar
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Under Secretary Sewall will deliver remarks on Countering Violent Extremism, the U.S. Government’s comprehensive approach for preventing the spread of ISIL and emergence of new terrorist threats. The Under Secretary will describe how the evolution of violent extremism since the 9/11 attacks necessitates a “whole of society” approach to prevent people from aligning with terrorist movements and ideologies in the first place. Drawing on recent travel to Indonesia, India, and Egypt, the Under Secretary will describe the vital role of actors outside government in this approach, including women, youth, religious leaders, businesses, and researchers. She will also elaborate on new steps the U.S. Government is taking to intensify its CVE efforts around the world. The Under Secretary will also take questions from the audience.

Speaker bio

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sarah sewall

Dr. Sarah Sewall is the Under Secretary for Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights at the U.S. State Department, and is a longtime advocate for advancing civilian security and human rights around the world. Dr. Sewall was sworn in on February 20, 2014. She serves concurrently as the Special Coordinator for Tibetan Issues. Over the previous decade, Dr. Sewall taught at the Harvard Kennedy School of Government, where she served as Director of the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy and directed the Program on National Security and Human Rights.

Dr. Sewall has extensive experience partnering with the U.S. armed forces around civilian security. At the Kennedy School, she launched the MARO (Mass Atrocities Response Operations Project) to assist the U.S. military with contingency planning to protect civilians from large-scale violence. She was a member of the Defense Policy Board and served as the Minerva Chair at the Naval War College in 2012. She also led several research studies of U.S. military operations for the Department of Defense and served as the inaugural Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Assistance in the Clinton Administration. Prior joining the executive branch, Dr. Sewall served for six years as the Senior Foreign Policy Advisor to U.S. Senate Majority Leader George J. Mitchell and earned a Ph.D at Oxford University, where she was a Rhodes Scholar.

This event is co-sponsored by Stanford in Government and CISAC

 

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Dr. Sarah Sewall Under Secretary for Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights U. S. State Department
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Abstract: From the Trent Affair of 1861, to Yasser Arafat’s speech at the United Nations in 1974, to Syrian opposition lobbying today, acts of insurgent diplomacy have defined some of the most memorable and important events in international politics. International diplomacy is a ubiquitous feature of insurgent politics because it is intrinsically linked to how groups pursue third-party political and military support. However, although war-time diplomacy is central to insurgent politics, scholars still cannot explain the substantial and puzzling variation in insurgent diplomatic strategies over time. The fact is that rebel groups can choose to engage with different types of actors, solicit different types of assistance, and have a diverse set of political-military objectives motivating their diplomatic strategies abroad. This article examines the varying grand strategies of insurgent diplomacy, and more specifically, when and why rebel groups focus their diplomatic attention on certain international actors over others. This framework is then applied to the international diplomacy of the Iraqi Kurdish liberation movement from 1958 to 1990.

 

About the Speaker: Morgan L. Kaplan is a CISAC Predoctoral Fellow for 2015-2016. He is a Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Political Science at the University of Chicago.

Kaplan’s dissertation examines the strategic use of international diplomacy by insurgent groups to solicit help from third-party actors. The primary empirical focus of his research is on the Iraqi Kurdish and Palestinian national movements from the 1960s to 1990s. In addition to his work on insurgent diplomacy, he also studies the politics of intra-insurgent competition and cooperation in multi-party civil wars.

His research has been supported by the Smith Richardson Foundation, the Project on Middle East Political Science, and the Nicholson Center for British Studies, among others. He has conducted field work in Iraqi Kurdistan, Israel/Palestine, Jordan, and the United Kingdom. He holds a B.A. in International Affairs from the George Washington University, and an M.A. in Political Science from the University of Chicago. 

Predoctoral Fellow CISAC
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