President Barack Obama announced his intent to appoint CISAC's Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, an expert on federal regulatory policy, public safety, and international security, to the Council of the Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS), an independent agency of the United States government charged with improving the efficiency and fairness of federal agencies.

Professor Cuéllar, who is both a CISAC faculty member and the Deane F. Johnson Faculty Scholar at Stanford Law School, recently returned from a leave of absence he took to serve as Special Assistant to the President for Justice and Regulatory Policy at the White House Domestic Policy Council. Among other issues, Cuéllar worked on improving food safety and public health policy, expanding support to state and local law enforcement, enhancing transparency in the regulatory process, and strengthening border coordination and immigrant integration. He negotiated key provisions of the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act and represented the Domestic Policy Council in the development of the first-ever Quadrennial Homeland Security Review. Earlier, Cuéllar co-chaired the Obama Transition's Immigration Policy Committee and served as a Treasury official in the Clinton Administration.

As part of the ACUS Council, Cuéllar will join leading lawyers such as former U.S. court of appeals judge Patricia Wald and former solicitor general Ted Olson in overseeing the work of ACUS and setting its priorities. With the appointment to the ACUS Council, Cuéllar will draw upon his scholarly expertise in how institutions manage complex regulatory challenges as well as his experience in government.

"At a time when our country faces such enormous challenges, it is especially important for agencies to safeguard the rights of the public, cut waste, and deliver value to the American people," said Cuéllar. "I am honored by this appointment and by the chance to work on these critical issues."

Established by statute in 1964, the Administrative Conference of the United States has played an important role in promoting improvements in the efficiency and fairness in the way federal agencies conduct regulatory programs. ACUS has been on hiatus for the past 14 years, but has been revived by Congress with support from a broad range of lawyers, scholars, and judges, including Supreme Court Justices Antonin Scalia and Stephen Breyer.

By the end of the year, scholars of security studies will be able to use a new website to learn how terrorist and militant organizations evolve over time and how they collaborate with--and compete against--one another.

"Mapping Terrorist Organizations," an interdisciplinary online project headed by CISAC Senior Fellow Martha Crenshaw, will focus initially on providing detailed, annotated information on militant and terrorist groups operating in Iraq since 2003, Pakistan and Afghanistan--areas of current policy concern for the United States. Future plans involve expanding research to include groups in Latin America, Europe, the Middle East and the United States and, if time and resources permit, to include major historical groups such as the Russian revolutionary movement.

The three-year project is funded by a $500,000 grant awarded to Crenshaw last fall by the National Science Foundation. It is part of the Department of Defense's Minerva Initiative launched in 2008 to support "research related to basic social and behavioral science of strategic importance to U.S. national security policy."

"No such study exists in the literature of terrorism," Crenshaw wrote in a report on the project. "Evolutionary mapping can enhance our understanding of how terrorist groups develop and interact with each other and with the government, how strategies of violence and non-violence are related, why groups appear and disappear, and how opportunities and constraints in the environment change organizational behavior over time." Furthermore, Crenshaw noted that visual mapping of highly complex, shifting information is likely to stimulate new observations that might otherwise have been overlooked."

Student involvement

Daniel Cassman, a 2010 CISAC honors graduate in political science and computer science, is building the site, which will contain interactive timelines, family trees and detailed group profiles. Cassman's programming--developed specifically for the website--will allow scholars to better understand and analyze patterns and structures of violent and non-violent opposition groups in multiple contexts.

At a June 1 meeting of a half dozen students working on the project, Crenshaw said one of the most challenging problems facing researchers is documenting how terrorist organizations evolve over time. With no official sources to rely on, Crenshaw's team spent the last year combing through government documents and academic research, autobiographies, newspaper reports and even jihadist websites-many of which disappear as quickly as they pop up. Crenshaw acknowledges that "precision in this field is elusive" even though the project emphasizes using documented primary sources. Students working on the project include Christy Abizaid and Sadika Hameed, 2010 graduates of the International Policy Studies master's program, and undergraduates Rob Conroy, Asfandyar Mir and Ari Weiss. CISAC staff member Julia McKinnon is assisting Crenshaw as well.

"We're keenly interested in changes in the sizes of groups," Crenshaw said. "That's one of the hardest things to figure out." It also is difficult to know when a group dissolves, becomes dormant or morphs into something else, she said. To obtain as complete a profile as possible, the website will include information about failed and foiled plots, as well as successful attacks, she said.

Charles Nicas, a student in International Policy Studies and Public Policy, said he joined Crenshaw's project to learn more about militancy and terrorism in South Asia. "The U.S. presence in Afghanistan and the fact that Pakistan is a nuclear-armed country mean that the U.S. will be involved in this region...for a long time," he wrote in an email. "The complexity of the situation takes a lot of research to understand."

Nicas's area of work focuses on sectarian groups in Pakistan, mainly Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) and its offshoot Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), both virulently anti-Shia groups. Nicas said SSP was founded in 1985 with state support and spawned LeJ in the mid-1990s. The groups are based in Punjab province in eastern Pakistan but had a significant presence in neighboring Afghanistan during Taliban rule. Both have become increasingly allied with militant groups in the border region, including al-Qa'ida, and are part of an umbrella group known as the Punjabi Taliban. "I've been surprised to learn how far back the roots of this problem go, which makes the challenge of effectively countering it especially daunting," Nicas said.

Terrorist organizations profiled

In addition to Afghanistan and Pakistan, Crenshaw's website will feature profiles of the following groups:

• 1920s Revolution Brigades
• Mujahideen Army
• Islamic Army in Iraq
• Ansar al-Islam
• Al-Qa'ida in Iraq

Group profiles include the following attributes:

• The group's name, including pseudonyms and name changes
• A history with a timeline, including whether the group is active, dormant or disbanded
• The group's goals/ideology
• Key leaders
• Group size (by date)
• Resources in the form of money and weapons
• Outside intervention and influence
• Dates of first and last known attacks
• Targets
• Area of Operations
• Tactics
• Political activities (by date)
• Key operational experiences (by date)
• Known splinter groups (by date)
• Relationship to other groups (by date)
• Relationship with surrounding population/popular support
• Defining characteristics/Major events

Stanford seniors Sam Stone and Ashley Lohmann have been awarded the Firestone Medal and Perry Prize, respectively, for their theses on energy import dependence and the Jihadist terrorist threat to the United States since 9/11.

Stone and Lohmann discussed their findings during a CISAC seminar on June 2. Their papers are available below.

The Firestone Medal for Excellence in Undergraduate Research recognizes the top 10 percent of all honors theses in social science, science and engineering. The William J. Perry Prize is awarded to a student for excellence in policy-relevant research in international security studies. Both recipients are students in CISAC's Undergraduate Honors Program in International Security Studies, directed this year by Senior Fellow Stephen J. Stedman and Thomas Fingar, the Oksenberg/Rohlen Fellow.

Sam Stone, a student in the Department of Mathematics and Program in International Relations, wrote "Gas & Geopolitics: The Foreign Policy Implications of Energy Import Dependency."

Stone's thesis abstract states: "In recent years, much attention has focused on the dangers of dependency on energy imports. Fears of energy import dependency are particularly acute in Eastern Europe, where most countries remain heavily dependent on Russian gas, but similarly dependent relationships exist across the globe. Most energy security research focuses on exporters; this thesis contributes to the study of energy security by exploring the effects of energy dependence on importers."

During 2010-11 academic year, Stone, as a Fulbright Fellow, will study Russian foreign policy, in particular energy security issues and nuclear nonproliferation efforts at Moscow State University. He also plans to continue working with the Stanford US-Russia Forum, an initiative that brings together American and Russian students to explore global issues.

Ashley Lohmann, a student in the Program in International Relations, wrote, "Jihad on Main Street: Explaining the Threat of Jihadist Terrorism to the American Homeland since 9/11."

Lohmann's abstract states: "Since September 11, 2001, 26 jihadist plots and attacks have targeted the American homeland, but because the details of the plots and attacks as well as the profiles of their perpetrators vary greatly, scholars, government officials, and other authorities still disagree about the seriousness of threat posed by jihadist terrorism to the United States. This study provides a clearer understanding of the nature of jihadist terrorism in the U.S. by examining all 26 plots and attacks in detail. It concludes that jihadist terrorism is generally a minimally threatening, homegrown phenomenon, but some plots and attacks still emerge that do pose a serious threat to U.S. national security."

Stedman and Fingar described the award-winning theses as the very best in an exceptionally strong field of submissions by members of this year's honor's class.  "Sam Stone's creative and rigorous use of case studies and 'large N' data to to examine hypotheses about the effects of energy dependence gives decision makers theoretical and empirical tools to anticipate and ameliorate unwanted consequences of dependence on foreign sources of oil and gas," Fingar said. "Ashley Lohmann's rigorous examination of factors contributing to the success or failure of Jihadist threats to the American homeland provides valuable insights on the magnitude and character of such threats and how best to address them. These were the best, but other theses were also worthy of special recognition and we learned much from the work of every member of the class."

Thirteen fellows, including three first-time Stanton Nuclear Security Fellows, will be in residence at the Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC) during the 2010-2011 academic year.

Fellows and their research topics include:

• Alexander Betts, a post-doc from Oxford University. "Global Migration Governance: Multiple and Contested Institutions."
• Edward Blandford, a post-doc from the University of California at Berkeley. "Scaling of Hierarchical Engineered Systems."
• David Blum, a Stanford pre-doctoral candidate. "Probabilistic Early Warning Systems for National Security Crises."
• John Downer, a post-doc from the London School of Economics. "Administering Aircraft: The Security Implications of Technological Ecosystems." Zukerman Fellow.
• Matthias Englert, post-doc, CISAC. "Managing the Proliferations Risks of Gas Centrifuges-Analysis in View of Possible Solutions."
• Katherine D. Marvel, post-doc, CISAC. "Understanding the Regional Consequences of Global Climate Change" and "Game Changers for Nuclear Energy."
• Aila Matanock, a Stanford pre-doctoral candidate. "Reformed or Reconfigured? Explaining why Militant Groups Participate in Elections."
• Brenna M. Powell, pre-doc from Harvard. "Normalizing Security after Conflict: Jobs for the Boys and Justice for the Hoods."
• Jan M. Stupl, post-doc, CISAC. "Controlling the Spread of Ballistic Missiles."
• Michael Sulmeyer, D.Phil candidate, Oxford University; law student, Stanford Law School; teaching assistant for CISAC Honors Program. "Weapons under Fire: Terminating Major Weapons Contracts for the U.S. Military."

Stanton Nuclear Security Fellows and their research areas include:

• Anne Harrington de Santana, a post-doc from the University of Chicago. "The Fetishism of Force: Nuclear Weapons as a Currency of Power."
• Gaurav Kampani, a Cornell pre-doctoral candidate. "The Weaponization Paradox: Why some Emerging Nuclear Weapons Powers Delay Building Operational Forces."
• Riqiang Wu, a pre-doc from Tsinghua University in China. "How to Establish and Maintain an Asymmetric Deterrence: China-U.S. Strategic Relations."

Article Highlights: 

• A recent model reveals that sheltering could save tens of thousands of lives after a nuclear terrorist attack in a large city such as Washington, D.C.

• However, as a society, we have largely forgotten about the importance of sheltering--a mainstay of Cold War-era civil defense training.

• That's why it's incumbent upon the federal government to immediately start a comprehensive public education campaign about the benefits of sheltering during a nuclear terrorist attack.

Of the 15 terrorism and natural disaster scenarios used by the Department of Homeland Security for planning purposes, the first scenario is the most feared: Terrorists detonate a 10-kiloton improvised nuclear device at ground level in the National Mall in Washington at 10 a.m. on a weekday morning.

In an attempt to understand what can be done to mitigate the consequences of such an attack, I, along with Stanford graduate students Sylvie Denuit and Youngsoo Choi, constructed a detailed mathematical model of this scenario that includes the initial effects of the detonation, the radiation fallout in subsequent days, the traffic flow of vehicles exiting the city, and the behavioral responses with respect to shelter versus evacuation. (Our full study will appear in an upcoming issue of the journal Risk Analysis.)

The results are on the order of what happened in Hiroshima nearly 65 years ago: Approximately 80,000 people would die from the immediate effects of the blast and heat and the radiation generated in the first minute. (These numbers are rough estimates and depend upon a number of irreducible factors, including the precise weather conditions.) Additionally, fallout--radioactive material carried by the explosive force and prevailing winds for up to 20 miles--would kill 20,000-40,000 pedestrians (i.e., commuters and residents without access to a vehicle) and 20,000-60,000 people in vehicles. The lower range represents the case in which most people shelter in basements or large buildings (office or residential) for 12-24 hours after the blast; the upper range represents the case in which most people attempt to immediately evacuate (by foot or vehicle).

These 60,000 saved lives far exceed the number of lives that would be saved in our model by medical care. Transfusion support and antibiotics obviously have the potential to save many lives, but such care will be practically impossible in the aftermath of a nuclear terror attack.

More to the point, as a society, we have forgotten about the importance of sheltering--a mainstay of Cold War-era civil defense training. This is partly because there isn't a scientific consensus on the shelter versus evacuation decision. Recommendations range from "evacuate if you can do it quickly" to "everyone shelter-in-place." Subtler strategies include "shelter unless you're in an area that will receive a potentially lethal dose of radiation" and "evacuate if your shelter isn't very good and you can rapidly get away from the plume."

Our analysis suggests that there is only a tiny fraction of people who would be better off by evacuating. And we should note that these people won't know who they are when the decision about evacuation needs to be made. Accurate plume information--the cloud can be irregularly shaped due to different wind directions at different altitudes--and travel-time estimates won't be available, and the ability for the government to communicate to those impacted by the attack will be extremely limited, perhaps restricted to battery-powered radios.

And even if the information and communication were perfect, historical data suggests that citizen compliance to a government-managed evacuation would be far from perfect. Although just 3,500 people within a 5-mile radius of Three Mile Island were told to evacuate when the plant melted down in 1979, 200,000 people within a 25-mile radius actually evacuated. Further, a 2007 survey found that the self-evacuation after a dirty bomb attack would be 65 percent in the absence of government advice and 39 percent if the government advised against evacuation. Moreover, our traffic-flow calculations suggest that even if a small percentage of those who aren't supposed to evacuate do so anyway, all of the evacuees will be stuck in traffic jams and therefore, exposed to much more radiation, especially because vehicles provide almost no protection from fallout.

Thus, the only robust strategy is to advise everyone to shelter.

To start implementing such a planned response, the government must first relinquish control of consequence management to our citizenry and then initiate an aggressive public-education campaign. The irony is that U.S. government websites currently contain excellent advice--including "everyone should shelter"--but they have neglected to tell people about them. Consequently, Homeland Security needs to get its message out creatively (how about Kiefer Sutherland, a.k.a. Jack Bauer, as the department's primary spokesman?); simply ("stay indoors for 12-24 hours"); and broadly (ask companies near large cities to have simple sheltering strategies).

The cost for such an educational campaign would surely be less than what we spend on other catastrophic terror threats ($877 million contract for an anthrax vaccine). The bottom line: The public must be educated about this issue now, because it's a lesson we don't want to learn from experience.