Abstract: Weapons School is the premier USAF tactical school producing advanced air, space and cyberspace leaders/tacticians capable of transforming and inspiring the nation’s joint combat power. The school is constantly pushing the tactical envelope.  In contrast, the B-52Hs flying today are 53 years old and slated to remain in active service beyond 2040. They represent the most visible portion of the nuclear triad with a legacy of devastating conventional attacks in Vietnam, Iraq, Bosnia and Afghanistan. 

The talk begins with a brief history/mission overview of the Weapons School followed by B-52 capabilities, roles, and missions. Then Lt Col Schendzielos interweaves personal experience to highlight how the USAF’s top warriors prepare for and conduct combat while making sure the B-52H remains a potent force in tomorrow’s fight. 

Speaker Bio: Lieutenant Colonel Schendzielos is a CISAC National Defense Fellow, Weapons Instructor, Electronic Warfare Officer, Strategist, and former Orbital Analyst.   He recently commanded the 340th Weapons Squadron, the Weapons School’s B-52 squadron. He led a cadre of Weapons Instructors teaching a graduate-level 5 ½ month training and integration course consisting of 427 academic hours, 348 flying hours, 19 sorties, and 1,107 weapons.  Lt Col Schendzielos served previously as Director of 13th Air Force Commander’s Action Group; Strategy Division Deputy Director; Weapons and Tactics Flight Commander; Bomb Wing/Operations Group Executive Officer; and Space Control Analyst/Orbital Analyst, deploying three times accumulating over 270 combat flight hours. He graduated Air War College, Army School of Advanced Military Studies, Army Command and General Staff College, Air Command and Staff College, USAF Weapons School, Squadron Officer School and the USAF Academy. He holds a Master of Military Arts and Sciences in Military Space Application, Master of Military Arts and Science in Theater Operations and Bachelor of Science in Political Science.

Abstract: How do policymakers infer the long-term political intentions of their states' adversaries? A new approach to answering this question, the “selective attention thesis,” posits that individual perceptual biases and organizational interests and practices influence which types of indicators a state's political leaders and its intelligence community regard as credible signals of an adversary's intentions. Policymakers often base their interpretations on their own theories, expectations, and needs, sometimes ignoring costly signals and paying more attention to information that, though less costly, is more vivid (i.e., personalized and emotionally involving). In contrast, intelligence organizations typically prioritize the collection and analysis of data on the adversary's military inventory. Over time, these organizations develop substantial knowledge on these material indicators that they then use to make predictions about an adversary's intentions. An examination of three cases based on 30,000 archival documents and intelligence reports shows strong support for the selective attention thesis and mixed support for two other approaches in international relations theory aimed at understanding how observers are likely to infer adversaries' political intentions: the behavior thesis and the capabilities thesis. The three cases are assessments by President Jimmy Carter and officials in his administration of Soviet intentions during the collapse of détente; assessments by President Ronald Reagan and administration officials of Soviet intentions during the end of the Cold War; and British assessments of Nazi Germany before World War II.

About the Speaker: Professor Keren Yarhi-Milo is an Assistant Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University’s Politics Department and the Woodrow Wilson School for Public and International Affairs. Her research and teaching focus on international relations and foreign policy, with a particular specialization in international security, including foreign policy decision-making, interstate communication and crisis bargaining, intelligence, and US foreign policy in the Middle East.

Professor Yarhi-Milo’s forthcoming book (Princeton University Press) titled, “Knowing The Adversary: Leaders, Intelligence Organizations, and Assessments of Intentions in International Relations,” explores how and why civilian leaders and intelligence organizations select and interpret an adversary’s signals of intentions differently.