Governance

FSI's research on the origins, character and consequences of government institutions spans continents and academic disciplines. The institute’s senior fellows and their colleagues across Stanford examine the principles of public administration and implementation. Their work focuses on how maternal health care is delivered in rural China, how public action can create wealth and eliminate poverty, and why U.S. immigration reform keeps stalling. 

FSI’s work includes comparative studies of how institutions help resolve policy and societal issues. Scholars aim to clearly define and make sense of the rule of law, examining how it is invoked and applied around the world. 

FSI researchers also investigate government services – trying to understand and measure how they work, whom they serve and how good they are. They assess energy services aimed at helping the poorest people around the world and explore public opinion on torture policies. The Children in Crisis project addresses how child health interventions interact with political reform. Specific research on governance, organizations and security capitalizes on FSI's longstanding interests and looks at how governance and organizational issues affect a nation’s ability to address security and international cooperation.

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Almost every company is asking the question of survivability – how to balance business needs and growth, while meeting regulatory compliance and mitigating security risks? This question is facing organizations of all sizes, and for some the answer is changing the mission and scope of their IT security initiatives. In this session, Malcolm will discuss Intel’s approach to managing risk with its new “Protect to Enable” information security strategy.


Malcolm Harkins is vice president of the Information Technology Group and chief information security officer (CISO) and general manager of Information Risk and Security. The group is responsible for managing the risk, controls, privacy, security and other related compliance activities for all of Intel Corporation's information assets.


Before becoming Intel's first CISO, Harkins held roles in Finance, Procurement and Operations. He has managed efforts encompassing IT benchmarking and Sarbanes Oxley systems compliance. Joining Intel in 1992, Harkins previously held positions as the profit and loss manager for the Flash Products Group; general manager of Enterprise Capabilities, responsible for the delivery and support of Intel's finance and HR systems; and in an Intel business venture focusing on e-commerce hosting. Harkins previously taught at the CIO institute at the UCLA Anderson School of Business and was an adjunct faculty member at Susquehanna University in Pennsylvania. He received the 'Excellence in the Field of Security' award from the RSA conference as well as an Intel Achievement Award. Harkins received his bachelor's degree in economics from the University of California at Irvine and an MBA in finance and accounting from the University of California at Davis.

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Malcolm Harkins Vice President, Information Technology Group; Chief Information Security Officer; General Manager, Information Risk and Security Speaker Intel Corporation
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About the Topic: As fiscal year 2001 came to an end, the Hart-Rudman Commission and its recommendations for a post-Cold War national security structure were still on the agenda of Washington decision-makers. After the attacks of September 11, the comprehensive approach envisioned in Hart-Rudman was abandoned in favor of a piecemeal approach, resulting in such legislation as the Patriot Act, the Homeland Security Act, and the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act. As we enter what could be described as a "post-post-9/11 environment," it is worth asking whether the U.S. needs to consider a more comprehensive review, with Hart-Rudman as a starting point.

 

About the Speaker: William Nolte is research professor and director, Center for Intelligence Research and Education, at the School of Public Policy, University of Maryland.  He retired from federal service in 2006 as the chancellor of the National Intelligence University system within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. A career National Security Agency officer, he served in a range of positions as senior intelligence authority, director of education and training, and chief of legislative affairs at NSA; as deputy national intelligence officer for the Near East and South Asia and later director of strategic planning at the National Intelligence Council; and as assistant deputy DCI for analysis. He holds a Ph.D. in history from the University of Maryland, and has taught at Georgetown and George Washington universities.

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William Nolte Research Professor and Director, Center for Intelligence Research and Education, School of Public Policy, University of Maryland; Former Chancellor, National Intelligence University, Office of the Director of National Intelligence Speaker
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In an article for Foreign Policy, Karl Eikenberry argues that the drifting Taiwan-U.S. relationship puts the stability of the Asia-Pacific region at risk. He observes that other regional allies are hedging their bets against a rising military power in China because of skepticism that the United States can keep its commitments, and outlines key weaknesses that Washington must overcome with Taipei.
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Karl Eikenberry has spent the better part of the last 40 years in uniform, and much of it in combat zones. Then as U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan, he continued a mission of service to his country.

Now he's offering his thoughts on the future of the military, and even turning a critical eye on the institution he has long served.

But, he told an audience during his second Payne Lecture, hosted by Stanford's Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, "We must not confuse dissent for disloyalty."

Eikenberry, who left the Army in 2009 when he became ambassador, said he has been disturbed in recent years by how political leaders have been using the military and by what he characterized as the military's outsized role in determining national security and foreign policy.

"These are problems that have to be acknowledged and debated publicly for the good of the nation and, I believe, our Armed Forces," he said during the May 3 lecture.

He said the dissolution of the draft after the Vietnam War led to the creation of an incredibly competent and capable military, but one that elected officials are more willing to deploy.

Drafted vs. voluntary armed forces

"Question No. 1," Eikenberry asked the audience, "If we had a conscript Armed Forces in 2003 and that conscript Armed Forces then are the sons and daughters, drafted, of constituents of our members of Congress, I want you to raise your hand if you think in 2003 we would have invaded Iraq."

Eikenberry questioned, as well, whether Congress would have held hearings – which it hasn't done – into the killings of Americans and allied servicemen by Afghan soldiers and police if the victims had been draftees rather than enlistees.

After only a few hands went up, Eikenberry said, "When you see those results, is there something wrong with the system?"

The former lieutenant general, who did not endorse a draft, urged a debate on ownership of the military: Does it belong to the American people or politicians?

He warned that the separation between soldiers and civilians – in daily life on bases, for example – also leads to ignorance of how the other lives. The separation can mean less judiciousness by lawmakers when determining whether to send service members into war, he said.

He also criticized the lack of oversight of the military by Congress and the media.

"I witnessed this up close and personal in Afghanistan when I transitioned from general to the top diplomat," he said. "Formerly treated with great deference by members of Congress, both I and my embassy team were now constantly on the witness stand."

He said lawmakers were right to challenge them: "We're spending a good deal of taxpayers' money."

He said as a member of the military, he never experienced that kind of scrutiny, as lawmakers are reluctant to be seen as less than fully supportive of troops.

"But by not subjecting the military to the same rigorous standards of scrutiny, they were applying a double standard and I don't think they were doing their complete jobs," he said.

He also said the media have failed to provide critical analysis of military engagements because of relentless pressure to file stories and fear they'll lose authoritative sources if they question actions.

Eikenberry spoke about responsibility and accountability within the military itself, as well.

Regarding the second Iraq war, he said the failure to anticipate the post-invasion environment was a massive failure of military command and planning, not just civilian.

"The costs of this failure have been enormous," he said. "And yet, there has been no accounting."

The 'strategic corporal'

He also talked about the "strategic corporal," a term coined by then-Marine Corps Commandant General Charles Krulak in 1999. The strategic corporal refers to the serviceman whose missteps, wittingly or unwittingly, can have a strategic impact on the outcome of a military campaign.

He said in World War II there were no strategic corporals, only strategic commanders. A corporal's missteps would likely not affect military advancement in a battle.

"In the 21st century, however, in an era of instantaneous global communications and decentralized combat fought across very complex political, ethnic and religious mosaics, the strategic corporal does decidedly exist," he said, mentioning Abu Ghraib, the recent Koran burnings and the suspected murder of 17 Afghan civilians by an Army soldier.

"When the president of the United States has to apologize frequently for the misdeeds of members of our Armed Forces on the global stage as he's had to do in recent months, I have to say, I don't think that he or the American people are being well served," Eikenberry said.

He said in those cases of misdeeds, the mission may be too risky or the strategy not well planned out, and policy should possibly be reconsidered.

As the war in Afghanistan winds down and the military's mission is refocused, Eikenberry said the biggest security threat to the U.S. is a faltering economy. He echoed the sentiments of former Joint Chiefs of Staff Adm. Mike Mullen, who said in 2010 that he considered the country's growing debt to be its No. 1 security threat.

"With a broken economy, our country cannot make the foundational investments in education, research and development, and infrastructure that are absolutely essential to sustaining a strong defense," Eikenberry said.

Eikenberry said retirement and health care costs in the Defense Department also are ballooning.

Eikenberry said it is important to keep our research and development lead, invest in education, ensure we have systems in place to defend U.S. borders against terrorism and invest more in alliances and partnerships as the world becomes more multi-polar.

He also said the military needs to know what it's after.

"With the end of the Afghan and Iraq conflicts, and our current fiscal crisis, our military leaders and our civilian leaders, they need to better define threats and they must be ready to address today and tomorrow these threats," he said.

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Sponsored by

The Preventive Defense Project and the

CISAC Science Seminar Series

Roughly 85% of the critical infrastructure systems in the United States is owned or operated by the private sector. Managers of these systems must keep everything running and try to ensure nothing bad happens, despite increasing system complexity and demand for continuing improvements in efficiency. This challenge naturally leads to the questions “which parts of an infrastructure are critical,” “how critical are they,” and “how should we invest limited budget to defend our infrastructure?”

We introduce two- and three-stage optimization models that represent the strategic, game-theoretic interactions between preparations to defend critical infrastructure, an “attacker” who observes these preparations before acting, and a “defender” who operates the surviving infrastructure as best as possible after an optimal attack. We identify worst-case disruptions in the operation of a system by solving a system interdiction problem. Then, given an available budget and list of possible defensive investments (e.g., hardening, redundancy, capacity expansion), we solve for a combination of investments that makes the system maximally resilient to worst-case disruption. We show some unexpected results that have proven insightful.

These models apply equally well to government, military, and commercial systems. Between our NPS student-officers and faculty, we have conducted over 150 case studies on systems ranging from electric power, to transportation, to supply chains, to the Internet.


About the speaker: David L. Alderson, Ph.D, joined the Naval Postgraduate School faculty in 2006 after working for three years as a postdoctoral scholar in the Division of Engineering and Applied Sciences at the California Institute of Technology (Caltech). He received a B.S.E. in Civil Engineering and Operations Research from Princeton University and the M.S. and Ph.D. degrees from the Department of Management Science and Engineering at Stanford University. His research focuses on the function and operation of critical infrastructures, with particular emphasis on how to invest limited resources to ensure efficient and resilient performance in the face of accidents, failures, natural disasters, or deliberate attacks. He currently serves as the Director of the NPS Center for Infrastructure Defense (CID). As part of a Multiple University Research Initiative (MURI) team studying "Next-Generation Network Science," he studies tradeoffs between efficiency, complexity, and fragility in a wide variety of public and private network-centric systems. He has extensive experience working on the Internet and other complex communication networks, having been a researcher at the Xerox Palo Alto Research Center (PARC), the Santa Fe Institute (SFI), and the Institute for Pure and Applied Mathematics (IPAM) at UCLA. He is a member of INFORMS and MORS.

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Dave Alderson Assistant Professor, Operations Research Department Director, Center for Infrastructure Defense, Naval Postgraduate School Speaker
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About the Speaker: Eric Schwartz became Dean of the Hubert H. Humphrey School of Public Affairs at the University of Minnesota in October 2011, after a 25-year career in senior public service positions in government, at the United Nations and in the philanthropic and non-governmental communities. 

Prior to his arrival in Minnesota, he was U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Population, Refugees, and Migration. Working with Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, he served as the Department of State’s principal humanitarian official, managing a $1.85 billion budget, as well as State Department policy and programs for U.S. refugee admissions and U.S. international assistance worldwide. 

From 2006 through 2009, Schwartz directed the Connect U.S. Fund, a multi-foundation – NGO collaborative seeking to promote responsible U.S. engagement overseas. From August 2005 through January 2007, he served as the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s Deputy Special Envoy for Tsunami Recovery.  In that capacity, he worked with the Special Envoy, former President Clinton, to promote an effective recovery effort. Before that appointment, Schwartz was a lead expert for the congressionally mandated Mitchell-Gingrich Task Force on UN Reform. In 2003 and 2004, he served as the second-ranking official at the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights in Geneva. 

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Eric Schwartz Dean, Hubert H. Humphrey School of Public Affairs, University of Minnesota; Former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Population, Refugees, and Migration Speaker
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Abstract

Why do insurgencies erupt in some places and not in others? This article exploits an original violent event database of 274,428 municipality-month observations in Colombia to determine the conditions favoring organized violence at the subnational level. The data cast doubt on the conventional correlates of war: poverty, rough terrain, lootable natural resources, and large, sparsely distributed populations. The evidence suggests that rebellions begin not in localities that afford sanctuaries, impoverished recruits, and abundant finances, but instead in regions providing receptacles of collective action: the organizational legacies of war. Specifically, the data indicate that regions affected by past mobilization are six times more likely to experience rebellion than those without a tradition of armed organized action. The significant correlation between prior and future mobilization is robust across different measurements of the concepts, levels of aggregations of the data, units of analysis, and specifications of the model. These include rare events and spatial lag analyses. These results highlight the need for micro conflict data, theory disentangling the causes of war onset from those of war recurrence, and a reorientation away from physical geography and back to the human and social geography that determines if rebellion is organizationally feasible. The findings suggest new avenues of research on the post-war trajectories of armed organizations, the causes of repeated war, and the micro-foundations of rebellion.

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Journal of Peace Research
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Sarah Z. Daly
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