Health and Medicine

FSI’s researchers assess health and medicine through the lenses of economics, nutrition and politics. They’re studying and influencing public health policies of local and national governments and the roles that corporations and nongovernmental organizations play in providing health care around the world. Scholars look at how governance affects citizens’ health, how children’s health care access affects the aging process and how to improve children’s health in Guatemala and rural China. They want to know what it will take for people to cook more safely and breathe more easily in developing countries.

FSI professors investigate how lifestyles affect health. What good does gardening do for older Americans? What are the benefits of eating organic food or growing genetically modified rice in China? They study cost-effectiveness by examining programs like those aimed at preventing the spread of tuberculosis in Russian prisons. Policies that impact obesity and undernutrition are examined; as are the public health implications of limiting salt in processed foods and the role of smoking among men who work in Chinese factories. FSI health research looks at sweeping domestic policies like the Affordable Care Act and the role of foreign aid in affecting the price of HIV drugs in Africa.

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Herbert Lin
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Fred Cohen was the first person to introduce the term “computer virus.” In a 1984 paper, he defined it as “a program that can ‘infect’ other programs by modifying them to include a possibly evolved copy of itself. With the infection property, a virus can spread throughout a computer system or network using the authorizations of every user using it to infect their programs. Every program that gets infected may also act as a virus and thus the infection grows.” (The original 1984 paper was eventually published in 1987.) Since then, the security company Kaspersky claims, rightly so, that “when it comes to cybersecurity, there are few terms with more name recognition than ‘computer viruses.’”

This bit of history has taken on new meaning now that the world is in the midst of a global pandemic caused by a biological virus, the novel coronavirus, that induces an unusual and novel disease, COVID-19.

Read the rest at Lawfare Blog

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Important pandemic lessons from cybersecurity would have saved the U.S. economic and medical heartbreak had those lessons been heeded earlier.

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Steven Pifer
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Early this year, Vladimir Putin had big plans for an excellent spring:  first, constitutional amendments approved by the legislative branch and public allowing him the opportunity to remain in power until 2036, followed by a huge patriotic celebration of the 75th anniversary of the defeat of Nazi Germany.  Well, stuff happens—specifically, COVID-19.  Putin’s spring has turned out quite differently from what he had hoped.

Big Plans for the Spring

The president surprised Russians on January 15 in his annual speech to the Federal Assembly (the lower house of the Russian legislative branch).  He proposed amending the constitution to reduce the authority of the presidency, increase the power of the Federal Assembly, and provide a legal basis for a State Council.

The amendments prompted speculation that Putin, who likes to have options, sought to create ways to hold on to power after 2024, when term limits would require him to step down from the presidency.  He might become an empowered prime minister or head the State Council.

Then, on March 10, another surprise.  A Federal Assembly deputy proposed an additional amendment that would, in effect, allow Putin to run for president twice more, opening the possibility that he could remain in office until 2036.  He had consistently argued in the past against ending term limits.  However, according to the Kremlin spokesperson, Putin was so taken with the deputy’s justification that he changed his mind on the spot.

Things can move fast in Russia—especially when Putin wants them.  On March 11, the Federal Assembly approved the constitutional amendments by a vote of 383-0, and the Federal Council (Russia’s senate) gave its approval 160-1.  (Nothing like having a rubber-stamp legislative branch.)  Within two days, all 85 regional parliaments had approved the amendments.  The Constitutional Court worked over a weekend and, on March 16, unsurprisingly found the amendments consistent with the constitution.

All told, it took just six days to check the legal requirements for amending the constitution.  Putin, however, desired more.  He called in January for a nationwide referendum on April 22 to approve the package of amendments.  The constitution provides no requirement for such a vote.  Putin wanted it to further legitimize the changes to the constitution.  Popular endorsement would undercut any future challenge should he decide to run for reelection in 2024.

Topping off the spring would be the May 9 celebration of the 75th anniversary of VE Day.  Putin has built this holiday up to rival New Year’s Day, traditionally the biggest holiday for Russians.  The celebration of World War II veterans and a large military parade on Red Square not only remind Russians of their country’s part in defeating Hitler, but they also play well to the themes of nationalism and Russia’s place as a great power on the world stage that Putin has embraced and perpetuated, particularly over the past eight years.

COVID-19 Intrudes

Alas for Putin, reality intruded.  The number of COVID-19 cases began to grow in mid-March.  As of April 21, the country reported over 52,000 cases, with more than half of those just in Moscow.  The number undoubtedly is understated—as in many countries—if for no other reason than some are asymptomatic or suffer mild symptoms.  There are also indications that local health authorities are underreporting cases.

Moscow’s mayor adopted a shelter-at-home policy, but with lots of exceptions.  While the mayor asserted that the city’s hospitals had sufficient capacity, medical staff described more difficult situations, and videos showed ambulances in line to wait hours to admit patients.  The health infrastructure outside of Moscow and other large cities is weaker, raising concern about the virus’s impact in rural areas.

Much like his American counterpart, Putin responded slowly to the mushrooming health crisis, leaving it to mayors and regional authorities to manage.  Sounding a lot like Donald Trump in February, Putin told Russians on April 19 (Orthodox Easter) “the situation is under full control.”  He has raised his public profile the past ten days, conducting videoconferences from his residence outside Moscow.  Russia, however, may be just beginning its COVID-19 trial.

As the number of cases grew in March, questions arose about the feasibility of the April 22 referendum.  Putin apparently very much desired it, and the Kremlin wanted a large turnout to bolster the referendum’s legitimacy.  Some suggested the referendum could be conducted over several days, allowing voters to space out visits to polling stations.  But the Kremlin bowed to reality and announced on March 25 that the referendum would be postponed.

Likewise, the Kremlin hoped that the May 9 commemoration could go forward, and troops began practicing for the military parade (one video showed thousands of soldiers in close formation with no masks).  However, the day’s heroes—World War II veterans now in their 90s—constitute an age-group very vulnerable to COVID-19.  Going forward with a celebration that could devastate their ranks hardly made sense.  On April 16, Putin announced a postponement.

The Economic Prognosis Looks Grim

Instead of a big public endorsement of his constitutional amendments and a patriotic gala on May 9, Putin faces a daunting challenge:  the combination of COVID-19 and an economy in trouble.  Under the virus’s impact, Russia’s already anemic economy is headed for recession.  The International Monetary Fund expects it to contract by 5.5 percent in 2020.

Complicating the economic picture for the Kremlin is continued application of Western sanctions due to Russia’s seizure of Crimea and its conflict with Ukraine in Donbas.  Economists estimate they cost Russia 1-1.5 percent of its gross domestic product.  While Russian officials downplay the effect, they miss few opportunities to ask for their removal.  For example, Putin used his intervention in the March 26 videoconference of G20 leaders to call for an end to all international sanctions.

COVID-19 has another negative impact on the Russian economy.  It has crashed global demand for oil, by far Russia’s most important export.  Perhaps not expecting the economic consequences of the virus, Russia on March 6 did not agree to an OPEC proposal to reduce production.  Igor Sechin, head of the Rosneft Oil Company and a close associate of Putin, reportedly wanted to drive the price down to push U.S. shale oil producers out of the market (their production has boosted the United States to supplant Russia and Saudi Arabia as the world’s largest oil producer).

The price dropped, more than Sechin might have anticipated.  Saudi Arabia responded to Russia’s refusal to cut production by boosting its own output and cutting the price.  On March 8, the price of oil fell 30 percent.  The resulting havoc hurt both sides.  On April 9, Russia and OPEC agreed to cut production by about 10 million barrels per day.

Whether that will suffice is uncertain.  The global economic slowdown has caused demand for oil to drop by 20-25 millions barrels per day.  On April 21, the price of a barrel of Brent oil fell below $20, a price not seen since 2002.  That was down from $74 one year earlier (the Russian government budget was designed to balance at a price of $42 per barrel).  The per barrel export duty collected by the Russian government fell to below $1, also the lowest since 2002.  Russia has to cut 2.5 million of barrels per day of production to meet its part of the April 9 agreement.  With oil storage facilities nearing capacity, there may well be further price drops before things turn around.

None of this is good news for the Russian economy, but how hard a hit it will take remains to be seen.  Thus far, the Kremlin has adopted a stimulus package to counter the COVID-19 economic consequences that is relatively modest, especially compared to programs being implemented by the United States, Germany, Britain and other industrial countries.

Managing the health crisis and its economic consequences, which could affect Putin’s approval rating—something to which the Kremlin pays extraordinarily close attention—is now the Russian president’s top preoccupation.  This is not anything like he anticipated three months ago.

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Seminar Recording: https://youtu.be/j9S_CKmku00

 

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Bryan Metzger

1:30 PM - 2:15 PM 

Introductions will start at 1:30pm. Each presentation will be 20 minutes with a 10 minute discussion.

Title: Lobbyists, Public Relations and “Malign Activities”: The JCPOA as a Case Study of Foreign Influence

Abstract: In July 2015, the P5+1 announced the conclusion of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), known colloquially as the “Iran nuclear deal,” an agreement between Iran and the P5+1 to place limits on the Iranian nuclear program. The agreement was controversial not only within American domestic politics, but also in the eyes of American allies in the Middle East that are commonly thought to exercise significant influence over American foreign policy. Using the JCPOA as a case study on foreign influence in American political decision-making, this thesis analyzes the influence strategies of Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Iran from 2013 to 2018 while assessing the efficacy of these strategies. Based on the theoretical literature, I propose four different influence strategies: direct and indirect lobbying, and direct and indirect shaping of the information space. As a result of nearly forty interviews with former government officials, ambassadors, policy advocates, and regional experts, this thesis finds that while foreign influence does not drive US foreign policy, it can act as an important intervening factor, raising or lowering the costs of political decision-making and amplifying existing preferences within the American political system. Thus, this thesis provides a nuanced perspective on foreign influence in American decision-making, showing the real impact that such campaigns can have while eschewing the idea that American policymakers lack agency in important foreign policy matters.

 

 

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Andrew Lokay

2:15 PM - 2:50 PM

Introductions will start at 1:30pm. Each presentation will be 20 minutes with a 10 minute discussion.

Title: The Repatriation Dilemma: European Countries and Islamic State Foreign Terrorist Fighters

Abstract: This thesis explains differences in European countries’ approaches to the repatriation of Islamic State foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs). Following the territorial defeat of the Islamic State, the United States urged European countries to take back their citizens who travelled to Syria and Iraq to join the caliphate. Some have done so, while others have not. This thesis is the first study to analyze the variation in responses to this request and uses an original dataset of FTF repatriation across 16 European countries. I apply a nested analysis research design to evaluate four explanatory variables: a country’s history of jihadist attacks, justice system capability, desire for a better relationship with the United States, and domestic political pressure. I arbitrate among these potential explanations though a medium-N analysis and case studies of the United Kingdom and the Republic of North Macedonia. I suggest that NATO aspirants are more likely to repatriate FTFs. The empirical evidence I collect does not support the other three hypotheses. I also propose that high evidentiary requirements in legal systems present a challenge to FTF repatriation. This thesis advances the literature’s understanding of the responsiveness of U.S. allies and partners to Washington’s demands, and it expands the counterterrorism scholarship to address a novel question regarding a salient and divisive policy debate.

 

 

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Adam Elliott

2:50 PM - 3:20 PM

Introductions will start at 1:30pm. Each presentation will be 20 minutes with a 10 minute discussion.

Title: Keeping Pace: Addressing Life Sciences Dual Use Risk Across U.S. Government Agencies

Abstract: Why do different institutions address the same security challenge in different ways? Global biosecurity governance is ill-equipped to stay apace with advances in biotechnology. While almost all necessary life sciences research incurs the risk for misuse, certain experiments with higher risk to human health if misused are labelled dual use research of concern (DURC). U.S. government policies to guide public funding for DURC experiments attempt to outline lists of experiment types or select agents that constitute DURC. However, experts argue some experiments are definitionally DURC, but they do not fall within the scope of the U.S. policy. This thesis analyzes how the National Institutes of Health (NIH) and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) approach funding two of these experiment types: gene drives and virus engineering for pandemic preparedness. Tracing each agency’s approach to funding these experiments, as well as their institutional history and culture, leads to several findings. First, when experiment types test the limits of what biosecurity policies are scoped to address, agencies tend to respond in accordance with their mission. However, decisions by agency directors may influence the response as well. Coherent leadership and strategies are critical for preserving the integrity of the scientific enterprise and for protecting humanity from biological threats – including natural, accidental, and deliberate release of biological products that could cause human suffering. By studying the ways different agencies respond when they have to address new biosecurity challenges, governments can better assess the effectiveness of existing biosecurity policies and design future policies in a way that allows society to enjoy the benefits of life sciences advances without undue exposure to risk.

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Bryan Metzger, Andrew Lokay, and Adam Elliott
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Seminar Recording:  https://youtu.be/sQynE60SFTc

 

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Sophia Boyer

1:30 PM - 2:15 PM 

Introductions will start at 1:30pm. Each presentation will be 20 minutes with a 10 minute discussion.

Title: AK-47s, Tanks, and F-16s: Understanding Shifts in Pakistan's Conventional Military Strategy in the post-Cold war era

Abstract: The United States has navigated a complex relationship with Pakistan since the country’s inception in 1947. The behavior of the Pakistan Army has been a central factor in that relationship. This thesis analyzes when, how and why the Pakistan Army has shifted its conventional military strategy in the post-Cold war era. An investigation of the Pakistan Army’s capabilities, doctrines, rhetoric and force distribution suggests that Pakistan shifted its conventional military strategy four times since 1989: a ‘Post-Cold war Strategy’ from 1989-1994, a ‘Defense Minimal strategy’ from 1994-2001, a ‘Two-Front Commitment Strategy’ from 2001-2010, and a ‘Three-Front Commitment Strategy’ from 2010-2019. Based on existing literature and interviews, this thesis argues that external threats, specifically those emanating from India and the U.S., and bureaucratic politics driven by leadership changes have impacted shifts in Pakistan’s conventional military strategy substantially. These findings can inform a calibrated US South Asia policy comprising the management of conventional military balance in nuclear South Asia.

 

 

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Samantha Feuer

2:15 PM - 2:50 PM

Introductions will start at 1:30pm. Each presentation will be 20 minutes with a 10 minute discussion.

Title: From the Shadows to the Front Page: State Use of Proxies for Cyber Operations.

Abstract: Why do some states delegate cyber operations to proxies while others rely on central commands? This thesis explores state use of cyber proxies in light of principal-agent problems. In particular, this work examines cyber proxies allegedly acting at the behest of China, Russia, Iran and North Korea by considering three variables: cost, skills and specialization, and plausible deniability. The use of case studies and process tracing analyses evaluate their explanatory power in the cyber realm. The data suggest that states may use cyber proxies to differing degrees and with differing motivations depending upon the type of mission or strategic aim, as well as their ability to pose credible threats to misbehaving proxies. Although cyber operations are comparatively “cheap” relative to physical missions - hence their appeal - some evidence suggests that using cyber proxies may provide additional cost savings compared to the use of their central commands for certain missions. States’ need for skills and specializations, not immediately attainable through central commands, may also lead them to use cyber proxies. Based on available evidence, it remains inconclusive whether states’ potential desire for plausible deniability influences their use of cyber proxies. During a period of global uncertainty in which our everyday lives have been forced online, critical infrastructure, the public sector and private industry are increasingly vulnerable to cyber-attacks from adverse actors. As data in this field improves, this thesis hopes to serve as a framework for future researchers to test, with more certainty, the causal links between these explanations and the use of cyber proxies within these four states.

 

 

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Elena Crespo

2:50 PM - 3:20 PM

Introductions will start at 1:30pm. Each presentation will be 20 minutes with a 10 minute discussion.

Title: Blood and Treasure, but Mostly Blood: U.S. Electoral Accountability and the All-Volunteer Force

Abstract: In the wake of the American military’s transition to an all-volunteer force (AVF), scholars and military leaders alike cautioned that the Armed Forces defending the nation would come to disproportionately draw from the least advantaged and least politically powerful populations. Should that be the case, certain communities would pay higher costs of war while others would be relatively untouched, leaving the Executive free to command with little public accountability. This thesis adopts an experimental statistical counterfactual approach to examine the geographic casualty distribution across states during the Iraq War had there been a conscripted force. The data presented suggest that the conventional logic is partially correct: an all-volunteer force is not egalitarian. It disproportionately burdened certain states—predominantly in the South and Midwest—with higher casualty rates than would have a conscripted force. However, many of the states that shouldered the costs of war under an AVF also carry disproportionate political gravity as electoral swing states. These findings suggest that a President who chooses to use force is more likely to face electoral backlash for his or her decisions under an all-volunteer force than under a conscripted force. Ultimately, the thesis proposes that President George W. Bush may have increased the margin of his victory in the 2004 Presidential election and contributed to greater Republican victories in the 2006 Senate election had the Iraq War been fought with a conscripted force that more equally distributed casualties. This finding runs contrary to the popular contention that a conscripted force is inherently more democratic and will lead to better electoral accountability for use of force.

Virtual Seminar

Sophia Boyer, Samantha Feuer, and Elena Crespo
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Seminar Recording: https://youtu.be/yh5HVfzLgy0

 

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Antigone Xenopoulos

1:30 PM - 2:15 PM 

Introductions will start at 1:30pm. Each presentation will be 20 minutes with a 10 minute discussion.

Title: Alliance or Vulnerable Reliance: U.S. Dependence on China for Critical Dual-Use Products

Abstract: Why has the United States become economically dependent on China for the supply of critical dual-use products—those which have both military and commercial applications? Examples of such dependence include pharmaceutical drugs, rare earth metals, printed circuit boards, and more. I propose three theoretical models as likely explaining this phenomenon: the formerly low prioritization of China as a security threat, uncoordinated economic and security policies, and interest group influence. Next, by systemizing evidence from plethora of sources such as trade data, industry assessments, and government speeches and reports, I show that the U.S.’ dual-use dependence on China is measurable, has increased with time, and manifests across industries and defense applications. I find that entities within the U.S. government long recognized the threat of dual-use dependence on China. Nevertheless, because China was not prioritized as a security threat or portrayed as a competitor, this dependence was not responded to; instead, it persisted. Finally, and surprisingly, I find that U.S. industry associations did not uniformly support offshoring to China; even industries which would be expected to take such a position acknowledged the national security imperative of maintaining robust domestic supply chains. Combined, these findings demonstrate that US government’s internal dynamics rather than private-sector factors better explain the U.S.’ dual-use dependence on China.

 

 

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Kelly Devens

2:15 PM - 2:50 PM 

Introductions will start at 1:30pm. Each presentation will be 20 minutes with a 10 minute discussion.

Title: Assessing Russian Noncompliance in the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty

Abstract: The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty was a landmark bilateral arms control agreement created by the United States and the Soviet Union in 1987. However, the United States formally withdrew from the treaty on August 2, 2019, citing years of Russian violation of the Treaty with the development of its 9M729 missile system. This thesis explains the major underlying motivations behind Russian development of this ground-launched, intermediate-range missile, which was a violation of the INF. It utilizes a single case process tracing approach and presents two datasets: (1) a robust timeline of events detailing the development of the missile system, the mechanics of the violation, Russian public commentary on the Treaty, and the American response, and (2) a collection of interviews of high-level American officials heavily involved in the investigation of the violation and American and European academic subject experts. The thesis finds that 9M729 missile system was likely not developed for any one mission in particular. The Ministry of Defense and Russian military industry wanted the missile system to provide flexibility in response to an increasing number of military threats in several theaters, believed they could develop the missile with plausible deniability, and used factors such as U.S. missile defense systems, the expanding size of NATO, rising influence of China, weapons proliferation to unstable neighboring regions, and the opportunity to divide NATO as justification to receive program approval. Determining the rationale for developing a treaty-noncompliant weapons system presents opportunity to consider how existing and future arms control agreements are developed and considered.

 

 

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Jonah Martin Glick-Unterman

2:50 PM - 3:20 PM

Introductions will start at 1:30pm. Each presentation will be 20 minutes with a 10 minute discussion.

Title: “All Options Are On The Table”: The Correlates of Compellence and Coalition Effects

Abstract: Why do some militarized threats compel an opponent state to change its policy or behavior while others do not? This thesis is the first study to comprehensively evaluate the major theories of compellence by considering individual signals. An original data set compiled by surveying 124,000 archival documents catalogues every major military mobilization and verbal threat by the U.S. President with compellent intent since strategic parity. The results contest theories regarding “cost-sinking” and “hand-tying” signals, reputation, and assurances. Moreover, they challenge the conventional “costly” signaling framework. Instead of a simple positive relationship between a signal’s cost and coercive utility, this thesis proposes a different dynamic: at some point, cost can diminish coercive value by conveying that concessions may not prevent later demands or the use of force. The effect of international support for intervention is instructive: although associated with a higher rate of some concessions, international backing has no bearing on whether a target fully capitulates. Case studies of compellence prior to the First Gulf War and the 2003 Iraq War suggest that this phenomenon may be explained by the sequencing and expense of coalition building. Ultimately, policymakers should consider that effective signaling is rare and that demonstrating an unflinching commitment to the use of force can backfire.

Virtual Seminar

Antigone Xenopoulos, Kelly Devens, and Jonah Martin Glick-Unterman
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Seminar Recording: https://youtu.be/vrUV4VtYZsE

 

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Ben Boston

1:30 PM - 2:15 PM 

Introductions will start at 1:30pm. Each presentation will be 20 minutes with a 10 minute discussion.

Title: America in East Africa: Security Partnerships, Aid Dependence, and Diplomatic Leverage

Abstract: Why is the United States able to shape the actions of friendly nations? In this thesis, I offer an answer by examining cases of military invasions by and domestic political liberalization effort of the Kenyan and Ugandan governments since the end of the Cold War. Drawing on academic, journalistic, and participant reporting of each case, including interviews with key American policymakers, I test three theoretical frameworks: balance of interests, dependence, and coercive diplomacy. Through these I attempt to explain American influence over the 1998 Ugandan and Rwandan invasion of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the 2011 Kenyan invasion of southern Somalia, the 1991 Kenyan reinstitution of multiparty politics, and the 2005 Ugandan abolition of presidential term limits and reinstitution of multiparty politics. The existing literature on these cases focuses on outcomes broadly, and on African states’ comparative ability to secure agency relative to the wishes of their donors. Taking the United States as my focus, in this comparative case study, I find consistent limits to America’s ability to shape the actions of Kenya and Uganda regarding their core interests; however, clear, sustained application of coercive diplomacy still altered outcomes — especially when it used the leverage offered by dependence. This thesis creates a model of American agency in maximizing leverage over aid-dependent states.

 

 

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Eva Frankel

2:15 PM - 2:50 PM

Introductions will start at 1:30pm. Each presentation will be 20 minutes with a 10 minute discussion.

Title: Assessing the Threat of Bioterror from Lone Insiders in Biological Laboratories

Abstract: As the cost of DNA synthesis and sequencing drops and the life sciences advance, the literature suggests that synthesizing and weaponizing pathogens may have become within reach for non-state actors, creating a fundamental shift from a Cold War framework focused on the capabilities of state bioweapons programs to one focused on the threat posed by mass-casualty attacks perpetrated by terrorists. Lone insiders in biological laboratories, who have technical training and access to laboratory equipment, are considered a particular threat. Given the scholarship that suggests lone insiders in biological laboratories pose a significant security threat, why have there been no mass-casualty attacks perpetrated by lone insiders using pathogens? This thesis considers the capabilities of potential malicious actors in biological laboratories to weaponize pathogens, and their motivations to perpetrate mass-casualty attacks. Drawing on bibliometric data from synthetic virology papers, I argue that the historical threshold for capability required to weaponize pathogens is prohibitory to those who are not early adopters or innovators in the field of synthetic virology. Furthermore, I show that the malicious acts historically perpetrated by lone insiders are best characterized as biocrimes rather than bioterrorist acts, and transnational groups have not sought to recruit insiders in biological laboratories. By more fully understanding the threat of bioterrorism posed by lone insiders, policymakers and research institutions can work to ensure laboratory safety and security while promoting open science.

Virtual Seminar

Ben Boston and Eva Frankel
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Steven Pifer
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In the midst of the damage to public health and the global economy, the COVID-19 crisis could present an unexpected opportunity both to resolve the only hot war in Europe and to address Russian President Vladimir Putin's assault on international norms of behavior.

As the spreading coronavirus and collapsing oil prices weigh increasingly on the Kremlin, the United States and its allies should offer to lift international sanctions against Russia if Putin will end his military incursions into Ukraine. President Trump and Congress can advance America's interests, and the world's, with a bold step to encourage an end to this war. The Trump administration and Congress should seize this opening.

 

Read the rest at NPR.org.

 

 

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David Relman
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On 9 December, 1979, health officials declared smallpox as the first and only human disease to be eradicated in what is considered the greatest achievement of modern medicine. Four decades on, the U.S. and Russia still maintain samples of the potentially deadly virus, and the debate on whether they should be kept or destroyed rages on....To this day, only two remaining stocks of the variola virus are known to exist. They are kept under high-security conditions at a U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention laboratory in Atlanta, and at Russia's State Research Centre of Virology and Biotechnology (Vector) in the Siberian city of Novosibirsk. Everything known about their location is in the public domain— except for the exact rooms and freezers where the samples are kept, David Relman, professor of microbiology and immunology at Stanford University, told Newsweek.

 

Read the Rest at Newsweek

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Dr. Jared Dunnmon is currently the Cofounder and Chief Scientist of a maritime logistics startup.  He has previously served as the Technical Director for Artificial Intelligence at the Defense Innovation Unit (DIU), Vice President of Future Technologies at battery firm Our Next Energy (ONE), and a member of the early team at Snorkel AI. Prior to this, Jared was an Intelligence Community Postdoctoral Fellow in Computer Science at Stanford University, where he was advised by Prof. Chris Ré at the Stanford AI Lab. Jared holds a PhD in Mechanical Engineering from Stanford University (2017), a B.S. from Duke University, and both an MSc in Mathematical Modeling and Scientific Computing and an MBA from Oxford, where he studied as a Rhodes Scholar.

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Rodney C. Ewing
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Q&A with Professor Rodney C. Ewing, Frank Stanton Professor in Nuclear Security and co-director at the Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC) in the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI). Interview with Katy Gabel Chui.

Your previous research with this team helped identify the types of radioactive particles that can become airborne and were transported away from Fukushima during the 2011 nuclear disaster.

This most recent paper goes further to show how these Cesium (Cs)-rich silica particles behave in several types of fluids, including simulated human lung fluid, concluding that the particles are fully dissolved in the latter after more than 35 years. What might that mean for human health in the Fukushima area and beyond?

The first breakthrough was the recognition that such particles, a few microns in diameter, existed, a discovery by Japanese scientists at the Meteorological Research Institute, Tsukuba, in 2013. The particles are important because they were dispersed over distances of tens of kilometers and were “carriers” of highly radioactive Cs. Our team’s previous work, led by Professor Satoshi Utsunomiya, mainly focused on the characterization of the particles and their constituents at the atomic-scale and surveyed their distribution in the area away from the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plants. Our earliest work from 2016 can be found online. A good summary of the history of the work on these cesium-rich microparticles was recently published in Scientific American.

This latest paper published in Chemosphere is the 6th in a series of papers on the Cs-rich microparticles. We describe the behavior of these particles when exposed to different types of fluids: ultra-pure water, artificial sea water and simulated lung fluid. The microparticles dissolve in all three fluids, reaching a long-term but a continuing, slow rate of release after just three days. Essentially, the calculated release rate of cesium depends on the rate of dissolution of the silica glass matrix and the initial size of the particles. In the simulated lung fluid, the particles are modelled to fully dissolve after more than 35 years.

What is the simulated lung fluid made of, and how does it work in simulation? How do you estimate 35 years?

The constituents of typical lung fluid were simply mixed to simulate its composition based on a recipe reported by previous studies. The lung fluid is different from the other solutions because it contains organic compounds and has a different chemistry, i.e., higher sodium and chlorine content. The estimates of residence time in the body assumes that the particles are inhaled and find their way to the pulmonary system. The calculation of residence time is based on assumptions about the size and composition of the microparticles, and we used the long-term release rate from the experiments. We assumed a spherical shape and a constant decrease in size as the leaching process continued. The rate can vary depending on the actual shape, internal texture, composition (such as occurrence of intrinsic Cs-phase inclusions), and precipitation of secondary phases that may form a “protective” coating on the cesium-rich microparticles (CsMPs). The rate of release was fastest in the simulated lung fluid.

The important result is to realize that the Cs-rich silica particles dissolve slowly in the environment and in the body. Essentially, the release extends for several decades.

How can nuclear energy experts and policy makers use this research to avoid future risk?

Understanding the form and composition of materials that host and disperse radionuclides is the first step in completing a careful dose calculation. Based on these results, the fraction of Cs contained in the silica particles will not be rapidly “flushed” through the environment or the body, but rather will be released over several decades.

 

 

 

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